As the Obama administration debates whether to stick with the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, opponents point to that nation's flawed presidential election as a reason why this approach cannot work. Counterinsurgency is premised, they argue, on the presence of a legitimate national government that can win allegiance from local populations. Given credible allegations of rampant abuse in Afghanistan's August election, President Hamid Karzai's newly illegitimate government cannot play this role. As a result, the United States has little choice but to change strategies.
This argument is badly flawed. Electoral fraud will render our task in Afghanistan more difficult, but it does not make counterinsurgency impossible. On the contrary, a counterinsurgency approach - and not a narrowly tailored mission focused solely on killing or capturing enemies - remains the best path to success in Afghanistan. To understand why, consider the analogous case of Iraq over the last three years. In January 2007, the "surge" of combat forces began as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized clearing areas of fighters, holding that territory and building the infrastructure and institutions that had been so badly lacking - just as Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has proposed for Afghanistan...
More at The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
MikeF:
I'm afraid that you've misunderstood the point of my post, and I did unfortunatly overemphasize the red herring of past criminal/ongoing threat distinction. My fault on that.
The true point of my post was to point out that the international realities are very different today from when mossad was hunting nazis.
If I had any great ideas that hadn't been already discussed ad nauseum on this site and elsewhere, you'd have heard about them a long time ago. Just an ignorant country boy here who happens to be studying international law.
What I have been puzzled about this is how resilient the idea of the Afghan nation-state has been in all of this. In the competing arguments, it appears that the COIN approach builds a central state while the CT approach would let if fail, if that is what it is destined to do.
For all the discussion of strategy, it does not seem that we allow a middle ground because it would call into question the issue of sovereignty and it would possibly allow a state as presently composed to splinter.
In the COIN approach, reading Galula, he emphasizes that we must start where we are strong and the enemy is weak. Only after we have fully secured those areas (which arguably are also the best areas to initially train and employ a newly created indigenous security force), should we go into areas of the enemy's strength. This is where COIN can be truly "counterintuitive" by reversing the US preference to go directly after the enemy's "center of gravity" or source of strength. In Afghanistan, it seems we are trying to contest the enemy in his heartland (the south) with the idea that if we break his strength there (by securing the population away from him), he will fail elsewhere.
In a cursory look at the Taliban conquest of Afghanistan, it appears they used this model. They consolidated their strength in their secure areas (the south) then conquered the rest of the nation piece by piece.
We on the other hand, are trying to build from a central government downwards, rather than from successful local governments upward. This would seem to against good COIN sense and past experience.
If we are truly serious about the CT approach, which leaves the central government to its own devices, then a provincial/regional approach would support securing the population in only those areas where we require it, in order to have the local bases to mount offensive strikes from.
Admittedly this is all back of the envelope dabbling. However, in a country that never had a tradition of strong central government, or loyalty to the idea of Afghanistan except in the face of foreign threats, we seem to be making the double mistake of associating the central government with the foreign presence.
Anon-
"I would agree that the Afghans getting more involved and security force assistance are essential for whatever strategy is adopted for A'stan. The questions are do we have enough assets for SFA (especially given the issues of the ANP) and what force levels are required for population security and insurgent neutralization to provide the ANSF enough time to be sufficient in numbers and training to do the job? Or, for that matter, will they ever be?"
I don't know the answer, but I do know that it's an Afghani problem. Ultimately, regardless of how much we surge or occupy, they have to figure out how they will live their lives. We can help, but we can't do it for them. I look at that problem as akin to having a good friend addicted to drugs. You can tell him he has a problem, call the cops, or force him into rehab, but until he admits the problem he'll never recover.
Also Anonymous-
We can agree to disagree, and that's okay. I've never claimed to have all the answers. My reply is that your post represents the lack of creative thinking that I mentioned earlier. Take it for what it's worth.
UBL is not a clear and present danger to US just as Eichman wasn't a c/p danger to Israel even though he mass-murdered millions of Jews. UBL's goal is Saudi Arabia. He's very clear about that in all his writings. Both are simply criminals. It's all a manner of how you frame their actions. Capturing them and holding them to trial is punitive. So what?
What do you propose?
v/r
Mike
v/r
Mike
MikeF:
I don't think your comparison of AQ v. U.S. and ex-nazis v. Israel is valid.
First the mossad was not hunting ex-nazis because they represented a clear and present danger to the peaceful existance of Israel. They were hunting the likes of Eichmann for purely punitive purposes-for deeds done in WW II. I haven't read any histories that suggest Eichmann or any other former nazis were planning to open a terror campaign on Israel post 1945. Nor have I read any serious suggestions that Eichmann or his ilk were close to establishing a 4th Reich somewhere. The Israels were hunting out of a purely revenge motivation-not to prevent future nazi inflicted atrocities which no one has argued were immenent. As a result, the mossad could afford to be patient and await the perfect opportunity to apprehend Eichmann.
