El Centro

We have posted Michael L. Burgoyne's excellent thesis as a separate page due to its length, but I hope that readers will click through to the link and comment here to discuss his work.  The thesis can also be downloaded as a PDF by clicking here.  The opening portion is included below:

Abstract

Powerful criminal groups are developing into serious threats to nation states. Increasingly intense violence in Mexico is of particular interest to the United States.  Coming on the heels of insurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is predisposed to apply its tested counterinsurgency doctrine to the problem. This study addresses the effectiveness of counterinsurgency principles against criminal insurgencies through a case study analysis of Colombia’s fight against the Medellin and Cali Cartels and Rio de Janeiro’s efforts against favela gangs. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine proved to be highly effective against Rio’s gangs, however, the campaign against the Medellin and Cali Cartels indicates that an enemy focused approach may be more appropriate against a drug trafficking organization. The results of this study show that while much of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is applicable to criminal threats, several adjustments to campaign planning and threat analysis tools will be required to ensure its effectiveness against emerging criminal national security threats.

Mexico is currently engulfed by rampant violence that has taken over 40,000 lives since 2006.[1] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the drug fueled violence as an “insurgency,” while others have called it a “criminal insurgency.”[2] Criminal threats to state stability are becoming more common; Japanese Yakuza, Chinese Triads, Italian mafia, Russian mafia, and Colombian Bandas Criminales all represent dangerous evolving criminal organizations.[3] These unique apolitical security threats are not a new phenomenon, but they are rapidly developing into one of the most dangerous challenges in the globalized world. One of the greatest national security threats facing the United States today is the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Mexico where Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO)[4] and enforcer gangs have ignited a countrywide war.[5]

Mexican criminal organizations have evolved into existential threats to the Mexican state and are now growing in the United States.[6] Initially transportation elements subordinate to the powerful Colombian cartels, Mexican DTOs capitalized on effective interdiction in the Caribbean and the demise of the Medellin and Cali Cartels to increase their control of the drug trade. This increase in criminal power coincided with an equally important political upheaval in Mexico.

The election of President Vicente Fox of the PAN party in 2000 effectively ended the one party system throwing long standing arrangements between PRI leaders and DTOs into chaos. Institutionalized corruption and government control of the illicit economy collapsed into violence as DTOs went to war with each other and the state to increase their control of territory and lucrative drug routes.[7] Following his election in 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón embarked upon a campaign against organized crime employing the “full force of the state in order to safeguard the liberty and security of its citizens.”[8] However, there remains no end to the violence in sight; 2010 was the most violent year yet with 15,273 homicides.[9] Calderon’s strategy has been applauded and criticized in both Mexico and the United States. Equally, the U.S. response to the crisis has been the subject of intense policy debate. Much of the frustration with the government response stems from confusion regarding the nature of the conflict.

Carl Von Clausewitz warns that “the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”[10] Coming on the heels of the development of a robust counterinsurgency doctrine, many U.S. defense and law enforcement scholars have designated the Mexican conflict an insurgency.[11] Accordingly, counterinsurgency methodologies have been recommended as the proper response.[12] Conversely, other scholars like David Shirk and former head of the Drug Enforcement Administration Robert Bonner have called for a law enforcement response.[13] Far more than a mere academic semantic debate, the term insurgency impacts which agencies and methodologies government forces employ against the problem. These types of “wicked problems” are defined by “one’s idea for solving it.”[14] An incorrect diagnosis of the problem and its solution can have far reaching repercussions.

Whatever its nature, the United States has vital interests in Mexico. The United States has spent 90 billion dollars on border security since 2001[15] and spends over 15 billion dollars annually on drug control.[16] Mexico is the United States’ third largest trading partner with 393 billion dollars in trade in 2010.[17] The United States appropriated 1.5 billion dollars to support the Mérida Initiative, a multinational security agreement that focuses on operational support to law enforcement and institutional professionalization.[18] Given the importance of Mexico to the United States and the scope of the conflict, it is imperative that the U.S. strategy fit the problem.

Before the United States embarks on an expensive counterinsurgency campaign or advises foreign governments on their own campaigns, the efficacy of counterinsurgency principles against economic or criminal groups should be evaluated. Criminal insurgency is a unique type of threat.  This study addresses the question to what extent counterinsurgency principles, as outlined in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, are effective against criminal insurgencies; specifically, in Colombia’s fight against the Medellin and Cali Cartels and Rio de Janeiro’s efforts against favela gangs?  

This study argues that the analysis of powerful criminal organizations using an insurgency framework is useful and that the Colombian cartels and Rio’s favela gangs can be appropriately described as criminal insurgencies. Several counterinsurgency principles listed in FM 3-24 were effective in both case studies including understanding the environment, intelligence driven operations, long term commitment, small unit empowerment, learning and adapting, and supporting the host nation. In addition, counterinsurgency methodologies, as found in U.S. doctrine, were highly effective against Rio’s favela gangs. However, the methodology employed in the case of the Medellin and Cali Cartels indicates that an enemy focused approach can be effective against a DTO. Furthermore, a DTO’s financial center of gravity seriously degrades the effectiveness of some of the principles found in COIN doctrine. Finally, several factors and techniques not specifically referenced in COIN doctrine can be critical in the case of a criminal insurgency, such as vetted units, anticorruption measures, financial targeting, divide and conquer approaches, and social and cultural root causes. This study will briefly review the evolution of the concept of criminal insurgency. The study will then examine the Medellin and Cali Cartels followed by Rio’s favela gangs. Each case will include a brief historical summary, an analysis using an insurgency lens, and an examination of the government response based on COIN principles. Finally, implications for security policy and recommendations will be provided.

