On General Krulak's E-mail to George Will

Carl,

I agree with you on the national will. Unfortunately, none of the three previous administrations have asked any sacrifice from the majority of the populace.

You stated,

"Bugging out on our friends is dishonorable. It is bad business in the long run because it means we can't be trusted. And as Scott says, if you can't be trusted you will eventually stand alone, a victim in waiting."

This is a tricky one. Do nation-states really have friends or just allies, interests, and partners?

I'm inclined to think the latter. For instance, I would be hard pressed to consider Maliki or Karzai a friend. On the other hand, the boys in Canada, England, and Oz have been pretty good to us over the years.

Mike

Ryan:

I disagree about the will of the Americans. We have the will. Col. Yingling said that the American people have done whatever has been asked of them. That is true. But we have to be asked. The people who do the asking are the political and cultural elites. THEY are the ones who are shaky. There isn't anything wrong with the backbone of the Americans, but for some reason we keep electing a critical proportion of people who are straight out afraid to try.

I keep hearing that the American people won't do this and don't have the patience for that. I don't buy it. We've been at this for 8 years and if we are asked by someone who will lead, instead of sniffing out what the polls say, we will go another 8 years or more.

I also wouldn't mistake a lack of passion for a reluctance to persevere. Passion is hard to maintain for a multi-year effort and a persevering attitude often isn't very colorful.

John:

Bugging out on our friends is dishonorable. It is bad business in the long run because it means we can't be trusted. And as Scott says, if you can't be trusted you will eventually stand alone, a victim in waiting.

Regarding the following quote: "We could no more easily stop the rise of the Taliban in 1992-95 than we can now- and we should not consign ourselves to an endless intervention and counter-insurgency in a vain attempt to prove that reality to be wrong. As for the terrorists being disenfranchised or oppressed, how do you explain the current crop of terrorists who have long been exposed to the West or are home-grown?"

I don't know about 92-95 but the Taliban is eminently beatable now, if we are willing to try hard. I think we should. I don't remember saying anything about terrorists being this or that but if I were pressed I would guess that the little terrs are mostly soreheaded, resentful young men whose nihilistic tendencies are taken advantage of by the ideologues.

Forget strategy, operations and tactics - this is all about National Will. We simply don't have it.

I've been off active duty for three years now and must attest to the disconnect between our military and the rest of our society. Right now, all people care about is the economy and whether they will ever be able to retire or not.

Few people in the general public really care about either war. The war to most Americans is no different than any other reality TV program that they can switch the channel from.

I hate to break it to everyone on active duty who still believes in this effort, but I'm convinced that a vast majority of people on both sides of the political spectrum really don't care. We never mobilized our country for war, we're still trying to do it as an economy of force mission.

Sure, surveys will show XX% of public support, but it doesn't measure passion of position. People are not passionately FOR the effort. In fact, I bet that if you defined victory that most people would say "Who cares?"

For those who think that there will be political reprecussions if we "lose" either war, I'd offer that we can't win in the historic sense of the word - or at least to the level that would convince the American people either war has been worth fighting. Iraq has relatively stabilized, yet, I've noticed that John McCain isn't President.

I've had someone on AD suggest that the current administration would be blamed if we pulled out and Al Qaeda attacked. I'm not so sure. I don't take it for granted that the American people would feel that way. It is difficult to say whether Americans would blame their President for a terrorist attack. That was Bush's goal - to protect no matter the costs, even personal freedom. What's more important is that we demonstrate moral authority among all nations - that we demonstrate that our actions have not invited attacks.

We should act responsibly in Afghanistan, but I don't think we should expect that we can build them into a country in our image of Democracy. Stabilize and hand over the keys to whoever can manage the power - hold them accountable for keeping Al Qaeda at bay and focus on other means to protect our borders.

Carl commented:
"It is in our national interest to pay our debts also. And we owe the Afghan people. We used them as a tool to weaken the USSR then we turned away. They suffered more years of war and the Taliban for that. Then we used them to chase AQ into the hills, and we paid as little interest as we could to them until just lately, because the Taliban is back. Now that things are getting harder for us we can't just bug out and leave them, again. We owe these people."

