Update: And from "on the scene" at an U.S. Army Unified Quest pre-wargame event, Spencer Ackerman of Wired's Danger Room writes Army Brains: Kill PowerPoint, 'Counterinsurgency'. Also by Ackerman on UQ: Army Asks Itself: Shouldn't We Be Diplomats?
Comments
<b>Bill C.:</b>
If you mean that our 'leaders' perceive that there is less likelihood of a "great power war," that may be true and I'd agree with them on that. If you mean that this lack of specific worry gives them the belief that they can engage in other adventures or allows them to cling to a model, then I believe that is possibly correct -- probably correct with respect to some -- but I'm not at all sure there's a consensus on that score. Further, I suggest that those who do think along those lines are, as <b>Robert C. Jones</b> often says, folks who do not realize the Cold War is gone. Or that it was an aberration...
However, the real issue is not what the policy makers believe or think but what they actually can do and will do. While they may wish to take certain actions, they may well be constrained, possibly significantly. The Voters are getting restless and their ire is directed at politicians from both sides of the aisle who seem to place their reelection ahead of the national interest. We'll see.
Again, I do not agree that all the "great powers" were aberrant. Nor do I think all other major powers were or are converted or transformed other than superficially and I believe it a potentially dangerous misapprehension to assume they are. I strongly disagree that we "must convince, convert and transform the 'rest of the non-integrated world.'" In fact, I suggest that our numerous failures to do that over the past 100 years pose a strong cautionary.
One that may or may not be ignored.
I believe that the global dominance aspect -- if you mean in the economic and / or military senses -- is unrealistic as an ideal or a position (Though I acknowledge there are <i>some</i> in policy circles who're inclined that way...). It is eminently possible that the message you suggest is part of the equation. What is also possible is that such a message will be no more successful than were the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines. Politician's minds don't do nuance; chicanery, yes; nuance, no...
Ken White:
"Consider that last question -- if all that went before worked as well as you seem to imply, then why are (we) where we are?"
From a foreign policy - national security perspective, our national leaders seem to believe -- especially with regard to the potential for great power war -- that we are in a much better position today than we were in the 20th Century.
This is one of the reasons, I believe, that they cling (rightfully or wrongfully) to the same general model (see my comments above) that they used to achieve these perceived significant foreign policy - national security successes.
In fact, it would seem that our national leaders actually view today's current foreign policy problems/challenges (those related to lesser and remaining states and societies) exactly and specifically THROUGH the lense of these perceived national security/foreign policy/great power successes, to wit:
a. Now that we have convinced, converted and transformed these bad boys (the "aberrant" great powers and their societies), now we must
b. Convince, convert and transform the "rest of the non-integrated world" -- in order to be able to feed, service and support these guys and, thereby, keep them, and their societies, "on-board. In doing this, we must, simultaneously,
c. Retain our position re: global dominance.
Do our national leaders see the potential conflict/contradiction between "b" and "c" immediately above? I do not know.
However, by General Petreaus and others --- via such things as the COIN narrative --- telling our national leaders what it will take to pursue these objectives (many, many more troops; placed much more directly in harm's way; endless amounts of time and money; etc) are our military leaders not -- in all reality -- actually sending our national leaders a "reality check" message and, thereby, causing them to choose between (1) continued global dominance and (2) transforming the less-integrated world?
<b>Bill C.:</b>
I think you need to question some of your assumptions as stated above. First, you say we retain the broad political goals you outlined. Is that correct? If so, should it be? Have changes in the environment (broad based usage...) suggested or dictated a change in goals to which we simply have not adapted due to arrogance and misperceptions?
Secondly, you say:<blockquote>"...using the same general model that we used so successfully against the aberant great powers."</blockquote>Is perhaps the word 'aberrant' inappropriate for some of said powers? Will the same sorts of efforts be successful applied against lesser States? Are some or all of those "lesser States" truly aberrant and is intervention thus warranted? Were we in fact "successful?" If so, why are we in our current position?
Consider that last question -- if all that went before worked as well as you seem to imply, then why are where we are?
That implication may be the major flaw in your assumptions...
I suggest the answer to your final question is none of the above because we do not do <i>any</i> of them at all well. Why do something you do not do well for short term benefit when there are better, cheaper and more effective ways that will produce better results for us in the long term...
Addendum: Problem with the above concept:
In many instances, one must do "government-building" -- before one can move on to "nation-building" or other important projects.
What application of military force (if any) is needed for this/these huge additional requirements -- unique to the "lesser and remaining states and societies" of the world?
Or should all of this (now with due understanding of and consideration to these unique,new and costly requirements) be considered a "bridge too far" in the cost/benefit analysis thereof?
Guys:
The deal is that our broad strategic aims,
As in the days of WWII and the Cold War,
Remain to:
(1) Dominate the world so as to
(2) Maintain and expand the world liberal economic order.
The primary obsticle to this initiative in the 20th Century was aberant great powers.
The primary obsticles to this initiative today is thought to be aberant lesser and remaining states and societies.
Re: the outlier great powers, we overcame these obsticles by:
(1) Using our instruments of power to
(2) Convince and convert the governments thereof (cause them to see things more our way) and
(3) Cause these great power governments to transform their socieites such that might more closely resemble our own.
Today, we retain our broad political goals outlined above and seek to overcome our current obsticles thereto (aberant lesser and remaining states and societies) using the same general model that we used so successfully against the aberant great powers (use our instruments of power, to convince and convert the governments of the aberant states/societies, and have these governments transform their societies as we desire).
Now, understanding that:
a. Our broad political aims have not changed and
b. That we still intend to use the same general model outlined above to achieve these broad political aims
c. What application of military force is best used to compliment this process/bring about the desired results: FID, SA, COIN, other, some combination of these???
Two brief comments on <b>LPierson's</b> excellent post. Reference today's Troops:<blockquote>"...they aren't overly light-infantry'ized, but rather, perhaps over para-military policed'ized. At this stage, GPF, serve as glorified cordon and blocking police units and not the primary trigger pullers..."</blockquote>They really aren't over light-infantryized due to the fact that our less than stellar training system takes about three years to produce a really competent light infantrymen. That's pathetic in this era. As an aside, re-roling is only marginally effective and is a dangerous fallacy that we should work hard to eliminate today and should never repeat. I've talked to too many people who have seen re-roled units operate and a few who have done it and it just is exceedingly poor use of people and units.
