Why Can't We All Just Get Along? (Update # 2)

I'm sitting here pondering the latest e-mail circulating through various military and subject matter expert networks concerning Dr. Jason Brownlee's Middle East Report hit-piece on the Army's newest field manual -- FM 3-07, Stability Operations. In Imagining the Next Occupation, Brownlee evokes all the politically biased bugaboos in his implied bottom line - the better we become at nation building the more likely we are to try to do more of it, thereby establishing military occupation as a Pentagon priority.

I'll give my "knuckle-dragger" two-cents worth and then turn this discussion over to good friend and colleague Dr. Janine Davidson via her recent Small Wars Journal post - The New Army Stability Operations Manual: Fact, Fiction, and Perspective on FM 3-07 (reposted here in full and recommended reading for Dr. Brownlee should he be inquisitive enough to wander by SWJ).

My bottom line for those disposed to hurling stones at doctrinal publications such as FM 3-07 and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (USA and USMC doctrine) is they really do not understand why the Army and Marine Corps (MCWP 33.3.5) felt compelled to write both publications -- because in the absence of such doctrine -- they were reduced to "winging it" -- conducting stability and counterinsurgency missions as directed by our civilian authorities without the whole of government package associated with such operations. Read -- all those non-military lines of operation such as governance, essential services and rule of law. When a vacuum exists someone needs to fill it and this often falls to the default only guys in town -- excepting the bad guys of course.

Doctrine is not national security strategy, defense strategy or a campaign plan and it is especially not the U.S. military's version of Mao's Little Red Book. Often unread by many until needed, military doctrine provides a common framework and lexicon to foster initiative and creative problem solving. In the case of the two FMs mentioned here, it provides a how to think - not what to think - about an unfamiliar operating environment. The military really does like to be "prepared for the unexpected" and the lack of such doctrine has caught us flat-footed one too many times. More importantly, the collaboration between the Army and non-DoD civilian departments and agencies on FM 3-07 paved the way for a common framework to someday truly contribute to a whole of government approach (read unity of effort here) to problems that beg for non-military solutions. Dr. Brownlee -- it ain't sinister -- it's just good common sense.

Now on to the smart stuff -- here is Dr. Davidson's 20 October SWJ post on the facts, fiction, and perspectives concerning FM 3-07.

The recent release of the Army's latest Field Manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations, has generated as much controversy as it has praise. On one side of the debate are those who see it as a great step forward in helping the military make sense of the complex, violent, and population-focused environments in which it increasingly finds itself. To the extent that our future conflicts are likely to look more like our current ones as Secretary Gates has asserted, it is high time we stopped muddling through and got serious about learning how to do this stuff. On the other end of the spectrum, however, are those who see the new doctrine as another dangerous step on the slippery slope toward U.S. imperialism. The better we become at nation building the critics claim, the more likely we are to try to do more of it. Moreover, teaching soldiers how to do stability operations not only erodes their war-fighting skills (i.e. their "real" mission), but it lets the civilian agencies who are supposed to do it off the hook in building their own capabilities and capacities. There are merits to both arguments, but on balance FM 3-07 should be seen as a great accomplishment.

Why FM 3-07?

It is perfectly understandable to hope that the military will conduct fewer stability operations in the future, but hoping does not make it so. The military still needs to prepare itself for the missions it will most likely be called on to perform. Given the thousands of troops over the last 200 years who have repeatedly been called to conduct these messy stability operations with little to no doctrine, education, or training, it seems high time someone put some rigorous effort into understanding how to conduct them better.

The concern over the U.S. as an imperialist power may be valid, but let's not get carried away. Doctrine is not grand strategy. For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect. If there is one thing this manual makes very clear, it is that stability operations are not rocket science -- they are actually more complex and uncertain. Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes.

Fact vs. Fiction

The real value of FM 3-07 is that it gets a dialogue going and sets a few things straight:

First, FM 3-07 rightly notes that, contrary to popular belief, the Army has been conducting these types of missions for 200 years. The opening chapter is an excellent overview of this rich history. Military troops have been tasked with stabilizing, building, and re-building societies since the first units were sent West to keep peace between the settlers and the Indians and to build -- literally -- the nation. Recall that West Point was established as an engineering school for a reason. President Thomas Jefferson insisted that if we were to have a standing military (which he originally opposed) it should be as useful in times of peace as it is in times of war. One might make a similar case today and ask if the American taxpayer should expect more for $500 billion than an institution organized, trained, and equipped to fight conventional battles and nothing else.