This sort of self-deprecating guilt concerning our past politico-military decisions is ruinous to our foreign and military policy. We could no more easily stop the rise of the Taliban in 1992-95 than we can now- and we should not consign ourselves to an endless intervention and counter-insurgency in a vain attempt to prove that reality to be wrong. As for the terrorists being disenfranchised or oppressed, how do you explain the current crop of terrorists who have long been exposed to the West or are home-grown? We are most certainly in a deep-seated clash of civilizations.
Our military and its civilian leadership are fundamentally limited by public opinion in their ability to devise policy and strategy. The American people do not and will not accept such large scale counter-insurgencies with such long timelines as have been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan- regardless of the reason. Nor should they. As is most often the case, the voting public has better instincts in this regard than its government and military. Such wars consume an inordinate amount of resources and lives. They also encourage a cultural arrogance within our leadership that leads them to imperially suppose we can change societies around the world merely by facilitating elections and imposing socialist statism. Without the long democratic traditions under whose shadow we in the West comfortably live, these experiments in democracy will inevitably fail. This is especially true in the Mid-East where one only needs to look as far as Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to see that Islamic extremists have sizeable constituencies.
There are those who do not want to face the fact that in most of the world, democracy is not the best answer for our security. Instead of pursuing this false hope, let's return to the strategy that we perfected throughout the 20th century- back whichever ethnic group or politician who can best stabilize the country while remaining opposed to the fundamentalists who are our enemies. The client state system allows us to exercise control without bleeding ourselves dry in the process. The enemy is going to try and kill us regardless- whether we give him the vote, give him a green card, provide a job, or hunt him down.

Scott-

I'd start out with The Sayyid Qutb Reader by Albert Bergesen. It'll take you through Sayyid's life and writings from 1930-1960. During his imprisonment and subsequent execution by the Egyptian government, Qutb begame an underground hero. His works were banned but distributed on the Black Market. From what I understand, he is the hero of Zawahari and the spiritual god-father for AQ.

Next, check out the USMA Counter-terrorism Center. They've translated seized AQ documents from the last twenty years. It'll take some time, but you can begin to see how AQ has developed and evolved it's organization structurally, strategically, and philisophically.

Hope this helps.

Mike

Scott, I don't like the word assume, but I'll assume you are asking about Dr. Sayid Imam al-Sharif, known also as Dr. Fadl?

You may find his book "Foundations of Preparation for Jihad" of value in your research.

The Agency found al-Sharif in Yemen. He was "rendered" to a secret CIA facility for interrogation, and later extradited to Egypt where he's serving a life sentence - no color TV!

"I don't think that hatred for America is the primary motivator among our adversaries."

I met a sociologist that believes what we're actually seeing is the end-tail of Islam's version of the Prodestant Reformation. In his view, the struggle of Islam to define or redefine itself started at the end of World War One with the disolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's transformation into a non-theological based state, and the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In his view, this struggle has nothing to do with us. If he is correct, in the next 20-30 years, AQ and other transnational terroist groups will be a threat of the past as they are marginalized by the greater Islamic community.

Additionaly, he compared these groups to the anarchist of the late 19th and early 20th century.

I think his view has some merit,however, the question remains on what should we do in the interim?

v/r

Mike

In other words, we should strive to see the world as it is not how we wished it to be.

Clarity gained could provide better understanding as to remedies.

v/r

Mike

"These are some of the really hard issues no one is talking about"

John, spot on. Sayyid Qutb, the god-father of modern day AQ and the young Iranians that stormed the American Embassy in 1979 were all educated in the United States. I often forget these facts as I read or discuss indirect solutions such as better governance, democracy, and education for the ME.

