Lessons Learned in Iraq
by Sergeant Michael Hanson, Small Wars Journal
COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)
Tanks and artillery don't defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".
This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.
So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?
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Comments
Good article written by a veteran NCO on small unit infantry TTPs in the conduct of COIN operations. It's a good discussion of the operational and tactical issues that our military leaders are dealing with in the current fight.
However, I would challenge the author's initial statement in the article. He says, "Tanks and artillery dont defeat insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents". Although I will give him the benefit of doubt and assume he is speaking to the tactical level, I feel this is a dangerous statement that represents the idea that many Americans (including many civilian leaders) have in that they believe that the military alone can defeat an insurgency.
Although the military can kill and neutralize insurgents, it alone can not defeat an insurgency. It can only set the conditions for success of a broader national effort by providing the needed local and regional security and stability (as can be seen by the success of the "surge" in Iraq to quell violence, not defeat the insurgency). However, without a comprehensive "whole of government" strategy that employs the entire arsenal of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), no amount of military effort will ultimately succeed.
So, although the article is very useful in advancing improvements to COIN military operations and tactics, it should not be confused with a strategy to defeat an insurgency.
MAJ Joe Bethel
Student, CGSC
Ft Leavenworth, KS
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government."
The Council discussion on this article is <a href="http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6355">here.</a>
Sergeant Hanson has figured out that the key to defeating insurgents -- or, indeed, any enemy -- is the application of well trained and empowered units with the lowest possible level of control.
He has also learned that the deterrent to implementation of this desirable and proven effective methodology is a failure to train which engenders a massive lack of trust...
In our Indian Wars in the 19th century, MG George Crook was considered the most successful commander -- he used well trained, highly mobile and small units that rapidly dominated some of the worlds best guerrilla fighters. This in great contrast to other commanders like Terry and Custer who insisted on mass which achieved few successes and a number of failures.
In the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, it was learned again that small well trained units achieved more than large elements blundering about. The same lesson was again learned in World War II, in Korea and as Sergeant Hanson illustrates, in Viet Nam. We are now learning it anew in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq.
In each of those cases, the caveat "in some units' is required simply because the Army and the Marines as institutions never adapted, only some units with astute leadership did so. The often asked question "Why do the US Armed Forces have to relearn the lessons for each war?" is answered very simply -- the institutions have never been willing to accept that in combat independence and adaptability trump conformity and compliance. That is a truth regardless of the level or intensity of combat and is as (I would posit 'more') applicable to MCO as it is to COIN or FID missions.
Nor have they been willing to invest in truly adequate training for Soldiers and Marines upon initial entry thus forcing the system to over supervise and to attempt to replace competence with technology; a flawed premise. That is compounded by flawed personnel systems that effectively insist all persons of a given rank and skill set are equal and interchangeable -- that is, of course, patently untrue and has caused unnecessary combat deaths for our forces for a good many years in many places.
Egalitarianism can be carried to an extreme. So can a failure to trust. Failure to adequately train for combat is a violation of trust...