The GPF not being the "primary trigger pullers" is another fallacy; they should be. They are capable for most situations -- and could be for almost all with the better training they deserve. That would allow others to do what they should be doing instead of playing shooter. Dumb turf battle and sad misuse of talent all the way around...
Bill M.,
You'll not get any disagreement from me regarding the requirement for having a combined arms capability. And (yes COL Gentile), that capability MUST include all elements in robust ammounts. We need the capacity to turn large swathes of this globe into glass and have the human capability to safely occupy such territory afterwards. That also includes troopers trained to close with and destroy our enemies.
Bill, "FID" in the form of Security Assistance, meaning providing stuff, IMET, FMS/FMF, etc. has always been the majority of those lower profile efforts. I would not argue against those activities either. However, we can't actually look at those in the same comparative light with COIN/FID anymore.
You and I both were involved in some of those early post-Vietnam kinda-sorta-FID/COIN-efforts that included the MINIMAL presence of active, armed and involved US personnel. However, during those same years the mantra from senior leaders and policy makers was "WE DON'T DO COIN." As such COIN/FID was not going to be considered a real planned, programmed and seriously resourced capability. Hence my comments regarding the "P4" and the popularity of COIN.
At this juncture, we have gone from one end of the spectrum ("oh no we ain't) to the other (we ain't going to do anything but). And since we cannot find a way to define our threats, it is perilous to continue to build our capabilities, any of them, under an organizational paradigm that is mired in the mid-1990'S.
However we will get to the point woth COIN/FID much in the fashion as Thomas PM Burnett (regarding OOTW and SASO)described in his road show: "...We don't want to do this..." Same has been true for COIN/FID.
Our dilemna does lay in having capabilities that are funded. Absoultely correct! However, you can't have a policy unless you fund the capability to execute. Rhetoric does change the need.
Last note. I would go farther than COL Gentile in categorizing our troopers; they aren't overly light-infantry'ized, but rather, perhaps over para-military policed'ized. At this stage, GPF, serve as glorified cordon and blocking police units and not the primary trigger pullers...
I for one I'm getting a little tired of the fix government mantra with no methodology offered. It reminds of the hippies begging for peace on earth. Yes, most of us would like it, but the reality is another story.
We also have ongoing efforts through a variety of agencies that attempt to repair/fix/manipulate foreign governments that usually are failed efforts, so based on the current state of the art, yeah, let's have peace on earth brother, but while we're waiting on the tooth fairy and Santa Claus to arrive we better do something else to achieve our goals (that's the crux of the issue, or goals are too grandiose). What's the threat to begin with? How do we deal with it?
Shorter <b>Dayuhan:</b><blockquote>"Trying to fix a government can be a long ride too, if we can do it at all...<b>We generally can't fix governments:</b>...I'd hope Americans would think at least twice, ideally more, before setting out to fix anyone else's government, still more before going out to give anyone else a government. Easy to say, hard to do...<b>There's just not enough payoff in most cases to make intervention worth the effort.</b> <i>(emphasisis added / kw)</i>"</blockquote>Not editing; just reiterating the very important and very valid points to insure they don't get overlooked...
At the same time expressing a bit of hope that they will not be ignored as similar advice has been in the past. How'd that work out for us...
RCJ:
<i>Fix the government, fix the insurgency. Ignore or prop up the government, and hang on for a long ride.</i>
Trying to fix a government can be a long ride too, if we can do it at all. There are also some wrinkles to the process: when we try to fix governments we're inclined to press them to conform to our expectations, which may be quite different from the expectations of the various populaces concerned. Those varying populaces may have widely varying and at times incompatible expectations, and we may not know clearly what they are.
We generally can't fix governments: all we can do is try to pressure or bait governments into fixing themselves, and our track record at this is not impressive. We may not have adequate carrots and sticks for the desired effect, and the Government involved may not have the capacity to fix itself.
I'd hope Americans would think at least twice, ideally more, before setting out to fix anyone else's government, still more before going out to give anyone else a government. Easy to say, hard to do.
Bill C:
<i>In seeking to address this perceived error we have tried (and are trying) to use the same general model that we used re: the great powers in the 20th Century, to wit: (1) "convince and concert" the governments of the lesser and remaining states and (2) use these governments to transform their outlier societies as we desire.</i>
Highly speculative. The states that remain outside the global economy generally pose no significant threat to that economy and no transformation is required. It might benefit the people in those countries, but the global economy doesn't need them. As long as gap states don't actively disrupt other states - generally by attacking others or harboring those who do - they will generally be contained, deterred, and/or ignored. There's just not enough payoff in most cases to make intervention worth the effort. Nobody cares about "transforming" Chad, Somalia, Zimbabwe, the DRC, etc... too much effort and expense for too little gain.
"The anxiety that comes from the possibility of having made a bad decision can lead to rationalization, the tendency to create additional reasons or justifications to support one's choices."
Likewise, the anxiety that comes from the possibility of having made a bad decisions can, also, lead to an attempt at corrective action.
The mistake that was perceived have been made by the United States, post-the Cold War, was to have not moved decisively to deal with the problems the "lesser and remaining" states who had not configured their societies and ordered their lives as we did. (This problem having been substantially addressed re: the aberant great power states [Germany, Japan, USSR and pre-capatilist China] during WWII and the Cold War respectively.)
9/11 suggested that it was time to address and correct this error.
In seeking to address this perceived error we have tried (and are trying) to use the same general model that we used re: the great powers in the 20th Century, to wit: (1) "convince and concert" the governments of the lesser and remaining states and (2) use these governments to transform their outlier societies as we desire.
We need only remember that while insurgenies are waged in the countryside, they are won and lost in the Capital. Fix the government, fix the insurgency. Ignore or prop up the government, and hang on for a long ride.
Currently we're signed up for the "long ride" program. We keep debating what the answer is, instead of simply pointing out that we are asking the wrong question.
gian p gentile
I think you are correct. I called this the cognitive dissonance of COIN in a recent article published on SWJ.
