In “Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia” Yegor Gaidar writes “[w]e are not the first to suffer post-empire nostalgia, which permeates the Russian consciousness today. It has occurred in history more than once. The Soviet Union was not the first empire to collapse in the twentieth century, but it was the last. … The problem for a country dealing with post-imperial syndrome is that it is easy to evoke feelings of nostalgia for the lost empire.”[i] It is easy to see the effect of the “post-imperial syndrome” in how the Russian population supports Putin’s actions in the Crimea. What may be less easy to see is how that syndrome is affecting us.
When the Soviet Union fell apart the United States was an unchallenged military leviathan; the only superpower on the planet. Our military divided the earth into sectors of military control overseen by geographical combatant commanders. We projected power across the globe, and we still do. However, since we won the Cold War the U.S. military has been involved in two less than totally successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those wars we fought an enemy who did not use the conventional tactics and systems that we had perfected over the last half of the twentieth century. As those counterinsurgency operations come to a close the military today looks to regain its past prominence as a conventional fighting force.
Russia’s land grab has offered us that opportunity. This new confrontation in Europe comes complete with convenient historical examples. Russia, with its quasi-dictatorial leadership, makes the perfect enemy. We can see the long shadow of Hitler in his actions, replaying the events of Czechoslovakia in 1938, only the first steps in his quest for German “living space”. Further, this is the Soviets, … err, … I mean, the Russians we are talking about. It was not that long ago that they were a threat to capitalist societies around the world. History dictates that we must act now. There is the added bonus of the Russians being a conventional force. We know how to fight them. Most of the equipment we now have was designed in the era where BMPs, T-90s, and Hind-Ds were the threat to defeat.
But before we jump into this with both feet, perhaps it is worth considering Sun Tzu’s advise to know not just your enemy, but yourself. How much of our interests in re-engaging Russia in a battle of wills is an attempt to regain our own former military glory? Secretary Gates characterizes Putin’s actions this time around as a direct challenge to America – Putin had “thrown down a gauntlet.”[ii] Putin’s action is not about Russians in Crimea or even Russian territorial and military interests there. In reading blogs on places like the Small Wars Journal one would believe that the Ukrainians are simply caught in the cross-fire between Russia and the United States, helpless pawns in the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R., Round Two. Why do we choose to characterize the situation this way? Perhaps it is because we are also trying to regain our former military glory. Here is an enemy the entire country can fear. Putin is Stalin and Hitler all rolled into one. Here too, is a military we can confront on conventional terms where we have the clear advantage. This is the perfect combination to provide us the opportunity to reassert our dominance and regain our status as the undefeatable military leader of the world!
So before we turn the Kremlin into radioactive ash, we need to consider that the world is no longer a bi-polar place. This is not capitalism versus communism. Putin is not after “living space.” He has extra-territorial aspirations, but he is probably not looking to invade France. Our allies in Europe have their own interests in how this confrontation plays out that may not align with our need to beat Russia into submission. More important, we need to understand how our own recent history is affecting our decision making process. We should not let nostalgia motivate our response; two former enemy’s both attempting to regain past glory is a recipe for disaster.
If we recognize how our history is affecting how we view this situation, then perhaps we can make some rational long term decisions on how to deal with a leader trying to regain his nation’s former status. If we fail to recognize our own nostalgia, then we are likely to see only what we want to see, and make the kind of mistakes reminiscent more of WWI than of WWII.
End Notes
[i] Gaidar, Yergor. “Collapse of an Empire: Lessons from Modern Russia.” Translated by Abtonia W. Bouis. 2007. Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution Press. P.
[ii] Gates, Robert M. “Putin’s Challenge to the West: Russia has thrown down a gauntlet that is not limited to Crimea or even Ukraine.” The Wall Street Journal. March 25, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579460183854574284 (accessed April 15, 2014)
Comments
Ned---that is the reason I found the Putin comment about the RSA in Interfax today revealing---he is thinking the same thing---actually a small remark but it reflects the subtle undertone of hope the RSA will not do it.
I am not so sure he fully understands the deep RSA dislike of Russian support for Assad especially since Russia is the major weapons supplier.
And as they say hope is not a strategy.
By the way it was reported once and never again and never explained which they do on other occasions.
