ISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance Released

I agree with Robert Mihara's point.

But he is thinking through strategy, where the Guidance Document that he rightly has a critical view of is talking tactics and operations.

Yet it is those very tactics and operational methods of population centric counterinsurgency that have eclipsed our ability to think and reason strategically.

And this mindset of population centric Coin has become so dominant that it precludes as a matter of strategy using different forms of warfare like attrition and exhaustion, as Miharas critique of the Guidance Document shows.

Ironically, population centric counterinsurgency as it is has been expressed through documents like this Guidance Document is the closest warfare can come to being "total" in an age of limited wars imposed by nuclear weapons. How could it not be seen as anything but near totality with notions of establishing government legitimacy, building from anew security forces, protection of the entire population, etc; that is to say, Nation Building.

But coherent and functional strategic thought demands the consideration of alternatives and the realistic alignment of ways and means to achieve political ends. With this near "total war" approach to American tactics and operations in Afghanistan, strategy seems to have left the equation.

Okay, I've read the CG's COIN guidance.

The CG: "First, an insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition; its supply of fighters, and even leadership, is effectively endless. Roughly seventy percent of the Afghan population is under age 25. Vast unemployment, illiteracy, and widespread political and social disaffection create fertile ground for insurgent influence and recruiting."

That was enough for me to rest my case right there. However, I continued the read.

According to the preceding quote from page 2, and the CG's math exercise also on page 2, the "vengeance" multiplication factor has put NATO (and primarily the U.S.) so far behind the power curve, that it will take at least 16 years to recover from the first 8 years. Yes, 8 + 16 = 24. That would be more than 2 times the length of the U.S.S.R.'s futile time spent in Afghanistan...and yes, 24/8 = 3 times the length of NATO's present occupation.

No government of any member nation of NATO will be able to maintain the support of its voting electorate for "peaceful" (or otherwise) counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan---for even another 16 months, let alone 16 years!

The CG goes on to talk of "MORE PERSONAL INTERACTION with the Afghan people."

What is NATO going to do---set up PPOCs, i.e., persuasion & protection operations centers in each population center, no matter how small and rural or mountainous or isolated? Even if such a theory was plausible, it would take hundreds of thousands of soldiers to effect such "personal interaction"...such personal persuasion & protection. That would simply lead to a clash of western style nationalistic socio-economic-political culture with Afghan socio-economic-political tribal culture. And what about the inflation of prices for goods and services? The Afghan people would be lost in their own land (if not already).

What's next on the CG's (unintended) agenda of "EMBRACE THE PEOPLE"...love and marriage between Christian sons and Muslim daughters? Even just a handful of what would certainly end up being well publicized "interfaith" romances would "unsettle" the Afghan population more than any misguided missile or bomb ever would! Young Afghan men "under age 25" won't be at all keen on young Afghan women "under age 25" being romanced by young American men "under age 25"...young Americans under great stress, far from home on REPEATED TOURS AND LONELY for female companionship.

American sons would just naturally lean in this direction if they continue to occupy Afghanistan for any great length of time. There is such a thing as getting too close, especially where Islam is concerned. It reminds me of the (bad) attitude of the Saudis in 1990-91 and after (until the U.S. changed out Arabia for Iraq). As I recall, the Saudis just wanted America to do the killing and then get out of the Arabian Peninsula. However, the U.S. didn't leave.

A now well known Saudi fugitive by the name of Osama bin Laden was taking notes at the time.

I rest my case as to the just naturally futile nature of the present (or any) series of counterinsurgency operations by an occupying western power. And NATO is far too far east of both its birthplace and its charter.

POSTSCRIPT: The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is 2/3 American...and in Iraq 99% American. Over the next 18-24 months, American Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen will end up very close to that 99% figure in the entire SW Asia TO (Afghanistan, Pakistan & Iraq)---EITHER because the "allies" will head for home to appease their voting electorates (on a staggered schedule), OR because President Obama might make the mistake with the American voting electorate of sending tens of thousands more American sons to aid the CG in his theoretical counterinsurgency experiment.

