On Counterinsurgency: Thoughts on the Re-write of Field Manual 3-24
Grant Martin offers his thoughts on the rewrite of FM 3-24 and more realistic and sustainable COIN efforts.
Grant Martin offers his thoughts on the rewrite of FM 3-24 and more realistic and sustainable COIN efforts.
In a timely offering, Butch Bracknell considers the implications of Quran burning and other slights in Afghanistan, real or perceived, to find that perception is what matters.
Youssef Aboul-Enein and David Trandberg take a look back into Libyan history to examine Arab insurgency tactics.
Michael V. Rienzi lays out possible Iranian responses to a U.S. attack.
Alex Verschoor-Kirss provides an interesting look at a case of cultural insurgency: the Estonian Forest Brothers movement.
I enter the COIN argument to say that the debate is misplaced in an article at Foreign Policy's Af-Pak Channel.
Before arguing about counterinsurgency as a tactic or a strategy, we must first acknowledge a key point: America did not enter any of these wars (going back to Vietnam) as a counterinsurgent or a nation-builder. America entered these wars with ill-defined strategic goals, the result of lowest common denominator bureaucratic negotiations. These goals were not sufficiently thought out, clearly stated, or properly subscribed to by the government writ large, resulting in nearly immediate drift. This fact should point us toward the true roots of the problem.
Steven Metz writes about the psychology of insurgents. It is not mirror-image political concerns that they are after, but psychological needs.
Mike Few interviews civil war historian Mark Grimsley, research affiliate at The Ohio State University and author of several books, about reconstruction and insurgency.