Okay, everyone who's anyone - and many who think they're someone -- inside and outside the beltway - has chimed in - did I miss anyone? Speak now or forever hold your peace.
The Afghanistan affair is quite complicated; we know that, we also can study it to death and comment until the cows come home.
How about a novel approach at this particular point in time - give the Commander in Chief, the National Command Authority, State... and most importantly, the Commanding General and his staff in Afghanistan some efing breathing room to sort this out? The guys on the ground - get it?
How much is too much?
For the all the hype about the benefits of instantaneous global communications and Web 2.0 - of which we most certainly are a part - we've never really examined the tipping point - the place where we become part of the problem, rather than the solution.
My two cents - and while it may come across as way, way too simplistic to many of the 2K-pound brainiacs I run into around town - you can take it to the bank that a general backing off of the noise level would be most beneficial right now.
Thoughts?
Update: A reader e-mailed that not everyone will get my reference to General Jack Keane and suggested ...just like Jack Keane became the insider for President Bush with the answer to Iraq in 2007 now everybody who is anybody today with regard to Astan want to play the role of a Jack Keane.
Comments
Ideally, the Afghans will like the effect that the US Federal government has on their lives so much that they apply to become a US Territory, and eventually for statehood.
It's the mechanism for taking, holding, and building governing institutions in hostile lands that the founders built into the constitution.
If they don't want to be a US state, perhaps, we must look inward to see why.
My main complaint with some of the discussion I've seen (and this includes some online areas) is that many of those "pitching in" have no real grasp of the history of the subject. They don't understand how this stuff works, or that interesting comparisons for the situation we face in Afghanistan might actually be further back than say 1970. There seems to be a total lack of comprehension about how long these sorts of operations actually take, and that setting an "unconditional surrender"-style outcome like World War II just isn't possible.
Well here is 2 cents:
My main issue is we have no stated goals by the governments that have committed troops in Afghanistan that the public is aware of. Without the support of the people of these countries I do not see how we will be in Afghanistan long enough to help the people or solve the issues the troops face. In my opinion the first strategy must be the commitment of governments to set goals. Set them and announce them. Until then I do not see how any military strategy will work because there is no clear target to shot at.
I would like to see blogs like this push the governments for proper strategies/goals not the military. Not in battlefield goals but in political goals. Politicians need to do their duty and serve first, how else can our militaries serve the governments. This war is not fought for the benefit of the military. Politicians have huge issues, still the burden needs to be placed on them first to define the goal.
The problem is not too much discussion or too many people discussing. The problem is that much of it, if not most, is geared first toward promoting the pundits or their organization, and second toward mission accomplishment.
The only thing disagreement that I have with Dave on this issue is the idea that anyone wants to be the next Jack Keane. They want to be the next Nagl, Kilcullen, Ricks, or Kagan (that is by no means a swipe at any of those men). They want book deals, notoriety, and invites.
"Turning it gives it an illusion of control, but this bus is going where it will."
I can symphatize or at least understand some of the current frustrations, but Dave Dillege is on point with this post calling for others to simmer down and let the boys on the ground sort it out. Trust me, the solutions they come up with will far surpase any idea from a think tank or our own arm-chair position.
Additionally, IRT illusion of control, that is exactly what democracy and capitalism are. Democracy is most probably the worst form of government, but it is the best man-made form developed thus far. Additionally, capitalism and free markets are a horrible way of doing business. Left unregulated, they tend towards greed, but they are the best that we have yet to come up.
Furthermore, None of our current problems will be sorted out from mindless yelling, fear rambling, or propaganda. Yes, we face difficult problems, but they must be discussed and solved in non-partisan fashion.
Today is not Armageddon. We've been here numerous times. Today is certaintly not one of the most trying days for the United States. One only has to look back at history to understand that.
Today is just different than what we expected.
A ways back, I published a paper on this dillema entitled "Nature Redux: Wicked Problems, Creative Thinking, and the Transcendalist."
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/204-few.pdf
It is my modern interpretation of Ralph Waldo Emerson's "On Nature." Today, it may be even more relevant.
v/r
Mike
Dave, I'm kind of surprised by this.