Second, the manual recognizes that the nature of conflict is more complex than the pure science of defeating enemy militaries. If we truly wish leave a lasting peace in the places in which we intervene or fight, we do not have a choice between preparing for pure scientific battles and preparing for stability operations. At a minimum, if we do not stabilize a place after we bring down an enemy, then we set a trajectory for more chaos not peace. In so many other cases where the military is called to intervene in on-going conflicts or insurgencies, where the need to provide human security is the decisive line of operation, we need a military with a "full spectrum" mindset to understand the myriad interconnected tasks required to get the job done. FM 3-07 is a first step in this education.

Third, the manual suggests that despite aspirations to the contrary, the desired capability and capacity in civilian agencies not only does not currently exist, but it is not likely to be built in the near future. More importantly, even if and when USAID, State and all the other agencies were to enhance their expeditionary capacity 10 fold, these civilians would still not be capable -- nor should they be -- of doing their thing while bullets are still flying. That is the definition of a combatant, not a civilian. This means that the military will, at a minimum, be required to set a trajectory for accomplishing the long term strategic objectives with or without civilian experts on the ground. Once the environment is safe enough for civilians to engage, the military needs to know how to support their work. This means having a fundamental understanding of the nature of the conflict environment, the intersecting lines of operation (e.g. governance, security, economic development, etc), and the appropriate coordination of efforts among myriad military and civilian actors. This is what FM 3-07 is designed to accomplish.

Finally, it is important to understand that although this is a military manual, paid for and sponsored by the U.S. Army, it is in every other way, shape, and form, a true interagency, whole-of-government product. The process of writing this manual was almost as important as the product itself -- and this process was unique. Through a series of conferences, roundtables, and workshops with thought leaders and representatives from various agencies throughout the government, in the NGO community, and among allies, FM 3-07's author, LTC Steve Leonard, was able to glean the latest thought, theory, lessons, and controversies from the widest possible group of experts. Detailed debates over language, connotations, social science theory, and recent lessons learned from the field took place over a 10-month period, with some of these non-military participants contributing actual text to the finished product. In the end, FM 3-07 was written for and by the civilian-military community of practice, which spans well beyond just the U.S. Army. LTG Caldwell, the manual's chief sponsor at Fort Leavenworth, recognized the importance of generating this vibrant interagency dialogue and has thus set the bar for future whole of government efforts in doctrine and strategy. Indeed, the next QDR might follow a similar model.

In sum, FM 3-07 is a great accomplishment. It is about time we thought seriously about these missions -- not only how to do them, but why we do them. That the publication has generated great debate means that it is functioning just as it should.

Update:

Andrew Exum has more at Abu Muqawama - On Critiques of COIN/StabOps:

This MERIP piece is just another example, I'm afraid, of what happens when a political scientist tries to arrive at broad conclusions about the military without the necessary familiarity and study required to do so.

Spencer Ackerman at Washington Indpendent chimes in too - The Counterinsurgency Debate in Two Quick Hyperlinks.

Update # 2:

Mark O'Neill at Lowy Institute's The Interpreter - It's Not a Strategy, it's Just a Very Useful Book:

The pertinent fact to take away from all of the noise is that FM 3.07 is not grand strategy. It is not even a strategy. It is essentially a 'cook book' that provides US Army personnel in simple, easy to understand format, concise information about what they should do when in a stability operation. And this is useful, since they actually have a few of these on their plates at the moment, and it is probably better (for all of us) if they can pull them off successfully.

The idea that the US is likely to embark upon countless crusades because the US Army now has some instructions in how to undertake stability operations is ridiculous. Consider this - the US Army has had doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons for over half a century. I don't recall seeing any blogging about the fact that because they have nuclear weapons doctrine that they will invariably use such weapons. It is simply an illogical argument.