by Allison Brown, Small Wars Journal
Poppy is Not the Most Profitable Crop, It's the Only Crop (Full PDF Article)
If poppy were really the most profitable crop in Afghanistan, farmers would be growing it year-round. They're not, nor are they growing all that much of it outside 4 provinces in the south. How can this be if poppy is such an economic slam dunk?
It is no lie that poppy has advantages. Poppy fits a special niche in the agriculture calendar, the winter season when very few valuable crops can grow. The harvested opium gum is imperishable and easily transportable and it increases in value with age, serving as a home-grown, interest bearing bank account. And the opium can be used as a pain killer where there are no doctors. The disadvantages of poppy -- that it is illegal, haram (forbidden), and a management nightmare -- are overshadowed by farmers' need to survive. But the notion that opium is the most profitable crop is a myth.
Poppy is the most profitable crop when there is little else to sell. That is, growing poppy is the most profitable option for farmers who are too far from a marketplace, farmers who have no access to modern technologies and reliable farm supplies, and farmers who live where gangsters rule -- a gun at your head is a compelling inducement to do most anything.
Poppy in southern Afghanistan is a winter-season monoculture and farmers are mere contract growers. The gangsters provide a full agriculture extension package -- seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, labor management and immediate payment for the product at the farmgate. The rest of the year the Afghan government, with the help of international aid programs, struggles to promote other crops.
Poppy is Not the Most Profitable Crop, It's the Only Crop (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
A newer model in Columbia with the coca farmer should be implemented in Afghanistan post haste - road infrastructure developement and security to the marketplace.
Not often talked about is the cross purpose that occurs when our national level intelligence agency sits in on DEA interrogations and turns the criminal into an asset, but in return, turns a blind eye, and in fact enables the production and distribution of brown tar horse.
If we are going to insist that Karzai's Kabul government get its house in order - we need to do the same thing.
Perhaps we may want to look at the Turkey model for Afghanistan at some point - if we stay the course?
First I must caveat that these comments are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the US Army, or the US Government. Regardless of whether or not opium poppies are the most profitable or only crop is not relevant. The Afghani inability to provide a safe and secure environment for their constituents is where the problem lies. If the Afghan government could police its territory, an environment could not exist where opium farms are a major source of revenue for Taliban and Al Qaeda Islamic Extremists. - A state must first focus on the safety and security of its constituents; once basic safety and human services are in place the state can create an environment where people are less likely to turn to or be coerced to engage in illegal activities. - Opium provides funds to fuel Islamic extremism in Afghanistan as surely as the Iranians fund Hezbollah with oil money in the Middle East. According to a UN report quoted by Colum Lynch and Griff Witte, writing for the Washington Post in August 28, 2007; "The surge in opium production has frustrated U.S. and NATO military commanders, who believe that the trade plays a major role in funding a Taliban insurgency that has become increasingly deadly over the past two years. Commanders also believe that the involvement of public officials in the drug trade has undermined Afghans' confidence in their government." Allison Brown states that opium production is mostly limited to the nearly lawless provinces in southern Afghanistan. Until International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are able to contain Islamic Extremism along the Afghan/Pakistani border, and then hand over police operations to a capable and sustainable Afghan government, the southern provinces will continue to supply nearly 90% of the worlds opium (Through extortion and taxation, the Taliban are believed to reap as much as $300 million a year from Afghanistans opium trade, which now makes up 90 percent of the worlds total. That is enough, the Americans say, to sustain all of the Talibans military operations in southern Afghanistan for an entire year - Dexter Filkins, NY Times, "Poppies a Target in Fight Against Taliban," April 28, 2009). The bottom line is that if the US wants to stop the production of 90% of the worlds opium and put a strangle hold on Islamic extremist financing in Afghanistan, then the populace of the US needs to be ready to provide security for the non Islamic extremists in Afghanistan until the Afghan government reaches a point of self sufficiency. If the US political will falters and removes security forces from Afghanistan prematurely (the International Community will immediately follow suit) then the US and international partners will create a security vacuum that could allow the Taliban to take control of the nation again.