Of course one could say we are hunting Bin Laden out of revenge, but I don't think anyone would argue that Bin Laden would love to perpetrate another 9/11 given the means and opportunity.
Further the comparison is invalid because the realities of International law and politics are very different now from the 50s, 60s, and 70s. I'm not so sure if Israel could get away with similar acts today-particularly if they were attempting to apprehend/kill, for example, militant Palestinians (not nazis) abroad.
Mike-
OSS Detachment 101's operations with the Kachins is a great microcosm of special ops and example of creativity. Indeed, where have all the "Wild Bill" Donovan's gone?
I would agree that the Afghans getting more involved and security force assistance are essential for whatever strategy is adopted for A'stan. The questions are do we have enough assets for SFA (especially given the issues of the ANP) and what force levels are required for population security and insurgent neutralization to provide the ANSF enough time to be sufficient in numbers and training to do the job? Or, for that matter, will they ever be?
Anon-
I would submit that tracking down UBL is different not more difficult than what the Mossad accomplished. We have a long history in the US of tackling these messy problems using creativity and lowering accepted risk thresholds (creation of the OSS and employment in France and Burma is one example).
In the case since 9/11, I think we've been stymied by a lack of creativity and institutionalized risk-aversion. Currently, anything 30 miles from a FOB is called a long-range strategic patrol. That's not good. Going deep behind enemy lines means the FATA area.
As for A'stan, honestly, I think we need to turn it over to the snake-eaters under State civilian control and augmented by CF. More FID, less Nuristans. Plan Colombia and the Phillipines project offer some examples.
v/r
Mike
Mike-
Fair enough, but I think the Mossad et al. hunting in Argentina is less difficult than U.S. forces trying to hunt AQ in Taliban-controlled areas of Afpak. And the Israelis have pre-emptively invaded or occupied adjoining territory when they felt it was necessary.
The decisions to go into Afghanistan and then stay were made long ago, so we have to proceed from there. Do we leave (strategic risk of Afpak being taken over by unfriendly governments with sympathy for AQ and access to nuclear weapons), surge (strategic economic and political risks), or strike some sort of middle course. A middle course could use existing force levels to build the ANSF and neutralize the insurgent.
I did not indicate any priority, just that securing the population had to be done by someone or the whole thing unravels--no protection, no support, no intel, no ability to deal with a regenerating and likely growing insurgency. The ANSF could potentially protect the population while other coaltion forces concentrate on neutralizing insurgents. However, much of the ANSF, especially the ANP, are not ready to do so on thier own yet. The fact remains that someone has to do it; your stock enemy-centric approach in isolation carries great strategic risk in the long term.
Anon-
I'd recommend that you take some time studying man-hunting. In particular, review how the Israelies tracked down former Nazi's after WWII.
One of the more fascinating tales is the capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina. While the Israelies took some heat for violating international boundaries, they got their man. They did it through good detective work, not occupation. They did not pre-emptively invade Argentina to find him. They did not do Pop-Centric COIN.
We can all learn some lessons from the past in regards to hunting down and destroying non-state actors.
v/r
Mike
Schmed:
I am not. The President's stated policy objectives make perfect sense to me. He has not to my knowledge called for nation building as a political objective in Astan but instead it has been more narrowly focused on AQI. Nation building has become the generally accepted method to get at that policy goal but not the actual goal itself.
Anon: well, your response to mine is the stock population centric coin explanation that in order to get at the insurgents you must protect the people first. But I argue that we can achieve the President's political goals with a much less maximalist approach like nation building or pop centric coin.
First, your objectives represent a change from what has been stated. While they may be what we should do and what the President's strategic review could adopt, your objectives do not represent curent policy.
Second, where are we going to get the intel to deal with AQ? Do you really think that they will "present themselves" for death or imprisonment? And kill and capture "any other Afghani element who align themselves with AQI" sounds like it eould include all of the insurgent factions or groups with which we are dealing--back to square one, especially if you're just trying to kill or capture them. We have to be more broad and nuanced in our approach than this.
Third, I would love to face your tactical method if I was an insurgent. If you don't protect the population, you've already ceeded the insurgent the initiative (unless he's dumb enough to be using foco, then have at it). A skillful insurgent will keep you busy with guerrillas while his underground takes over the population--you'll lose in the long run. No, you have to secure the population AND neutralize insurgency (see IDAD) at the tactical level. How you blend those two (plus balanced development and mobilization) depends on the situation and means, but you can't just pick one and expect to be successful.
