Colombian Intelligence (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad - DAS) Compromised by Drug Traffickers¹

Intelligence Pulse: On 18 September 2011, the newspaper Semana obtained records of the identities of all 6,800 DAS (Colombian intelligence) officials, including undercover agents and their missions, and noted that thousands of intelligence documents were also leaked. The current director of the DAS confirmed the leaks, stating that DAS officials who stole information sold it for personal profit. Semana alleges that the intelligence was passed on to various drug kingpins. President Santos has said he plans the closure of DAS by November 2011.¹

Analysis: While this note may not specifically pertain to the Mexican cartels, it has been included in this series to show the need for robust OPSEC (operational security) and counter-intelligence programs for Western Hemispheric nations threatened by cartel and gang threats. The government of Colombia is considered very sophisticated in responding to these threats given its initial experiences with the Medellin and Cali cartels dating back to the 1980s. This incident represents a severe blow to Colombian intelligence gathering and covert operations capabilities.² Further, well known linkages exist between the narcotics traffickers and criminal groups in Mexico and Colombia and their sharing of intelligence gathering tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Similar threat potentials directed at Mexican and American intelligence organizations focused on the Mexican cartels and the criminal insurgencies taking place in their own respective territories must be considered. These potentials exist for all areas of Mexico and increasingly throughout the US with major threat concentrations in Texas and within the border zones of California, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Notes

1. This intelligence pulse— originally titled “Colombia - DAS officials leak intelligence to drug traffickers for profit” — was provided with the permission of Samuel Logan, Director, Southern Post (www.southernpulse.com), and a SWJ El Centro Fellow.

2. Additional reporting suggests that most of this information was leaked in 2009 and that the ongoing breach of security at DAS has continued. See Travis Mannon, “Colombia’s intelligence chief takes responsibility for massive information leak.” Colombia Reports.  Monday, 19 September 2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/19057-colombias-intelligence-chief-assumes-responsibility-over-massive-information-leak.html.

Mexican Cartels (Transnational Criminal Organizations) Now Operating in Over 1,000 US Cities; Up From 195 US Cities

The recent publication of the US Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2011 (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/topics/ndtas.htm#y2011) (August 2011) provides an important strategic insight into Mexican cartel penetration into the United States. On p. 8 of the document, a single sentence states:

Mexican-based TCOs were operating in more than a thousand U.S. cities during 2009-2010, spanning all nine OCDETF regions.

The corresponding note (g) is as follows:

Included are traffickers who purchase illicit drugs from TCO associates and distribute them on their own, cells that function as an extension of the TCO to traffic illicit drugs in the United States, and cells that provide warehousing, security, and/or transportation services for the TCO.

Prior publicly released National Drug Intelligence Center data on Mexican TCOs (Transnational Criminal Organizations) operating in the United States dates back to a situation report and a series of maps from April 2008. The Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27986/index.htm). This sentence from the Discussion section provides a baseline concerning Mexican cartel penetration into the United States:

Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting reveals that Mexican DTOs operate in at least 195 cities throughout the United States.

The acronym “DTO” stands for Drug Trafficking Organization which has since been replaced by the acronym “TCO”— Transnational Criminal Organization— used in the 2011 document— to convey that the Mexican cartels are now viewed as more threatening and capable (with transnational reach) entities. This data comes from

“Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Reporting January 1, 2006 through April 8, 2008”. No corresponding note exists concerning the metrics of the data pertaining to this report, though it assumed, that the same data collection methodology was utilized by the US Department of Justice analysts. If this assumption is accurate:

This would mean that Mexican cartel operational penetration into US cities is now thought to be 500% higher than previously estimated in the time frame of roughly three years. The baseline of “at least 195 cities throughout the United States” has increased to “more than a thousand U.S. cities”. 

While the April 2008 document was supported by Map 1. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations showing the locations of the Mexican cartels in the United States, the new August 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment does not provide such a map. A query and public request for information to NDIC public affairs concerning the release of such a map was made. The response was that such a map would now be considered a law enforcement restricted document. While this might be understandable from an operational security (OPSEC) and counter-intelligence perspective, it is in variance with an open public debate on the Mexican cartel (and gang) threat to the United States and the more encompassing threat to Mexico, Central America, and other regions of the Western Hemisphere.

