Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 2:32 PM
Subject: CSA Sends - Transition Team Commanders (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE
CSA SENDS
Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.
I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.
Therefore, we are creating a new CSL sub-category called "Combat Arms Operations". It will be open to all eligible officers in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) branches and to Foreign Area Officers (FAO). It will fall under the Operations category and will be effective on the FY 10 CSL board which meets this September.
As a bridging strategy, for FY09 we will activate officers for these command positions from the alternate lists of all four major MFE command categories - Operations, Strategic Support, Training, and Installation. Officers accepting and who serve will be awarded CSL credit in the Operations category for serving as a Transition Team Commander. Additionally, if selected by the FY 10 CSL board, the officer may opt to command in the category they are selected after completion of their TT Command. Those that do command will receive credit for a second CSL command. If chosen, and they opt not to command, they will still receive credit for their TT command.
Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element of 21st century land power. We need our best involved.
GEN Casey
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Comments
Hey MAJ C,
WRT #1 - I think you have hit a real concern, and one we must guard against - it is in our vital self interest that we not pigeon hole ourselves, but look beyond what the job was, and look toward how the person did in the job and what they left behind in selecting those for command. We may have a natural bias to overcome in picking those who look most like us, but it is to our detriment if we cannot overcome it.
#4 kind of captures #s 2 &3 -
I think the quantity or absence of certain personal traits and attributes that make someone suitable enough for one may not serve them well enough in the other, but in many cases there are those that have them in spades and can emphasize the right ones at the right times.
Consider the range of most commanders a fellow has seen or come in contact with by the time he makes field grade or more senior SNCO rank. There are some who brilliantly do it all by themselves, and by the time they are gone much of the energy and direction of the organization is gone with them. Then there are those who empower their commands with authority and responsibility, and create organizations that can stand on their own in the most difficult times. Chances are the same traits and attributes you find in the latter will translate well to advisory duty.
We've (big US Army we)done some good research on what makes a good advisor and posted it on the JCISFA website on the JKO portal - and its available elsewhere as well. In its most basic sense it comes to the advisor being comfortable not being at the wheel and in control all the time, but instead is at home and recognizes the value in fostering the development of those he or she is advising. In terms of a commander, this translates to the acceptance of risk in that his/her subordinate leaders must have the potential to fail in order to grow.
It is similar in advising - the advisor needs to understand the value they bring is not in making the call for those they advise for a year, but in developing the abilities of those they advise to make the call in the year they are there so that FSF leader can make the call that year, the year after and the year after that.
I think there are some who might be a good enough commander as long as there are subordinates, peers, and superiors who don't let them fail for the sake of the cost to the organization, those types of commanders are the ones who are sort of the minimum standard types. We've all seen them and wondered about the system that perpetuates them. These types of folks don't make good advisors anymore then they make good commanders. I've also seen advisors who were part of a successful team but who were carried - they may go back and make it to a command position where they will probably be carried as well.
Interestingly war in the modern OE stresses the value of the same sets of traits and attributes we look for in both. Look at what BCTs, BNs, COs and PLTs are being asked to do, mission effectiveness means empowering subordinates and accepting you can't do it all. Hard "A" type personalities don't cut it anywhere - in command or advising. Hard "A"s shatter when they get tired and bump up against the unexpected. While a hard "A" might have succeeded in a relative peacetime army where all they had to do was power through red, amber and green cycles with a CTC rotation at the end and an OER, war has proven full of the unexpected and the most severe & irrevocable of consequences.
I believe advising and command are complimentary to developing the leaders we say we want and require because they both rely on the skills and attributes required to develop those around you. They both stress the need for an organization that is not centered around one individual, but is healthy throughout. They both provide unique opportunities to consider things differently and to contemplate a more developed perspective of war & peace.
I'd say having been a good advisor to FSFs makes you a more qualified and prepared commander or staff officer, and being a good staff officer or good commander makes you a better, qualified advisor. The former adds to both your character and your knowledge, the former provides the experience set required to advise others - after all nobody wants an advisor whose sole quality is being a good communicator.
