NATO Commander Breedlove Discusses Implications of Hybrid War

Sirs,

You are surely familiar with the Gerasimov Doctrine of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE, which appears to be working splendidly for Putin?

Russian Army General Valeriy Gerasimov articulated this doctrine in 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Science’s annual meeting. In 2014, his doctrine was officially adopted as Russian Military Doctrine. Was anyone in NATO paying attention?

Since then, Putin has effectively enacted almost every single plank of Gerasimov’s doctrine.

Gerasimov builds his concept of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE out of the doctrine of COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, which Thomas Schelling discusses in detail in his classic work on the subject, filling a hopper with examples from the Comanche in North America to the Mongols of Ghengis Khan. CD is the precurser of hybrid war and ambiguous warfare. Its orgins are found in tribal wars and tribal conflicts.

Another forgotten source for hybrid warfare is Professor Dean C. Worcester who was Teddy Roosevelt's man in the Philippines. Worcester was the first strategist to derive lessons about hybrid warfare from the US "Indian" wars and apply those lessons learned to conduct covert-type, anti-insurgent operations on foreign terrain (1890s). What Worcester articulates in his post-war memoires sounds very much like what you are describing as hybrid warfare today.

Coercive diplomacy and ambiguous warfare FAIL, as the scholar of war doctrine, Seymour Brown, points out, when open war breaks out. Putin knows that neither NATO nor the EU will engage him or his proxy Army in OPEN war.

In your "hybrid model," you don't take account of the current RUSSIAN practice of AMBIGUOUS WARFARE. Yet, Putin and his General are proving to be masterful shadow commanders.

As I have said elsewhere at SWJ, I don’t see us (NATO/EU) responding effectively to those who are ACTUALLY practicing what you appear to be preaching—namely ambiguous warfare. But Putin most certainly does put his money and hardware where his mouth and doctrine are.

This dispute is similar to the current US/KSA and US/Israeli dispute--reminds me of this quote that kind of sums up everything.

By the way it seems both the KSA and Israel are going it alone as they have written off the current US administration as nothing but interested in their 2017 legacy nothing more nothing less.

Notice how the US "leaks" intel info although old but in fact just as damaging in the ME.

Outside of four single sat photos released by the US taken over the Ukraine and around the Debaltseve fighting the US has released absolutely nothing that would rock the Russia boat even though the Russians have challenged them three times to release their data--ever wonder why?

Obama's recent actions, sadly, confirm the great Mideast scholar Bernard Lewis' dictum: "America is harmless as an enemy, (but) treacherous as a friend."

http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/032615-745366-was-release-of-n…

The differences between German and American views on Russia in Ukraine may very well be cultural. Since WWII there is a cultural inclination in Germany to shy away from war, so follows all of western Europe. The Germans alone suffered about 9 million total civilian and military deaths. The U.S. has no comparable experience to such heavy losses. The U.S. and Germany see Russia through different experiences, it should be no surprise how they interpret intelligence, the OE, or how they spin their views on Russia to to the public....for better or worse.

Outlaw -- at his March 25, 2015 1:35am comment below -- asks us if there is really anything new since the early 1980s re: hybrid (and political/unconventional?) warfare?

Herein suggesting that "the only difference between say 1983 and now is the internet, speed of mass communications i.e., social media, and new weapons technologies."

I must beg to differ.

As my argument below suggests, what is new is that the United States/the West, post-the Cold War, has (1) adopted the position that the Soviets/the communists held during the Cold War and, thus, has (2) ceded the moral high ground to our opponents -- wherever in the world they may be.

Explanation:

a. During the Cold War, the Soviets/the communists were the one's that were seen as being embarked on a crusade to impose their alien and profane political, economic and social preferences on others.

b. Post-the Cold War, it has been the United States/the West that has been seen in this light.

c. During the Cold War, the United States/the West could, in the face of the Soviet/communist threat to traditional ways of life, be seen as something of a "cultural defender."

d. Post-the Cold War, the United States/the West could (much as was the case with the Soviets/the communists during the Cold War) be seen as something of a "cultural destroyer."

e. Thus, during the "Soviets/the communists v. the Rest of the World" scenario of the Cold War, the United States/the West could often find common cause with the Rest of the World.

f. In today's the "United States/the West v. the Rest of the World" scenario, however, it is the Russians, the Chinese, the Islamists, etc., who can often find something akin to a common cause and, thus, can be seen to be employing somewhat common defensive rationales, rhetorics and techniques.