Outlaw-09,
I have read this several times from you and you are absolutely right about turning the Russian blackmail on its head. I had not commented because I was caught up in justifying my views and deferred to your perceptivness. Like Germany, the Saudis will step up if we make a concerted call to coordinate sales from the strategic petroleum reserve with their leading OPEC to suppress prices. If it is too late to install some military companies in Ukraine, this option becomes all the more paramount and immediate. Especially since, if Russia does make Ukraine a satellite, the Putineers will not only hold out the possibility of an oil black-mail but will control much of the basic foodstuff in Europe.
Thanks for alerting the rest rest of us.
Ned.
Dayuhan---selling sour oil out of the USs SOR for a period of one year coupled with the RSA lowering their own sour oil prices will bankrupt the Russian Central Bank-Russian needs at a minimum of 85USD per barrel all the price has to do is sink to 60 USD actually the Russian CB calculates it needs 105 USD--it is that easy and Putin stated as much today with a comment referenced from Interfax.
"It's easy to speculate on hypothetical responses to hypothetical actions, but the real-world options are limited and not terribly attractive."
Yes it is actually easy and this process is what truly killed the SU---it had nothing to do with our heavy military spending.
Yes it is that easy.
By the way the US government ran this scenario several weeks ago and the price dropped immediately after their sale announcement to 85 USD and that was without the RSA support.
Noticed the US WH trip to the RSA---yes it was over their deep differences but I am betting the oil issue was discussed as the RSA does not like Russian support for Assad and Putin knows this.
I don't think it's at all accurate to say that "We could have ended the Ukrainian adventure of Putin with true economic sanctions". The US economy is not closely linked to the Russian economy, and I don't think any package of US-only sanctions would be, or would have been, a significant deterrent. Europe has the economic leverage, but their will to use it is questionable.
I don't see anything terribly "new age" about the developments, and I don't think they are poorly understood. The understanding just doesn't offer much in the way of effective response. Economic sanctions require European participation and even with it will take time to bite. Even with a fairly harsh sanction package the Russians would be tempted to impose a fait accomplii and wait out the sanctions: they'd hurt Russia more than Europe, but who has the higher pain tolerance? A military bluff is unlikely to deter, as everyone in the picture knows the US isn't going to war over the Ukraine. It's easy to speculate on hypothetical responses to hypothetical actions, bu the real-world options are limited and not terribly attractive.
I continue to argue that Russia is an entity we now fail to understand and I think it has to do with our concept of "we won the cold war" now let's move on.
We overlooked developments in nationalism, we overlooked ethnic tensions in the former Warsaw Pact, we overlooked the development of massively strong Russian and eastern European criminal gangs---alone at one time in the Soviet Union there were over 136 distinct languages being spoke.
We over looked it due to our 13 year long war with jihadi's which took us out of Europe and virtually the rest of the world where they were not to be found.
Now we find ourselves caught out in left field trying to "understand" both Russia and Putin and it is actually not that hard.
The days of arguing US power can be projected are over---not a single combat solider or piece of armor is to be found in Europe these days---we argue that hey "soft power" is the greatest and through diplomacy all an be achieved if one just tries.
The real argument should be do we fully understand the use of unconventional warfare and the use of political warfare---both are the coming thing these days ie exactly what Russia is using and we have what as a counter strategy, nothing, nada, zip. We cannot even settle on a definition of unconventional warfare that makes sense and is not someone's preferred choice due to tuft wars.
We could have ended the Ukrainian adventure of Putin with true economic sanctions as well as could have the Europeans--but it would have hurt our businesses/economies---that is though exactly what Putin needs to see--are we ready to hurt ourselves in the name of a specific cause and idea?
Currently really doubt we are as a country ready for that thus one gets these nostalgic debates that really do go nowhere. Doubt seriously if you asked Americans to give up something for the greater good if it meant hurting themselves for a small country called the Ukraine---are you kidding.
My concern is the 300 other hot spots where the Putin doctrine can be applied to---have you noticed that no one is calling it in fact a Doctrine when it is one that goes to the Revenge of Geography or ethnicity or culture or language ---then what do we as a country do just stand by and say hey they have to solve it---not our problem or it does not impact my living style?