This study is “policy-evaluative” and will examine the implicit theoretical assumption that criminal insurgencies can be defeated by current counterinsurgency doctrine.[19] Given the importance of the security threats involved, it is important to ask “will the policy produce the results that its proponents promise?”[20] Investigations such as RAND’s recent counterinsurgency report[21] and the Fishel-Manwaring SWORD model have scientifically evaluated the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies; however, current literature has not adequately addressed the use of counterinsurgency doctrine against criminal threats.[22]

This project uses a structured comparison of case studies with the goal of identifying the value of current counterinsurgency principles in the unique circumstances of a criminal insurgency.[23] Political scientist, Stephen Van Evra notes that when working with policy prescriptive studies, researchers should study cases whose background characteristics parallel the characteristics of the current or future policy problems.”[24] As such, two cases were selected that closely resemble current security concerns in Mexico: the Colombian defeat of the Cali and Medellin Cartels and the Brazilian fight against favela gangs.

Both of these cases were considered government victories because the threats to national security were defeated. This study assumes that both of these cases are government victories and focuses on the methodologies utilized. In Colombia, the powerful Medellin and Cali Cartels were dismantled leaving residual criminal groups. This study does not expand its time horizon to include efforts at community policing in Colombia after the fall of the Medellin and Cali Cartels. Expanding the case to include these initiatives would result in difficulty managing the distinction between criminal insurgency and crime as well as between counterinsurgency and normal governance. Furthermore, the security problems in Cali and Medellin after the fall of the major DTOs closely resemble the characteristics of the Rio case study.

The Rio case study, however, is a more defined phenomenon with less possibility of intervening variables arising from traditional insurgent groups like the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) present in Colombia. In Rio, gangs that had successfully succeeded from government control were displaced and control was reestablished.[25] Since 2008, the government has cleared some 25 communities and reasserted state control over 280,000 citizens.[26]

To maintain a disciplined configurative approach the cases are evaluated using an insurgency analysis framework outlined by insurgency expert Bard O’Neill and the 13 principles and imperatives of counterinsurgency as found in Field Manual 3-24. One of the strengths of utilizing a case study methodology is that it serves “the heuristic purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and generating hypotheses.”[27] The detailed case study approach allows this study to go beyond O’Neill’s framework and the 13 principles to identify other factors that are important to the problem.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #9: Decapitated Adult Male with Hands and Feet Removed:

Found on Side of a Dirt Road Near Marana (Pima County) Arizona

Key Information:

Via Veronica M. Cruz, “Decapitated body found near Tucson Mountains.” Arizona Daily Star. Saturday 7 January 2012:

A man’s decapitated body was found on the side of a dirt road Friday morning west of the Tucson Mountains.

The hands and feet also had also been removed from the body discovered in the 2300 block of North Reservation Road and West Mile Wide Road. None of the missing body parts were found at the scene, Pima County sheriff’s Bureau Chief Rick Kastigar said.

The body was discovered by two men cutting grass along the road to feed their animals, he said.

The men flagged down Bureau of Land Management Rangers and border patrol agents in the area, but were released before deputies could question them, Kastigar said.

“We don’t know who they are or where they came from,” Kastigar said of pair who reported the discovery. “We don’t know their association to the crime.”

Other evidence was found at the scene but Kastigar could not provide details, citing the ongoing investigation.

Kastigar said that neither he nor the department’s veteran investigators have dealt with a case like this before.

“I can tell you that the crime of murder is not necessarily new to that part of the county,” Kastigar said. Homicide victims have been found in the remote area.

An autopsy is scheduled for today.

Sheriff’s deputies are asking for anyone with information to call to call 911 or 88-CRIME (882-7463) [1].

See Kvoa.com (Ch 4 News Tucson, AZ) 1:23 minute video at http://www.kvoa.com/videos/body-found-near-marana-was-decapitated-sheriffs-say/.

For information on this incident and on other Mexican cartel beheadings in the US see Krgv.com (Ch 5 News Rio Grande Valley, TX) 1:45 minute video at http://www.krgv.com/news/expert-says-beheadings-in-u-s-look-like-work-of-cartels/.

Who: Unknown adult male. Ethnicity and/or distinguishing features not provided.

What: Beheading and partial dismemberment; hands and feet removed.

When: Estimates are that the body was not at the location more than 24 hours which would place the body dump on roughly  Thursday 5 January 2012 [3].

Where: On the side of a dirt road near Marana (Pima County) Arizona— 2300 block of North Reservation Road and West Mile Wide Road [2]. This is a rural area North-West of Tucson with the interstate I-10, linking Phoenix and Tucson, about 15 miles to the East.

Why: The working assumption is that this is Mexican cartel related [4], though the homicide is still under investigation. The lead investigative agency is the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.  

Tactical Analysis: The beheading and partial dismemberment of the adult male has all the trademarks of a Mexican cartel killing although this homicide will likely never be solved in the near term [5]. No mention of tattoos on the body or personal items have been made in the news reports which would help to identify potential cartel and gang linkages. None of the victim’s removed body parts have been located [1] and investigating detectives said that the body also suffered other obvious signs of trauma [2]. Lack of the head and other body parts at the body dump scene (potential crime scene unlikely) indicate that the perpetrators did not want the victim identified. The mention of ‘obvious signs of trauma’ is assumed to mean physical abuse and/or blunt force or penetrating trauma [eg. bladed weapon or gunshot(s)]. It is noted that the body was dumped by the side of a dirt road. The body could have instead been buried in a shallow grave further away from the road which could mean (a). The perpetrators wanted the body found (possibly as a warning to others linked to their activities) or (b). Due to time or operational security (OPSEC) reasons they decided to leave the body out in the open. Past cartel TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) would suggest that the perpetrators wanted the body found to make a statement to other illicit narcotics and/or human trafficking smugglers. A body dump to dispose of a kidnapping victim (for family extortion purposes) also has to be considered but would appear highly unlikely. This incident will now likely end the debate concerning whether beheadings have taken place in the Arizona desert— though technically the victim may have been killed indoors for OPSEC reasons. While no such Arizona desert beheadings had been identified prior to this incident this cartel violence spillover ‘firebreak’ now appears to have been crossed [6].