The advisor best serves those he is advising by having the type of tacit knowledge by having served well at the level and in the position they are advising. In my view the key to gaining real influence and being effective depends on giving good advice (being right) when it matters - often the key to doing that was not just the possession of technical knowledge, but in having had the type of tacit knowledge that comes from developmental experiences where my own leadership allowed me the chance to fail and learn - which in turn spurred growth.
When I meet someone who has served as an advisor to a FSF, no matter the capacity, the type of unit they advised, or if their experience was positive or negative, I find there is an aspect of their character that has developed in a way that no other job I've seen can do.
In my opinion this not only serves us because by, with and through FSFs is a growing part of our strategy, or as GEN Casey said "Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element of 21st century land power. We need our best involved.", but because those we lead deserve the best leadership we can provide them, and every experience that more fully develops our leadership to meet the types of challenges we've seen in war should be taken advantage of for their full worth.
Best, Rob
Rob,
This note from GEN Casey is a very interesting, and reasonably positive, development as I see it as a bridge to LTC John Nagls concept of a permanent Advisor Corps. This is certainly a positive step for the Brigade level Transition Teams (not the ones built out of a units hide), as I have seen far too many guys who had last been on active duty 10-15 years prior (e.g., long retired Retiree recalls and M-Day USAR guys) to their time in that saddle and were just completely out of touch with the current Army. I think the battalion teams are in decent hands, but my experience with brigade teams was generally not too positive.
1) In my opinion, while TT Team Chief will now be given KD credit, it will be looked on as a "soft-KD" job for command selection purposes. An officer who wants to be an MTOE battalion commander will still need to do at least two years as an MTOE battalion or brigade S3 or XO.
2) Anecdotally, I know a sizeable number of Military Transition Team (MiTT) and National Police Transition Team (NPTT) Chiefs are currently coming out of the TRADOC side of the house (former S3s/XOs of various training battalions). Both the 1-3-1 and 2-4-1 NPTT incoming team chiefs in December 2007, which my battalion had operational control of in east Baghdad, were on their first combat tour and came from Fort Benning out of the Infantry Training Brigade and Ranger Training Brigade, respectively. A very good friend currently leading another BN NPTT in Baghdad came out of 29th Regiment at Fort Benning . I can tell you that most of my peers who have served with the National Police came back very bitter for a whole host of reasons. Guys who served with the Iraqi Army generally had a more positive experience.
3) Much like KD service in TRADOC essentially locks one into TRADOC command, majority KD service as a TT Chief will probably lock one into the TT Command track.
4) A point that always stuck with me, brought out in either John Cooks book THE ADVISOR or Stuart Herringtons book SILENCE WAS A WEAPON (and I very much welcome his thoughts on this), is that the temperament required for command and advisory duty are often contradictory.
Rob;
This is among the wisest of investments promoted by the CSA. Let us hope that the commitment is duplicated across all the services.
Sometimes I believe that our technology has the ability to widen our vision while shrinking its depth. There is changing world unseen inside the platforms of composite material where too many careers are grown.
Best, Bill
The "P" or personnel piece of this will serve as the fulcrum by which we will better leverage the rest of the DOTMLPF.
Im not alone when I say that serving as an advisor to a foreign security force is among the most rewarding to be had. In my own military service it is coequal with command. I view them as complimentary - one having made me better for the other. I think if ever I was asked to take another command it would benefit both me and those served. This is because as an advisor to FSFs you will see and do things you would not see or do other wise. It is because the conditions inherent to being an effective advisor require you to develop and exercise a different side of your talents - often in a different way, and because the environment in which the advisor operates offers a view from a different perspective - both on the operational environment and our own forces.
The CSAs message talks to the valuable contribution the advisory mission makes to our Land Power. That is worth considering beyond just our current operations in OIF and OEF. As more leaders take on this challenge, it informs the rest of our Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities development and decisions we make as we go forward. With the CSAs message we stand to create both a relevant body of knowledge throughout the force on working closely with FSFs, and we create Army stakeholders that better understand how "by, with and through" both benefits our own tactical, operation and strategic objectives, as well improving upon the direction we take our own force.
The CSAs message shows what we value; we protect and advance those things which we value.