We preached in Iraq and AFG the Rule of Law and Good Governance but when a population on it's own stands up and declares what it wants even in the face of violence then we as a country run and preach caution.
Why---we have simply no strategy for any of these new age developments as our's is still locked in the 20th century.
So understanding Russian decision making and the why's behind it would be a good start especially Russian ethnic nationalism.
Outlaw,
I believe the author was making observations about American reaction to Russian aggression, not necessarily about the Russian aggression itself. It is our nostalgia for our past glory that the author is talking about; nostalgia for an era when the Soviet Union threatened every free country on the globe, as opposed to now where a regional power is flexing its muscle and igniting ethnic tensions.
The observations about WWI being closer to the current situation than WWII are most apt. Take the British justification for entering into WWI "Britain entered the war for two main reasons; one because they were under treaty with both France and Belgium, making them feel it was a “moral obligation” to defend them from the Central Powers. The second reason Britain entered the war was to justify the
principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed by the arbitrary will of strong overmastering power (Arnstein 321). (http://users.manchester.edu/Student/mrmorris/ProfWeb/BritishResearchPap…) Many of the comments I have read here use the exact same arguments, morale obligation and defense of the small, helpless country.
Personally, I have great respect for the power of ethnicity. There are many places on the globe where we are suffering from the Revenge of Geography. But that too, is another subject.
The author forgets the simple core problem---what happens when the population of a country identifies with their leader and accepts the concept of ethnic nationalism?
What happens when that leader convinces the population that the coming economic difficulties are the "fault" of the West thus they must tighten their belts and push for the greater empire. What happens when the entire population pines for a "lost empire".
What happens when history repeats itself as in 1905 when a Russian leading politician spoke about "we need a nice small war to win" and what did it get Russia in 1905?
What happens when a country armed with nuclear weapons rewrites the international rules of engagement/law meaning one country can take territory of another due to ethnicity, language and or culture.
The second core problem is how does one respond to ethnic nationalism that is accepted/expressed by a majority of the entire population of a country?
Do we now go back and redraw the existing territorial boundaries of all countries if there is a dispute concerning ethnicity, language and or culture which was settled in Europe with the Treaty of Westphalia and the falling of the Wall.
This really has nothing to do with how we view WW1 and 2- but it has a lot to do with how a population views the rule of law and good governance as defined by themselves and not by others.
A Russian business person told me today here in Berlin---we had big dreams after 1995 about our own economical development, how we could build new businesses and how our children would someday have good jobs and a better way of life and now.......? That is why he has never returned to Moscow and will never return.
Remember in the 1995 elections to the Duma--- a rather large number of former Communists lost their jobs in the first time ever democratically held elections.
The Germans had a saying in the late 30s "Heim ins Reich" and Putin is implementing that German idea.
Note the commonality of "post-empire nostalgia" in both the current Islamic and Russian worlds.
Should this similarity be seen in the same light as other similarities I have noted re: the context of modern (post-Cold War) conflict, to wit:
a. The West's efforts to transform other states and societies more along its (the West's) political, economic and social lines and, via these efforts, to incorporate these transformed states and societies more into the western sphere of influence,
b. The resistance of various population groups (examples: the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and the ethnic Russians in Ukraine) to these efforts, and
c. The assistance rendered to these resisting population groups by neighboring nations and like-minded/related peoples (example: the assistance offered -- by both the people and the states -- of Pakistan and Russia respectively).
Given this additional commonality, to wit: that of "post-empire nostalgia;" should this be rightfully added -- as item "d" -- to support my theory of the overall context of modern conflict (offered at "a" - "c" above)?
Brilliant. Utterly brilliant. Gates last memoir ended with something like "it was a glorious crusade."
The DC consensues is incompetent, many military leaders just want to protect their jobs until they can cash out in the private sector, and many Americans view war as a video game and diplomacy as social engineering with American PhDs as gods. I could post a million more things around here but what is the point. FID and Munich is everything. Nuclear doctrine? That is the not in the Barnes & Noble WW2 nostalgia section.
And the leadership all knew and still fronted in AfPak for their old cold war proxies and pets. Protectors my a$$. They are stupid enough to turn it all radioactive.