The anxiety that comes with the possibility of having made a bad decision can lead to rationalization, the tendency to create additional reasons or justifications to support one's choices. The most famous case in the early study of cognitive dissonance was described by Leon Festinger and others in the book When Prophecy Fails.
The authors infiltrated a group that was expecting the imminent end of the world on a certain date. When that prediction failed, the movement did not disintegrate, but grew instead, as members vied to prove their orthodoxy by recruiting converts.
There is a big debate in Australia regarding troop numbers following the death of a soldier in a recent engagement with the Taliban. Our Government expects the overall strategy to work yet not prepared to invest the right amount of resources. Forget COIN we ain't going to win even in a conventional perspective. More importantly, in line with your sentiment our political leaders claim "numbers are about right now" - to me that is code for they have no idea.
Indeed, having to respond to events -- and to threats -- seems to be the stimuli needed to cause the United States to recognize and react to the overall problem it perceives. This being: That nations and societies that are not configured and oriented as we are can -- and will -- cause us significant problems.
Thus, in the 20th Century, reacting to events/threats of this nature (those who are not like us can and will cause us significant problems), this required the United States to move decisively to "convince and convert" the governments of the aberant great powers of the world (Germany, Japan, the former USSR and pre-capitalist China), and to cause these convinced and converted governments to act in our behalf to transform their societies as we desired (such that they might become more similar to ours).
Now, in the 21st Century (prodded as we have been by problems in such nations as Afghanistan, Iraq, N. Korea and Iran) we seek to "finish the job" by "convincing and converting" the governments of the aberant weak powers of the world (too many to name), and causing these governments, as in the case of the great powers above, to transform their societies as we desire (such that they become more like us).
Whereas, conventional military forces were the "sticks" that were required to to "convince and convert" the aberant great powers noted above, and to cause these nations to transform their societies as we desired,
Now we seem to believe that COIN and WOG forces are what will be needed to achieve these same results in the -- much more diverse -- weak power world.
Lance,
A combined arms capability allows us to win in combat/battle regardless of the scenario. Our combined arms posture has not been focused on the Fulda Gap since the mid 90s. Also I'm not confusing winning the battle with a winning strategy, but we're not going to tolerate losing in battle, nor should we. It took a combined arms effort to triumph in battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it will take a well trained combined arms effort to triumph in future battles.
I like to know why you think FID wasn't taken serious prior to P4 taking credit for rewriting old COIN doctrine? The U.S. actually conducted FID in several locations throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s and had success in some locations (largely due to the host nation). El Salvador was simply big in the news, but it was far from our only endeavor in FID. Most FID efforts are lower profile where the military assistance is facilitated through the offices of the JUSMAG or ODC. I agree that our military assistance in El Salvador was a small part of what contributed to victory, but I think it was still an essential part of the whole. It was the tomato on the salad.
You're absolutely right we don't know what threats we will face in the future, but we can safely assume they'll be a combination of conventional and irregular threats (history informs the future and although much has changed in the world there is much that has not changed). If we have more intelligently conceived policies then the cost of defense won't necessarily have to drive our country into debt.
In short we don't know what threats the future will bring us, so we need a capable military force that can effectively triumph militarily against all potential foes. While the COINdistas don't want to hear this, that means a capable combined arms force. Our initial failures in Iraq and Afghanistan were not military failures (although there were shortfalls), they were policy shortfalls. We shouldn't confuse the two. The military cannot impose the type of change on foreign cultures that come idealistic policy wonks desired. We don't need to redesign the military based on experimental policies. Real threats to our nation will long outlive these idealistic policies.
Some of us are old enough to remember the last time COIN and Conventional pros and cons etc. were discussed with great exuberance.
The very existence of a COIN capability, regardless if the executive agent is State or DOD, tells the world we intend to be meddlesome and interferring in the internal affairs of other nations. In fact it sends a much more disturbing indicator of our meddling intentions than 10+ fully equipped combined arms divisions.
At the same time, we have no REAL clue what (threats) we are going face or what to we will do and require (strategy, policy and operational art, and "stuff") to face "them" with (resurgent USSR, China, Venezuela, narco-cartels in Mexico...)?
COL Gentile laments the death of the combined arms capability, a capability that was structured to meet a thoroughly defined opponent that went away when a wall came down. I only use the good COL'S lament to illustrate that we build great capabilities only to find they may not fit the the jam we got ourselves into when executing the latest EXORD. We should be so lucky to have a WARSAW PACT again.
Yes I believe large scale COIN is very costly, especially, when it is executed as an after thought reaction. However, does anyone really take COIN seriously. Frankly, COIN and its contemporary cousin FID wasn't considered real capabilities until GEN Petraeus and Killcullen rejargoned the concept. The only real COIN/FID executed prior to our current adventures was El Salvador, and the results of that may not be necessarily linked to 55+ advisers, but rather to time, as the afore mentioned wall fell along with the external support from a bankrupt and demoralized entity. And there were extraordinary controls, oversight and political wrangling limiting the reach of said effort.
The jury is still out regarding OEF-P.
Will COIN go the way of the dodo after we extricate ourselves from CENTCOM and allow the old empires of the region to manage things we believe we can't or shouldn't? And is the real argument about nation-building, of which State has been, and always will be a VERY reluctant executor usually being dragged to the effort screeching and howling.
Meanwhile those that seek our destruction won't be giving a rat's nose how they go about bringing about our demise. And it is a very safe assumption those will use asymmetric/irregular/insurgent methods to do so. In any case, we are in for huge costs to insure US security.
Bill C, I think you may be given too much credit to our strategists. I suspect the reality is we respond to events and then if you collectively look at our responses it starts to look like a strategy. Sort of like abstract/modern art, it is perceived in the eyes of the beholder as either art or chaos.
