by Colonel Donald C. Bolduc
Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)
The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command, unity of purpose, and unity of understanding needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to assist the Afghan government to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This paper uses key counterinsurgency principles to suggest a way to organize NATO and ISAFs political and military effort in order to succeed in Afghanistan.
NATO and ISAF can facilitate the Afghan's efforts, but the Afghans must win the counterinsurgency war. In 2009 the Afghan government clearly does not have the capability and capacity to effectively govern and provide security, stability, and safety to the Afghan people. NATO must build this Afghan capability and capacity so NATO can relinquish the role of leading the nation-building effort and assume an advisory or supporting role to the country's new central government. NATO has organized its current forces to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan instead of leading counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. To lead the counterinsurgency, NATO must develop a balanced COIN strategy, reorganize their COIN force, and consider relocating their bases to conduct internal defense and development (IDAD). President Karzai has informed NATO that more than anything else the Afghans need to rebuild their human capital and their institutions, their army, police force, administrative structure, and judiciary. When this comprehensive rebuilding process is successful, NATO can relinquish the role of leader and then serve as Afghan advisors and supporters.
Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
Great article and spot-on regarding the challenges in Afghanistan. It is surprising that after 7 years, the command structure in Afghanistan is as disjointed and confused as it is.
I, too, am a strong advocate of putting troops down in the villages, much as Bing West and his crew were in Vietnam ("The Village").
Given all of the high-tech gizmos we have, it seems like we ought to have the capability to put troops in these villages with video cameras (like the ones on our cell phones) in order to capture images and stories that confirm coalition version of events and discredit the propaganda put out by the Talibs.
Perhaps that is what we ought to look at.....instead of more troops, just send troops with video equipment (satellite-link capable) in order to assist in getting our version of the story (what we call the Truth) out to the world before the enemy sends out their distorted version.
Morgan:
The IW solution is much easier than what you're proposing, but we've just been too hesitant or dumb to use it. Who is the intended audience of these videos? It would have to be the international community, but the international community isn't in danger of siding with the Taliban. Rural Afghans don't have televisions. They have battery-powered radios. So the solution is more radio stations (I won't say pro-government because the Afghans already know to distrust government propaganda).