Interest, yes... but a specific request?
The other question, of course, remains over who will pay the costs. Given Europe's economic capacity and anemic defense spending, and given the economic stress on the US and the reality that the US really can't spend more on defense, it seems quite unreasonable for the American taxpayer to shoulder the burden of defending Europe.
Check out this DefenseNews.com article:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140416/DEFREG01/304160026/Poland-W…
Within the article you will find this quote:
<blockquote>“Poland is very much interested in increasing the allied American presence in Poland,” Siemoniak said.
“What’s important to us is to cover diverse areas with this presence,” he said. “But Army presence or [an] Army base would be a very visible testimony to the American boots on the Polish ground.”
The minister said he would use his discussions in Washington to “bring us closer to the solution.”
Siemoniak is traveling with a sizable Polish defense delegation. including Chief of Defence Lt. Gen. Mieczyslaw Gocul, for this week’s meetings.</blockquote>
Have any NATO countries asked the US to deploy armored forces to protect them? Wouldn't that be a NATO decision, not a unilateral American decision?
If NATO countries believe themselves to be threatened, they will of course discuss those perceptions, and their perceived needs, with NATO and the US. Hardly the place of the US to be telling others when they are threatened and what they need to avert threat.
You made this comment to Ned elsewhere:
<blockquote>I'm about your age, and if you think this is the most dangerous time we've lived in, I'd suggest re-examining the history.</blockquote>
True, given the prior possibilities of broad nuclear war. However, you mention MAD here but that does not appear to apply to states like Pakistan and India that could employ limited nukes because of a failed conventional defense or in retaliation for LeT nuclear terror for instance.
Elsewhere, either a Hezbollah or al Qaeda extremist group could smuggle a nuke to the U.S. not caring about the consequences or believing the source could be hidden. Would we nuke Saudi Arabia because Saudi national extremists with some Saudi rich guy's backing set one off in NYC? No way. MAD reduced the likelihood of WMD employment while extremism increases that probability.
<blockquote>What you're missing here is that long before the 70s started, the US and allies conceded all of eastern Europe before finding a place where a viable "tripwire" could be installed.</blockquote>
No mention of the 70s was made. Rather, a strong NATO presence worked for nearly 70 years and was considered an acceptable cost. That beefy presence is gone now. What little ground presence that remains is far from borders that are relevant. That may be beneficial for parked airpower from an A2/AD missile attack standpoint but it is unacceptable from a perspective of credible ground power to counter Russian armor.
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were Soviet responses to attempted revolutions in Eastern Bloc nations already under Soviet control. That is a major difference from Russian invasion of a NATO nation or one's falling under prior treaties as is the case in Ukraine.
Moving U.S. armor to NATO countries alone vs. Ukraine and asking for a Ukrainian buffer zone via federalism is one possibility as groups meet today in Geneva. The Ukrainians already said no to federalism. If Russia seizes east Ukraine and we announce repeatedly that we only are moving forces into NATO countries to defend them, there is little risk of nuclear escalation. Compare that to moving troops to Japan or Philippines or into adjacent oceans if China seizes the Senkakus. What is the difference? Are we expected to do nothing in response?
<i>We know how to deter them: armored boots on the ground on a border. That tripwire effect worked for nearly 70 years without blood shed.</i>
What you're missing here is that long before the 70s started, the US and allies conceded all of eastern Europe before finding a place where a viable "tripwire" could be installed. The US backed away from provoking war with the Soviet Union at the close of WW2, and backed away from provoking a fight with potential for nuclear escalation over Hungary in '56. That might have been considered "appeasement"... but at the end of the day, it worked. The Soviet Union rotted out from the inside, and the Cold War was won without roasting the human race. That sucked for Eastern Europe, yes... but would it have been better for them to have served as ground zero for a 3rd World War?
MAD is still in place. Deploying armed force on the other guy's border raises all kinds of possibilities, some of them potentially leading to extinction. That makes political leaders cautious: it's meant to. It's why the US backed off in Hungary, and why the Soviets backed off in Cuba a few years later. It doesn't mean surrender, it means looking for a place to draw your tripwire that can be enforced without excessive risk of a direct confrontation that serves nobody's interest.