That is exactly what President Johnson and Secretary McNamara did when General Westmoreland made his pitch on Vietnam (as if either one really needed a pitch). Then President Nixon and Henry Kissinger decided that it would be a peachy keen idea to expand counterinsurgency operations up (as well as down) the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

General Eisenhower had a hard time keeping America's European "allies" in line during a conventional war effort---both leading up to the invasion of France in 1944, and during the immediately subsequent occupation of Germany (and an isolated West Berlin).

So, how long does one think it will take for America's European "allies" to begin (if not already) arguing over why in the world they have sons of families of their voting electorates continuing to die in Afghanistan---where there is neither oil nor any chance of ever seeing a pipeline?

A politician using any argument other than an oil pipeline for staying in Afghanistan ["other" meaning an altruistic argument such as "democracy" or say, protecting the (nonexistent) rights of Muslim women, for instance] will not last long politically in Western Europe (or in the United States for that matter).

I'm getting ready to read the CG's COIN Guidance. I'll admit to bias at the outset. However, I will consider what he has to say with as much of an open mind as I can muster. Up to this point, I find the CG's views on counterinsurgency to be purely academic and theoretical. In the first place, he (Class of '76) didn't put on the active duty uniform until more than three years after America's withdrawal from SE Asia's series of counterinsurgency operations---the final conclusion of which (after some 20 hot & cold years) saw neither political nor economic success---but did see several hundred thousand American casualties (to include those whose mental & physical deterioration became gradually apparent over several decades after their departure from the TO). In other words, the CG has no personal counterinsurgency experience down where the rubber hits the road, i.e., at fire team, squad, platoon, company or even task force level (likewise his boss at CENTCOM, i.e., Class of '74). Since his recent arrival in Afghanistan, the CG seems to be riding the wave of an as yet unproven long-term political & economic "win" in Iraq---facilitated by an also as yet unproven long-term military "win" there. With counterinsurgencies conducted by foreign military forces being historically unwon anywhere in the last century---my present opinion is that with no personal experience down where the counterinsurgency rubber hits the counterinsurgency road, the CG is engaged in an academic, theoretical and proverbial reinvention of the wheel...similar to what General Westmoreland engaged in.

It's a great paper, but the devil is in the details.

First it certainly comports with my observations as PRT Chief in Afghanistan. One of the key points to take away is that the people there are on the edge. They are in basic survival mode and are afraid (rightfully if you ask me) that the West does not have the staying power to defeat the Taliban. They fear that as soon as we leave, the Taliban will be back. They dont like the Taliban (even in the heart of the Pashtun Belt), but they are afraid that there is no other alternative. Thus the key first step is establishing security - and that requires boots on the ground controlling the towns and highways and isolating the Taliban in the mountains where they are forced to either starve to death or reintegrate into society. We do not need to control every square inch of Afghanistan to "win."

Second, we have to stop this mindset of trying to "win their hearts and minds." We will never do so, nor should we really be trying to. What we must focus on is getting the GiROA to win the hearts and minds of its own people. And this is so inherently difficult in a society that as so tribally fractured and suffers from a long history of endemic corruption. It is easy to say that this needs to be fixed. Solutions though are not easy and absent massive societal change, I dont see it really happening.

I loved the story about replacing the corrupt police chief. The problem is it isn't always possible. Afghanistan, coming off of 30 years of warfare, does not have the capacity to replace every corrupt or incompetent official. After 30 years of warfare, they are missing some basic capacity and have not developed a leadership class that can effectively govern. There are further political considerations that make replacement difficult if not downright counterproductive. The Provincial Governor may be a complete failure, but he may also be the leader of the largest tribal group in the area with enormous influence.

But we should recall that there was a period of stability in Afghanistan under the last king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. He is often criticized as being a weak and ineffective leader because he never sought to extend the influence of the central government during his rule and there was little progress on modernization during that time. But from 1933 to 1973, Afghanistan was largely free of tribal infighting. A parliament and universal suffrage was introduced and women were slowly granted more rights during that time.

The lesson is that building a strong central government may not be possible nor necessarily the best way to defeat the insurgency. That is counterintuitive as it contradicts to some extent Clear, Hold and Build and the three ISAF Lines of Operation: Security, Governance, and Reconstruction. Instead maybe what we should focus on is not the Taliban, but Al Qaeda. It was Al Qaeda that deliberately attacked the West. Thats a far tougher nut to crack because they are all holed up in Pakistan and come across the border for sporadic attacks. Going into Pakistan may create far more problems.

