... Does that ability of troops to shift back and forth seamlessly between different types of operations hold across the board? I would argue that it's not always the case. For example: there was a clear difference in competence between Sallee's soldiers doing a cordon and knock operation and an artillery company temporarily converted into a motorized rifle company doing the same task. The 11 Bravos, the infantry, were just much better at basic infantryman skills, which stands to reason. Special operators, who relentlessly train to take down a house or roomful of enemy, are much better than the 11 Bravos, although that gap has narrowed considerably in recent years as the rank-and-file ground pounder has accumulated a mass of experience doing cordon and knock operations during combat tours in Iraq.
Speaking earlier this month at a CNAS conference in Washington, Gen. David Petraeus weighed in on the issue. Our troopers can still very much fight," he said, but instead of preparing just for the big battles, current and future wars require troops prepare for a constantly shifting mix of conflict, across the low and high intensity scale, he said. We're not doing the big tank armies colliding in the central corridor anymore, we're doing continuous complex counterinsurgency which sometimes requires very significant kinetic ops, often requires very significant stability and support, all integrated." Readying units for a major force on force fight might mean a couple of weeks spent brushing up on shooting big metal targets at the NTC, he said.
The Army is wrestling with the issue. Trainers at the Army's premier training center are mindful of a potential atrophy of high-intensity skills and try to include some training in those tasks for units preparing for Iraq and Afghanistan, said Maj. Michael Burgoyne, co-author of an excellent book on adapting to counterinsurgency: The Defense of Jisr Al-Dorea. It's about finding a balance... somewhere in between counterinsurgency and high-intensity conflict, some kind of mix of capabilities where we can do a lot," he told me...
Much more at DoD Buzz.
Comments
The author makes the same mistake many in -- or recently in -- the Army make; the author can be excused due to lack of knowledge; the others cannot.
Performing infantry tasks in FID or a COIN effort and performing infantry tasks in MCO differ little; if one can do the job in one type of conflict, than one can do it in the other.
On the other hand, directing Tankers, Artillerymen or others to do Infantry work is akin to sending the Fire Department to put down a riot. They can do it, firehoses will knock people off their feet -- but it is using a poor tool for the job. Sometimes, emergencies occur and one has to use an improper tool -- but that should be avoided if remotely possible.
The point, of course, is that we can and should better train all initial entry folks, Officer and Enlisted -- we do better now than almost ever in the past but there's still much room for improvement.
We must also attempt to avoid using Tankers and others to do Infantry work; they will certainly do what's tasked and do their best however, the deterioration of primary skills thus caused is not beneficial and imposes downstream costs best avoided. Doing that obviously entails selective planning for the employment of force -- a national and political, not a military problem.
The Author cites Kepeinevich:<blockquote>"Krepinevich argues that the Army needs to beef up its irregular warfare skills, that soldiers need more, not less specialization. He calls for a bifurcated Army, with a portion oriented to stability operations and counterinsurgency, and the other for conventional operations. "While it was once argued that such "general-purpose" forces could readily shift gears to handle contingencies at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the evidence of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq suggests the contrary."</blockquote>
In order, he's correct. More specialization is required but that requirement is for the MOS to be better trained in regard to the basics than is currently the case -- and for the Soldier to be used in his trained specialty, not as an interim Infantryman. Misuse of a tool is not an indicator of a flaw in the tool...
The GPF can shift gears and and handle all levels of the conflict spectrum -- the real issue is whether Senior commanders in the GPF have adequate training and professional military education in all spectrums of conflict to do such gear shifting. The conflicts listed indicate that many -- not all -- have difficulties with this.
In their defense, I will note that the training and education decisions by a series of senior Army leaders in the 1961-1965 and 1975-2002 periods are responsible for much of that problem and that a one-size fits all dysfunctional personnel system is also partly responsible.
Further, there is the problem of bureaucratic inertia and the US Congress (which imposes personnel and equipment issues that it should not). Those two factors are significant impediments to the flexibility required in shifting between modes and spectra of conflict. Congress is probably not repairable; the bureaucratic inertia problem can be fixed
The very flawed idea of a "bifurcated" Army would produce two very different forces with ever widening outlooks and capabilities would result in not enough people -- read capability -- in either force. Not flawed; it's really a dangerous idea and not at all well though out.
Most who espouse the idea of separate forces are products of the Viet Nam buildup with its significantly less capable personnel inflow <u>or</u> of the post Viet Nam era; a period in which we foolishly 'dumbed-down' training to the fifth grade level, the rough plane of said late Viet Nam entrants.
We have a professional force and we need to dispense with the great mobilization trainup and personnel requirement myth. By all means, plan and prepare for such a mobilization -- but do not adopt it as a way of life today, put the plans on the shelf and adapt personnel and training policies to today and the future, not to World War II. Those days are gone, never to return.
Do we want our unconventional wars to become "conventional?" Or, our irregular wars to become "regular?"