Significance: Beheading; Cartel Tactics; Cartel TTPs; Cross Border Violence

Source(s):

1. Veronica M. Cruz, “Decapitated body found near Tucson Mountains.” Arizona Daily Star. Saturday 7 January 2012. http://azstarnet.com/news/local/crime/decapitated-body-found-near-tucson-mountains/article_dcfd05a7-73d2-598f-a44d-144b17ffae9f.html. Note—typos in original article.

2.  “Decapitated Body Found in Area West of Tucson.” MyFoxphoenix.com. Friday 6 January 2012. http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/dpp/news/crime/decapitated-body-found-in-rural-area-west-of-tucson-1-6-2012. Includes 2 crime scene photos.

3. Ina Ronquillo, “Beheaded murder victim found in Marana area.” Kgun-TV Tucson, AZ. Friday 6 January 2012. http://www.kgun9.com/news/local/136822898.html.

4. See former DEA supervisor Phil Jordan’s analysis. “Expert Says Beheadings in U.S. Look Like Work of Cartels.” KRGV.com. Tuesday 10 January 2012. http://www.krgv.com/news/expert-says-beheadings-in-u-s-look-like-work-of-cartels/.

5. Such incidents have the potential to be solved many months, even years, later when cartel and gang cells are broken up and the perpetrators accept plea deals to reduce sentences and/or seek immunity when they testify against their former associates.

6. See ABC15.com staff, “Have there been beheadings in Arizona desert?” ABC15.com. 2 September 2010. http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/state/have-there-been-beheadings-in-arizona. Contains a video sequence on the earlier debate that became politicized during Arizona gubernatorial elections in 2010. It should be noted that the Martin Alejandro Cota Monroy beheading in Chandler, Arizona, which was a Mexican cartel hit, took place in an apartment in October 2010.

Useful Reference(s):

Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #8: Teen Tortured, Dismembered, Beheaded by Trafficking Gang in Bethany, Oklahoma.” Small Wars Journal. 3 January 2012. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-tactical-note-8.

Pamela L. Bunker, Lisa J. Campbell, and Robert J. Bunker, “Torture, beheadings, and narcocultos.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge, 2011: 145-178.

Robert J. Bunker and Pamela L. Bunker, Beheadings and Ritual Murders Bibliography. Quantico, VA: FBI Academy Library. August 2007. http://fbilibrary.fbiacademy.edu/bibliographies.html#beheadings.

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #8:

Teen Tortured, Dismembered, Beheaded by Trafficking Gang in Bethany, Oklahoma

Key Information:

Via IBTimes Staff Reporter, “Carina Saunders: Teen Tortured, Dismembered, Beheaded by Trafficking Gang.” International Business Times, 23 December 2011:

Oklahoma teen Carina Saunders was brutally murdered as a means to frighten another woman into cooperating with a human trafficking ring, police have reported.

The 19-year-old who graduated from Mustang High School just last year was tortured, dismembered and beheaded. Parts of her body were found stuffed in a duffel bag and dumped behind a grocery store on Oct. 13. She was identified by her distinct tattoos.

Jimmy Lee Massey, 33, has been arrested on first-degree murder charges. A 20-year-old woman, whose name has not been disclosed, came forward as a witness to report she had been kidnapped by Massey and forced to watch the brutal murder in Bethany, Oklahoma, reports The Daily Mail.

Massey was already being held in Oklahoma County jail on drug charges. He has admitted to investigators that he kidnapped the 20-year-old woman and forced her to watch as others tortured and killed Saunders. He also provided details about the crime.

Both women reportedly knew Massey separately, but there is no evidence that the two women knew each other.

Police Chief Phil Cole said: "Evidence in our investigation has led us to believe that she had been expected to provide certain things to this trafficking group and that she had not been performing to their satisfaction."

"We believe there were other people there and they're now the focus of our investigation."

Another man, Francisco Gomez, was arrested in connection with the murder. As Gomez was led into the police station in handcuffs last night, he yelled to reporters "I've got nothing to do with no drugs, no murder, no nothing."

"We surrounded a possible address for Mr Gomez and he surrendered peacefully. He was booked on a trafficking charge," authorities said.

Despite the fact that she was known to run with a rough crowd and use drugs like marijuana, methamphetamine and Ecstasy, Saunders was a "random" choice for the killers, according to police.

Cole said, "Our information right now leads us to believe she was a random choice, as sad as that is. She had relationships within these loosely associated people, and I think that she was a victim of opportunity."

Oklahoma County Assistant District Attorney Scott Rowland said a judgment will be made in January…[1].

For KFOR.com news channel 4 (Oklahoma City) videos pertaining to this incident see: http://www.kfor.com/news/local/kfor-graphic-suspect-arrested-after-girls-body-found-in-duffle-bag-20111220,0,6407719.story.

For a detailed 14:50 minute news video of a law enforcement press conference related to this incident see NewsOk, http://newsok.com/another-arrest-made-in-bethany-killing/article/3633876.

Who: Carina Saunders, 19, born in Oklahoma City and grew up in Mustang, Oklahoma [2].

What: Torture, beheading and dismemberment.

When: Went missing (per friends) Wednesday, 28 September 2011; Killed, late Sunday, 9 October 2011/early Monday, 10 October 2011 [6]; Body found Thursday, 13 October 2011; Identified via tattoos and dental records, Monday, 17 October 2011.