The GIRoA will eventually have to come to some kind of political compromise with certain Taliban elements. It is going to have to accept some power loss - especially in remote areas that do not wish to see Kabul control them. But frankly thats not our concern. Thats something for the Afhgan people to decide for themselves the best way that they can. I think it can best do so though by getting a stronger grip on corruption (starts at the top) and having far better reconstruction efforts ongoing. PRTs need to build far more roads, schools, and water management projects. (All the while ensuring that the government gets the credit.) But we should carefully assess the need to actually go into Taliban controlled areas. They will come around if they see the benefits that their neighbours have and we keep them from attacking areas under our control. The only reason to go into those areas is to prevent the movement of Taliban across boundaries and to go after certain top key leadership, or better, foreign fighters such as Al Qaeda. Aside from that, let them have the little villages in isolated spots. As long as they dont bother anyone, we shouldnt give a damn. Again, they will eventually come around to supporting the government once they see the benefits of cooperation rather than conflict. This might also require an amnesty but we make peace with enemies, not friends.

Sterling L. DeRamus, CAPTAIN, USN

This is a perfect exposition of classic population centric counterinsurgency maxims, dictums, and tactical techniques and procedures. Building on what Phil R said, if proper nouns and locations were switched in it, it could have easily come from the pen of the French General Layautey in his countrys pacification of rebellion in Morocco in the early 1900s, or from the British General Templer whose "hearts and minds" campaign purportedly broke the insurgency in Malaya in the early 1950s, or from the French imperial officer David Galula whose 1964 book "Counterinsurgency Warfare" has been the precise template for the American Army's new Counterinsurgency doctrinal manual, FM 3-24.

This exposition is another example of how the American Army has imbued itself with the tactics of population centric counterinsurgency; to be sure a very necessary thing for an Army fighting these kinds of wars.

But as the Chinese philosopher of war Sun Tzu said, "Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat." The United States Army did not lose the Vietnam War because it failed at counterinsurgency tactics; rather it lost the war because it failed at strategy. But today so many of our Defense Experts are buried within the world of counterinsurgency tactics and procedures which has eclipsed strategic creativity and reason.

How would it have sounded if General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the summer of 1944 as American troops were slogging their way through the Normandy hedgerows against stiff German resistance issued strategic guidance that described the tactics of how platoons and companies should assault dug-in German positions?

Great guidance! Clear, direct, useful. Now let's see if we can get it implemented at the ground level! Hat's off to GEN McChrystal and his writers. Devil is always in the execution.

Not a problem at all - Dave

Hi Gulliver, I wanted to take you up on the invite you left here, but was having trouble posting at your blog (my response was too large) - I dont think Dave would mind if you cross posted or linked. If you need more info you can ping me through SWJ.

In some ways it is easier to think of this as force development of a foreign security force (FSF). This is important because the capabilities (ability to do a task) the element conducting SFA puts forward need to be considered in light of the capabilities to be developed in the FSF. This is really where it gets to putting the "right capabilities" forward.

I'm going to work through a FSF development methodology in order to get after how those with responsibilities for generating capabilities on this end might best support operational requirements - a process which starts on the pointy end and if not done correctly may result in putting the wrong capability forward.

We think this process starts by identifying the political problem the FSF has been tasked to address - e.g. "secure the population of city "X"". Getting the FSF problem right requires a thorough FSF assessment that considers the FSF organizationally (what do they look like, what are their functions/tasks, how well do they do those functions/tasks), the environment it exists in and must operate in (what are the operating requirements), and the institution(s) which ultimately must sustain the generation and employment of the FSF (how do their institutions inhibit or facilitate capability development).

Once you have the problem down, you can begin to look at the conditions that must change in order to address the problem(s). You can start to consider "what are the indicators the conditions are changing (good or bad)."

Once the conditions are identified then the tasks the FSF must do in order to change those conditions and address the problem can be worked out.

Changes in the conditions based off the tasks being done by the FSF are the FSF Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) while how well the FSF executes the tasks which address those conditions are the FSF Measures of Performance (MOPs)

By identifying what tasks the FSF must perform, we can derive what capabilities they require and then understand what SFA developmental tasks (Organize, Train, Equip, Build/Rebuild, Advise or OTERA) the element conducting SFA will have to accomplish (Note - Assist is not a developmental task as it does not develop any sustainable capability or capacity, but instead provides the FSF a capability through us meant to address a given condition).