If US Congressional and Senate committees—such as the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/subcommittees.asp?committee=8)— and those focusing on homeland security are to continue their public hearings on this broadening threat, some consideration should be made as to US strategic requirements and open public debate. Ten years after the 9/11 attack by Al Qaeda, the United States has reached a pivotal strategic decision point in our national policies. Are we to continue with our national security policy of focusing on that terrorist entity (and its group of networks) as the dominant threat to the US and the homeland or will the Mexican cartels (and their supporting gang networks) now be recognized as replacing Al Qaeda as the number one threat to our government and safety of our citizens? While the violence potentials of Al Qaeda are universally recognized— we will never forget the thousands of our dead mourned after 9/11— the violence associated with the criminal insurgent potentials of the Mexican cartels and their ability to corrupt and undermine governments in the Western Hemisphere must now be considered far more threatening to our nation.¹

Notes

1. Two issues should be further clarified. First, any type of Al Qaeda inspired attack taking place domestically— even a botched suicide bombing attempt against the DC metro system— would result in heightened media sensationalism and a continued US Governmental focus on Al Qaeda as the primary threat to this nation. The fallout from such an incident would likely serve to downgrade our perceptions related to the greater threat stemming from the more corruptive and subtle insurgent activities of the Mexican cartels combined with their use of symbolic violence.  Second, I want to reiterate that the cause of global jihad promoted by Al Qaeda and other elements of radical Islam are still a significant threat to US interests and our global security posture. In the case of our allies in Europe, for example, Al Qaeda and radical Islam continue to be the number one external and internal strategic threat to many of these nations. When our own domestic security scales weigh the threats, however, Al Qaeda and radical Islam, has to now be considered less of a threat to the security of the United States than the Mexican cartels and their associates. Ultimately, while we can live with governmental failure and internal strife in Afghanistan and/or Iraq—we cannot say the same concerning Mexico, given the cross border cartel infiltration we have now identified per the National Drug Threat Assessment 2011.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note # 3: Narco Armored Vehicle Threats and Countermeasures

Robert J. Bunker

Who: Mexican Cartels (Lev III/IAFV; primarily Zetas & Gulf Cartel) 

What: The deployment of narco armored cars and improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) in Mexico as a byproduct of the criminal insurgencies taking place.

When: I&W (indications & warnings) traced back to at least 1979 to the Dadeland Mall shooting in Florida tied to a Colombian cartel assassination team using improvised ballistic protection in a delivery truck (historical). Mexican cartel deployment of armored SUVs begins by the late 1990s and has greatly increased over time. A firebreak was crossed with the initial deployment of improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs) in 2010.

Where: Threat Level I- sporadic at best in Mexico; Threat Level II- throughout cartel areas of operations in Mexico; Threat Level III- primarily in North-Eastern and Central Mexico, with vehicles recovered in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.

Why: For well over a decade now, a deadly arms race has been taking place in Mexico between the various warring cartels and their gang and mercenary auxiliary forces. Weaponry has been shifting from civilian arms to law enforcement arms and then to infantry combat small arms. The introduction of cartel enforcers with former military and special forces backgrounds has resulted in the fielding of cartel units that have been increasingly professionalized. A component of this process is the deployment of armored SUVs and improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs).

Synopsis of Narco Armored Vehicle Threats

Tactical Analysis

Narco armored vehicles come in defensive (Lev I-II) and offensive (Lev III) variants. While Lev II vehicles were superior in defensive armor to early Lev III vehicles (which did not have protected cabs/driver compartments), the early Lev III vehicles utilized gun ports as an offensive innovation. This allows for mounted infantry tactics to be conducted much like those undertaken by military units.

Defensive Vehicles

 Threat Level I: Hasty/improvised ballistic protection utilized in otherwise soft vehicle. Countermeasures: Utilize shredder/hardened projectiles (via shotgun) and higher velocity AP rounds (via semi-auto rifles) for anti-personnel use and to target tires and engines (radiator) for mobility kills, establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT response.

Threat Level II: Professionally armored SUVs can be encountered alone or in “commando units” of up to dozens of vehicles in Mexico. These threats can also be interspersed with soft (unarmored) vehicles. Since firing ports are atypical, cartel gunmen lose primary defensive advantage when dismounting to engage other forces, still, the armored doors/vehicle body can be used for ballistic shielding purposes. Countermeasures: Attempt mobility kills against tires and engines (radiator), target dismounted gunmen with small arms fire, establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT response. The deployment of spike strips and/or commandeering trucks/big rigs to isolate avenues of approach/contain in urban choke points may be warranted.

