Ignore Phase 1 at Your Peril: A Call for Better Exercises
NATO rarely, if ever, exercises the deployment to and operation of the force in an environment that is under “hybrid” attack.
NATO rarely, if ever, exercises the deployment to and operation of the force in an environment that is under “hybrid” attack.
If we have our decisive conditions wrong, we will construct the wrong effects and wrong measurements. It doesn’t matter how good our actions may be.
Danish philosopher Kierkegaard noted almost 200 years ago, “There are only two ways to be fooled. One is to believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to believe what is true.”
Design thinker and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal, Major Ben Zweibelson has been published in the recent issue of National Defense University’s PRISM journal. His article, titled “Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications” (p. 87) may look familiar to SWJ readers that follow Ben’s design work. He based this most recent article on his previous design articles published here at Small Wars Journal. Ben expressed to our editors that many of the concepts in this new article were made possible by the many helpful and insightful comments by SWJ readers on Ben’s previous articles published here. Small Wars Journal is encouraged to see fellow military publications engaging in the continuing design debate over concepts, methodology, and application in strategic and operational situations.
American leaders secured victory by reviewing the strategy and making corrections. Conversely, Tripolitan leaders placed their faith in a comfortable, outdated strategy.
Why acronyms are ruining shared military understanding.
Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the cause.
Making IPB an “entire staff” process is critically important to achieve shared understanding of the various mission variables.