Where: Found in a duffle bag behind a Homeland grocery store at 7101 NW. 23rd and Rockwell in Bethany, Oklahoma [2][3].

Why: Used as an example to terrify a group of women who were victims of a human trafficking (prostitution) ring and an associated drug trafficking ring [4]. Note— some of the individuals involved were members of both rings.

Tactical Analysis: A 20 year old woman (name withheld by the police to protect her identity) was kidnapped, blindfolded and transported to an unknown location (some type of room) by Jimmy Lee Massey, age 33, late Sunday 9 October/early Monday 10 October 2011. She was then forced to watch the torture killing of Carina Saunders by a small group of individuals. 

Carina Saunders, the victim, was a known user of marijuana, methamphetamine and Ecstasy [1]. She had multiple tattoos. One of which is a ‘Kween Spade’ with a spade in an oval between her breasts [5]. No other upper body tattoos or tattoos on lower legs/ankles are evident from social networking photos. Due to her associations, she came in contact with the network of some of the members of the human trafficking and drug trafficking rings. Per the police, she appeared to be a random target of opportunity in this torture killing. Little mention has been made of the condition of Saunders from the time of her kidnapping to her death, though similar incident patterns would suggest that she was most likely physically and sexually abused.

The incident intent of the criminal gang(s) was for the 20 year old woman to let the other victims (i.e. sex slaves) of the ring know that, if they did not cooperate with gang member orders, this is what would happen to them too. The woman who witnessed this crime instead went to the police and reported the incident. Jimmy Lee Massey (aka “Big County” or “Country”) was subsequently arrested on 4 November 2011 and booked on drug trafficking warrants— he had also been the focus of a large narcotics investigation. Massey was read his Miranda Warnings and Rights, then waived them, and proceeded to discuss his part in the kidnapping of the 20 year old woman, the torture killing of Saunders, and the dismemberment of her body and its disposal. He now faces charges, filed on Tuesday, 20 December 2011, related to kidnapping, assault and battery, and murder [6].  It should be noted that “Massey also identified other persons that were involved and present in the room and involved in the murder.” [6].

Another suspect, Francisco Gomez, age 31, was then taken into custody on 20 December 2011 [7]. Per a law enforcement press conference pertaining to this incident, Gomez is thought to be a US citizen, however, quite a few Mexican nationals have been implicated as also having ties to this incident and/or the drug trafficking ring [8]. This is an ongoing investigation with more suspects and/or persons of interest being sought.

Whether this incident is directly linked to Mexican cartel/gang involvement or inspired by such killings is unknown at this time. Of note is that a NewsOk report has its story on this incident linked to a page entitled “Cartel Connection: Oklahoma’s #1 Threat” with a state highway map and drug cartel-based crimes superimposed over a map of the state of Oklahoma [9].

This torture killing (decapitation) incident is of much concern because it has all the hallmarks of a Mexican cartel killing. If this incident is directly tied to Mexican cartel or gang members, it will neither be the first nor the last such incident, with a small but growing, number of torture killing (decapitation) incidents now having taken place domestically over the last decade. These include the following US incidents (see Table 2.) listed in Pamela L. Bunker, Lisa J. Campbell, and Robert J. Bunker, “Torture, beheadings, and narcocultos” in Narcos Over the Border [10]:

To this listing can be added the more recent Chandler, Arizona beheading incident which took place in October 2010. In that incident, Martin Alejandro Cota Monroy was killed in his apartment by the PEI-Estatales/El Chapo drug cartel in retaliation for stealing a 400 pound load of marijuana [11].

Significance: Beheading; Cartel Tactics; Cross Border Violence; Human Trafficking; Torture Killing

Source(s):

1. See http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/272193/20111223/carina-saunders-teen-tortured-dismembered-beheaded-trafficking.htm.

2. Jon Watje, “Friends remember Mustang High School graduate.” Mustang Times. Monday 24, October 2011, http://www.mustangpaper.com/v2/inactive.aspx.

3. Homeland, http://www.homelandstores.com/StoreLocator.aspx.

4. Asia One News, “Woman forced to watch murder.” Originally published in The New Paper, Sunday, 25 December 2011, http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Crime/Story/A1Story20111224-318025.html.

5. Daily Mail, http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2011/12/21/article-2077059-0F3F904C00000578-329_634x379.jpg. Original source is news9.com which obtained the photo via a social networking site (assumed).

6. See the District Court of Oklahoma document (the probable cause affidavit), filed 20 December 2011, pertaining to Jimmy Lee Massey, http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/griffin/NEWS9/PDF/1112/Jimmy%20Massey%20Arrest.PDF.

7. Bryan Dean and Robert Medley, “Another arrest made in Bethany killing.” NewsOk, 21 December 2011, http://newsok.com/another-arrest-made-in-bethany-killing/article/3633876.

8. see NewsOk, http://newsok.com/another-arrest-made-in-bethany-killing/article/3633876.

9. “Cartel Connection: Oklahoma’s #1 Threat.” NewsOk. See http://newsok.com/news/drugcartel.

10. Pamela L. Bunker, Lisa J. Campbell, and Robert J. Bunker, “Torture, beheadings, and narcocultos.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge, 2011: 159.

11. Reuters, “Police link Arizona beheading to Mexican drug cartel.” Thursday 3 March 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/us-beheading-arizona-idUSTRE7230L320110304.

Mexican Cartel Operational Note No. 1:

Mexican Military Operations Against Los Zetas Communications Networks

Via CNN Mexico, “La Marina desarticula la comunicación de ‘Los Zetas’ en Veracruz.” Jueves, 08 de septiembre de 2011 a las 10:32, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2011/09/08/la-marina-desmantela-la-red-de-comunicaciones-de-los-zetas-en-veracruz, view the 2:31 video of the initial seizure of Zetas communications equipment.