In this regard, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civiilizations was prophetic. If we want to try and determine better solutions, I'm starting to think that we will have to have challenge our assumptions and conduct serious discussions on how different cultures view the world. This debate would be difficult given our propensity to shy away from discussing race, culture, and religion based off our own troubled past.

v/r

Mike

Dear John:

Well, and actually, people say it is a strategy all of the time. How do you explain the simple term often used by experts, journos, and even practioners like our "counterinsurgency strategy" in Afghanistan? Is this just a rhetorical use of the term, or does it really indicate confusion between strategy and operations. The strategy that you say is ours reads to me like a set of Coin tasks at the tactical level, except for your last one which implies nation building writ large.

thanks

gian

"Today, we are fighting to prevent the establishment of the Caliphate - which is Al Qaeda's strategic objective."
Given how fanciful that objective is, do we win by default?

Perhaps it's only fanciful if you look at it as a purely military competition and assume the Caliphate requires AQ leadership. Perceived as a social, informational, cultural, economic etc competition with occasional military conflicts maybe it is not so fanciful.

Despite that, I tend to think that the AQ cause is doomed in the long term because it denies human nature. In the meantime, however, there is a need to delay, counter, resist, subvert,...much like the West's response to the Cold War.

FID in Pakistan won't resolve the future of Pashtunistan. The bigger question is: can Pakistan be made strong enough to withstand both the Pashtuns and radical Islam - which are quite discrete threats - given that solutions to one will tend to incite the other.

FID in Pakistan is a form of warfare - which war should it serve?

jdk

Most of the comments so far are about the character of warfare in Afghanistan rather than the nature of the war. To think strategically we need to get our thinking right.

The Cold War is a useful metaphor. There was competition in cultural, social, economic, informational and military spheres and actual fighting in places like Korea, Vietnam.... All of these aspects of competition were unified under a strategy of containment.

Today, we are fighting to prevent the establishment of the Caliphate - which is Al Qaeda's strategic objective. The US is only important to AQ because you stand in their way.

This war is seeing competition in social, cultural, economic, informational and military spheres and actual fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan.....There is as yet no public unifying strategic concept.

These wars only make sense when considered in the context of the fight to prevent the emergence of the Caliphate - this is the source of their strategic logic.

Iraq was important not because of WMD but because AQ chose to confront US power there - and lost. While losing it alienated a large slab of its support base through its unacceptable attacks on Muslims etc. This turned a local military set-back into a strategic defeat.

Afghanistan is only important because if it falls it seems likely that Pakistan will fall. If Pakistan falls..... This raises the problem that all strategy is conjectural. It conceptulises a chain of causes and their effects which is based on many assumptions and limited understanding. Such is life.

'In war the result is never final'. Each war merely re-sets the conditions for the continuation of history - we should not expect too much. Iraq and Afghanistan will both resume their histories independent of direct Western control. All we have done is deny one field of endeavor to Al Qaeda for the time being. The Taliban is a local, narrow, political movement of no import - other than that they stand in the way of our immediate objective which is to deny Al Qaeda a refuge in Afghanistan. The Taliban is riding on Pashtun identity. In the context of the wider war to stop the Caliphate, the Pashtun may bring down Pakistan but the Taliban is unlikely to. These two factors mean that our focus should be on the Pashtun not the Taliban.

Whatever actions we take in Afghanistan need to be looked at in the context of the wider war against the establishment of the Caliphate. In itself, this is sufficient justification for a continuation of the war in Afghanistan - demonstrated lack of US resolve would be a strategic defeat of the first order - in the same class as AQ's strategic defeat in Iraq.

Now to warfare. If our focus is the Pashtun, this is not a COIN. The Pashtun represents an early form of state - the borders of which are not those of modern Afghanistan. This is state-versus-state irregular warfare not COIN. It is highly unlikely that inappropriate population-centric COIN models will be efficacious in this context. We need to re-conceptualise the nature of Pashtunistan and re-define our approaches accordingly.

The next theatre in the war against the Caliphate is Gaza and the West Bank. AQ has accepted the futility of military confrontation of the US for the time being. By exploiting Palestinian grievances they can re-establish their status as the flag bearer of militant Islam, establish a state political base in a place inaccessible to US military power and exploit US support for Israel to further alienate it from the Islamic world. This is a strategic challenge of the first order for the US.