Thus, I suggest -- and specifically re: political, hybrid and unconventional warfare considerations today -- it is this amazingly new, different and, shall we say, "role reversal" backdrop and paradigm that must come to form the basis for our discussions.

Discussions that have (as the fate of the Soviets/the communists might indicate) exceptionally important implications.

And there is no current "disconnect" between NATO, SACEUR Breedlove and the National Command Authority Obama who is nominally the Commander and Chief of all US Forces---someone convince me there is no "disconnect" over Russia and the Ukraine and Europe.

The current European view is that he simply no longer cares as it is not on his "legacy list of things to do ie Cuba and Iran".

He can deal with Iran but not NATO where the Russian stated geo political goal is to disconnect the US from NATO and Europe--remember the recent Russian FM infowar messaging that stated Europe should not be following US Generals and Obama as it will lead them to disaster.

Bloomberg View ✔ @BV
.@joshrogin scoop: Obama snubs NATO chief at moment of crisis. http://bv.ms/1xxOrUO pic.twitter.com/Pb0BbES4YR

From that article the following sticks out--it seems that in three full days in DC the WH "light calendar schedule" somehow could not fit the NATO SG's visit in--how can that be in the days of at least Twitter?

Last Friday, at the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum, Stoltenberg talked about the importance of close coordination inside NATO in order to first confront Russian aggression and then eventually move toward a stable relationship with Moscow.

“The only way we can have the confidence to engage with Russia," he said, "is to have the confidence and the strength which is provided by strong collective defense, the NATO alliance."

“The only way we can have the confidence to engage with Russia," he said, "is to have the confidence and the strength which is provided by strong collective defense, the NATO alliance."

Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski told the Brussels Forum that there has been a worrisome lag between NATO’s promises of more defensive equipment for Poland and what has actually arrived, a blow to the alliance's credibility. “It’s very important and necessary for everyone to have the conviction, including the potential aggressor to have this conviction, that NATO is truly determined to execute contingency plans,” he said.

The White House missed a perfect opportunity to reinforce that message this week in snubbing Stoltenberg. It fits into a narrative pushed by Obama critics that he would rather meet with problematic leaders such as Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who will get an Oval Office meeting next month, than firm allies. The message Russian President Vladimir Putin will take away is that the White House-NATO relationship is rocky, and he will be right.

(Touched up a little.)

The context within which political warfare, hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare today are being contemplated was anticipated by Ambassador Paul Nitze in the early 1990s.

Herein, Ambassador Nitze voiced his concern that the victorious United States/the West, post-the Cold War, would come to adopt the thinking (universal values) and the associated practices (ignore sovereignty; impose one's political, economic and social preferences on others) that had been the purview of the former Soviet Union/the communists during the Cold War.

Thus, Ambassador Nitze suggested -- before we go down such a "role-reversal" road (we become the cultural aggressors rather than the cultural defenders) -- that we consider "one of the most important lessons of the past era;" which he believed was to be derived from the Soviet/the communists experiences of the past half-century.

This being that, in spite of communist leaders efforts -- for decades -- of trying to impose a common culture and society on others, they did not succeed.

Why? Ambassador Nitze suggested that the reason was "the near impossibility of erasing cultural ties, ethnic identities and social practices in a world where communications and ideas cannot be suppressed."

Thus, Ambassador Nitze suggested that the United States post-the Cold War -- instead of going down the same road as the Soviets/the communists in the second half of the 20th Century -- adopt "political diversity" as our way forward.

As we know, the United States/the West ignored Ambassador Nitze's such warnings and suggestions and, accordingly, paid the price.