I think it would be useful to dismiss Iraq and Afghanistan experience temporarily when we discuss posturing and preparing the force for the future. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are too close to most of us to think rationally about them. The lesson 9/11 (not a new one) is that irregulars on occasion can pose a serious threat to our national interests, and it is important for the U.S. Government and its allies as a collective whole to develop better methods to counter these threats (when required). It doesnt mean we forfeit our ability to win decisively in a more conventional conflict, nor does it mean we overthrow every government we disagree with and occupy it and conduct large scale COIN operations until their people embrace our values. That is a pipe dream, not a strategy.
As we explore the full realm of irregular threats and identifying appropriate strategies for dealing with them to include investing appropriately in our homeland defense, we must ensure as Sec Clinton said, any strategy must be funded. We cant afford to sacrifice the future of our children with unbearable debt that also undermines our national security in the long run. As Gian stated, large scale COIN operations are too expensive based on the return. I think there are other options/strategies for countering irregular threats that are sustainable economically and more effective in the long run than invading and attempting to transform other countries. Unfortunately if we cant move the debate beyond pro-COIN and anti-COIN well never get to that discussion
Is the reason why we are so infatuated with "governments" today is because we realize that,
By "convincing and converting" the great power governments of Germany and Japan in WWII -- and doing the same re: the great power governments of the former USSR and pre-capitalist China in the Cold War (using different methods) -- we were able to, with our continuing assistance,
Cause these governments to become our "agents of change" and, thereby, cause them to transform their own societies -- such that these societies came to be configured and operated more in-line with our wishes, desires and political aims?
A broad application of conventional military forces seemed to have served our purposes in "convincing and converting" the contrary great powers -- in the world of the strong -- to transform their societies more toward our way of living and thinking.
In the world of the weak, where we now set our sights re: these broad political aims, what application of military force is likely to be needed to "convince and convert" local governments and, thereafter, support and protect these governments as they, likewise, act as our "agents of societal change?"
P.S. Tick-Tock. Our national leaders believe that this transforming of the societies in the world of the weak must accomplished much sooner rather than much later -- so as to adequately support -- and not place in jeapordy -- the amazing gains we have made in the great power world.
Anon:
Anonymous in Theater:
There is a war over COIN being fought in the Army, I've seen it. If this was an offline conversation I could tell you some of the fly on the wall stuff I've seen as part of BDE and BN staffs, with Commanders and Threes fighting it out over what the focus will be in the terribly short time there was to train in the mid-late '00s.
AND that plays out everytime the BCTs do their CTC predeployment rotations---ie the internal conflict over how to run a BCT and what to do in COIN--over and over and over---and if anyone doubts it look at the 5/2SBCT track record at the NTC and then the track record in Afghanistan!
Lind in his 4GW articles often alluded to the fact that the Army never really got out of their thinking of 2/3GW and have really never made it to the 4GW world--you can see this in the thinking of the CTCs in trying to get to a hybrid warfare scenario when hybrid warfare is not even being accepted anymore by DoD.
There is a war over COIN being fought in the Army, I've seen it. If this was an offline conversation I could tell you some of the fly on the wall stuff I've seen as part of BDE and BN staffs, with Commanders and Threes fighting it out over what the focus will be in the terribly short time there was to train in the mid-late '00s.
Robert:
Are you really saying that inside every Afghan is an American democrat just waiting to jump out and embrace government American style?
Even if you are right about such things and there is a better way of doing nation building in Afghanistan by focusing on producing a better constitution the question of strategy still persists: Is it worth the cost of carrying out such an approach relative to the limited political objectives that we seek to achieve?
And yes America's senior military officers have a critical hand in the doing of sound strategy. Of course we will do what we are told, but the President has never told us to do nation building in Afghanistan as a given political objective. Instead his Army, consumed by the tactics and operations of Coin, has seen fit to offer no other way.
gian
I have to say, I am encouraged by this discussion. Bill C. has put forth a great explanation as to why we are now so concerned with stabilizing the world -- developing a foreign policy tailored to dealing to "the world of the weak." I think this framework dovetails with other points made about our continued application of the Cold War approach of propping up governments with military force without respect to the competence or legitimacy of the government. All we seem to care about is whether the government is stable enough to do our bidding. And these two points help to illuminate the problem that Mr. Jones has discussed here and elsewhere with supporting a government that is not capable of providing "good governance" (i.e., legitimate, effective, etc., governance -- also, integrated? I am unfamiliar with that term as applied to government).
All of these points are good explanations for the primacy of COIN in U.S. military thinking, and illustrate many of the very good strategic reasons for not committing GPF to COIN operations. Perfect fodder for arguing with policy makers and other academics and thinkers about strategy. But this entire discussion fails to acknowledge that a decision whether to commit military forces is driven by domestic politics. Often, the public sentiment is based on the emotional reaction to a particular issue or event.In some instances, that emotion can be stirred up by the national leadership (e.g, the discussions by the administration prior to the Iraq invasion to highlight the threat posed by Hussein, or similar efforts prior to the first Gulf War to build support for the use of force to liberate Kuwait), but the public sentiment can drive the decision (interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and perhaps, the Spanish American War after the sinking of the Maine). Either way, these decisions are not often driven by reasonable debate about the costs and benefits of a particular course of action.
Unfortunately, we are at a point in our history where the public perception is that there is very little we can't accomplish through the use of military force. And because we have a large professional military, the perceived cost to society at large of committing a moderately-sized force (in historic terms) to fight what is essentially a brush-fire war is small. I think Col. Gentile's point that we can dictate the types of wars we fight might be premised on the ability of military leaders to influence these decisions. However, however reasonable the argument might be to NOT commit forces to, say, support some friendly government against an insurgency or to invade some country whose government has failed in order to reach a favorable outcome is likely to fall on the deaf ears of a public who believe that the U.S. military is all-powerful. A military leader who has been selling the capabilities of the military to Congress, the public, or the president, might find it somewhat difficult to then argue that the military would not be the best tool in any given circumstance -- however accurate it may be.
In short, we are victims of our own success. It may be that, after 9 years of war with very limited progress, this public perception of military power is changing. However, I believe that the best way to avoid having to do COIN is to prevent insurgencies which threaten governments of our allies from getting to the shooting phase. Mr. Jones and others have mentioned this before. Diplomacy with the goal of helping to build "good governance" is the first step. The use of SF in FID is also important. Basically, it is true that if the host government cannot deliver "good governance," no amount of well-trained COIN forces can prop it up -- it will always be viewed as illegitimate and the populace will be looking for an alternative. Intervention by a foreign power will likely exacerbate the problem.