Again this can only be given strategic logic if taken in the context of the war as a whole. War and warfare are different - confusing them confuses the 'how we fight' with the 'why we fight' and threatens to get the cart before the horse.

jdk

It may have been 29 years since I retired as a USMC Brig. Gen. but here is another "General" who thinks that Gen Krulak is "dead right" on this issue. It is my firm personal belief that within no more than 10 years after US troops departure from Iraq that the government there will be another "elected Dictator." What will we have gained there, and at what cost?
As to Afghanstan- we simply have no national interest there that is worth the expenditure of lives and equipment currently occurring. Who ever thinks that we can "close out" every place in the world where any of our enemies might be plotting against us does not understand the limits of military power. The sooner "out" the better!

Dave:

Point taken, and I do apologize. I know he has thought a lot about it... but his post and response are written with such certainty and such a lack of subtlety that I am just gobsmacked.

I just don't get it.

If Col. Yingling's contributions to this threat don't convince people about Col. Gentile's warning about there being a "COIN religion" -- accepted on faith and requiring no affirmative defense -- I don't know what will.

--BF

Some wise words:

"If you're going to play the game boy, then you got to learn to play the game right. Every gambler know the secret to survival is knowing when to hold em and knowing when to fold. Every game is a winner; Every game is a loser."

-Kenny Rogers, The Gambler.

v/r

Mike

All,

Let's not go down the slippery slope here in regards to statements like "shocking lack of thought". Paul and others on this site - on both sides of this debate - put lots of thought into everything they write.

Stay on the subject. Disagreements are fine - that is what we are about - but we do not tolerate personal admonishments.

Thanks,

--Dave Dilegge

Col. Yingling:

You must realize how badly your oversimplify the issue, no? I mean, you post basically assumes that the fortunes of the insurgency and the risk posed by AQ are wholly intertwined. Do you really believe that?

Your argument presupposes that AQ sanctuary in Pakistan provides essentially no functionality, whereas regardless of mitigation efforts a Taliban seizure of power would instantly provide AQ with tremendous capabilities.

I would urge you to think carefully about these issue. What precisely do you think AQ would gain? How would these gains translate into an ability to launch plots greater than already exists? Why are you so sure that the failure of our efforts to defeat an insurgency would inherently mean a CT mission would already fail.

The last one is a real fundamental problem. Is there really absolutely no difference between CT and COIN in Afghanistan? I just don't see how that argument is sustainable, and certainly not as a wholly unexamined assumption.

I really don't want to be a jerk about it... but your posts suggest a shocking lack of thought about any of these issues.

--BF

sorry, the above anon post is mine

Paul:

Good to hear from you and thanks for coming up on the net for discussion.

I agree with MikeF that the options do not have to be so stark, so black and white of either total Coin commitment, or withdrawal.

It is curious to me why the advocates of this current Coin operational approach in Astan always seem, though, to present it in such maximalist terms, and often times with the moral baggage attached that we have given so much already that the only way ahead must be more, more, and more.

And the Coin Advocates also seem to assume that "defeat" of Al Queda in Astan, has to be total and their defeat is automatically linked to a rebuilt Afghani nation. Why cant we be satisfied with suppressing AQI in Astan?

The reason why Strategy is out of whack in Astan is because the Coin proponents want to push near total war in the place in terms of commitment of resources and blood and treasure, but the true nature of the war seems to be more limited, requiring a commensurate and limited approach.

gian

Some of us are not amoungst the autumn group. For many, to include Schmedlap, Exum, Rob, and others, this struggle has shaped our 20's and will continue to define our lives. The events are very personal, and the cost in blood and treasure are very real.

I don't enjoy trying to question COL Yingling or COL Gentile much less GEN Patraeus, McChrystal, or Odierno.

I just want to get it right for the next generation.

Let's continue the debate to find the right answers.

v/r

Mike

Mike and C4 both make good points.

I'd earlier sent Mike a note just explaining that in this case SFA (the capabilities to do those developmental tasks of organize, train, equip, build/rebuild and advise) should be oriented on developing those ANA and ANP capabilities required to do those specific tasks required to change the conditions as they relate to the problem.