You and your blog have always encouraged the questioning of authority and dissented against so much of the narrative about US operations in Iraq before 2007. Indeed, you helped to change so many bad practices in our COIN efforts.
I know this post came out of frustration, but are you angry because so much discussion about Afghanistan is ill-informed? Or do you believe that it's bad for the war effort to publicly debate this?
Could you expand your views and discuss this more?
Dave, I'm kind of surprised by this.
You and your blog have always encouraged the questioning of authority and dissented against so much of the narrative about US operations in Iraq before 2007. Indeed, you helped to change so many bad practices in our COIN efforts.
I know this post came out of frustration, but are you angry because so much discussion about Afghanistan is ill-informed? Or do you believe that it's bad for the war effort to publicly debate this?
Could you expand your views and discuss this more?
I strongly disagree with this argument. The Obama Administration is talking about expanding the commitment to Afghanistan dramatically. This process has occurred completely by inertia. There not been any debate on either the merits of the conflict or the best means. Yes, there have been several high-level "reviews" -- but if you look at the participants, they were almost unanimous in their belief that (a) the conflict is worth fighting and (b) that pop-centric COIN is the operational means to implement.
I know that Obama stressed Afghanistan in the campaign, but he also stressed health care, climate change and a number of other things. If we can debate those... we can debate this.
--BF
What do Afghanistan, health care reform, The economic melt down, Middle East policy, China policy, and the California budget crisis have in common? They are all causes of, or symptoms from the fact that we are out of money. We keep asking what to do in each area, as though we are able to choose from an array of affordable options based on competing merits. The reality is that very soon, our decision making powers, or perhaps I should say, decision making illusions, will vanish before us as the fact of our insolvency becomes ever more clear. By all means, give the military policy wonks more breathing room. Give all the elites more time to plan their next moves. Just understand that the steering wheel is off the column. Turning it gives an illusion of control, but this bus is going where it will.
Well, since I'm paying for all this (or more accurately, my children and grandchildren will be), I'd like to make sure I'm getting my money's worth. The generals have been in there tinkering for about 8 years now and the price keeps going up, so forgive me if I get impatient and poke my head behind the curtain from time to time.
I'm sure they know what they're doing, though. Maybe I'll just let them work on it some more and check back in another 8 years. I'm sure they'll have a very impressive Afghanistan for us by then, one that all the other countries will be very jealous of.
I know this isn't the "window" but I still have my alternative plan for them if they want to use it. It's not all fancy since I never went to a think tank, but it's definitely cheaper and less death-inducing to all involved:
1. Pack up.
2. Go home.
I'm sure it can be fleshed out by some smarter folks . . .
This is an awfully callous post for a blog/community dedicated to discussing counterinsurgency related topics. The internet lowers the barrier to entry in public discussion for every topic (see youtube comments for the most unfortunate evidence of this), COIN strategies are certainly no exception. It should be taken for granted that ignorant hacks show up on the media regularly to comment on this and attempt to take credit for issues that have been around for years. This is the nature of modern media.
Instead of complaining about it, it should be seen as another opportunity to help push the overall strategy. If the news media and 'blogosphere' are dying for stories about the Afghanistan strategy discussion, don't be a pretentious bastard and dismiss them as Johny-come-latelys, send some PR guys and crack an egg of knowledge on their heads about what the real situation is.
Alternatively, pour a few fingers of single malt and "when all else fails, simply revel in the absurdity of it all." (to quote an unknown LCDR)
I can understand completely a desire for all the armchair analyzing to end. There has been a shift to population-centric operations and good lord we all know that is a long war strategy and needs time to make progress. The problem is that Gen. McChrystal is about to deliver a report on the situation and ask for more troops to implement this strategy. That will open a debate about whether it will work and the cut and run chorus in Congress will let loose with "We're doomed Christopher Robin" moans.
The question of what to try in Afghanistan is pretty much settled, Pop-centric COIN and a heavy dose of civilian surging as well. The question remaining is will it be funded and given enough time to succeed. That is definitely still up in the air. And we will need an info war strategy to convince America it is a good idea in the face of Democrat(Pelosi, Reid Murtha)/Media opposition.
