counterinsurgency

Insurgents have a symbiotic relationship with their popular support base. The people provide money, food/supplies, new recruits, and intelligence while the insurgents provide protection, advancement of social, economic, and political aims, and social services, e.g., education and health care. Oppressive regimes attempt to separate the insurgents from their popular support base, that is according to Mao Zedong, to dry up/divert the water (popular support base) in which the fish (insurgents) swim. The FBR organize-train-equip model design is worthy of study by the unconventional warfare community for its potential applicability to support insurgences through strengthening the bonds and rapport between insurgents and their popular support base.

Greater attention has been drawn in recent years to the atrocities committed in Balochistan. The decades-long insurgency has galvanized the nation and cannot be resolved until there is better investment in civil efforts. The Supreme Court and its affiliated judicial bodies must convince the military to respect the law and be an example of human rights. The armed groups in Balochistan have largely defeated themselves through infighting and a fractured leadership system. Pakistan should seize this opportunity to address the core grievances that Balochistan faces.

The Syrian regime’s application of “reconciliation agreements” in northwest Syria risks accelerating the humanitarian situation for internally displaced persons and destabilizing areas previously liberated from ISIS. There are no longer viable options for relocating individuals from Idlib Governorate given the presence of Turkish or U.S.-led Coalition elements in the other areas that remain outside of the regime’s control.

The most significant weakness of the counterinsurgency efforts is that the Myanmar government has not addressed any of the root causes driving the ARSA insurgency. The Rohingya Muslims continue to be classified as stateless people due their lack of citizenship within Myanmar and the limited and nearly impossible methods for seeking naturalization or repatriation.

Perhaps the greatest thing that the American State Department could do for Afghanistan would be to bring members of the legislature and other key government officials to the United States and allow them to see the real impact of state and local governance in action. Showing them the effectiveness of local governance and democracy in places like Alaska and Montana might well convince them that decentralization could work better for them than the present system. Perhaps that would encourage decentralization. Tip O’Neill was right, all politics is local - and so is the heart of most insurgencies.

The “Grozny model” promises security and prosperity to the loyal Syrian enclaves, if they accept the distinct features of “Chechenization”.

This essay provides the perspective of a Foreign Service Officer who was involved in Vietnam in several capacities, including Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

Our leaders do not seem to understand insurgencies. Most of our approaches are ineffective, if not counterproductive. Too many lives have been lost due to ignorance and carelessness.

The “Bamarization” and militarization of the Burmese government gave rise to a proliferation of insurgent ethnic armed organizations and continuous conflicts.

Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s epic, 18-hour television series on the war in Vietnam left me feeling the same way that the war did: sad, depressed, disillusioned, and ready for it to end.