El Centro

Islamic State Group: Nicaragua Arrests Four Suspected Members – BBC News

Four men with suspected ties to the Islamic State (IS) group were arrested in Nicaragua after crossing illegally from Costa Rica, officials say.

The identities of three of the men matched those in an alert attributed to US officials saying three suspected jihadists were in Central America.

There were fears they could have plans to try to enter the US, reports said.

The four, aged between 26 and 41, included two Egyptians and two Iraqis. They have been deported to Costa Rica...

Read on.

Lessons for America’s Longest-Running War from the Americas’ Longest-Running Insurgency by Lionel Beehner and Liam Collins - Modern War Institute

In 2016, Colombia achieved a remarkable success by seemingly bringing to an end the Western Hemisphere’s longest-running insurgency. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been at war with government forces for more than fifty years. And yet here was a negotiated settlement by which two parties that had been fighting for generations agreed to lay down their arms—by which the guerrilla organization itself would be brought into the government’s formal power structures. The case raises important questions—not least for a US government that watches the clock on its own counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan tick ever closer to two decades. How was this possible? And are there lessons that can be exported and applied to other intransigent conflicts, like Afghanistan? The Modern War Institute at West Point recently led a research trip to assess these and other questions.

To be sure, the case of Colombia offers not a shining success story but a cautionary tale of how the US military can assist a foreign military and a weak government in fighting a counterinsurgency to bring about peace. A signed peace agreement does not mean that all is instantly well. In Colombia, attacks continue, as the January 2019 terrorist attack against the police academy in Bogotá highlights, and cocaine continues to emanate from Colombia at record levels. Although promptly rescinded, a recent order by the Colombian army to double the number of criminals and guerrillas they kill caused a swirl of controversy among both its rank and file as well as human rights groups, given the armed forces’ past track record of targeting civilians to reach quotas. Still, the conditions in Colombia are significantly improved from what they were a decade ago…

Read on.

Colombia Army’s New Kill Orders Send Chills Down Ranks by Nicholas Casey – New York Times

The head of Colombia’s army, frustrated by the nation’s faltering efforts to secure peace, has ordered his troops to double the number of criminals and militants they kill, capture or force to surrender in battle — and possibly accept higher civilian casualties in the process, according to written orders and interviews with senior officers.

At the start of the year, Colombian generals and colonels were assembled and told to sign a written pledge to step up attacks. Daily internal presentations now show the number of days that brigades have gone without combat, and commanders are berated when they don’t carry out assaults frequently enough, the officers said.

One order causing particular worry instructs soldiers not to “demand perfection” in carrying out deadly attacks, even if significant questions remain about the targets they are striking. Some officers say that order has instructed them to lower their standards for protecting innocent civilians from getting killed, and that it has already led to suspicious or unnecessary deaths.

The military tried a similar strategy to defeat Colombia’s rebel and paramilitary groups in the mid-2000s, before a landmark peace deal was signed to end decades of conflict…

Read on.

Counterinsurgency as an Approach to Organized Crime in Latin America by Yuri Neves - Georgetown Security Studies Review

The growing complexity and capabilities of criminal organizations in Latin America necessitate a new approach to fight crime in the region. The conditions that give rise to insurgencies, are similar to those that allow organized crime groups to prosper. Furthermore, both entities utilize similar strategies. Therefore, any policy that aims at defeating these groups should utilize counterinsurgency strategies (COIN).

While many have critiqued using counterinsurgency tactics to combat criminal organizations, many of these critiques are misguided or narrowly conceived. Counterinsurgency simply refers to tactics used to combat an enemy that relies upon, and blends in, with the civilian population. So, while counterinsurgency inevitably conjures images of security forces utilizing heavy duty military hardware against masses of populations, this is only one application of COIN doctrine. Using COIN strategies to combat organized crime is not the same as militarizing the police. Rather, it is an appreciation of the political causes of organized crime. Counterinsurgency campaigns can range from a “hearts and minds” approach, in which the focus is on winning the population’s support, to the kind of brutal tactics employed by the Sri Lanka government in their fight against the Tamil Tigers. While insurgencies differ in that they aim to overthrow the existing government, there are enough similarities with criminal organizations to make use of COIN tactics appropriate…

Read on.

Colombian Army’s Kill Orders Put Civilians at Risk, Officers Say by Nicholas Casey – New York Times

The head of Colombia’s army, frustrated by the nation’s faltering efforts to secure peace, has ordered his troops to double the number of criminals and militants they kill, capture or force to surrender in battle — and possibly accept higher civilian casualties in the process, according to written orders and interviews with senior officers.

At the start of the year, Colombian generals and colonels were assembled and told to sign a written pledge to step up attacks. Daily internal presentations now show the number of days that brigades have gone without combat, and commanders are berated when they don’t carry out assaults frequently enough, the officers said.

One order causing particular worry instructs soldiers not to “demand perfection” in carrying out deadly attacks, even if significant questions remain about the targets they are striking. Some officers say that order has instructed them to lower their standards for protecting innocent civilians from getting killed, and that it has already led to suspicious or unnecessary deaths.

The military tried a similar strategy to defeat Colombia’s rebel and paramilitary groups in the mid-2000s, before a landmark peace deal was signed to end decades of conflict.

But the tactics caused a national outrage when it emerged that soldiers, aiming to meet their quotas, engaged in widespread killings and disappearances of civilians.

Now, another incarnation of the policy is being pushed by the new government against the country’s remaining criminal, guerrilla and paramilitary groups, according to orders reviewed by The New York Times and three senior officers who spoke about them...

Read on.