Cordially,
Uncle J
In terms of campaign planning and execution, we have added a "pundit" cycle to the 24 hour news cycle. Most readers here understand the long lead times involved in understanding a situation like Afghanistan, developing a solution (that really must be negotiated across coalition and interagency stakeholders), and following through with execution and reasonable assessment of progress (or lack thereof).
ANY plan, especially with resource constraints, will involve risk at certain points. Call it economy of force or whatever. Whatever we decide has to be nearer the bottom of the priority list will not only be where the adversary will seek advantage, but it will be where critics of the plan will see, and report, "fatal flaws."
I believe that its this cycle, among other things, that brings external pressure to bear on changing the plan before it has a chance to really succeed or fail. French General Andre Beaufre wrote some interesting books on strategy in the early 1960s that spoke of internal and external maneuver.
Modern commanders need to look beyond just working with the near term news issue, but also must seek to either influence of deal with the pundit/think tank/commentator issue that is probably more far reaching as it carries more credibility (deserved or not) in many decision-making circles.
As for the Keane role, his was hardly in the public eye (or in the public fora) until after the fact, and then only limited. As your update implies it's probably not that well known to the general public today. I'd say this indicates something worthy of respect regarding his motive for assuming a task for which success was far from certain.
Given his background, qualifications, and circumstances of the day (and my limited understanding of events) I'd say the "reluctant warrior" (or perhaps "accidental guerrilla") description is apt (if not completely accurate). To repeat it requires a lack of self-aggrandizement most likely absent from any who would campaign publicly for the role.
Wish I had a dollar for every article I've read (via think tanks, blogs, or major media outlets) that started with (expressed or implied) "now is the time to debate Af/Pak strategy" (or even whether or not we should be there in the first place).
Respectfully, no. Operational and tactical tweaks are forthcoming (best handled by those in or near the the trenches), but that window on the grand strategy debate closed a few months ago (arguably should have been earlier) back when the current course was being mapped out. Now is pretty much the time to see where the chosen path leads.
However, given that we can be sure of unsteady and uncertain progress - no plan is perfect, foolproof, or survives contact with the enemy - now IS the time for masters of the obvious to point out the imperfections and claim foresight and wisdom.
This is not to say the topic can't be examined, discussed, explained, or debated to a point. Adjustments are one thing that's certain, after all (but "how can I help" might be the first question one should ask and honestly answer). But the "act" point is here, the "plan" stage is past.
Now we members of loud and boisterous democracies will debate what we please when we please, and that's a great thing. And plenty of folks did provide good, well considered arguments when it mattered, and will carry those arguments forward. But I'm unimpressed with the timing of complaints from apparently sharp folks (whose opinions matter) who suddenly declare that "now is the time".
What strikes me as regrettable about Afghanistan's fly-paper effect on pundits and thinktanks alike is that it is draining the pool of thinkers who spent years finally learning something about Iraq. Ironically, just as Afghanistan was abandoned in 2002 to deal with Iraq, the strategic-studies community is now abandoning Iraq en masse to 'deal with' (or 'be heard on') Afghanistan --- not that the situation there doesn't also warrant close attention and serious analysis.
I think Starbuck is on the right track. This is not so much about finding a solution as it is about being heard, being part of the discussion, and asserting one's influence and bonafides among the intellectual upper crust and policy making elites. When one chimes in, the others feel compelled to follow suit. Whatever plan is come up with, all the think tanks and professors will be scrambling to take credit for being part of the brain trust that came up with it - if it works. And then the book deals, TV interviews, requests for comment and analysis, op-eds, speaking engagements, and think tank donations will follow.
Back off? You're asking a lot. That's like telling a contestant on American Idol to just sit this show out and let the judges have some quiet time to themselves. This is their big break. I do not doubt that any of these folks want us to win and truly want to help figure out the way ahead. But the way that politics and punditry have become almost glamorized seems to be making it difficult for many to find a balance between selfless service and self-promotion.
I think that in recent weeks, there's been a circle-jerk phenomenon...one milblog will start posting on a subject and several others will start picking up the issue as well. Sort of like how Anna Nicole Smith/Paris Hilton/Britney Spears winds up in the news and, in order to keep up, the rest of the news stations follow suit. Witness last week's obsession with military senior leaders and blogging, and this week's obsession with Afghanistan strategy.