But this does not obviate the need for the military to have some competence in COIN. At this point, it is not unlikely that public sentiment at some point in the future will demand that troops be committed to head off some humanitarian crisis by either invading a country to remove a dictator or to commit GPF to some peacekeeping or stabilization mission. But even if public perception changes to the point where the military is once again dedicated to simply "fighting and winning the nation's wars," there will always be a component of any operation that requires the application of the principle's of COIN -- fighting partisan forces as the uniformed forces of our adversary retreat, or dealing with the population of a vanquished foe.
There is no reason to believe that we have no alternative but to engage in COIN in the future -- that the nature of the use of military force has fundamentally changed, though that argument cannot be dismissed as easily as many would like. Our current politics could likely push us into COIN again, and that pressure would be hard to resist. Furthermore, the principles of COIN have application beyond merely supporting friendly governments against insurgencies.
I guess my fairly long-winded point is that no matter how rational the argument for committing GPF to COIN operations, reason does not always win the day in decisions regarding whether or not to go to war.
Addendum to my comment immediately above:
Summary:
a. We wish to (1) continue to dominate the world so as to (2) maintain and expand the world liberal economic order.
b. To do this today, we must concentrate on the "weaker" states, socieites and actors of the world (no great powers currently stand in our way in this regard).
c. The way in which we intend to achieve our objective (see "a" above in this comment) is via "our" local/"host" governments.
d. Obviously, this requires us to (1) get these governments on our side, (2) get them to do our bidding, (3) get them into the proper shape and (4) be prepared to deal with those that would oppose us.
Does this (misguided?) concept help us to understand why COIN -- and WOG -- are considered the coin of the realm today?
All this driven by the fact that our foreign policy initiatives today must be tailored for and driven through the "world of the weak;" wherein, as an additional burden, we have no great power or other existential threat to justify other actions/methods?
In addressing the question of what has changed, that would now require us to concentrate on COIN:
a. Should we consider that it is not guerillas, terrorists or insurgencies. As Bill M has noted above, these have always been with us.
b. Likewise, might we consider that America's broad political aims have not changed; these being (1) global dominance, so as to (2) maintain and expand the liberal world economic order.
Should we consider that what HAS changed is that now, post-the Cold War, our focus, re: our broad political aims (see "b" above) has shifted:
a. From: "Great power obsticals" (pre-the Cold War: Germany and Japan; during the Cold War: The former Soviet Union and pre-capitalist China.)
b. To: "Lesser and remaining obsticals" (to wit: weaker states, socieites and actors.)
In that we now must operate within "the environment of the weak" -- so as to continue to further our broad political aims noted above -- is this what drives us to design and utilize our military forces, our other instruments of power, and our campaigns, so as to meet the moral and practical challenges of this very specific environment (to wit: that of the weak).
This factor, and the fact that there is no complementary existential or great power threat to help justify our actions in this "world of the weak," ties our hands, and forces us to go down this less familar and less comfortable road (that in which COIN plays a much larger role).
The root of the current insurgency in Afghanistan is the constitution that was ratified in 2004. LTG Barno, coming on board in 2003, is far more aptly the father of classic Insurgency in Afghanistan than he is the father of classic counterinsurgency.
We fell into the same trap in Afganistan that our founding fathers fell into when they produced the Articles of Confederation. The Articles were designed by the insurgents to prevent what they saw as the biggest problem of the government they rose to challenge. In the colonies it was the centralized government and the monarchy, so we wrote articles to have no centralized authority and to vest all sovereignty in the states. The chaos of this well intended document nearly tore a young America apart, either ripping it into a collection of weak nations, or sending it back to Mother England's warm embrace. The current US Constitution was designed for COIN, designed to carry the nation forward, not prevent what was behind it.
In Afganistan it was decentralizaiton, Warlords and Militias that were branded the enemey, so a constitution designed to prevent those things was written and ratified. The problem is that it contains none of the protections requried for COIN. It was so focused on preventing what we feared in the past, that it ended up over-reacting like the Articles did. The government is now too centralized and with no balancing protections has made a dictator of Karzai; codified massive corruption; and excluded the vanquished from any hope of participation in the new Afghanistan. The Afghan constitution makes insurgency, and economic and political corruption inevitable.
The key to the surge in Iraq was the reconciliation with the Sunni populace and leadership. The key to the surge in Afghanistan must be a similar reconciliation with Pashtu leadership and populace. (without at the same time destroying the support of the former Northern Alliance that fears such reconciliation and the return of a Pashtu voice)
"Classic" COIN can be many things; but Effective COIN must primarily focus on fixing the government and addressing how the populace feels about the same. Nation Building to buy off the populace and heavy handed efforts to defeat insurgent organizations are both indirect, slow, inefficient approaches to getting to good governance. We need to strike at the heartbeat of this insurgency, and that is this abortion of a constitution.
Reconciliation and a full constitutional Jirga (on the scale of what took place in Philly in 1787) is the key to success and should be not only our primary objective, but also the condition precedent to a single dollar being spent, or soldier going forward.
Jason:
You may be right about these things, but a simple question of strategy (of which the American military has a decided hand in the formulation thereof) is it worth that kind of operational effort to achieve the president's limited political aims? And yes by the way as a matter of strategy we do get to chose (most of the time) the kinds of wars that we fight.
Also, I dont buy the "input" argument put forward by many senior generals and policy makers that finally now we have the right "inputs" in place so the clock starts now. But arguably when General Barno took over in late 2003 he put into place a classic Coin campaign (this point is made by Don Wright et al in their new CSI book on Afghanistan). Now we are told, however, that we have only been doing Coin right since a year or so ago when General McChrystal took over. So what happened to those 5 intervening years? The counterargument would be that well yes but we didnt have the right number of troops in place as a key "input". But then the counter to this then would be that well sure, but there were also fewer Taliban at the time as well.
