The Deconstruction of Information Operations
by Colonel Randolph Rosin
The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)
With the publishing of FM 3-0 in February 2008, the Army ushered in a new information doctrine. Based on the premise of an operational environment of increasing informational complexity, the Army made the determination that the current concept of information operations (IO) was too limiting in scope and necessitated a paradigm shift. The problem set, as defined by the Combined Arms Center (CAC), was "an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently;" "no single cyber/cyberspace theory;" and "a perception that IO has somehow failed to deliver the goods."
To address this problem set, CAC created a conceptual framework based on five information tasks consisting of information engagement (IE), Command and Control Warfare (C2W), information protection, Operations Security (OPSEC) and military deception (MILDEC). IE is intended to address the first problem of an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently while C2W and information protection intend to address the cyber/cyberspace issue. Organized along functional lines, former IO capabilities disaggregate and reapportion to different staff sections. Consisting of a blend of public affairs, Functional Area (FA) 30 and PSYOP personnel, IE is the staff responsibility of the G7. Electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) form the C2W cell under the fires support coordinator (FSCOORD). Information protection, formerly information assurance, remains with the G6; OPSEC belongs to G3 Protect, and MILDEC, to G3 plans. Effectively, the new Army doctrine deconstructs the IO concept.
In deconstructing IO, the Army is pursuing an independent path that diverges significantly from the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in so doing, begs the question whether or not it is heading down the right path. Because the information domain cuts across traditional military distinctions of land, air and sea domains, a common joint understanding of concepts becomes an imperative to ensure unity of effort.
The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)
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Comments
Very good article to identify potential logic problems with CAC Information Proponent (FM 3.13)proposal. However, if we do go down this path as we in the IO community are believeing we will; it must strongly recommended that the new CAC proposal for a Military Public Relations professional needs to be strongly reconsidered. COL Rosin historical public perception is correct with OSI, but needs to include the US and Internationals media very negative response to the creation of a PR Officer. This is bad for IO, Public Affairs and PSYOP. Historically there are recent examples in open source about GEN Meyer's letter for separation of IO and PA. Additionally - review Columbia School of Journalism and JANES investigative reporting on PA and IO in Afghanistan and Iraq. MPR will only further create a perception problem for the Army.
The amount and time and energy being spent to "fix" the effects-spectrum doctrine (beginning with the creation of the concept of an "effects" spectrum to be managed) implies something isn't working quite the way it should.
I was surprised to see this particular solution was as disturbing to at least one IO officer as it was to a lot of the PA field- but also relieved there is debate about this outside FA 46.
There probably is some need for realignment among, or restructuring of, the related functional areas. Some of it to harness natural synergy between the FAs, some of it is because all these small specialties are notoriously tricky to manage and there are probably benefits that could be realized by gathering similar functions from a command, and even an HR, standpoint.
The question is, what can, and what should, be delegated? FA 46 fought hard to become special staff, and isn't going to relinquish that ground- for good reason. Does that mean everyone in FA 46 has to be independent of the G7 in every assignment? Maybe not.
Or maybe there's enough synergy there to combine FA46 and FA 30... a task organization that calls for one "hybrid" to serve as the commander's PAO, while another works as the IE and directs the day-to-day work of information assets.
Coming from a garrison position, we see similar issues here with IMO and IASO duties. From a doctrinal standpoint, the relationship is intended to be check and balance. From a practical one, the time-consuming training requirements outlined in 25-1 make it much more likely that small organizations are going to buck policy and appoint one person to both positions, because the training requirements are identical. It's good resource management, it's just bad policy... but if you don't have the luxury of putting 4 people (primary and secondary IMO and IASOs) through an 80-hour Security + prep course, you just don't have the luxury of keeping them separate.
Likewise, some commanders don't have the luxury of distinguishing between a PAO Specialist and Combat Camera Specialist when what they need is a troop with a camera. Nor is it always neccessary to make a distinction. But we've all witnessed the absurdity that ensues when the wrong troop gets sent out on the mission- or, just as bad, when the combat camera and the PA specialist are out there, side by side, getting the exact same shots their respective sections.
Rather than getting bogged down in trying to explain the various doctrinal subtleties, maybe we do need to streamline some of the skillsets in this list.
Although I understand the reasoning behind having an effects officer, I do not want to see PAO taken off the commander's staff and placed under G7- whether de-facto or by doctrine.
But I'm not convinced that one officer can't serve as effectively in several different "information engagement roles" over the course of a career. After all, one Army lawyer can serve as trial counsel, defense counsel, and SJA over the course of one career with no loss of credibility or effectiveness. I don't see why information experts can't do the same, as long as those roles are carefully deliniated and clearly defined - firewalled, if need be - so there is no question as to whether the command spokesperson is performing PAO duties, or "actually" doing MilDec.
The good news is that most of the new leaders of IO in the Army "get it" and many of the people who enabled Army IO to go down that path are elsewhere.
This is one of the more professional, insightful and articulate pieces regarding (the New Improved) Army IO which manages to remain concise and still comprehensive.
This isn't deconstruction, it's dismemberment. Remember the story of the "6 Blind Indians", asked to describe an elephant? Each one "deconstructed" the elephant to match the particular part they had. But what the Army has done--and what the IO community itself is doing, in the name of protecting resources--equates to using a chain saw on the beast. Everyone has safely guarded their particular piece of the elephant, but at what cost? This is the direction we are going, and it will be disastrous to the overall ability to use the information environment and use IO to its fullest impact.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post <a href="http://www.thunderrun.us/2009/08/from-front-08172009.html">From the Front: 08/17/2009 </a> News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.