As General Stanley McChrystal's 60-day strategic assessment is wrapping up, he poised to recommend a new approach for Afghanistan, one grounded in counterinsurgency's strategy of protecting the population.
This is an important step, but for the new strategy to succeed, it must recognize that there isn't just one Afghan war - there are thousands of Afghan wars, each differing in motivations, organization, regional strength and possibilities for resolution...
The challenge for General McChrystal is creating a comprehensive and integrated strategy for Afghanistan out of the hundreds, if not thousands, of peoples, identities, and conflicts in the country...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
omarali50: Will we ever see the Pakistani army in Wazirstan on the "ground" - they lack the training, and the desire. When I refer to accomodation, I'm referring to Afghanistan, where there seemed to be some talk awhile back, of approaching "softer" Taliban elements.
Frankly, I think this is naive thinking, if it was ever the case, since the Taliban seem to understand time is on their side and why should they accomodate us?
My use of the word accomodation was to draw someone out - not to flank and envelope, only to see what that someone (being you) might have to say.
Thanks for the discussion.
I am curious to know if most people here agree with boatspace? What "accomodation" would allow the US to leave?
In my personal opinion (based on zero inside information), the real issue is not Afghanistan, its Pakistan. Lets imagine that the US leaves Afghanistan in disarray, right down to the iconic helicopter takeoff from the Kabul embassy roof (maybe with Karzai hanging on to the rope ladder), even in that scenario, the real loss is loss of face. There is no oil in afghanistan and no easy way to have a functional modern country in the foreseeable future. Taliban ruled Afghanistan would become a haven for the world's adventure seeking jihadis, but the taliban would not have peace. The Northern alliance has been revitalized and will continue to get Indian and Iranian (and probably Russian and American) support and will hold the North. The rest will be one big mess, Somalia X 10, occasionally bombed and cruise-missiled as the need arises. How many international terrorist plots have been launched from Somalia? probably zero. Without Pakistan, the jihadis have nothing except endless war in the world's poorest country. The real prize is Pakistan. My question to you is this: do you think the US has finally flipped the Pakistani army or can they go back to training and arming jihadis? If not, isnt the job in that region pretty much done? (And I will admit I am trying to start a conversation and learn, these are not necessarily my final views)
Starbuck:
You didn't see tribal conflicts in Vietnam to the same degree (although the Montagnard revolt in 1965ish might be considered a tribal-type conflict). There were factional and religious disputes in the Delta region and around Saigon from time to time, but these weren't on the scale of what we see in Afghanistan.
At the village level the conflict between the VCI elements and some loyalist forces might have approached the level of a blood feud, but not in the same cultural sense as you may see in Afghanistan.
<i>The fact that the enemy in Afghanistan is not one organized centralized force (like the Vietnamese communists, to give an obvious counter-example) is so obvious, its almost trivial to point it out. </i>
Question for the Vietnam experts: Granted, the NVA was an organized force, unlike the Taliban. However, did we also experience the tribal conflict and blood fueds (albeit to a lesser degree) that exist in Afghanistan and Iraq?
Greetings omarali50. Since this article appeared in the NYT, the average reader probably doesn't realize our enemy is comprised of much more than just one big Taliban force in Afghanistan, so perhaps it is worth stating differantly and reemphasizing?
Afghanistan may be a land of 10,000 wars, but each one of them can add up to the proverbial 1,000 knife cuts and bleed us to death, something the hard core Taliban know, and are biding their time until we leave - and leave eventually we must - hopefully, with some accomodation?
The fact that the enemy in Afghanistan is not one organized centralized force (like the Vietnamese communists, to give an obvious counter-example) is so obvious, its almost trivial to point it out. Is the US effort in Afghanistan so clueless that even this fact needs to be reiterated?
On the other hand, the fact that the fighting is fragmented does not mean there is no big opponent out there. There is an Islamist insurgency, based in the Pakistani tribal areas, supported (until recently, and maybe still) by Islamists in the Pakistani establishment. All the other fragmented little wars feed off of this central big one. If you were the commander in Afghanistan, you wouldnt have to WIN every little fragmented war, you would just have to make it very clear that you ARE winning against the hardcore Islamists and they are NOT coming back. That will cause most others to start thinking in terms of making deals and finding their place in post-taliban afghanistan. On the other hand, if the hardcore islamists are not clearly defeated, then everyone is calculating for the day the US leaves and that means the 10,000 wars will go on UNTIL they leave. Does that make sense?
Rebonjour omarali50. You are correct, Afghanistan may be the tail wagging the dog - the dog being Pakistan. But as long as Pakistan believes they need certain Taliban elements they "feel" they can control to act as proxies we'll have to eventually come to some accomodation with them - - at the least to get them to deny sanctuary to al-Qa'ida won't we?
I'm not sure we have enough time and treasure left to kill everyone of'em?
Boatspace, accomodation meaning what?
My own view is that just about the only satisfactory outcome is a Pakistani army clearly at war with the Islamists (not necessarily eliminating them. They cannot eliminate them even if they wanted to)..winning is not so important as long as they are fighting against them. They could just be holding the line at the edge of Waziristan, but they have to be fighting AGAINST them. If not, then it doesnt matter what the supposed "accomodation" is; alqaeda is not a specific organization. If the relationship of the army with various jihadis is ambiguous, then they will continue to have space to recruit and plan and train and they will continue to penetrate deeper into the modern sector of Pakistan. IF its clearly antagonistic, then they are confined to the tribal areas and Afghanistan and its hard to see how they could live and train in peace and mount any mission that required taking a modern plane somewhere...