It is against this backdrop (that we are the one's who are now seen as attacking/undermining sovereignty and attempting to impose our alien/profane way of life and way of governance on others) that we must understand the common strategy, the common narrative, and the common defensive measures which are being undertaken by the Rest of the world.

In this regard, and re: the Russians/Putin specifically, consider this from the Economist:

" ... Mr Putin’s purpose is not to rebuild the Soviet empire—he knows this is impossible—but to protect Russia’s sovereignty ... "

" ... When thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets demanding a Western-European way of life, the Kremlin saw this as a threat to its model of governance."

"Russia feels threatened not by any individual European state, but by the European Union and NATO, which it regards as expansionist. It sees them as “occupied” by America, which seeks to exploit Western values to gain influence over the rest of the world."

“We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots, including their Christian values,” said Mr Putin in 2013. Russia, by contrast, “has always been a state civilization held together by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox church.”

"The Donbas rebels are fighting not only the Ukrainian army, but against a corrupt Western way of life in order to defend Russia’s distinct world view."

http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukra…

Thus, it is via this "West v. the Rest" narrative, which essentially suggests a role-reversal for the United States (now seen by all the world as the destroyer of individual cultures) that not only the Russians but also the Chinese and various entities within the Middle East and elsewhere are able to effectively stand against us.

The Soviets/the communists -- during the Cold War and with amazing political/hybrid/unconventional warfare capabilities -- were unable to overcome the fundamental truth of their untenable position.

The United States/the West, to suffer this same fate, and for much the same reason?

Something to consider (i.e., the wrong political objective, of fundamental and comprehensive outlying state and societal transformation, thus, the same goal the Soviets/the communists had during the Cold War) before:

a. Going further down the political/hybrid/unconventional warfare path so as to

b. Attempt to overcome such "natural" resistance -- as is described above.

(Note: This, as we know, did not work for the Soviets/the communists.)

General Breedlove is in fact frustrated due to several things;

1. he knows after watching events unfold in the Ukraine that any C-UW strategy, tactics and then deployment takes a "total whole of government approach" and that as they say "ain't never going to get off the ground" when one has to get 28 yes votes just to change a word in any joint doctrine document at ACT.

2. he has seriously now fully understood and watched daily the Russian "informational conflict" at work and to counter that alone will cost the US and NATO well north of a billion in start up costs. Russia paid out in budget money just for their own 113 TV and radio stations in 113 countries a billion plus and have budgeted 700M USDs for next year--that is not counting their social media troll business based on St. Petersburg where 300 plus are employed 24 X 7 365.

If one cannot control the daily narrative and the daily news cycle with all media forms especially the social media--do not even get into an informational conflict as you have already lost it.

I count currenly four different infor war initiatives that have started--Ukrainian, NATO, DoS and the EU is considering starting an operation long term. what is needed is a centrally controlled and driven operation in all major languages spoken in Russia AND in real time.

3. he knows that from a tactical level he is seeing a well orchestrated joint conventional and SOF operation which again "ain't going to happen" inside 28 countries--try getting a SF decision on something that involves the SF international training site where only six NATO members are involved.

4. he is seeing a National Command Authority unwilling to make decisions for a number of reasons 1) do not want to disturb the legacy after 2017, 2) need Russian support on Iranian deal, 3) soft power preferred and no inkling to even use the threat of hard power even if treaty after treaty has been basically violated by Russia to include the INF, 4) absolutely no understanding of Putin and current Russian influencers.

Remember the NCA is not a product of the Cold War veteran generation nor was he educated during that period of time.

UW as being currently practiced by Russia, China and Iran have been basically successful-- we are simply coming late to the party as we focused way to long on two wars around COIN that should have never been fought to begin with.

A typical "hybrid warfare' day today in and around the Ukraine and Russia and one then wonders by General Breedlove is frustrated--and this is just the social media side of the house?

