An Assessment of Our Operational Concept of Operations in Support of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Interagency Policy and Goals
by R.J. Buikema
Operational Check-Fire (Full PDF Article)
The U.S. approach toward Afghanistan and Pakistan has seen marked changes since the transition from the George W. Bush administration to the Barack Obama administration during January of this year. With a new president came a new policy, fresh leadership, and a modified military/ diplomatic approach. Once new leadership was installed, an increase of 21,000 additional military personnel was announced, meaning that currently, 68,000 U.S. forces are present in Afghanistan. Forces have expanded offensive operations and are concentrating on two fronts. The first is the eastern border provinces with Pakistan, a traditional logistics route for Taliban and Haqqani Network forces, which also use the border area for safe havens, training, recruiting, and command & control. The second is southern Afghanistan where the Taliban loyalists of Kandahar and Helmand Province have had a menacing and somewhat dominant presence for years. Even now, some legislators and military commanders are calling for an even greater presence of U.S. forces, as Afghanistan has rapidly shifted from a delaying effort to the pivotal point of strategic policy. Meanwhile, some political pundits are already referring to Afghanistan as "Obama's Vietnam", even though some elements of the outlined civil-military objectives are only now being implemented. While the political-military debate is likely to continue for some time, it is prudent to review the core goals for the region and evaluate if the ongoing U.S. operational approach is in fact supporting accomplishment of those goals. What is the strategic vision for Afghanistan and Pakistan? Which tasks and objectives support that strategic vision? Has operational success (or failure) had an impact on those strategic goals?
About the Author(s)
Comments
This articles foundation was based on a "Mission Statement" developed by the Interagency Policy Group. It read like a brigade commanders operations order; however, the problem is the Interagency Policy Group should be defining conditions they expect and then let the subject matter experts determine how to achieve those goals. We all know how long military operations have been going on and we also know at what cost. This fact can be attributed, at least in part, to the lack of well defined objectives at the strategic level.
I have a problem with some of Mr. Buikemas positions. I do not agree that we should not focus any effort on development, civilian assistance, capacity building, and bolstering legitimacy of the Afghan government. By conducting these activities we are working towards long-term solutions rather than short-term fixes. I further disagree that we should not conduct counter-drug activities. This is our best indirect method of attacking al Qaeda. I was very surprised to see Mr. Buikemas was the CEO of a corporation that focused on agricultural empowerment in developing countries. I believe by replacing the drug crops with legitimate crops you will provide economic strength to Afghanistan. The last point I will dispute is his stance on ceasing the thought of the clear, hold, and build strategy. His argument is based on there not being enough Forces to hold the vast expanses of Afghanistan. I submit that by building Afghan para-military forces at the local level the holding will not be conducted by US forces. I believe the people of Afghanistan do not want an al Qaeda presence any more than the US does; therefore, by building and supporting their capacity to secure themselves the US can influence all of Afghanistan.
I agree with Mr. Buikema with regards to the US has acquiesced on conducting significant offensive operations within Pakistan. Al Qaeda does not recognize an artificial border in the same manner that the US government does. This provides a significant advantage that they are leveraging to the point of providing themselves with serious tactical advantages. We are playing a football game with 9 men on the field. Like Afghanistan we should build Pakistan capacity to secure themselves from al Qaeda influence.
Major Steven B. Weliver, US Army
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Tequila,
You bring up a very solid point on the PAK government and their will to truly act against al Qaeda. Secondly, you bring up what I believe are two dillemas. For the U.S., what is more important, our status quo relationship with the Pakistani government, or the destruction of an identified threat to our national security? For the Pakistani government, will they act with the U.S. or, as you suggest, "eject" all U.S. personnel and support? I believe that, for both the U.S. and Pakistan, there are ways to politically mitigate the risks while achieving military success. Our actions would likely be a combination of precision strikes and raids, but NOT necessarily occupying Pakistani territory. We would discuss our change in approach (general terms) with the Pakistani government, ensuring them that we intend to work with them in order to achieve security of the region. Pakistan, frankly, has much to lose by "ejecting" us, in both financial aid as well as political legitimacy. The strategy, however, must take your concerns into consideration. My paper is based on the stated current strategy, and the premise that the ramifications for action have already been, or need to be considered. The consequences of NOT acting aggressively within Pakistan, however, I believe are not acceptable.
JMB,
While many are suggesting the OIF COIN model for AFG, I believe that the social/cultural factors as well as terrain as so distinct from Iraq that the results are not likely to be the same. Further, that strategy would still not accomplish our core strategic objective of destroying al Qaeda and denying them safe havens in AFG/PAK. We've been there 8 years, and have built hundreds of wells and conducted hundreds of MEDCAPS. While I'm fully supportive of those efforts, those steps alone are not likely to support our strategic goals.
Certainly, I think at this point, the effort to curb weapons and fighter incursions along the northeastern border region with Pakistan with ineffectual and highly vulnerable and remotely located COPs, at the expense of establishing FOBs and patrol bases within towns and villages, has been an inadequate operational effort. The truth is that the border remains porous; it is a difficult if not impossible task to seal off fighters coming over, and a misguided one when it comes at the expense of garrisoning villages and working at a more practical COIN effort.
Maybe the Islamo-tribal backwardness will be too difficult to overcome, but before we retreat or move to another, unworkable strategy, let's try the OIF COIN model from Al Anbar; it has apparently worked. Lock down cities, restrict movement in populated areas, inconvenience locals, while at the same time succeeding at low-cost yet worthy CMO projects like wells and MEDCAPs. It's worth the shot.
One main question for the author - You emphasize the necessity of destroying al-Qaeda bases no matter where they are found, with or without host nation permission. Without a doubt, the major al-Qaeda bases are found within the FATA of Pakistan.
If Pakistan refused permission for our forces to strike inside the FATA, as they are almost certainly guaranteed to do, what recourse would we have then? If we disregarded the Pakistani government's wishes, they almost certainly, at the very least, eject all American military and intelligence personnel from Pakistani soil and halt intelligence cooperation with us. Continued incursions would, I think, result in Pakistani military opposition. What then?