After eight years of conflict and an ongoing policy review by the Obama Administration, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain. Yet, as the latest assessment in Washington takes place amidst a contested Afghan national election, conditions on the ground continue to deteriorate. The brief, authored by CNAS Fellow and U.S. Afghanistan policy expert Andrew Exum, is meant to serve as a guide for strategic Afghanistan policy planning by laying out the worst, most likely, and best-case scenario for what the country might look like in 24 months, and how U.S. policy might make each scenario more or less likely. Although all three scenarios involve risks, an Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors remains a possibility.
In the "worst-case" and most unlikely scenario, Afghanistan returns to pre-9/11 conditions where insurgent groups again gain control of the nation, reestablish an Islamic Emirate, and grant refuge to transnational terror groups. This inevitably leads to civil war and furthers regional instability. In the "most-likely" scenario, the Obama Administration cautiously transitions to a coordinated counterterrorism mission where allied engagement is limited to training Afghan National Security Forces, employing precision airpower and conducting direct-action special operations. Given similar attempts to execute a small footprint-type mission in Afghanistan, the likelihood of failure is high and eventually leads to a protracted proxy war between the United States and Pakistan. In the third and "best-case" scenario, the United States and its allies agree to a fully resourced campaign to provide security for key population centers and continue to develop effective security forces. By committing to a foundation for peace in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies achieve its main policy objective of regional stability.
Comments
Anonymous 2:15 PM:
I'm not being optimistic, I'm simply an old cynic...<blockquote>"...by forcing a choice between doubling down on a gamble that COIN will eventually succeed in Afghanistan, or handing al Qaeda a significant victory by minimizing or abandoning American support in Afghanistan. I have little doubt this is what bin Laden had in mind in 2001 (al Qaeda's misadventure in Iraq notwithstanding)."</blockquote>In reverse order; Iraq showed we can be more nimble than some suspect and <i>did</i> upset AQs grand plan. He did have in mind what you state. He didn't force that Afghan choice upon us, we took it voluntarily (for reasons that have not yet become clear).
I don't think their strategic efforts have been superior; they're just more nimble and thus are bound to score occasionally -- penalty on our part of a big overweening bureaucracy and the political problems we have cited.<blockquote>"The question is, is the American leadership capable of recognizing and acting on the necessity of sacrificing the rook to preserve the queen? Or will it lose both to mere pawns?</blockquote>I have no doubt that many in the leadership business can recognize and will be willing to act in several different but acceptable ways -- there are far more choices than the two you cite and my bet would be something between those poles -- it is possible to keep both the Rook and the Queen. Whether the domestic political catfight will allow a sensible decision remains to be seen..
Bin Laden lost his bet not only due to Iraq but simply because we are still in Afghanistan. As I said, the ineptitude of others continues to save us. So far.
>Our only saving grace is that our opponents are usually more inept the >we are and I believe that to be true today.
I wish I shared your optimism in this regard. It seems to me that al Qaeda strategic decision-making has been superior to that of the United States thus far. It appears to have forked the American queen and rook by forcing a choice between doubling down on a gamble that COIN will eventually succeed in Afghanistan, or handing al Qaeda a significant victory by minimizing or abandoning American support in Afghanistan. I have little doubt this is what bin Laden had in mind in 2001 (al Qaeda's misadventure in Iraq notwithstanding).
The question is, is the American leadership capable of recognizing and acting on the necessity of sacrificing the rook to preserve the queen? Or will it lose both to mere pawns?
Anonymous 11:45 AM:
I'm also fond of saying that conduct of ALL our wars is predicated largely on domestic politics. Afghanistan is no different...
Poor strategic choices abound historically. Our only saving grace is that our opponents are usually more inept the we are and I believe that to be true today.
However, your comment on consequences is accurate. We really need to work on our political disconnects. If Congressional selfishness and vote buying are not significantly curtailed, that day will come sooner rather than later.
It occurs to me that all of the various "scenarios" presented by CNAS and others regarding the projected outcome of this or that option in Afghanistan are being framed through the lens of American domestic politics. "Winning" or "losing" is determined solely on the basis of whichever political position that COA validates.
None of these assessments strike me as a serious attempt to balance ends and means at the strategic level. Instead they are merely more spin and positioning in the political horse race that is all the media and public seem to be able to understand. Ken White is fond of saying that the U.S. always seems to "muddle through" its strategic decision-making, but at some point, American wealth and power will not be enough to protect it from the consequences of poor strategic choices.
"....if the US goes down to defeat in Af-pak...."
Who has defeated the US if the President decides not to endorse COMISAF's COIN surge? Which one of CNAS's 'scenarios' translate to US defeat? I thought we were in AFG to kill/capture AQ.
Given AQs current state and a continuing US commitment to hound them to the gates of hell wherever we can find them, a US drawdown and withdrawal from AFG and strategic shift away from the non-existential threat of the Taliban does not mean a US defeat. CNAS and the other COINdinistas are apparently well underway in making the 'big lie'[*] a reality by repeating it so often but the distinction cannot be lost in the noise of the current debate: we are not in AFG to fight the Taliban; we are there to kill any remaining AQ. From the mouth of the TB itself, our biggest fears of a new AQ safe-haven in AFG aren't too solid. If we do our mission in AFG and drawdown/withdraw, that is not a US defeat.
[*] sorry for that reference, but it's almost to the point of fitting to a tee.
I think the paper is generally on target. And I too think that a stable Afghanistan is NOT impossible, but would take hard work, which the US may not be willing to do (or capable of doing? one has to consider that imperial decay may already be past the point of no return).
Some commentators feel that this overstates the importance of the "af-pak haven" for AQ. While it is true that AQ does not really NEED a haven to continue as a terrorist group, a victory in Afghanistan would make a huge difference in their prospects. The difference is the difference between Baader-Meinhoff and a serious threat. Defeat in Afghanistan would make the whole AQ project seem even more of a fantasy and a cultish fringe act. They would still get the occasional Saudi willing to walk around with explosives up his butt, but such nutcases would not have wide support in the Muslim community (which would see them as dangerous crazies, not a serious alternative). On the other hand, if the US goes down to defeat in Af-pak, it would translate into a huge boost to the jihadi project. They would have proven their point: they got a superpower to walk into their trap and they defeated the superpower. Palestinians and others Muslim communities with grievances (real AND imagined) do not have to regard these people as medieval crazy morons who are more dangerous to their own community than they are a threat to US-Israel. Instead, they can see them as a real alternative to all the "corrupt puppets" the US has supported all over the Muslim world. Increasing numbers of Muslims will start thinking afresh about joining the cause or at least hedging their bets. Maybe no dominoes will actually fall, but many dominoes will have to be rescued using brute force, nasty tactics and extreme violence. Baader Meinhoff never got that far.....