Via the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, Naval Post Graduate School, “Zetas’ Communications Systems.” n.d.:

The Los Zetas operate a vast telecommunications network involving two-way radios, encrypted, secure radio networks, computers and burner cell phones. The original Zetas experience in the military lead to a number of innovative techniques in the Zetas operations including successfully using existing networks securely and building their own radio systems.

During a 26 day operation the Mexican Navy seized various communications devices from throughout the state of Veracruz. The seizure included mobile radio transmitters and high frequency repeaters, computers, cables and wiring, two-way radios, batteries and power supplies / amplifiers, solar power cells, 13 large antennae, 7 radio amplifiers, encryption devices and 7 trailer trucks carrying other supplies such as clothing and groceries^{.[1][2][3][4]} There were also 80 persons arrested during the operation, including six police officers. The system was reportedly capable of handling the communications in Veracruz and partially into neighboring Tabasco state.^[1] Images of the items can be seen in the gallery below.

One report indicated the network was highly sophisticated and stated: "The communications network was composed of several communication repeaters of high frequency band, known by its acronym UHF, which had independent power sources, frequency amplifiers, antennas known as "pool cues”, which are slender and go up to 20 feet above the ground, and antennas that were concealed in trees."^[5]

There were a total of twelve reported municipalities in which the seizures took place. The map below outlines the locations and demonstrates how the network traveled through the state north to south.^{[1][2][3][4][5]}

The municipalities are:

    * Tepetzintla

    * Panuco

    * Veracruz

    * Xalapa

    * Orizaba

    * Cordoba

    * Naranjos Amatlan  

    * Tantoyuca

    * Poza Rica de Hidalgo

    * Perote

    * Coatzacoalcos

    * Tuxpan

See the map and photo gallery at this site, http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Other/Zetas'_Communications_Systems.

Via Hispanically Speaking News, “Zetas’s High Tech Narco-Communications Central Seized (VIDEO).” 21 November 2011:

Communication equipment valued at $350,000 was seized by Mexican army elements in Torreón who raided a home known by Zeta narcos as “The Central.”

The $350,000 worth of equipment, was used by the Zetas for the control and coordination of their criminal cells as well as to monitor security forces to evade capture.

Army elements seized a central processing unit as well as 2 high capacity hard drives, long-range broadband digital radio equipment, networked laptops, 63 digital radios, 59 analog radio units with multiple accessories and a digital ICOM radio to communicate with aircrafts from the ground and 24 cell phones.  Mexican authorities also found several doses of cocaine [1].

Via Associated Press, “Mexican Army Dismantles Gang’s Antennas, Radios.” Thursday 1 December 2011:

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexican army troops dismantled a telecommunications system set up by organized crime in four northern states, authorities said Thursday.

The Defense Department said soldiers confiscated 167 antennas and 166 power supplies that gang members used to communicate among themselves and to monitor military movements.

The operation also netted more than 1,400 radios and 2,600 cellphones in the border states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and Coahuila and in the state of San Luis Potosi, a statement said.

The army hasn’t said which cartel was affected.

During the summer, Mexico's navy dismantled a communication system used by the Zetas cartel in the Gulf state of Veracruz. The Zetas have a strong presence in all four of the states involved in the army's operation….[2].

Via Ronan Graham, “Mexico Seizes 'Zetas' Communications System.” In Sight. Friday 2 December 2011:

Mexican army troops have dismantled a sophisticated communications network, believed to have been operated by the Zetas drug gang to conduct internal communications and monitor the movements of the security forces.

A statement from the Defense Department (SEDENA) said that military personnel dismantled the network in the northern border states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, San Luis Potosi and Tamaulipas following a 12-month operation.

Although the statement did not give the name of the drug cartel operating the network, the Zetas have extensive operations in these areas.

The military confiscated more than 1,400 radios, 2,600 cell phones and computer equipment during the operation, as well as power supplies including solar panels, according the Defense Department.

The equipment was found in rural, sparsely populated areas of the four states. According a military source, the antennas were painted green to blend in with the surroundings…[3].

An extensive collection of photos of this equipment can be found at “Desmantelan red de comunicación de Los Zetas.” El Universal.com.mx. Miércoles 14 de diciembre de 2011, http://fotos.eluniversal.com.mx/coleccion/muestra_fotogaleria.html?idgal=11883.

External Analysis:

Concerning the initial operations against Los Zetas communication system, per the STRATFOR analysis “Zetas Communications Network Disrupted in Veracruz,” Mexico Security Memo: Zetas Communications Network Dismantled. 13 September 2011:

The Mexican navy on Sept. 8 dismantled a communications network used by Los Zetas throughout Veracruz state. Among the equipment seized were mobile radio transmitters, computers, radio scanners, encryption devices, solar power cells and as many as seven trailers that served as base stations, according to media reports. A spokesman for the Mexican navy said some 80 individuals have been arrested over the past month in connection with the operation, itself the result of months of work by naval intelligence officers.

Los Zetas have been known to utilize more sophisticated communications networks than other cartels, due in large part to the organization’s origins in military special operations. The Zetas needed to augment sparse communications in some areas they control, and the Veracruz network likely was for the purpose of “off the grid” communications. Since cellphones are relatively easy for authorities to monitor, Los Zetas have sought to diversify their telecommunications capabilities, a fact of which Mexican authorities are aware.

It is possible that the seizure of this communications equipment means the navy is preparing to launch operations to push the Zetas out of the Veracruz port region. Indeed, a navy spokesman said the immediate result of the operation was the disruption of the Zetas’ “chain of command and tactical coordination.” If the navy is about to engage the Zetas in Veracruz, dismantling the Zetas’ communications network would be one of the first moves it would make….[4].

