Small Wars Journal

Night of the Generals

Mon, 03/05/2007 - 7:44pm
In the April 2007 edition of Vanity Fair - The Night of the Generals by David Margolick.

The six retired generals who stepped forward last spring to publicly attack Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's handling of the Iraq war had to overcome a culture of reticence based on civilian control of the military. But while each man acted separately, all shared one experience: a growing outrage over the administration's incompetence, leading some of the nation's finest soldiers to risk their reputations and cross a time-honored line.

The six generals are LtGen Greg Newbold (USMC), MG Paul Eaton (USA), MG John Batiste (USA), LTG John Riggs (USA), MG Charles Swannack Jr. (USA) and LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC).

The 16 page (printed) article provides a brief background on each of the generals' careers, some background on their thoughts while on active duty (excepting Van Riper) concerning the lead-in and the war in Iraq, reasoning behind their decision (or in one case another's decision) to retire, what prompted them to speak out and any regrets they may have in doing so.

LtGen Greg Newbold

Newbold began reviewing the plan to invade Iraq, several years old by that point, which called for 500,000 troops—a figure Rumsfeld summarily dismissed. Surely 125,000 would suffice, he said, and with a little imagination, you could probably get away with far fewer than that.

MG Paul Eaton

Among the six, Paul Eaton has one clear distinction. He was dealt the worst hand: to create a new Iraqi Army from scratch.

MG John Batiste

John Batiste, 54, may bear the greatest burden of the group. In the middle of Iraq, in the midst of the war, Batiste actually met with Donald Rumsfeld, who asked him point-blank whether there was anything that he, the commander of the First Infantry Division, had asked for that he had not in fact received. Batiste did not answer his question.

LTG John Riggs

Three-star general John Riggs, 60, should have been Donald Rumsfeld's kind of guy. He was the head of the army's Objective Force Task Force, the group charged with developing a lighter, lither army, built around "Future Combat Systems" of high-tech armored vehicles, drones, and sensors.

MG Charles Swannack Jr.

Swannack had all of the usual gripes, about troop shortages, de-Ba'thification, underestimating the insurgency, problems equipping Iraqi soldiers. Sometimes, at press conferences, he aired his complaints.

LtGen Paul Van Riper

At 68, Van Riper is the oldest of the six generals, old enough to have had two tours in Vietnam, where he left behind his spleen and a piece of his intestines. He is also the most famous, highlighted in Malcolm Gladwell's Blink, and, on martial matters, the most erudite.

While the Vanity Fair article presents the generals views it also touches on another issue - does such dissent undermine civilian control of the military?

Some scholars of military-civilian affairs said that the six had imperiled civilian control, undermined military mores and morale, jeopardized the military meritocracy and the trust between senior and junior officers. The time for these men to have spoken out, these critics said, was while they were still in uniform, through the chain of command; past retired generals with bones to pick had had the decency to wait for administrations to change before writing books, rather than popping off against incumbents in real time, practically before the ink on their retirement papers had dried.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld plays heavily in the article to include his styles of management and leadership.

I recommend this as a must read. I'm glad I did not have to "walk a mile" in their shoes. The decision to go or not to go public in dissent, either on active duty or in retirement, was not a decision these men made lightly.

Comments

zenpundit

Sun, 03/11/2007 - 12:37am

"What does civilian control of our military mean?"

All great questions are directed at fundamentals.

In the last analysis it means that the decision to go to war and make peace rest in the hands of our democratically elected officials, not our generals. When a conflict ensues, it is the McClellans and MacArthurs who must go.

As for making "plans" -that depends on what level of war you are talking about and what military force is intended to achieve. Grand strategy is something that is mostly the province of statesman not soldiers, with the exception of a few figures like George Washington, George Marshall. Or, less charitably, a Caesar or a Napoleon.

It would be tempting to say civilians should stay out of military planning entirely but too many counterexamples abound. Lincoln had more sense than most of his generals until he tapped Grant and Sherman. It was Churchill who pushed hard for the use of innovative tanks and amphibious invasion ( disaster at Galipolli, key to victory at Normandy). General Curtis LeMay was dead wrong during the Cuban Missile Crisis and JFK was right. If LeMay had prevailed, operational Soviet nukes would have obliterated several American cities and set off WWIII and perhaps we would not be here today.

On the other hand, civilians, even talented and intuitive military amateurs who are political appointees, do not have a grasp on the variables of war possessed by a military professional, much less one with successful experience in combat command. Operational details are best left to the real pros, setting national objectives to our elected leaders and strategy to a working partnership between the two.

max161 (not verified)

Wed, 03/07/2007 - 4:57am

Quote: "While the Vanity Fair article presents the generals views it also touches on another issue - does such dissent undermine civilian control of the military?"

The question I think needs to be asked is: "What does civilian control of our military mean?"

Does civilian control mean an office of the secretary of defense and all the civilian officials assigned to it? Or does it mean civilian control as in the President and the Congress and a Secretary of War (Defense)? When developing war plans for execution should they be developed by civilians (including some with no relavent military experience) or should they be developed by professional military personnel and then approved by the civilian leadership. Again, a further question should be asked: "Should civilian political appointees be developing war plans?"

Dave