Policy objective as given: Prevention of AQI using Afghanistan as a base to attack the United States, continued suppression of AQI in Afghanistan.
Strategy: Extended use of American military power and other forms of national power that concentrates efforts on AQI and thus accomplishes policy objective. But get out of the nation-building operational method in Afghanistan since a realistic assessment of what it would actually require carrying it out--a generational effort involving hundreds of thousands of troops--is not commensurate with what our national interests are in the place.
Operational Method: Focus military operations toward the suppression of AQI in Afghanistan by killing and capturing any AQI who present themselves or any other Afghani element who align themselves with AQI. Provide continued but limited special military support to the building of Afghani security forces. As an immediate measure to reduce violence and regain the initiative from the Taliban increase troop strength slightly but apply those combat forces and the ones already there with the tactical objective of killing the enemy instead of so called "population protection." The latter involves only the hope and dream of a better war whereas the former involves the direct killing of the enemy, the regaining of the tactical initiative, and thus the shifting to a different but sustainable strategy which will accomplish political objectives in Afghanistan.
Well my friend Colonel Dave Maxwell beat me to the punch. Dave is spot-on with his critique of this very stock and typical oped by the two authors which trot out the usual tropes about Iraq and then deploys them to make the clever argument as to why we should continue down the path of nation building in Afghanistan.
Dave Maxwell hits the central problem squarely on its head: Strategy. It is not about CT or COIN, per say since both of those two terms represent operational concepts comprised of tactical method. The issue therefore is how strategy should use operational method, of whatever kind, to accomplish policy goals. Yet until we can start to elevate other methods to countering an insurgency to the operational level other than population centric Coin we will never be able to move into the realm of strategy.
This oped by Nagl and Fontaine represents stale thinking and more worrisome shows very troublingly how utterly devoid of strategic thought and creativity American defense circles have become. Again, and I have said this before, we have devolved in Afghanistan to a strategy of tactics.
Let me start of by stating that I am a tremendous fan of Dr. Nagl's work. Having said that, I am concerned that the AF/PAK strategy debate is devolving into dangerous oversimplification. The phrase "Afghanistan is not Iraq" has been repeated countless times last year to today. Earlier this year, Dr. Nagl co-authored a brilliant piece for Foreign Policy JAN/FEB 09.
"If it is true that a new plan is needed in Afghanistan, it is doubly true that Afghanistan is not Iraq. Conflating the two conflicts would be a dangerous oversimplification. The Iraq war has been mostly urban, largely sectarian, and contained within Iraqs borders. The Afghan war has been intrinsically rural, mostly confined to the Pashtun belt across the countrys south and east, and inextricably linked to Pakistan. Because the natures of the conflicts are different, the strategies to fight them must be equally so. The very fact that Pakistan serves as a sanctuary for the Taliban and al Qaeda makes regional diplomacy far more necessary than it was in Iraq. Additional troops are certainly needed in Afghanistan, but a surge itself will not equal success."
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587
The layout above is far better than an Iraq cut-and-paste COIN strategy.
With all due respect to Dr. Nagl, this starts out reading like the argument that it worked in Iraq when things were thought to be lost so it will work in Afghanistan. Though I think such arguments are weak on the surface, he does make some interesting and useful points about the perceived legitimacy of the Afghan government and the feelings of the population toward their government which actually allows the argument to be made that things are better in Afghanistan now than they were in Iraq at the time of the surge.
I hate to beat a dead horse, but in the end the argument comes down to a "COIN strategy" versus a "CT strategy." I think we need a strategy that lays out what we need to do and how and with what means we are going to go about doing it (it will encompass a wide range of actions and activities that will include many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures found in COIN doctrine but as well will include the capturing and killing of high value targets in order to make those tactics of COIN successful - again, we need to stop this either or debate). I would like to see such a strategy laid out without using the terms COIN or CT. I think this argument has become counterproductive in the debate and it also makes us intellectually lazy as we can just use COIN and CT as shorthand and not have to articulate in detail what it is we are trying to do and what we need to do.
The full op-ed piece is well worth reading. The Afghan government may remain significantly flawed for many years; show me any one (including ours) that does not have flaws. They key is to maintain a minimal level of security and to promote development so that the Afghans can increasingly deal with the issues themselves without resorting to violence or succumbing to coercion. That requires a security strategy from the world (led by, but not exclusively provided by, the USA) which can listen to the people, and adapt to changing circumstances. COIN has the best chance of doing that; certainly a better one than simply relying on precision-guided munitions.