So we remained trapped in the Coin straightjacket which demands a narrative that states by rule that when you start Coin you have to be screwed up, and of course the unit before you was too, but now that we have the right things in place and with a lot of time we can make the whole process work.
It is a very seductive narrative and it seems like most of the American Defense Establishment has been seduced by it.
gian
Is Afghanistan giving COIN a bad rap or are we blinded by our obsession with time driven by domestic political timetables? This is combined with forgetting a range of simple drivers that remain neglected in Afghanistan or only just being addressed.
For example:
1. NATO/ISAF forces have not been properly resourced until late in the piece in Afghanistan.
2. Many of the ISAF countries I dealt with were poor implementers of COIN. It was a scatter-gun approach, confined to endless missions to the Governor's compound and back to the DFAC in time for lunch.
3. Afghanistan was also a basket case when we got there. There was no alternative government with any recognition by the people. Apart from the Taliban the alternative power (that is now back in place) was controlled by brutal warlords and drug barons.
4. The same elites are back undermining our COIN efforts - almost cancelling out everything we do with their corruption.
5. Then there is the failure to deal with Pakistan and the sanctuary it provides the Taliban leadership.
Finally, counterinsurgency has traditionally been fought by the incumbent government or authority and is in response to insurgencies fighting a civil or revolutionary war. In his new book Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen describes "Counterinsurgency" as an umbrella term that describes the complete range of measures that a government takes to defeat insurgencies. In Afghanistan it is a foreign force implementing COIN in partnership with corruption officials and President Karzai who appears to be dismantling the checks and balances against corruption. ie. its not as if the government is seen as a mis-understood valuable alternative.
There probably other obvious areas I have over looked, such as key military strategies and operations. No doubt as I learn more about this space I may come to regret my simplistic comments here.
Re: this question:
One could surmise that, at times, in order to achieve one's political objectives, it is necessary for a nation to have viable "carrots" and "sticks" (rewards and/or punishments to induce behavior).
Re: The "sticks" (and the need for these "sticks" to be viewed as viable):
a. Prior to 9/11, were America's armed forces organized, trained and equiped to adequately cause the United States to (1) deter real and potential opponents and (2) achieve its desired political objectives?
b. Presently, are America's armed forces adequately organized, trained and equiped to achieved achieve (1) and/or (2) above?
If the answer to either "a" and/or "b" above is/are "no," then:
a. Why is this? And
b. What course of action should the United States -- and the US military -- take in order to correct these deficiencies?
Max Boot is wrong. There is no "war" in the Army over Coin.
The Army is Coin. We have accepted "area security" as the dominant operational paradigm for the US Army. "Area security" as it is being deployed now as a term is an attempt (all with the right motives I might add) to put fangs and teeth into Rupert Smith "wars amongst the people" framework for the operating environment.
As a result the American Army continues down the road to light infantryization.
The Armor Force is dead, and more worrisome is the severe atrophying in combined arms competencies at all levels.
So with all of this, I ask my colleague here at the CFR Max Boot, where is this so called war over Coin in the Army taking place? Beyond interesting and worthwhile discussions on small wars blog and abu muqawama where is this war over Coin at?
gian
Bill M. makes the great point that much of this is FID and CT and is well within the scope and abilities of SOF to handle. The mission becomes too large for SOF when we occupy some country and attempt to exercise control over the political outcomes there, and due to that we now need a large COIN capability in the conventional force.
Or, the the counter argument: We need to stop occupying other countries and/or then attempting to manipulate/control the political outcomes once there.
There needs to be a new line established for what things we actually need to control directly, and what things we just need to be able to influence, to deter or defeat if deterrence fails.
Under the strategies of containment the "control" line was drawn WAY into the business of others in the perimeter we established around the USSR. Based on years of that being "right" we still seek to establish similar degrees of control over things that are no longer necessary or appropriate, and that create avoidable headaches. For example, how easy would Afghanistan be if we were not hard set on controlling what the final outcome looked like?
The new National Security Strategy continues the move away from Cold War Containment. Clinton gave us "intervention" Bush gave us "preemption"; as I look at President Obama's body of thought and his NSS, I think the best tag is "Empowerment."
How do we operationalize a strategy of Empowerment? Well, a good first step is moving that "control" line way back from the Cold War containment setting that it is still stuck on.
Then we won't need a COIN army. We will need a deter and defeat army. The big upgrade that we'll need are better policies and tools for detering and defeating non-state actors, but that is not a problem that a COIN Army solves. That is a policy and diplomacy problem largely, and also a Justice problem as acts war committed by non-states are more in the crime box than the war box.
Just some thoughts. One thing that will slow us from getting there is that the "nation-building solves everything" guys got that written in to the NSS as the solution. We need to cut that anchor line before it sinks us.
It is the rewrite of Vietnam history, 1967-1968 as a member of the ICEX/Phoenix office headed by Evan Parker I ran 30 field operations to develop psychological war to develop what is now called "counter-insurgency" I controlled all IFFV and Phoenix psy-ops. Was assigned the task to produce a Field Manual, which I did. I obtained 2 VC military unit defections Komer wanted a NVA unit and I was meeting with NVA officers 1968. There was a lot that went on, but not visible, to protect my intelligent net you could not tell any one, any one._It has been 42 years, 3 years ago I opened the file boxes from Vietnam for the first time. I have the original documents of assignments. CORDS I became a Brig General for military intelligence, was constantly working special assignments out of the Embassy. If you want to check..look for the Brig Gen that was relieved of duty because his Regt mutinied at Tuy Hoa I was one of three officers there to change command.
I have a manual in works at this time "Persuasion with Relevance" training and deployment. My research goes back to 1936 up to 2010. My interest is reducing the unnecessary deaths I witnessed of civilians and military. I did not turn the Phoenix manual over because the technology would have increased body counts excessively. With security clearances from military service I had access to Military, Embassy, Vietnamese, and CIA. When I briefed Gen Abrams at change of command, said he was there now to close it down..I had a young family to tend to, no reason to stay. We were defeating our selves and that was obvious in 1967.
A closing comment: a government title and a university or academy degree doesn't always mean your intelligent.