Offensive Vehicles

Threat Level III- Early: Armored fighting position/pill box placed on the truck bed. Countermeasures: Target driver in soft cab, engine (radiator), and/or tires for a mobility kill. Maintain standoff ranges/establish perimeter to allow for more specialized SWAT/military resources to engage armored position/pillbox.

Threat Level III- Mature: An improvised armored fighting vehicle (IAFV) with full body protection, gun ports, and an air conditioning unit carrying between 5-20 cartel gunmen. Variants may include breaching rams, turreted gun ports, cell boosters (for communications), and other innovations. Sizes range primarily from work trucks through dump truck size vehicles. They are somewhat like the Mexican Federal police vehicle El “rinoceronte” but cruder in appearance. Tires may be exposed or protected by armor—no “run flat” tire usage evident to date. These vehicles have only been seen individually or in small numbers operating together though dozens of these vehicles (possibly more than 100) have now been built. The attachment of a few of these vehicles to provided security to a narco armored SUV convoy (Level II threat) must now be a consideration. Note— cartel gunmen riding in these vehicles may be carrying RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades) or tube launched anti-tank weapons that allow them to target and knock out opposing cartel IAFVs. This represents an additional concern in addition to military small arms (assault rifles, launchers, and grenades) being carried by these mobile infantry forces. This threat is beyond most Mexican state and federal law enforcement response capabilities. Countermeasures: Military medium and heavy tanks and other anti-armor systems; in dire situations can target tires for mobility kill, utilize spike strips, and/or commandeer trucks/big rigs to isolate avenues of approach/contain in urban choke points while awaiting military support.

Threat Level IV (Predicted Evolution): Linear projection of the Level III Threat into the future. Superior anti-vehicular offensive capabilities of such an organic (main) gun added to IAFVs would generate a threat way beyond Mexican state and federal law enforcement response capabilities. Probable 50 Cal. initial machine gun system usage with an eventual increase into smaller 20-40 mm cannon sizes derived from AA (anti-aircraft) guns. Countermeasures: Same as Level III- Mature; responding to this threat would basically turn this into a conventional military AFV engagement. Utilizing attack helicopters with anti-armor systems against these vehicles would be warranted.

No expectation exists for US law enforcement inside US territory to encounter a narco improvised armored fighting vehicle (IAFV) [Level III Threat]. While such a vehicle, in an overwatch position in Mexico, could conceivably cover a drug load going into the US, such a scenario presently appears unlikely—though co-opted personnel in Mexican military vehicles in years past have been involved in such incidents. Far more likely scenarios for US law enforcement on the US side of the border are sporadic/potential encounters with Mexican cartel operatives in defensive oriented Level I and Level II threat vehicles. [Note- some instances of cartel vehicles containing caltrop and oil slick dropping compartments have been reported. The effectiveness of such systems will vary].

*Countermeasures guidance underwent a basic tactical review by retired law enforcement and military personnel with extensive special operations field experience.  

Significance: Cartel Tactics; Cartel Weaponry; Law Enforcement Countermeasures/Response; Officer Safety Issues

Sources

“Mexican Cartels now using ‘tanks’”- William Booth, Washington Post, June 7, 2011.

“Narco Motor Trend”- Gerardo, Borderland Beat, June 19, 2011. [See source for extensive collection of vehicular pictures].

“Monster Trucks in Mexico: The Zetas Armor Up”- STRATFOR, July 4, 2011.

“Narco-Armor in Mexico”- John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal, July 14, 2011.

“'Narco-Tanks': Mexico's Cartels Get Asymmetric Weapons”- Gordon Housworth, In Sight, July, 2011.

Also see the numerous English and Spanish http://www.youtube.com video clips of these vehicles.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes: No 2. Ambush/Targeted Killing of US Law Enforcement Officer (San Antonio, Texas)

Mexican cartel linkages to this incident are currently being investigated but have not been confirmed by US Law Enforcement

Who: Sergeant Kenneth Vann, 48, Bexar County Sheriff's, Texas.

What: Ambush-Targeted Killing of US Law Enforcement Officer.

When: About 2:00 AM Saturday 28 May 2011.