If those conditions are "protecting Afgan society and freeing it from lawlessness and subversion" then our efforts to develop those ANA and ANP capabilities fit within our definition of FID.

If those conditions involve countering insurgency, then they fit within COIN.

If those conditions involve countering terrorism, then they fit CT

This does not mean that once a capability has been developed it can't be employed to other ends - e.g. there are no "COIN" bullets, only "bullets". What does matter though is since we are not there to develop "full spectrum" capabilities in the ANA and ANP, our efforts to develop ANA and ANP capabilities should be tied to the tasks they need to do in changing the conditions both we and they (GIRoA) are really interested in.

If we are developing capabilities that the GIRoA is unlikely to be interested in sustaining past our willingness to do for them, and as such are unlikely to sustain them, that's OK, just realize that you (we) are probably going to be paying that bill for as long as you/we desire that capability. Even then, there may be reasons why they don't wish to support it - it may actually run counter to their goals.

From my perspective, it would seem wise to understand where that overlap of desired capabilities is. What is most important to GIRoA (what does it need, and how/where/what role will it sustain the generation and employment of its security forces in), and where is it most likely to be successful in doing so? The answer to the second question may be similar in many other places - e.g. where might a centralized government be desired, or more tolerated, and what conditions would support it?

This is why I agree with Mike F that this is not a either/or choice. I'm not by any stretch an Afghan SME - not even close; but I do think some of the principles about securing what is critical to your interests, and establishing bases of operation and freedom of movement between those critical areas are sound things to do under most circumstances. I would also think that recruiting and the other force generation requirements might be better in more heavily populated cities and where there is "less" tribal influence (understanding that is a relative thing).

This would seem to support other alternatives for engaging beyond those cities into areas where centralized government is seen as worse, and where sustaining a presence is difficult. This would seem a better course then extending operational reach beyond what is sustainable or desirable.

After some degree of control (however it is/was established) over those critical areas can be sustained, then perhaps the GIRoA might desire some further assistance in extending its own operational reach over areas that may be more difficult for it to exercise control over -contingent on its intersts.

I guess this then is the bottom line, if there is no desire on the part of any authority to sustain the capabilities required to exercise control over areas it may not care about - particularly if there are other areas that it is more interested in, then paying for those capabilities to be developed may only lead to unsustainability, or worse those capabilities may be used against them if they are not demobilized and put to work elsewhere.

This goes back to points made earlier about our ultimately desiring to turn it over to the GIRoA - what part of our interests (current and long term) do we share with them?

Maybe we should look at that and begin from there. Where our interests do not coincide, then maybe we should consider other approaches, ideally ones that would support where those common interests do exist. This might be more along the lines of limiting challenges to that central authority in places GIRoA did/does/will care about though our targeting of opposition leadership, disrupting their resources and freedom of movement and in some cases raids that do not attempt to hold ground (more than one way to this I suspect), with an aim to making it hard for the opposition to generate enough capability to challenge GIRoA in the places they care about and choose to be strong.

The opposite approach would seem to be developing Afghanistan to the point where the GIRoA would or might have to care about all of it. In this case they'd require a huge security sector, one which they still might not be able to sustain given their GDP.

I simply don't think this (or anything like this) is something you "fix" once and for all and someone else (GIRoA) maintains it because we were nice enough to hand it off to them. This is something that has to be managed as long as you have an interest in doing so. Steve Metz recently said something over at the National Security Experts blog about needing to consider both effectiveness and efficiency in our strategy.

I'll join Gian Gentile in saying no matter what one thinks about Gen (ret) Krulak's email to G.Will, Krulak is thinking more broadly then just this problem's (and the ways we might pursue it operationally) impact on our National Security, and I hope others will as well. We need to do both.

Best, Rob

One quick edit (outside the grammar and spelling errors) of my initial post based on feedback sent via email...H/T to Rob Thorton

Considerations:

4. FID/SFA NOT COIN. Afghanistan is not our country. We can advise and assist the government, but we should not be doing the fighting for them.

v/r

Mike

Schmedlap,

I wouldn't take it personally. Currently, we don't have an answer to the problem. My concern is that we haven't properly defined the problem and many are stuck in narrow tactical arguments for taming solutions.