Understanding what developmental tasks we must perform in order to develop capabilities in the FSF allows us to plan, train and organize more effectively. The difference between ad-hock and task organization is contingent upon understanding what the tasks are.

The FSF's MOPs then become the unit conducting SFA MOEs and how well the unit conducting SFA performs the developmental tasks of OTERA become our MOPs.

All of this to say that while we may package and develop capability in units that must perform a variety of tasks, the manner in which we employ them to meet operational requirements may look different. Force development of a FSF requires we consider them from both a FSF Operational Force perspective, and a FSF Generating Force perspective if we are to support the development of capabilities that they sustain the generation and employment of. This means that we may have to tap into the expertise and experience in our generating force to develop what might be thought of a "Title 10 like" responsibilities to man, equip, recruit, etc. as seen through DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Train, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel and Facilities).

The Army is evolving its approach and has a number of things to consider as it looks at all of its roles and responsibilities, and the Marines seem to be doing likewise (as are the USAF, the USN and the Coast Guard). Many SFA requirements will fall outside of those we might expect to address with military forces and will be driven by objectives and conditions. The goal is to match the capability to the requirement relative to the conditions and objectives - sometimes this may mean the best available, but not necessarily the optimal as it may be unavailable or employed elsewhere.

The process I described above is contingent upon first getting the problem right - which requires a significant investment in analysis and thought, and may require additional analytic and coordination capabilities in the various staffs as the elements conducting SFA not only have to consider the development of the FSF they are supporting, but the employment of their own force to that end - often over distances and in conditions that exceed their doctrinal outline. The ability to retain the initiative requires the assessment be ongoing throughout the development of the FSF.

I hope that is what you were looking for. Overall I'd say we are making progress in developing and institutionalizing the capabilities to support the development of FSFs through SFA (which is really the ability to do the developmental tasks OTERA) or "ways" that can be applied to "ends" via the "means". There is significant work going on both with the inter-agency (includes DoD) and within the services.

Best, Rob

Hello, Everyone:

I am a former academic peer review scientist with an emphasis in persuasion and communication and a former scientific administrator (1998-2002) in the CDC where I ran a communication research unit for occupational health and safety. I'm interested in applying my knowledge to the military, so you can imagine my interest in this document.

It strikes me as a directive for communication skills in general and as a clear need for persuasion applications. Soldiers won't be walking around like community organizers or election volunteers, certainly, but the guidance seems closer to that than search and destroy.

As an outsider here, I need feedback from everyone about how you think this guidance will manifest itself in the daily actions of soldiers in the field. Will the skill set move to include the kind of communication skills the guidance implies? Will all personnel operate this way or will more IO or PSYOPS units move in?

Thanks in advance for your ideas.

Steve

I've been considering McChrystal's guidance today. IMO, much of it is good, but here are two quick points where I would differ.

1. Securing the populace and destroying the enemy (capture, kill, or turn) are NOT mutually exclusive. Rather, they are comprehensively intertwined. Patreaus and Odierno addressed this issue in Iraq as identifying the reconciliables and irreconciliables. Regardless of how much influence one garners with the locals, there are still going to be dudes that make bombs, put them in the roads, volunteer for suicide bombings, etc. It takes a lot of intelligence collection to FIND these bad dudes, but then you must act decisively to FIX, FINISH, and EXPLOIT. When you neutralize the bombmaker, then the roads no longer blow up, and the market place becomes safer. That's what I call security.

2. Information Operations when dealing with Families. Yes, when you detain or kill a dude for placing bombs in the road, you are going to upset his parents, uncles, grandmother, and others. So what? I think the argument can be better understood by looking at our own country. Should a policeman release a drug dealer, murderer, or rapist because that person's family is upset over his detention. Of course not. So what do you do?
IMO, this is where Information Operations is best used. When possible, you address the family, the village, and the local leadership to EXPLAIN why you killed/detained the individual. Then, you ENSURE that he receives a fair trial. If he is found not guilty, then you help him get readjusted to home. You can drive him from the police station to his village. You can help him find a job. If he is guilty, then you inform the verdict to his family, and you can assists with helping them visit/communicate with him during imprisonment.

v/r

Mike