Concerning the Nextel phones, the networks themselves, and issues of OPSEC (operational security) and encryption, the initial outside analysis conducted by Tim Wilson, “The Zetas Take to the Air,” In Sight. Friday 9 December 2011, states:

…Notable in the most recent seizure were [1]354 Nextel radio phones— a higher radio take than in previous busts. The seized Nextel radios work on Nextel’s Conexion Directa network, a digital two-way radio “push-to-talk” cellular service that allows for free private calling with selected users. This service is difficult to hack, yet functions much like a police or taxi dispatcher. Up to 100 users can be connected free of charge, with capabilities extending even to cross-border calling. Anything less secure would put the group in an odd situation, i.e., worried about getting hacked itself.

However, it’s also clear from the seizures that the Zetas may not have the firmest grasp of the technology just yet.

Given the transmitter equipment being seized by the Mexican military, for example, it is obvious that the Zetas cartel has also been buying commercial-grade telecommunications gear and establishing their own open-band transmission system with basic encryption— completely independent of Nextel’s licensed spectrum.

Even with software-based security protocols bolted on to the system, it is likely that the Zetas are exposing themselves to “man-in-the-middle” eavesdropping by Mexican authorities. From a purely technological perspective, this would be difficult to do on the Nextel system, as cellular networks—and certainly Motorola’s iDEN technology, which Nextel uses— have rigorous security features, but it would be considerably easier in the unlicensed “white space” used for basic radio.

That said, the way around wireless encryption isn’t to hack it— that’s just too hard— but to know it, usually through what is called “social engineering,” which is essentially having access to human information. In the case of wireless technology, this means knowing the standard practices of technicians and thus creating the necessary safeguards to thwart break-ins.

Think of it like the encrypted Wi-Fi networks, which have solid technology but can still be hacked— if you have the right information. According to security experts contacted by InSight Crime, this is a common problem for all countries in Latin America, because usually it is the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who are responsible for configuring the routers and access points of their users, and they often repeat practices. In other words: they manage from predefined configurations, including passwords, allowing criminals to hack routers of a given type, potentially compromising others using the same ISP.

Now apply this to cellular networks. Given that Mexican authorities might have access to Nextel’s system, or simply know how to hack it based on an understanding of industry protocol, we should expect that the Zetas’ next move will be to set up a self-encrypted, autonomous communications network, even though the technology itself might be less robust. With that, they will most likely reach their target of a fully-functioning, independent comms network, if they haven’t already [5].

Analysis:

Veracruz State, September 2011

The communications hardware and supporting materiel seized by the Mexican navy (as identified in the news reports) is as follows:

• Mobile Radio Transmitters
• High Frequency Repeaters/UHF
• Computers
• Cables/Wiring
• Two-Way Radios
• Cell Phones (Burner)
• Batteries/Power Supplies/Solar Cells
• Encryption Devices
• Radio Scanners
• 13 Large Antennae (some Pool Cue to 20ft/Tree Concealment)
• 7 Radio Amplifiers
• 7 Trailer Trucks (Base Stations with Food/Clothing)
• 80 Personnel (Including 6 Police Officers)

The operation against Los Zetas communications network targeted their C² (command and control) and counter-intelligence (military communications scanning) capabilities for mostly northern and central municipalities in the state of Veracruz and for a section of the state of Tabasco (See the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups map). As mentioned in the STATFOR analysis this could signal a prelude to Mexican military operations against Los Zetas in the Veracruz port region. This was supported by the Mexican navy spokesman concerning the intended disruption of Los Zetas ‘chain of command and tactical coordination.’ Though geographically the seizures appear to be meant to isolate Los Zetas territories in northeastern Mexico in the states below the US border.

Of note is that this is a mobile communications system based on Semi-Trailer Trucks (like Peterbilts) mated with very large antennas to create a network grid in underdeveloped/rural areas. No evidence of sizeable weapons seizures were evident in the Mexican news video or photographs reviewed. This suggests that the base stations were relatively ‘soft assets’ and relied upon their mobility and remoteness as a form of defense. Still, weapons and body armor for some of the Los Zetas personnel serving as a small security force would be expected.

Torreón (in Coahuila State), November 2011

The communications hardware and supporting materiel seized by the Mexican army (as identified in the news reports) is as follows:

• 1 Computer (Central Processing Unit)
• 2 High Capacity Hard Drives
• Laptops (Networked)
• Long Range Broad Band Digital Radio Equipment
• 1 Digital ICOM Radio (for Ground to Air Communication)
• Scanners [Not Identified/Required for Monitoring Ability]
• Antenna(s) [Not Identified/Required]
• Cables/Wiring [Not Identified/Required]
• Batteries/Power Supplies [Not Identified/Required]
• 63 Digital Radios
• 59 Analog Radio Units (with Accessories)
• 24 Cell Phones

It was estimated in the reports that the value of this equipment is $350,000. The equipment was found at a fixed site— a residence known as ‘The Central’— which provided C² (command and control) and counter-intelligence (military communications scanning) capabilities for Los Zetas in the urban area of Torreón. Whether this site was raided prior to the December seizures/or was simply an early phase in the seizures in Coahuila state is unknown. No evidence of sizeable weapons seizures were reported in English language reports—though, as a fixed C² asset, hardening of the residence and a weapons caches inside of it should be considered a standard operating procedure. Four Los Zetas personnel arrests were mentioned at this fixed site [6].

Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, and Tamaulipas States, December 2011

Per the SEDENA (Mexican Ministry of Defense) statement, the following hardware was seized in this operation:

Habiendo detectado, desmantelado y asegurado un total de:

    * 167 ANTENAS. [Antennas]

    * 155 REPETIDORAS. [Repeaters; Receivers/Transmitters]

    * 166 FUENTES DE PODER. [Power Supplies; Including Solar Panels]

    * 1,446 RADIOS. [Radios]

    * 1,306 CELULARES. [Cell Phones]

    * 1,354 NEXTELES. [Nextel Phones]

    * 71 EQUIPOS DE CÓMPUTO. [Computer Equipment] [7].