Harry Wagner
<i>One of the few times our conventional forces have to conduct COIN is when we're an occupying power, so if that is the logic on why we have to focus our conventional forces "more and more" on COIN, then the next logical step is that we need to maintain/improve our combat skills so we can overthrow all of these disintegrated governments and then engage in COIN when the fight transitions from conventional conflict into an insurgency. I don't think that is the plan, so again why the compelling need to expand the COIN focus beyond SOF? </i>
I also cannot understand the desire to focus on insurgency and COIN, still less any desire to overthrow "disintegrated" governments. Most of the "disintegrated" governments out there are harming or threatening nobody but their own people and pose no threat at all to those who are integrated. I can't think of any "integrated" government that is seriously threatened by insurgency.
Over time, as the disintegrated note that integration brings prosperity, they will integrate of their own accord. There's really no need to force anyone.
Bill C.
I read half way through the document at the link you sent me and will read the rest later. I definitely appreciate the link, but didn't take the same message from SEC Clinton's remarks that you may have.
First her comments about the forces of disintegration (unlike the rest of her comments) weren't at all clear. That can be interpreted several ways, but even if that is our policy how does it logically conclude in we have to do COIN? I didn't see any statement that Sec Clinton made that requires us to do COIN, and would like to know why you think COIN is required to achieve these objectives?
She focused on better integrating Diplomacy, Defense and Development (I'm all for that), but that doesn't imply we need to turn our General Purpose Forces into a COIN force. Most of what she is talking about in my view is FID, where the military support can be minimal, the same type of support we have been providing for years.
I think those who argue that DOD hasn't adapted sufficiently to conduct COIN first off don't understand what it is (compared to FID), and second they are making illogical arguments in their strategic view of the world where COIN is the best answer. Whether there is a change of government in a foreign country through an election, or through an insurgency does that necessarily mean the new leaders are going to be disingrated? Even if it does, is it critical to our interests that every country remain integrated?
Mr. Boot is a very smart guy, but his argument is pretty lame when he states there are terrorists and insurgents in the world and they're not going away so we better learn to deal with it. Again, absolutely nothing new. The fact is that our military already can deal with it with our Special Operations Forces and enablers at the appropriate level.
One of the few times our conventional forces have to conduct COIN is when we're an occupying power, so if that is the logic on why we have to focus our conventional forces "more and more" on COIN, then the next logical step is that we need to maintain/improve our combat skills so we can overthrow all of these disintegrated governments and then engage in COIN when the fight transitions from conventional conflict into an insurgency. I don't think that is the plan, so again why the compelling need to expand the COIN focus beyond SOF? Short term for Afghanistan and Iraq I got it, but those wedded to the ideal we must do more are talking about the future.
Seriously, when you start looking at the arguments logically they simply don't add up.
"We are in a race between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration."
This is not a statement from CNAS.
It is quote from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her National Security Strategy speech of 5 May 2010 at the Brookings Institute:
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0527_national_security.aspx
With such a foreign policy focus; wherein, we intend to use "our" local/host governments in foreign nations to transform their societies and, thereby, re-focus and re-configure these nations/societies such that they might become integrated, what application(s) of military force are most likely to be needed?
Gentlemen,
I recently read the Army Operating Concept. The document, in my mind, may put the COIN vs. MCO debate to rest or at least reframe the discussion.
If you look at the possibilities of conducting wide area security and combined arms operations as Army core competencies then, IMHO, the COIN vs. MCO construct goes out the window.
The mission sets that cascade out of the two competencies create a platform for conducting FSO. Wide area security and combined arms maneuver aren't exclusive. They would be used in tandem depending on the nature of the situation. Combined arms maneuver would be used to seize and retain initiative at the tactical or operational level and wide area security to capitalize or stabilize the gains made through action. You could use both competencies in reverse as well. Combined arms maneuver to achieve localized tactical aims and to maintain an advantage (or stasis) in securing an area of operations.
This may sound like oversimplification but it has resonance with me.
Just my 2 cents.
Bill M.,
Exactly. The entire debate has been more about whether or not we should actually get involved in COIN or stability-type operations. However, it has been characterized as being COIN proponents versus anti-COIN folks. No one has acknowledged the fact that this debate is not about whether we should incorporate some form of COIN doctrine into our thinking, but is instead about the wisdom of engaging in COIN operations in the first place.
Unfortunately, I have not seen that debate taking place among civilian policy makers (though admittedly, I am not privy to much of what is debated in those circles). This debate is sort of silly to be having in military fora since we would have very limited choice if the civilian leadership said to us, "go help the government of Insertnamehereastan deal with their insurgency."
It is hard to argue that such a mission is outside the realm of possibility. No matter who is in charge on the civilian side, there seems to be a temptation to use military force to fix problems in the world that might affect our broadest interests (see Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.).
The proper debate to be having in the military is over the degree to which we incorporate COIN into our training and thinking and preparations for future operations. I am of the opinion that while it is important to understand COIN and to have some idea of its principles, it cannot be the main concept around which the military is built. I too suspect it is unlikely that we will do pure COIN again. However, I think it is likely that we will be involved in operations that draw to varying degrees on COIN skills. However, I also think that it is equally unlikely that we are going to fight a major tank battle across Europe again (or even in a desert), though we may engage in some operation that may draw on some of combined-arms skills that are required to right that type of war.
The truth is that, as is so often the case, a future conflict is likely to be somewhere in the middle -- requiring both skills in COIN and in combined arms. Future conflicts, much like many conflicts in the past, will occur on some continuum, with the character of the conflict changing over time.
So yeah, we need to know how to do COIN. Again, balance is the key.
I think a lot of folks confuse the vast amount of articles, propaganda, and lobbying efforts by organizations like CNAS as government policy. It is isn't, but all too frequently the squeaky wheel gets the grease.
If the American people understood the vast amount of money spent on these pipe dreams and what little (actually in many cases these efforts only cause more damage) we get in return certain voices wouldn't have as much credibility.
Again framing the argument as anti-COIN, is like a woman claiming you agree with me because I'm a woman, instead of simply accepting you disagree with her on a particular issue.
Yes we need to know how to do COIN, when we engage in COIN is what the debate should be over.