Check out the 1. Winning the War in Afghanistan and 2. Deterrence in Irregular Warfare threads in SWC. COL Jones (Bob's World) and Slapout are shaping potential strategies with the help from others.

We talk endlessly about finding holistic, comprehensive strategies, but in practice, IMO, we often limit the prescribed solution to refitting/remolding the GPF NOT implementing a whole-of-government response to cope.

v/r

Mike

COL Yingling,

Sir,

I do not think are options in Afghanistan should be constrained to a zero-sum game between an occupation strategy using Pop-centric COIN or a total departure with a small CT component hunting AQ. There are many other options that we must consider.

As I continue to reflect on my experiences in Iraq, I believe I'm gaining a better appreciation for the capabilities/limitations of "The Surge." We were not surgeons operating on a gun-shot wound victim. Instead (as others in SWC helped me frame), our actions were more analogous to police intervening into a bad Domestic Violence call. We secured the property, threw the husband in jail overnight, sobered up the wife, and forced all the crazy sisters and moms to quit yelling. Eventually, we have to leave the house, and the hope is that the couple can mediate their disputes in a less emotional environment without resorting to hysterical shouting and violence. Just like a cop can't fix a bad marraige, we cannot "fix" Iraq for them.

The Surge worked primarily because Iraq was a family- albeit a broken one. They have a long history of nationalism, functioning state government, and a relatively homogeneous nation.

The same cannot be said for Afghanistan. Instead of a domestic violence situation, we may be facing gang wars battling in San Diego where the fighting extends into Tijuana just a bit outside of our legal jurisdiction. We will need a different approach than reaction to domestic violence.

Sir, you stated,
"The US has done a great deal of hunting and killing in Afghanistan for the last eight years. During this same period, the insurgency grew worse on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and al-Qaeda coordinated major attacks in Madrid and London. Its leaders continue to evade capture and plot attacks against the United States, our people, allies and interests."

In my opinion, this statement is flawed on several accounts mainly because it is too narrow. I would argue that it is akin to trying to blaime Bernie Madoff's Ponzi Scheme as the primary cause for the United States current recession. His actions were deplorable, but there are simply too many other factors that must be considered.

As we continue to try to define and frame this problem, I will suggest several considerations,

1. Seperate AQ and the Taliban. Two different enemies. Mullah Omar and UBL may be drinking (chai) buddies, but they have completely different priorities.

2. Civilian Surge/Civilian Lead. This surge is a difficult one. It will probably take congressional reform to help State Department overcome the significant down-sizing after the Cold War not to mention the bureaucratic-drift with the massive expansion of DNI and DHS. We need a better command and control post in Washington.

3. FID not SFA/COIN. Afghanistan is not our country. We can advise and assist the government, but we should not be doing the fighting for them.

4. AQ as a system or network. The notion of AQ having a safe-haven in Afghan/Pakistan is an extermely limited in the scope of the real problem. AQ is expanding throughout the ME and Africa. As others have noted, the attacks of 9/11 could have well been planned in Canada, Mexico, or Raleigh-Durham.

Thoughts?

v/r

Major Michael Few

To continue the discussion of strategy, I submit that a fundamental problem is the persistent decoupling of politics and violence in the pursuit of our war aims. It is this problem that harms our current condition and darkens our long term prospects in Afghanistan.

This problematic thinking is characteristic of those who argue that winning the population over is the certain path to victory in insurgent war. Ironically, it is critics of the COIN-as-strategy approach that are repeatedly accused of clutching to this conceptual bifurcation of war. They are accused of ignoring the consequences of violence (i.e. "10-2=20"). Rather, it is many of the COIN-as-strategy advocates that are insisting on a false characterization of war by proposing that attrition doesnt matter and that it is winning over the population alone that provides the decisive means to victory in war as evidenced in the ISAF COIN guidance; these individuals diminish the consequence of security in war and exaggerate the contingent consequences of lethal violence. Such thinking helps to lead us down the path of tactics in place of strategy because it provides an internally consistent system of thought which justifies the path already chosen. It thereby divorces action from its empirical moorings and sets us on a troubled road by forestalling criticism under a shroud of deductive logic.