The sheer volume of equipment seized suggests a huge multi-state grid of fixed antennas and repeaters had been established by Los Zetas for their regional C² (command and control) requirements. This was a rural based system meant to be hard to detect (camouflaged) and self-contained, relying upon solar panel cells to cut down on battery/power maintenance requirements. Military communications monitoring capabilities were also mentioned in the news reports but are not evident in the equipment seizure manifest. Possibly a forensics review of the seizure pictures (not conducted in this note) would allow for the identification of scanner systems among the generic computer equipment listed. Since the equipment seizure in the state of Veracruz identified such scanners, the capability will undoubtedly exist—though it would be found in fixed and mobile C² Los Zetas facilities.

Operational Conclusions

Very little has been published on Los Zetas operations and intelligence ‘line and block’ organizational charts. The best work on this subject, now dated, has been conducted by Lisa Campbell and is based on the earlier Gulf and Los Zetas cartel alliance. Still, that work contains an intelligence organizational chart that identifies ‘Dirreccion’— approximately 20 communication experts providing C² support and counter-intelligence capabilities via police / military communications monitoring (assumed COMINT; electronic intelligence (ELINT) not known). See Fig. 2 from Campbell’s work [8]:

Reprinted from Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge 2011: 59.

The Los Zetas / Gulf cartel communications equipment identified as of early 2010 was as follows:

• Radio Transmitters
• Walkie-Talkies
• Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)
• Broadband Satellite Instant Messaging
• Text Messaging
• Encrypted Messaging
• Two-Way Radios
• Scanner Devices
• Modern Wiretapping Equipment
• High-Frequency Radios with Encryption and Rolling Codes [9]

How the recently seized Los Zetas communications equipment is ultimately related to their current operational and intelligence structures is unknown— such information represents classified SEDENA intelligence being utilized in an active counter-criminal insurgency setting. This is evident because, without question, the equipment seizures taking place over the last 4 months signify a component of a coordinated multi-state offensive against Los Zetas by the Mexican Federal government. This offensive is likely benefiting from US intelligence capabilities providing targeting support against the OPFOR (opposing force)— via general SIGINT (signals intelligence) and remote sensing assets (drone/satellite). This offensive is evident in at least five Mexican states (Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, Veracruz and possibly Tabasco).

A report had been filed by Chris Covert in October 2011 concerning the Laguna Segura counternarcotics operation which may represent a component of the Mexican government operations against the Los Zetas communications networks. Additionally, he noted “Last spring the national legislature, the Chamber of Deputies funded the addition of 18 new rifle battalions, most of which would be deployed in northern Mexican states” [10]. Covert linked it back to “A comprehensive security operation based on a framework used successfully in two Mexican southern states” [11]. Of note is how the counter-communications networks offensive against Los Zetas appears integrated into the broader counter-criminal insurgency strategy being conducted. That overarching strategy focuses on northeastern Mexico, and since early-2010, has been known as Operation Northeast Coordinated (Operación Coordinada Noreste). It represents a full scale Mexican federal governmental effort to take back territories controlled by both Los Zetas and the Gulf cartels [12]. One component of that strategy, which will eventually see the deployment of three of the new infantry (rifle) battalions, was recently highlighted in Mexican Cartel Strategic Note No. 10: Fortified Town (Burgward) Strategy Implemented in Tamaulipas [13].

Note(s):

1. See http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/notitas-de-noticias/details/zetass-high-tech-narco-communications-central-seized-video/11910/. The video link in the article may not function properly on some computer operating systems.

2. Posted at numerous news websites. See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=143034026.

3. See http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1925-mexico-seizes-zetas-communications-system. One photo of antennas seized at this link. Hotlinks to primary Mexican SEDENA and other documents in this article. The Borderland Beat site mirrors the In Sight article with the addition of additional pictures from the seizure. See http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/12/mexico-seizes-zetas-communications.html.

4. See http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1958-the-zetas-take-to-the-air. This analysis contains a hardware picture labeled “Antena Orizaba 1”.

5. Via Google’s cache of http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110913-mexico-security-memo-zetas-communications-network-dismantled.

6. From Mexican governmental report. “Los Zetas are slowly being dismantled: in Luguna Seura!” 19 November 2011, http://pikapvs.wordpress.com/2011/11/19/los-zetas-are-slowly-being-dismantled-in-luguna-seura/.

7. SEDENA, “Personal militar desarticula redes de radiocomunicación clandestinas.” Monterrey, N.L., a 1 de diciembre de 2011, http://www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php/sala-de-prensa/comunicados-de-prensa-de-los-mandos-territoriales/8104-1-de-diciembre-de-2011-monterrey-nl. The hardware seized is broken down by military zones.

8. Lisa J. Campbell, “Los Zetas: operational assessment.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., Narcos Over the Border. London: Routledge 2011: 59.

9. Ibid, 65. The sophisticated military style radios with the rolling encryption do not appear evident in the recent seizures of Los Zetas communications equipment.

10. Chris Covert, “Segura Laguna security operation begins.” Rantburg.com. 24 October 2011, http://www.rantburg.com/warticle.php?D=2011-10-24&ID=332129&HC=2. Derived from the following Spanish article “Llegan militares para plan Laguna Segura.” El Universal. Sábado 22 de octubre de 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/82661.html.