Curmudgeon,
Thank you for a well thought out answer. Unfortunately for our discussion, the lag-time problem persists in the very good idea long-term of a training center in Poland or, perhaps, smaller ones in several eastern countries.
The other difficulty I still have is that Putin's -- I say Putin, because it is he and his fellow K.G.B. alums turned mobsters or oligarchs that are the source of trouble until now -- thinking is not static; his calculations will change as he registers the response he receives. The West is facing a slippery slope.
Aside from Crimea, no other eastern territory of Ukraine is the Russian population above 40%; as we fail to respond to that annexation and that of Transnistria (perhaps all of Moldova), Putin's calculation and view of risk will change, possibly lowering the threshold of the percentage of Russian population required to justify an intervention, especially in what may well look like a three year window of opportunity of appeasement.
Because the longer-term responses that we get right will take a year or more to manifest should not preclude imperfect but credible short-term responses. My view of risk, conditioned by being a risk manager in the international credit markets, is one of weighing the likelihood of alternate downsides.
While the more severe down-side of doing nothing (i.e., leading to a much bigger war) is likely to be less probable than that of some push-back, it is not sufficiently unlikely to -- at least in my mind -- be ignored in the face of currently sizable Russian capability and readiness.
So, our world views differ. The last source of confirmation for me lies in the BudaPest M.o.U. guaranteeing Ukraine's territorial integrity. True, it is not a treaty and thus it is not legally binding. Yet the great majority of our security cooperation agreements around the world are not treaties.
Reneging on obligations explicitly spelled out in the M.o.U. effectively demotes such agreements to being letters of preference and not letters of intent. That would damage our credibility with allies as they see their larger ally saying, "Well, depending upon how I feel that day, I will honour or forsake that agreement..."
Ned,
When I assess risk, I look at the worst case scenario and the most likely scenario (dah). The worse case is that Russia takes eastern Ukraine, possibly all of the Ukraine. Even then, I see no scenario where Putin enters Poland or Estonia (who I actually think is next on the Putin hit parade) because these are NATO countries. There may also be signals to China that the border islands are now fair game. The most likely scenario is that he goes into Eastern Ukraine.
Looking at three levels of action: 1) what we are doing now; 2) NATO forces in Kiev and Western Ukraine; or 3) American forces in Ukraine, including the East if required. COA #1 is low risk and unlikely to provoke a direct military confrontation. COA #2 is more provocative, but probably still won’t stop Eastern Ukraine from trying to secede. COA #3 is likely to provoke a direct military confrontation and place the US in an occupation situation somewhere between Iraq and Kosovo. Remember that Eastern Ukraine has a substantial Russian minority/majority, easily provoked with just a little help from their kinsman across the border. Border refuges are the key to successful insurgencies.
Without playing out the entire gambit, I like #1 with #2 if we are invited in. I am against a unilateral #3 since it is more likely to create instability than stability.
I believe that we are not going to stop events in Eastern Ukraine because there is a substantial Russian population who are going to want to return to the motherland. As others have pointed out, the borders are not where they should be. But I also believe that Putin’s expansionist policies only extend to where there is a substantial ethnic Russian population. I don’t think HE wants to become an occupier in a country where he is not wanted. We all have seen what that is like. He will not invade with a military force initially. He is more likely to use UW tactics similar to those used in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine to foment an ethnic coup. To do that, you need a substantial Russian poluation. Only after the coup, when he is "invited" in, will the tanks roll out.
I have no problem with moving an armor BCT or two into Poland. I would love to see NATO create a training center in Poland. Something where we kept a couple of BCT’s worth of equipment and we rotated units into, say three times a year, to conduct joint exercises with our NATO allies. A cross between NTC and Udari. But something like that will take two years to establish, at a minimum. Still, it would be an adequate response.
Dayuhan,
Two quick points of clarification. What I mean by non-kinetic military push-back is the deployment of troops along the eastern periphery of N.A.T.O. as MoveForward ably argues. The one difference is that I would send two or three companies of SOF to eastern Ukraine as 'police training' advisors and two or three companies from the California National Guard to western Ukraine for 'routine' military exercises.