It's #Ukraine or Bust: https://goupillon.wordpress.com/2015/03/24/rus

So, the #Russia|n's are breaking Minsk by preventing @OSCE inspecting, verifying heavy weapons withdrawal in #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/aKusRSMQEK

WHAT??? FORMER PUTIN ADVISOR SAYS #RUSSIA SHOULD DECLARE WAR ON #BALTICS AND #POLAND http://upnorth.eu/former-putin-advisor-says-russia-should-declare-war-o… …

#Russia wants own international tribunal for war criminals to replace #Hague court "that depends on sponsors of the war crimes in #Ukraine"

It is interesting to read about Gen Breedlove's frustration with Russia's actions in the Ukraine. In my view this is what happens when NATO apparently has a paradigm that seems to embrace the view they are either at peace or war, and adversaries don't cross the line that equates to conventional war NATO is at a loss of what to do.

While the impact of globalization changes many things (strategic considerations based on relations between actors), underlying the changes is a persistent continuity. Dave's comments below on UW are certainly worth thinking deeply about, and I would only add that the USSR had similar plans for Western Europe that NATO was well aware of, and were allegedly prepared to counter. Maybe it is time to dust off and update old plans? Maybe NATO nations need to invest more in counterintelligence to get as far left of bang of possible. To prevent the Russians from achieving their goals by establishing decisive local political conditions via subversion in the first place?

I'm not convinced you counter UW with UW, but you certainly have to understand UW to counter it. We shouldn't hesitate, the CJCS should mandate that UW as a concept is a mandatory part of joint and service professional military education. Assuming our interagency partners have anything that comes to close to a professional development program they should also gain an awareness of this form of warfare also. It all too often seems we're driving blind. Having sat in numerous intelligence briefs over the past few decades I have noted a shift from when they used to address subversion and other UW activities, to now getting a blank stare if you ask an analyst if country X or Y is conducting this type of activity. This is why I think one of the most important comments Gen Breedlove made in this interview is,

"What the military needs to do is to use those traditional military intelligence tools to develop the truth. The way you attack a lie is with the truth,”

Excerpt:

QUOTE: One of the first aspects of the hybrid war is to attack credibility and to try to separate a nation from its support mechanisms, the general said.

"Informationally, this is probably the most impressive new part of this hybrid war, all of the different tools to create a false narrative," he said. "We begin to talk about the speed and the power of a lie, how to get a false narrative out, and then how to sustain that false narrative through all of the new tools that are out there."

Military tools remain relatively unchanged, he said. "But how they are used or how they are hidden in their use, is the new part of this hybrid war," the general said. "How do we recognize, how do we characterize and then how do we attribute this new employment of the military in a way that is built to bring about ambiguity?" END QUOTE

The question is are we able to operate within this type of warfare which can perhaps also be characterized as political and unconventional warfare. While we think what is happening with Russia in Ukraine and Crimea is new if we look back to our own doctrine we can see parallels (and we do not even have to go back to George Kennan's 1948 memo on political warfare. (http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm) Below is an excerpt from the no longer published DOD Encyclopedia from 1997. (http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp-encyclop(97).pdf)

QUOTE: UW is the military and paramilitary aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement and may often become a protracted politico-military activity. From the U.S. perspective, UW may be the conduct of indirect or proxy warfare against a hostile power for the purpose of achieving U.S. national interests in peacetime; UW may be employed when conventional military involvement is impractical or undesirable; or UW may be a complement to conventional operations in war. The focus of UW is primarily on existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements. Special operations forces (SOF) provide advice, training, and assistance to existing indigenous resistance organizations. The intent of UW operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerabilities by advising, assisting, and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic or operational objectives.

When UW is conducted independently during military operations other than war or war, its primary focus is on political and psychological objectives. A successful effort to organize and mobilize a segment of the civil population may culminate in military action. Strategic UW objectives may include the following:

• Undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of the target authority.

• Neutralizing the target authority’s power and shifting that power to the resistance organization.

• Destroying the confidence and will of the target authority’s leadership.

• Isolating the target authority from international diplomatic and material support while obtaining such support for the resistance organization.

• Obtaining the support or neutrality of the various segments of the society. END QUOTE