11. Ibid.

12. Gary J. Hale, Mexico’s Government Begins to Retake Northeastern Mexico. Rice University: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. 9 December 2011: 3. Concerning these communications networks this note is of interest: “The dismantled [Veracruz] network is thought to be part of a larger communications infrastructure erected by the Gulf cartel (when the Zetas were subordinate to the Gulf cartel) and that enabled realtime, handheld DTO communications from roughly Cuidad Acuña, Coahuila (across from Del Rio, Texas) in the northwest, to the Yucatan Peninsula to the east. This communications network, which is now largely disabled, previously allowed for continuous DTO command-and-control management of cross-border cartel operations.” p. 10.  Originally referenced to United States vs. Jose Luis del Toro Estrada aka “Tecnico,” United States District Clerk, Southern District of Texas, Case No. H-08CR616, plea agreement March 18, 2009.

13. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mexican-cartel-strategic-note-no-10.

Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America by Vanda Felbab-Brown, The Brookings Institution.

Public safety is increasingly determined by crime and security in urban spaces. How the public safety problem in urban spaces is dealt with in the 21st century as urbanization intensifies will determine citizens’ perceptions of the accountability and effectiveness of the state in upholding the social contract between the citizens and the state. Major cities of the world, and the provision of security and order within them, will increasingly play a major role in the 21st century distribution of global power. In many of the world’s major cities, law enforcement and social development have not caught up with the pace of urbanization, and there is a deep and growing bifurcation between developed and reasonably safe sectors of economic growth and social advancement and slums stuck in a trap of poverty, marginalization, and violence. Addressing the violence and lifting the slums from this trap will be among the major challenges for many governments.

There are many forms of urban violence. This article presents some of the key law enforcement and socioeconomic policy lessons from one type of response to urban slums controlled by non-state actors: namely, when the government resorts to physically retaking urban spaces that had been ruled by criminal or insurgent groups and where the state’s presence had been inadequate or sometimes altogether nonexistent. Its focus is on Latin America—specifically Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica; but its findings apply more broadly and are informed by similar dynamics between non-state actors and state policies in places like Karachi, Pakistan, and Johannesburg, South Africa...

When is a revolution over, completed, fulfilled?  Traditionally, we prefer to quantify revolutions as ending in a win, loss, or negotiated settlement.[1]  While this framework is helpful for shaping theory, it neglects that reality is often much more complicated and messy.  As John Maynard Keynes said, “it is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique for thinking, which helps the possessor to draw correct conclusions.”  Simply put, it is only a guide towards understanding history and human nature.

For instance, the American Revolution did not end with an American colonist’s win over the British Empire.  Rather, the conflict was the beginning of a long, arduous process that continues today.   As Richard Edens notes, “the American Revolution created an imperfect union.  In addition to legalized and racialized enslavement in a land of equality and freedom, the limited power state of the 18^th century was inadequate for the dynamism of 19^th century industrial capitalism rather than an economy dominated by agriculture.  These unresolved and irresolvable tensions led to the Civil War.”[2]

 James McPherson in the conclusion of his book on the Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, writes,

. . . when secessionists protested that they were acting to preserve traditional rights and values, they were correct. . . .  The South’s concept of republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the North’s had.  With complete sincerity the South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the founding fathers – a government of limited powers that protected the rights of property and whose constituency comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white race undistributed by large cities, heartless factories, restless free workers, and class conflict. …  Their secession was a pre-emptive counterrevolution.  …  ‘We are not revolutionists,’ insisted James B.D. DeBow and Jefferson Davis during the Civil War, ‘We are resisting revolution . . . .  We are conservative.[3] 

The tensions of an imperfect union continue to this day with a re-revolution and a counter-revolution, an on-going revolution for a changing context and resistance to revolution and a changing context.[4]   

In his seminal work, Rethinking Insurgency, Steven Metz challenged our community to rethink the existing assumptions and relearn how to counter insurgencies.[5]  Moreover, over the past decade, scholars challenged the accepted military definition that an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”  

Yet, with all the evidence, scholarship, theories, and analysis, we continue to muddle through small wars.  Why?  Perhaps, we often choose mass over maneuver and speed over subtle influence in attempts to control the problem.  Small wars are wicked problems.  If we continue to plug and play the latest "new" idea to tame a problem, then we will just muddle along and only make the problem worse.

In the last decade, we jumped from pre-emptive war to counterinsurgency, and we are now moving to Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/Security Force Assistance (SFA) without a serious debate, informed discussion, or collaborative endeavor.  There is no imagination.  There is no fully formed, holistic, comprehensive strategy.  We continue to muddle in tactics bypassing strategy.

Today, we are in a time of unprecedented economic, environmental, technological, and political change.  “The Agricultural Revolution was a roughly 3,000-year transition, the Industrial Revolution lasted 300 years, and this technology-led Global Revolution will take only 30-odd years. No single generation has witnessed so much change in a single lifetime.”[6]  We could be facing a generation of revolution as changes occur in the Americas, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.

Before we can hope to distill any lessons learned from this past bloody decade of war and rewrite the existing counterinsurgency manual^[7][8] and find a suitable foreign policy for this new century, perhaps we should first seek to better understand the nature of revolution. 

We need to start rethinking how we see revolution.  One place to start is with the great contributors at Small Wars Journal.

For instance, Col (Ret.) Robert C. Jones’s proposes that we relook our definition and consider,

Insurgency is an illegal political challenge to government, rising from a base of support within some significant and distinct segment, or segments, of the populace; and employing any mix of violent and non-violent tactics.[9]

This is just a primer to help us move past the COIN, CT, FID, and SFA debate in order to start thinking about strategy.  Perhaps, if we look at our own history, see that the United States is still a revolution in process, an imperfect union; it can help guide us towards better understanding the world around us.  Before we try to change the world around us, perhaps we should first seek self-awareness.

In the upcoming weeks, we will examine recent scholarship that argues that we should consider the Civil Rights Movement as an insurgency.