Paul Yingling states, "it's not clear that General Krulak has any particular expertise in the area of domestic American political opinion," may not be on target, though tactfully phrased.

As a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, the General was well aware, and indeed followed public opinion, if for no other reason, then how it affected the perception of the Corps, recruiting, its mission statement, support in Congress, and his own ability to run interference for his operational commanders in the fleet.

Couple this with the General's past experience in Vietnam - through Desert Storm, long talks with his late father, who was "somewhat" of an authority in this area, may be driving his thoughts?

It seems the direction the White House is going, is a hold-off and see approach, and may not yet be willing to commit futher resources, along with what I also see, as a deteriorating public support for our war in Afghanistan.

Taking this into consideration, General Krulak may see what he has expressed in his general overview, as the only viable option at this late date?

Interesting comments. As a long time Yingling fan and early Yingling congratulator, I read his essay with interest. Not being a strategist -- and having grown more than skeptical of those claiming to be such -- I wonder if there is not some terminal confusion over terminology here.

Strategy is an outline of a series of steps to accomplish a goal. In military terms, the operational level is that at which Politicians, Diplomats and Flag Officers dictate the disposition and structure of Troops and equipment to complete locally required steps to attain one or more strategic goals. These Flag Officers and Diplomats then (hopefully) allow their subordinates to execute various plans and actions to obtain the operational goals.

My point in restating the obvious is to suggest that there is no such thing as a COIN strategy, COIN operations are those taken by a nation -- sometimes with the support of other nations -- to suppress an insurgency. Within a given nation, COIN operations <u>are</u> the operational level of war within a given nation. Thus they are directed by that nation -- the 'host nation' -- if, as is the Coalition, intervenors are present, they are operating in support of and not as a counterpoint to that host nation. That significantly complicates roles for all involved.

The techniques used within the operational context may vary considerably and must be situation dependent; the old METT-TC effort.

I realize many commenting here are aware of that but some commenters do not seem to be and some who know better seem to forgetting a basic or two.

Thus the argument is not over a strategy inside Afghanistan today; the strategy put us in Afghanistan, said there would be an Afghan government and proposed several goals. The issue today is simply -- are those achievable goals?

If they are not, the strategy was and is flawed but COIN operations and techniques have nothing to do with it. The strategic issue is to adjust the goals to achievability. It is my perception that is being done. It is also my perception that it is a work in progress, is not yet complete and so we cannot know what is intended.

The Operational issue was and will be to define, for the US and for NATO plus other Coalition Partners including Australia, those actions required to to attain the revised strategic goals. Does anyone commenting know what those are or will be?

I thought not.

Probably those in Afghanistan are no more aware so they are doing what seems best and viable at this time. It is probably noteworthy that concerns for excessive COIN-like activities may be overstated, see this <a href=http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/…; Letter to the US National Security Adviser</a>. Those familiar with the author will know of his biases -- and they are included in the letter -- however, the letter I think reasonably accurately dispels any concerns of excessive COIN centricity...

I agree with Colonel Yingling that General Krulak's advice is ill conceived and said so elsewhere. I agree that what we are doing in Afghanistan is unlikely to achieve the strategic goals but that is not a flaw induced by what we are doing, rather it is one induced by using the General Purpose force in a role for which it was not intended, is not trained or equipped yet for which it is doing the best it can under the circumstances. It is more critically a flaw of initial strategic goal setting and asset capability and allocation.

The strategic error was committed seven or eight years ago, all that has followed has has been and is an attempt to rectify that. The operational problem accrued from that error was compounded by poorly trained (for the job at hand) forces in inadequate numbers due to other strategic (and operational, elsewhere) errors.

The issue of Tactics, "COIN" or "war" has by no option default been a blend of both, thus failing to satisfy proponents of either school.

