General McChrystal's New Way of War

"My greatest fear is that those who "get it" - "really get it" are bailing out or seriously considering bailing out and we will be left with the "career at all costs" types or the "don't have another option" bubbas. We have to figure a way to keep our best and brightest without burning them out - not for tomorrow, or next year - but for our Nation's survival through this century."

This is what we saw immediately after Vietnam, and it's the main reason I've been much more interested in the Army's response as an institution to the current conflicts than I have anything else. To their great credit, they've reacted very quickly and (on the whole) very well to the battlefield reality. But what concerns me is that the administrative reaction seems to be very similar to that we saw in Vietnam. Once again, I think at least part of the cure lies in reforming the personnel and training systems...both things that are long overdue and not especially likely to happen.

"400 officers who will spend years focused on Afghanistan."

Does anybody really think we will or can "spend" years in Afghanistan?

We're up against time besides an insurgent. And it would seem we don't lack for insurgents, but may be running out of time?

<i>I note that even many of our most passionate and well known COIN advocates seem to have found the attractions of the Beltway, Think tanks, the media or academia as being a far more attractive proposition than backing up for the 3rd, 4th or xth rotation in Iraq, Afghanistan etc.</i>

That is one of my fears - multiplied by the fact that "recent operational experience" is a perishable asset - even more so in regards to the "interesting times" we operate.

My greatest fear is that those who "get it" - "really get it" are bailing out or seriously considering bailing out and we will be left with the "career at all costs" types or the "don't have another option" bubbas. We have to figure a way to keep our best and brightest without burning them out - not for tomorrow, or next year - but for our Nation's survival through this century.

Steve,

I totally agree with this:
<i>Also, people are assuming that incoming commanders will LISTEN to the area experts. This doesn't always happen (see Vietnam, since Boot likes to use this as an example). That's just part of human nature, unfortunately, and it's likely to remain that way until commanders are held accountable for failing to listen.</i>

I ran into exactly this type of problem. And you're right, nothing will change until there is incentive/disincentive to listen to the voices of the more experienced.

I also agree that there are some good American examples in the Frontier Army. In a sort of prescient way, <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=jsSqTWA9CX0C&dq=imperial+grunts&prints… Kaplan also agreed.</a>

The first issue I see ties right back to the personnel system. Until we fix it, you're looking at cobbling another band-aid onto a system that hasn't served us as well as it could in every conflict since WW 2. And continuity in the shape of a single individual or two isn't going to work if we're still shaking up entire units on a regular period. We DID have some long-term area specialists in Vietnam (mainly by default in the form of multiple-extended tour folks and repeat tours with some others)...and most were ignored by new units as they came in-country. It was fluidity at the unit level that caused problems in many cases.

Also, in reaching to the British model, Boot overlooks the fact that we have had some very successful leaders in our own right in this area...the Frontier Army produced a number of leaders at all levels who had a good grounding in COIN and the like. That was accomplished with a small force serving long tours in specific locations and with a great deal of unit continuity. The keys have usually (for American forces, at least) centered around stable units with decent training or experience.

Also, people are assuming that incoming commanders will LISTEN to the area experts. This doesn't always happen (see Vietnam, since Boot likes to use this as an example). That's just part of human nature, unfortunately, and it's likely to remain that way until commanders are held accountable for failing to listen.

I understand the local trust problem, but until we fix the basic problems in our own structure we'll be reinventing the same wheel.

Mark and Steve,

<i>"Once analysis goes beyond punditry and the nostalgia for Kipling style narrations of warrior deeds on the frontier, the plan is wonky when it comes to praticalities."</i>

<i>"Creating a bunch of American Lawrences or the like won't help...and will in fact create a set of new problems."</i>

I'm just wondering what exactly these problems and practicalities are. And Max Boot isn't the only one who's been proposing this option for people with relevant knowledge who want to stay on to help newbies get a better understanding of the area. Max is exactly right -- as soon as a command and their soldiers begin to understand the nuances and complexities of their AO, it's time to go home, possibly (and probably) never to return to the same area again. That creates a huge trust problem with locals, and it wastes time and effort on behalf of the soldiers and the training program.

I'm still not sure how Mr. Boot thinks burning out a force to be an advantage. That said, I do think that our personnel system needs an overhaul, but that has more to do with building UNIT continuity and not so much a COIN focus. Moving command types every couple of years has caused problems for the US military since Vietnam...nothing new there. I also don't understand his fixation on the British military. We have plenty of home-grown COIN-type experience in our own military history, and there are many lessons there if we'd bother to review them.

Fix the training and personnel issues and you've made a good start to correcting this problem as well as many of the others we've faced in our post-World War II military experience. Creating a bunch of American Lawrences or the like won't help...and will in fact create a set of new problems.

I know that Max was trying to make the point about continuity, but this really is counterintuitive:

Quote The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, continued fighting until they were killed or immobilized. That gave their forces a huge advantage. Unquote.

So if all of your soldiers are killed or immobilized you have a huge advantage? Guess it makes the logistics problem easy, and you do not need to worry too much about manoeuvre .....

Grammatic style aside, the flaw with this idea is that it reflects a reality that modern society will not sustain. It beggars belief that there are sufficient numbers of warrior monks out there willing to sacrifice a 'normal' life (whatever that actually is for active duty members) IOT to address the problem in the manner suggested.

Generation Y, amongst other things, has been characterised as having quite flexible ideas about commitment to 'one career'. I do not believe that the idea of a decade in Afghanistan will be the next 'must do' bandied about on Twitter... Even the previous 'greatest generation' of Americans only endured, at most five years 'at war'.

I note that even many of our most passionate and well known COIN advocates seem to have found the attractions of the Beltway, Think tanks, the media or academia as being a far more attractive proposition than backing up for the 3rd, 4th or xth rotation in Iraq, Afghanistan etc.

You only need one good tour, a book deal, and then it will all be sweet right? Meanwhile, lets all agree with the good idea fairy, because 'someone else' (a lot of someone elses actually) is sure to ante up for the task.

Once analysis goes beyond punditry and the nostalgia for Kipling style narrations of warrior deeds on the frontier, the plan is wonky when it comes to praticalities.

Regards,

Mark