In terms of risk, will it be more difficult for us (the United States, the "West", champions of democracy) to recover from the loss of a conventional conflict than an unconventional one?
I say, there is no comparison.
This topic is not just about priority, but also the ability to communicate or translate principles to application.
The Army, if we want to remain a profession, is best served in adhering to core values, principles, and capabilities. If the core is strong (yes, I am on the X-fit bandwagon), then we are able to transfer capability to other methods.
But if we focus on methods (area-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures) at the expense of core capabilities (offensive, defensive, protection, battle drills, marskmanship, physical fitness)==we will be chasing our tails and may find ourselves lacking identity and relevance.
Training time is limited and precious between deployments, regardless of the "dwell time" (odd term).
If forced to prioritize (inevitable for the foreseeable future)--focus on core capabilities...what our Army can do exclusively for our Nation. If we are thrown into a condition requiring counterinsurgency tactics, we will be able to adapt becuase of our well-trained competencies.
I'm currently going to ILE at Fort Belvoir, VA after completing a third tour in Iraq as a S3 for 3-7 CAV and the brigade S3 for 2 BCT/3 ID.
Ike:
I think you are the same erstwhile Captain Sallee that owned a part of north west rasheed that my B Troop, 8-10 Cav took over from your outfit in early January 2006; no? We did our best to apply what you and your battalion taught us.
As to your questions and points my answer is yes, you are absolutely correct. It is the core competencies of combat skills and functions that are most important to maintain. Let's face it; the American army that marched north into Iraq, the Army that began to learn and adapt as soon as we hit the ground in 2003, and the Army that did the Surge was built on the back of a highly combat trained, general purpose force. I have lost count of newspaper reports like the one on your outfit that highlighted the excellent performance in counterinsurgency operations from the Spring of 2003 to February 2007. Not all were perfect and there were warts but the caricature presented by writers like Tom Ricks, Linda Robinson, and Kim Kagan of a pre-surge Army that didnt get Coin is just not correct. The preponderance of units did and histories written in the years ahead will drill this assertion home.
History shows over and over that well trained armies skilled in their combat core functions, with a strong value set, and superb discipline can step in different directions to do Coin and other forms of irregular war. History has also shown that the opposite does not work: that is of an Army trained and organized for Coin or irregular types of warfare cannot adjust easily to conflict on the higher end of the conflict spectrum. Dont believe for a second when the counterinsurgency experts tell you ridiculous things like counterinsurgency warfare is "more difficult" than conventional war. All war is hard and difficult, that is why it is called war. Your rifle company performed superbly because it had trained in its basic combat functions, adjusted somewhat to the environment that you were heading into. But it prided itself on being able to do first and foremost the basics of fire and maneuver and the synchronizing of other combat functions. From there it stepped into a different direction and did counterinsurgency operations fine. Again, this principle will simply not work well in reverse and if we end up using it in the years ahead as an organizing principle and build a force primarily for coin and irregular war it may end up costing us a lot of blood and treasure. We dont know what the future holds, but it guarantees to be nasty with potentially more fighting in the years ahead so the first and foremost thing we must be able to do when we hit the ground anywhere as an Army is fight.
gentile
I agree with my fellow classmate Ike Sallee on maintaining the core competencies of our Army.
Prior to my deployment with the 1st Brigade/1st Armored Division in 2006, I served as the Brigade S3 Plans under COL Mansoor (ret) and then COL MacFarland. During the year leading up to our deployment, our brigade made a concerted effort to both train for COIN in Iraq, but also retain conventional based training to maintain our skill sets. We conducted several CPX exercises which highligted the atrophy of conventional battle command skill sets. Secondly, the Brigade conducted a maneuver field exercise through the German countryside to practice skills such as tactical road marches, conducting of breaches, and command and control. At CMTC, our Brigade conducted a mix of conventional high intensity warfare followed by COIN operations (Phase III and Phase IV of Iraq). In addition, the Brigade conducted standard armor, infantry, and artillery gunneries in the conventional sense followed by a second gunnery focused on COIN operations to include ligh cav gunnery and dismounted skills. By the end of the year, the Brigade had conducted a fair mix of COIN training and conventional maneuver operations.
How did the results play out in Iraq? In my opinion, the Brigade was able to adapt quickly from conducting offensive, defensive, and stability operations in Tal'Afar and Ar Ramadi in 2006-2007. The ability of tank crews to fight in the conventional sense and then dismount and conduct light cav duties was essential to the success of the Brigade.
Based on that experience, there is no reason for two seperate armies, but an army well trained and balanced to conduct all aspects of Full Sprectrum Operations based on our core competency. For Armor forces today, it means that its core competency skills expanded beyond the tank, but to all armored vehicles (track and wheel) to conduct its operations and at the end of the day, a well trained Soldier is capable of adaptation on the battlefield.
I am a student at ILE at Fort Belvoir. I served as a Brigade S3 Plans in 1st Brigade/1st Armored Division and as an S5 in Task Force 2-37 AR in Iraq from 2006-2007.