COIN

In civil wars like Syria’s, strength is not necessarily a product of popularity; often strength actually produces popularity because compliance is more important than winning hearts and minds.

Some of the major “lessons learned” by ISAF while conducting Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in Afghanistan

The Army has an unfortunate tradition of considering insurgent conflict a sideshow effort and relegating the study of insurgencies to the fringes of military science. The Philippines campaign is a prime example.

Cann’s book is very much a must read, especially considering the painfully limited Anglophone literature on the Portuguese Overseas War.

Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.