Your criticism plays into the conceit of sending a trip-wire force somehow ratcheting up to a full military engagement quickly and inevitably. Though I caution against mind-reading, my intuition says that this non-sequitur in escalation is exactly what Putin is betting on. To be clear here, others with whom I agree have not argued that last point of SOF and N.G. in Ukraine, for very good reasons (e.g., the risk of miscalculation).
Otherwise, I defer to the deeper technical knowledge, military experience (of which I unfortunately have none) and the access to ground truth of Messrs Carl, MoveForward and Outlaw-09. Once more to be clear: I am not hiding behind them by passing the buck on them; their intelligence and principles necessarily shape my thinking for obvious reasons.
Lastly, where you and I differ (and where I differ with others like Curmudgeon), is my belief that the risks of an inadequate response -- yes, one I view as weak -- are much higher than taking smaller, decisive and immediate steps demonstrating a resolve that entail risk and are, therefore, to be pursued prudently.
I don't know what "non-kinetic military actions" you'd want to take in Ukraine, nor do I see what SOF would reasonably assigned to do. The US isn't going to war over Ukraine, and given the current state of the Ukrainian government, an effort to significantly raise indigenous capacity would take a long time.
The other issues are fairly peripheral, but... as far as I can see the effort to "install democracy" in Iraq was doomed from the start: if yo're going to walk away sooner or later, might as well make it sooner. I never wanted to see the US involved in Syria. There are no vital or pressing US interests art stake, and any number of things waiting to go wrong. We really aren't required to jump into everything.
The hazard policy-makers face, when trying to use history as a guide, is that they pick the wrong analogy. Yet picking the right analogy depends on picking that which remains congruent with the other fellow's thinking. Such complementarity requires the reading of minds, alien thinking; something that seems to be lacking when predicting the Putinista. As always, my concern is that the lag between when economic measures are imposed and when they kick-in creates a window of opportunity, perhaps and incentive, to accelerate aggression.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4495801/ukraine-dilemma-nut-shell
Again, it comes down to reacting by prediction or acting based on visible capability. With thugs circulating throughout Ukraine, agitators of unknown origin raising Hell in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as Transnistria plus 40,000 Russian troops 'exercising' on the border, I would focus on capability. (incidentally, I use the word thugs rather than Special Forces in this Russian case out of deference to our highly educated and skilled SOF soldiers.)
The West would be wise to take non-kinetic military actions to preclude a possibility of misreading of intentions; the SOF would be lead players in these measures. By the way, the forum from which the clip is snipped is worth the 1½ hours to watch. Please excuse my earlier digressions; they are intended to show that other questionable actors are watching this situation closely. The two hot situations -- Syria and Ukraine, in both of which Russia is intimately involved -- have thus far elicited from this Administration only surplus wheaties and unused TV-dinners. Not exactly robust.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?318898-1/russia-vladimir-putin
The U.S. can not fix everything but it can selectively exercise a muscular, non-kinetic humanitarianism, as a leader of the U.N. or N.A.T.O., with the SOF taking the lead. Such responses are relatively inexpensive in terms of a tight U.S. budget and pennies on the proverbial dollar should Ukraine or some other conflict-prone hot-spot erupt into a shooting war. Presence, not perfection is required now in Ukraine, particularly Crimea, and Eastern Europe. Surely, the trip-wires of Berlin, etc. were inadequate in the face of a full-scale Soviet attack on the first day. Yet, as better argued by others, they were sufficient to forestall an invasion over time.
Ned.
P.S. We had 50-75,000 troops in Iraq in 2010 when al-Maliki subverted democratic process of the election. President Obama did nothing -- no push-back nor a threat to draw down more quickly -- to pressure al-Maliki into the rightful transfer of power to Iyad Allawi. We gave that fuzzy logician eighteen additional months to consolidate his position under the protection of the U.S. Army. That was a classic case of our brothers and sisters in uniform presiding over or bailing out impoverished policy-making by civilians.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-russia-supports-syria
P.P.S. (http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.com/2013/08/letter-83-thoughts-on-syria-c…), I have elsewhere discussed what we might have done in Syria. Instead, President Obama presented us with the bogus choice of a large scale war or nothing. Cast in those terms, President Obama's decision appeared sound in Syria as it has in Crimea (with war being ruled out publicly). These (in)decisions appear sound but are not since they are shrouded in unsound terms (amply belied by the $4 billion of military supplies into Syria in 2012; three times the level of U.S. aid to Egypt, a country three times as large as Syria).