Where: While in uniform, sitting in his marked patrol car at a traffic light at Loop 410 and Rigsby Road (on San Antonio's southeast side) on his way to a call.

Why: Unknown. Initial speculation via Sheriff Amadeo Ortiz is that the officer was randomly targeted because he was a governmental representative/symbol of authority. No motive has been established and no one has claimed credit.

Synopsis: Hasty overview; The officer was waiting at a traffic light. The flashing lights/siren were not turned on in the patrol car and the officer was obeying traffic laws. A small white car is thought to have pulled up next to Sgt. Vann's vehicle. A gunman then fired an estimated 28 rounds via a semi-automatic weapon— possibly an AK-47 assault rifle—at the officer in two bursts. Sgt. Vann was pronounced dead at the scene. Suspect(s) are still at large.

Update: On Tuesday, a sheriff's spokesman said investigators were looking for a royal blue Ford F-150 pickup truck that left the intersection where the incident took place. The small white car has been found and is being processed by forensics. Reward of $127,000.00 now offered for the arrest of those responsible; More than 300 officers from 10 law enforcement agencies—armed with about 1,300 warrants— were deployed to the streets of San Antonio on Tuesday, May 31 in order to get leads concerning this incident.

Tactical Analysis: Derived from news photos of the crime scene and satellite imagery. Kill zone was established at a traffic signal going forward toward I-410 bridges underpass; channeled avenue of approach/confined terrain on Rigsby Road going forward. Location is also well suited for E&E (escape and evasion) of engaging forces (I-410 and 87). The targeted killing appears to have occurred via shots entering the passenger side of the patrol vehicle that struck the officer on the right side of his body. This places the law enforcement officer at an immediate tactical disadvantage in his response since he would be required to shoot through the passenger side of his vehicle to return fire. The targeted killing appears to have been conducted in a tactically proficient manner. TTPs/Weaponry/ Ford F-150 pickup truck (of interest) appears consistent with cartel operations in Northern Mexico.

Significance: Officer Safety Issues; Reward Amount/Mass Warrant Approach; Psychological Warfare/Insurgent Tactics (If determined to have cartel linkages); Cartel Violence Spillover (If determined to have cartel linkages).

Source(s):

"Search Continues For Sergeant's Killer - Investigators Working Full-Time To Find Sgt. Kenneth Vann's Killer" - Tim Gerber, KSAT 12 News, Wednesday, June 1, 2011

"Officers Hope Warrant Roundup Leads To Info In Sergeant's Death: 10 Agencies Join Efforts In Warrant Roundup" - David Sears, KSAT 12 News, Tuesday, May 31, 2011

"Reward For Info On Vann's Death Raised To $127K: FBI Offering $50,000, In Addition To $77,000 Already Raised" - KSAT 12 News, Tuesday, May 31, 2011 (UPDATED: June 1, 2011)

"Mexican Drug Link Probed in Ambush Murder of Texas Lawman" - Borderland Beat, Tuesday, May 31, 2011 | Borderland Beat Reporter Ovemex. Original Reuters Link

"Slain Sergeant's Widow Speaks Out: Yvonne Vann Asks For Public's Help Solving Husband's Slaying" - Jessie Degollado, KSAT 12 News, Monday, May 30, 2011

"Suspect Who Gunned Down Deputy Remains At-Large: Sgt. Kenneth Vann Shot, Killed Early Saturday Morning" - Simon Gutierrez, KSAT 12 News, Sunday, May 29, 2011

"Bexar County Deputy Slain in 'Senseless' Ambush" (See crime scene photos/video) - Associated Press, WFAA.com, May 28, 2011

Mexican cartel linkages to this incident are currently being investigated but have not been confirmed by US Law Enforcement

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Here is a great 2 minute video ("Rival gunmen clash in Nayarit: 28 deaths reported") from a Mexican news station posted on YouTube via Borderland Beat. The video displays an engagement aftermath - that would be dead cartel foot soldiers in body armor/tactical gear.

We don't usually see many such body armor images. Since we are getting armored cars showing up more and more in Northern Mexico along with all the military infantry weapons (frag grenades et al) the need for body armor should come as no surprise.

Also -- apparently a Mexican Federal Police helicopter was engaged by Knight's Templar small arms fire and forced to land yesterday. See "Knights Templar attack Federal Police helicopter in Michoacan".

Dr. Robert J. Bunker