The hoped for lessons from this intervention are:

- Military interventions in another nations affairs are to be avoided if at all possible. The potential for a reasonable return on the investment is extremely poor.

- The US psyche is not equipped to operate at the behest of a 'host nation.' We want to be in charge and tend to act as if we are when we should not and to be surly and unhelpful if the host nation does not operate as we wish.

- Our training and education are remiss. We can not train the GPF to be a culturally aware and multi-language "COIN" force, nor should we try -- we can improve our initial entry training to better ground Officers and Enlisted person in the basics of their trade to include operations in support of civil authority.

- The bulk of COIN centric operations require extensive civilian skill input which can generally best be provided if adequate security prevails.

- Providing security in a situation that is or might become an insurgency requires a large number of competent security force personnel and the operations will be combat focused of necessity. Strategists must be prepared for that and if an adequately sized security force is unlikely to be available from the outset, an alternative to intervention should be pursued.

- Given the foregoing, avoidance of such interventions by improved intelligence, diplomacy and early commitment of assistance by possibly Special Forces and certainly USAid and other civilian elements should be a strategic goal.

Our 'strategists,' military and civilian, operated on several flawed premises -- not least that the GPF can be converted to COIN operations easily -- they cannot and will never be so capable. They can be trained to operate more effectively in a Foreign Internal Defense role and should but they will <b><i>always</i></b> remain a blunt instrument and their deployment in FID should be avoided if possible. Anyone with delusions that can be changed really needs to do some work on the history books...

With all do respect to Gen. Krulak, I have to say that Yingling brings up a few hard truths.

A scaled down CT campaign using SOF hunter-killer teams is hugely attractive (if only because the name sounds so badass). However, it persistently ignores the fact that a standoff, small footprint approach has only produced more enemies whenever it was employed in the past. A reliance on few troops and lots of airpower is what got tons of civilians killed in Afghanistan between 03 and 08, resulting only in more Afghans supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Anyone who doubts this should read the newly declassified documents at the National Security Archive detailing how the 1998 cruise missile attacks against al-Qaeda only drove AQ and the Taliban closer.

Col. Gentile is right that COIN is doctrine and not strategy. However, a strategy can center on the use of COIN doctrine to achieve strategic goals. Would it be great if this wasn;t necessary? Of course. But a strategy that only creates more enemies for us isn't any better.

Gian's original reply was spot-on. Gen Krulak appears to be gauging the extent to which the Taliban and AQ pose a threat to the US, the nature of that threat, and the level of effort the US should commit to in addressing that threat. For example, the threat posed by the USSR was existential - their nuclear inventory and conventional force capabilities posed a threat at the "survival of the US" level. At best (and while not minimizing the horrific tragedy of 9-11, especially on this 8th anniversary), AQ can take down individual buildings. Granted, if in possession of a biological or nuclear weapon, an attack would have much greater consequences, but this would apply to a broad range of enemies. The Taliban pose a threat to the US only to the extent they provide operational sanctuary to groups like AQ. One could make the argument that Taliban activities pose a more severe threat to the stability of Pakistan, and that if Pakistan implodes or is co-opted by Islamic extremists, their nuclear weapons inventory could present such a threat to us or our allies. But that's a different argument. To raise Afghanistan out of the 9th century, a substantial effort will be required, one taking a mountain of treasure, sustained commitment of large numbers of personal, and the significant attention of our Services. Our bag of tricks is not bottomless and to the extent we are embroiled in Afghanistan for years we are unable to also address other regions of the world. Eight years along, we face conditions dramatically different than 2001 - a global financial meltdown, national debt spiraling out of control, a military that will have to recapitalize its inventory at great expense, and a joint force that has had to fully commit itself to sustaining the level of effort needed for ops in Iraq/Afghan with acceptable rotational policies. Wars can (and have) bankrupted countries in the past. Gen Krulak points out that we should be practical and realistic in our assessment of the AQ/Taliban "threat" and commit ourselves to a strategy for dealing with that problem appropriate to our interests and circumstances.