Do you seriously believe the US has the capacity to "fix" Iraq, Syria, and/or the Ukraine? I don't honestly see how failure to stick your crank into every available meatgrinder constitutes "absenteeism in leadership".
I'm about your age, and if you think this is the most dangerous time we've lived in, I'd suggest re-examining the history.
<blockquote>3. The lack of any push-back to P.M. al-Maliki's subversion of the Iraqi democracy, at the expense of Sunnis, is leading to a civil war in that beleaguered country, again with Saudis, Yemenis et al. killing Shi'ites and Iranians, quite possibly leading to an attritive intervention by Teheran, to make much of Iraq a wasteland.</blockquote>
Do you really believe those around President Obama are that callous (and smart) on your 1 and 2? Also, I don't think Iran would invade Iraq. Why would they and risk cutting off their permissive supply line to Syria that we would attack along with Persian forces? Iran already controls the part of Iraq the counts, right?;)
<blockquote>3. islamic violence in Syria and Pakistan could wind up with Hizbullah and al Qaeda having W.M.D.s (with an excited disposition to use them against Kashmir, Israel and each other to precipitate wider conflicts).</blockquote>
That is a big fear because we would not necessarily know who to retaliate against if the unknown group that used smuggled WMDs kept silent about it. For instance, who is responsible for this missing 777? Plus you left off the part of the Saudi and GCC creating their own nuclear deterrent against the Iranians with Pakistani help.
<blockquote>Jeez, what do these brainiacs in the White House talk about all day long? We live in the most dangerous period of my lifetime...I am 57 years young.</blockquote>
What do they talk about, hmmm: Domestic policy ways to further screw up the medical sector, suppressing homegrown-drilling thinking incorrectly that it will fix global warming created by India and China, protecting obscure species at the expense of jobs and drinking water, legalizing Democratic voters who are not U.S. citizens, offering more freebies to young Democratic voters, reducing gun rights, and the list goes on.
Forgive my cynicism. Like you, I recently have extra time on my hands as I search for a new job. Fortunately, I'm 59 so in a few months I'll be able to start spending my limited 401K money. Some seem to think we all are rich as they appeal to mom and pop and taxpayers to view the military as the problem instead of the domestic policy hiding behind the curtain. Military budget and force structure cuts created by sequester and de-emphasis of the Army are taking their toll. Gotta cut 25%...go after the contractors first. Unfortunately Soldier training and ultimately Soldier lives will suffer as a result and Soldiers/Civil Servants will be asked to do far more with far less.
MoveForward,
Beautifully stated. Look for the Administration's rationale on Iraq, Syria and Ukraine to be something along the lines of: if what we do not like is broken, don't fix it!
1. Syria has several adversaries fighting each other in a war of attrition, with Hizbullah and the Assad régime, aided by an increasingly committed (an over-extended Russia), fighting Islamic extremists and Saudi / Qatari proxies.
2. Russia will execute a direct or indirect roll-in of the Anschluß of eastern Ukraine. Since the other provinces to be sliced off are less than 40% Russian, there will be an insurgency that bogs down Russia in another war of attrition (think Chechnya writ large), dissipating Russian power by creating another wasteland similar to the Balkans, Syria and Lebanon.
3. The lack of any push-back to P.M. al-Maliki's subversion of the Iraqi democracy in 2010, now at the expense of Sunnis, is leading to a civil war in that beleaguered country, again with Saudis, Yemenis et al. killing Shi'ites and Iranians, quite possibly leading to an attritive intervention by Teheran, to make much of Iraq a wasteland.
To deflect the obvious questions of ducking commitments, the Administration will basically leak out that this inaction was all deliberate since those who hate America hate each other even more and are wasting each other's threat potential far away from home. What is missing in this reasoning, demoting it from sang-froid to excuse, is the utter disregard of the innocents to be killed, maimed, raped and displaced.