<b>Bill C.:</b>
While there is no doubt there are some in "our national leadership" who believe those things, it is far from certain that all of them do. Quite far.
There is no consensus that I can ascertain...
Nor should there be. Deciding to go just one way into any situation or to determine there is one solution to a disparate set of problems is a path to real trouble if not disaster.
As a starting point, could we consider this as an explanation:
Our national leaders today believe that conventional military power has little utility in allowing the United States to achieve its current foreign policy aims.
These current foreign policy aims being:
a. To achieve long-term and sustainable peace and prosperity by:
b. Transforming certain aberant states and socieities (think rogue, weak, failing and failed states; and societies not grounded in/dependent upon democracy, capitalism and global markets/international trade).
b. This transformation to provide that these states and societies (1) become less of a problem for, (2) better benefit from, and (3) better service and support (a) the current international system and (b) the expanding global economy.
c. The central most important achievement in this "integration" process being (1) to cause the local governments to become (2) our "agents of change" and, thereby, (3) bear the brunt of the responsibilities -- and the costs -- of achieving these objectives.
d. Herein, it becomes critically important for us to vastly strengthen and expand "our" local governments -- and their military and police forces -- such that this transformation can be achieved as quickly, asefficiently and as peacefully as possible.
Thus, our national leaders believe that these foreign policy aims (transforming and integrating outlier states and societies; and utilizing the local governments as our "agents of change") are best achieved by a "soft power" and "whole of government" approach.
Obviously, resistance is to be expected in such an endeavor, which, by its very nature (1) can cause those of the "old order" to lose power, prestige, wealth and influence and (2) can challenge, discard and replace certain of the foundational tenants and values of these societies/civilizations.
Herein, COIN, etc., rather than the use of conventional military forces, is considered the best way to deal with these "war amongst the people" that we will have instigaged.
Don't pay attention to Ackerman anymore since his JournoList affiliation and activities were revealed.
The pursuit of COIN only makes sense if America plans on remaining the dominant economic and military power in the world - COIN only matters because of America's global significance and the foundation of that significance is conventional military power, not COIN - COIN exists because of conventional power - if that status quo cannot be maintained then COIN is ultimately a waste of time. Given present circumstances is conventional dominance coupled with unending COIN-like engagements really possible while China rushes forward with a valid plan to undermine the former without having to entangle itself in latter? That's the real question to be answered, because if the answer is no then the ultimate winner in Afghanistan will be China, not us.
<i>
But what other effect could cause the United States to need to anticipate, organize, plan for and counter many more -- or more catastrophic -- insurgencies?</i>
We always need to see a threat on the horizon, and we don't have another one.
<i>Could it be globalization, which has the distinct potential and characteristic of requiring that the "old order" give way to the "new?" (The understanding being that this conflict between the "old order" and the "new" is inevitable; this causing the United States to move to support, shape and strengthen foreign governments -- especially their military and police forces -- such that they might better meet the challenges [insurgencies] that these transitions are sure to cause.)?</i>
Why should globalization require that the old order give way to the new? The old order already gave way, globalization is the existing order, and no state that is in any way vital to the global economy currently faces a serious threat from insurgency.
There's no real reason to claim that insurgency is the problem of our future. The only reason we have insurgencies to manage today is that our policies created insurgencies. All we have to do is stop trying to install governments in other countries - something we really don't need to do - and there's no reason to expect that insurgency will be a major issue for us.
Agree with Bill M.
Guerillas, terrorists, and insurgencies have always been with us.
Something else must drive the reason we feel compelled to change today.
Both of Bill M.'s suggestions (strategic goals; the impact of terrorists/insurgencies, etc) seem reasonable.
But what other effect could cause the United States to need to anticipate, organize, plan for and counter many more -- or more catastrophic -- insurgencies?
Could it be globalization, which has the distinct potential and characteristic of requiring that the "old order" give way to the "new?" (The understanding being that this conflict between the "old order" and the "new" is inevitable; this causing the United States to move to support, shape and strengthen foreign governments -- especially their military and police forces -- such that they might better meet the challenges [insurgencies] that these transitions are sure to cause.)?
Bill M.,
While our national leadership may give us objectives, they are just as likely to put limits on the means with which the military might achieve them (e.g., Vietnam, Korea, etc.). Those limitations might be based on forces available, the leadership's interpretation of the broader geopolitical situation, domestic politics, or any combination of the above. It may also be that the objectives are such that the best means available are some form of COIN, or that the objectives are unclear.
In an ideal world, these limitations would not exist and every mission would be crystal clear. However, we do not live in an ideal world.
I am certainly not arguing that the military should henceforth be a dedicated COIN force, or even that it should be the main thrust of our strategic thinking. Far from it. I do believe that COIN should not be put on the shelf as it was after Vietnam. Problems such as the ones we have faced in the past twenty years are likely to arise again. It would be nice if we had a military that was not wholly unfamiliar with the problems involved in dealing with an insurgency, if only so that the military leadership could properly advise our political leaders.
In the end, though, Ken is correct: the best way to handle an insurgency is NOT to commit GPF, but to head it off early. Let State do its job, and if needed, let SF do its FID job. The If GPF are required, it is probably already to late to fix the problem. But that doesn't mean that those forces won't be asked to try.
Bill C,
If our civilian leadership tells us to piss in the wind, you're right we have to piss in the wind. However, we're confusing the ways (method) with the end. Words have meaning, we have been conducting FID for decades, and that doesn't required converting all of DOD into a COIN force. Part of the gray area in the debate is we're confusing COIN (what we're doing in Afghanistan while also conducting FID) with FID, which we're doing in many countries with a very small presence.
Furthermore, our national leadership gives us objectives, they don't tell us how to achieve them, we come back with course of actions based on "analysis", not simply responding by saying we're going to do COIN, which the COINdista's have already determined. What did Boot say, these conflicts exist in the world, so we better get ready for them? My response is when haven't they existed? Do we have to get involved? Based on our objectives, do we have to conduct COIN? We all know terrorism and insurgencies are not new, so the fact they exist doesn't require a paradigm shift. Something else (strategic goals, the impact of terrorism/insurgencies, etc.) must drive the reason we feel compelled to change. What is it?