Common humanity demands that pro-active steps be taken to try to prevent this foreseeable outcome; your case for trip-wires makes sense. In actuality, I would favor placing troops in Ukraine (less than 1,000). With the absence of action to date, that idea may no longer be viable. Of course, the risk with this do-nothing excuse-making is that:
1. Iraq could degenerate into a much larger Arab-Persian war;
2. Russia could over-reach the current rewards of appeasement (as did Hitler) and precipitate a regional war in Eastern Europe; and,
3. islamic violence in Syria and Pakistan could wind up with Hizbullah and al Qaeda having W.M.D.s (with an excited disposition to use them against Kashmir, Israel and each other to precipitate wider conflicts).
These three elements do not contemplate actions by China or North Korea, possibly instigated by current absenteeism in leadership.
Jeez, what do these brainiacs in the White House talk about all day long? We live in the most dangerous period of my lifetime...I am 57 years young.
<blockquote>There is the added bonus of the Russians being a conventional force. We know how to fight them. Most of the equipment we now have was designed in the era where BMPs, T-90s, and Hind-Ds were the threat to defeat.</blockquote> We know how to deter them: armored boots on the ground on a border. That tripwire effect worked for nearly 70 years without blood shed. That tripwire was lost by downsizing our Army in Europe of any realistic mechanism to deter. Stateside heavy armor and a larger reserve component do not deter Russian armor, particularly in an era where we claim A2/AD threats exist that slow and endanger months of deployment.
<blockquote>So before we turn the Kremlin into radioactive ash, we need to consider that the world is no longer a bi-polar place. This is not capitalism versus communism. Putin is not after “living space.” He has extra-territorial aspirations, but he is probably not looking to invade France.</blockquote>The first sentence is both the crux of the problem and the solution. We have and must back allies against aggression. We know that we would never launch a nuclear attack against the Kremlin, and they know it too, as evidenced by this article where a nuclear exchange could have occurred in 1983 were it not for good judgment.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/04/the-slaughter-…
We know that no matter how many nuclear weapons the Russians or Chinese possess, they won't launch a nuclear strike either. What is left is the possibility of conventional attack from China or Russia against neighbors other than "France." Little guys don't matter to us, right? Except that when lots of little guys band together with the U.S., conventional deterrence is achieved. If we fail to place credible ground forces in NATO countries near the threat, no tripwire or true deterrence exists. If we put all our eggs into the AirSea basket coming up with all kinds of plans to penetrate adversary airspace to target their mobile/tunneled missiles, the rational decision-maker with access to nukes may become less rational.
If there really is a nostalgic group within the military, it pretty clearly is the USAF and Navy. The USAF has not had a major air-to-air engagement since Vietnam as evidenced by the lack of any aces for decades. The Navy has not had a major sea battle since WWII, which leaves them itching for a threat that does not exist...another nation's blue water navy. Meanwhile, countless active threat armies exist that outnumber our own, yet we plan to downsize our active Army to levels not seen since before WWII <strong>and</strong> leave them stranded in the U.S. where they deter little to nothing. We managed to afford a forward deployed Army for decades that prevented incidents such as we see now. Why is it too costly now? Could it be the increased costs of naval and airpower that hasn't been required in overwhelming numbers in decades?
<blockquote>However, since we won the Cold War the U.S. military has been involved in two less than totally successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.</blockquote>
What's wrong with this picture? Ukraine is only a symptom of the illness that led to insurgencies during stability operations. An argument could be made that parts of the Ukraine should be Russian just as parts of Afghanistan should have been a newly-created Pashtunistan, and parts of Iraq should have become independent of Shiite-government direction. That is the major lesson we should have learned from the insurgencies that followed Iraq and Afghanistan. Ill-conceived boundaries left intact lead to more problems during an occupation.
The Syrians and Russians know how to deal with such insurgencies. They smash them using barrel bombs in Syrian neighborhoods and level Grozny in Chechnya. We won't do that. Instead we must rely on allied relationships honored with "little guys" that are neighbors of those who would engage in aggression. Ukraine is not our ally but you can speculate how effective their insurgency could be against all those pipelines heading east should Putin threaten more than just Croatia and Eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, the addition of even a single spread out armored BCT in countries neighboring the Ukraine would create a line in the sand sorely missing in Europe today. Why is that lesson of the Cold War so hard to understand and thought to be so costly?