"I hope people who say this war is unwinnable see stories like this. This is what winning in a counterinsurgency looks like." Lt. Col. William F. McCollough, commander of the First Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment, is walking me around the center of Nawa, a poor, rural district in southern Afghanistan's strategically vital Helmand River Valley. His Marines, who now number more than 1,000, arrived in June to clear out the Taliban stronghold. Two weeks of hard fighting killed two Marines and wounded 70 more but drove out the insurgents. Since then the colonel's men, working with 400 Afghan soldiers and 100 policemen, have established a "security bubble" around Nawa. Colonel McCollough recalls that when they first arrived the bazaar was mostly shuttered and the streets empty. "This town was strangled by the Taliban," he says. "Anyone who was still here was beaten, taxed or intimidated."
Today, Nawa is flourishing. Seventy stores are open, according to the colonel, and the streets are full of trucks and pedestrians. Security is so good we were able to walk around without body armor - unthinkable in most of Helmand, the country's most dangerous province. The Marines are spending much of their time not in firefights but in clearing canals and building bridges and schools. On those rare occasions when the Taliban try to sneak back in to plant roadside bombs, the locals notify the Marines...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
Carl,
I guess we disagree. I probably should not have used the phrase 'losing game' since like you, I believe the war is theoretically winnable. That said, I would say it is currently stalemated, and I am betting we dont have the strategic patience to see it through. For the reasons I have mentioned, therefore, I don't believe it is worth the price of staying in the game.
I accept that the other points are arguable, but wrt Pak I sugggest that the internal military / civil dynamics are not tightly related to the Afghan war.
Since independance, Pak has alternated between corrupt civil regimes and (relatively) cleaner military ones - each of which loses legitimacy over time and re-starts the cycle. The military was always loosly supported by the then fairly weak islamist factions.
Now our western pressure to get tough has upset this predictable cycle. The islamists have grown stronger as the military has been forced to turn against them. Call me a cynic (or realist) but I would rather the previous predictable, if ugly, alternation of power to the current uncertainty.
Carl,
"i strongly doubt he would have been able even to start his kind of work in Afghan pre-2001. if the Taliban takes over there again, anyone doing his kind of work will have to run or die."
You gotta read the book. It's very compelling. He works in Af-Pak, and he started in the mid-1990's.
v/r
Mike
I haven't read the book either, but I think the point was that Mortensen was protected by the local population.
Of course his story was unique and does not fully translate to US nation building...Mortensen was trusted by important local clerics who did not see him as an intruder. (he even obtained a letter of recommendation from the Supreme Council of Iran...)
Mike:
i haven't read the book so i can't say much about his activities. i know exactly what you mean about committed individuals being greatly more effective than govs. my aunt (a saint in waiting, though she will dispute that) has been a Medical Mission Sister in Karachi for more than 40 years. she only left just this year. when i was in Kinshasa it was a miracle what one US diplomat did with children crippled with polio. he has been doing that for years.
what concerns me is armed, organized groups with a strong ideology, like the Taliban can trump the wishes of the people. i only read about Mr. Mortenson on Amazon but i gathered he works in Pak. i strongly doubt he would have been able even to start his kind of work in Afghan pre-2001. if the Taliban takes over there again, anyone doing his kind of work will have to run or die.
people like Mortenson, my Auntie and the US diplomat i spoke of can't do good unless guys like you and your company are around to protect them. in Mortenson's and my Auntie's case, i think the Pak army fulfills that function. in a Talibanland, there would be no one.
(contact me for the name of that polio charity. it is one of the best.)
Carl, your question drives into one of the two takeways that I learned from Greg's work.
1. Total Cost. He spends about $15,000/school. Great Return on Investment. Much different than the billions we waste in Iraq/A'stan on our Cerp projects.
2. He has been effective despite the lack of security. It seems so paradoxical, but he found a way to do it. Seriously, we have a middle-aged, white American running around one of the most anti-American places in the world with impunity.
v/r
Mike
Steve Metz's post is spot on, in my view.
A close reading of the history of the British Empire from mid-19th Century to 1899 shows that they understood strategy and were able to avoid maximalist operational methods that used military force to achieve ends. In short they understood that the application of military force had costs and if they reached a point where strategy showed that the continued use of military force was not worth it, they were quite able to withdraw, or adjust method.
Good strategy it seems to me requires its practitioners to be good gamblers. Steve's post, I think, suggests that we are not good strategists but bulls in a china shop with a one-way approach (Population Centric Coin) to any problem that confronts us: Victory, nothing less, and total commitment of the military to achieve it. The idea of cutting our losses at a certain point is anathema to us
This has become the new American Way of War.
"Also, we have a moral obligation to those who helped us and believed that we sincerely wanted to help them. I am very weary of the USA bugging out on people we said we wouldn't bug out on. It has happened several times in my lifetime and I don't want to see it happen again. If we want to issue 10 million entry visas to the US, then fine, we can leave. But short of that, no."
I feel you, and I concur. Send me and my handpicked team in to end AQ and let Greg Mortenson do his thing.
v/r
Mike
Carl, you stated,
"I think for the past 8 years we have been trying as hard as we can to get UBL and Z. We haven't been able to do it. If Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban, those two gentlemen would have that much larger an area to hide in and an actual government, again, to openly run interference for them. So I don't think it is a matter of us simply deciding to get those guys."
I respectfully disagree. You directly observed first hand what I accomplished in Diyala Province from 2006-2007 under the then current guidance without FM 3-24 or any other leadership. We just did what we felt needed to be done.
Taking that a step further, we have neglected pursuit of UBL and Zawahari. Instead, we've focused on a proxy war with the Taliban in A'stan.
We haven't tried our best. That's all I'm saying.
Think about it...Just start with these freaking simple questions....
1. Who is responsible for 9/11?
2. Where are they now?
Everything else fades to black.
v/r
Mike
Mike:
I think for the past 8 years we have been trying as hard as we can to get UBL and Z. We haven't been able to do it. If Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban, those two gentlemen would have that much larger an area to hide in and an actual government, again, to openly run interference for them. So I don't think it is a matter of us simply deciding to get those guys.
The majority in Afghanistan, it seems to me, did want change. They seemed rather relieved when the Taliban were driven back in 2001. Their country was shattered by decades of war and the attentions of the Soviets and ISI. We neglected the situation and didn't do much to help them put it back together. The ISI and the Wahabis didn't stop paying attention, so back comes the Taliban. They want to restore Afghanistan to what it was in the 90's, not what it was prior to the Communists screwing everything up. Afghanistan was never Nebraska but from some that I've read it wasn't all that bad. People used to ride busses and such through there following the hippie trail.
To write off the country because of what it became during those decades of war is not a good thing.
Also, we have a moral obligation to those who helped us and believed that we sincerely wanted to help them. I am very weary of the USA bugging out on people we said we wouldn't bug out on. It has happened several times in my lifetime and I don't want to see it happen again. If we want to issue 10 million entry visas to the US, then fine, we can leave. But short of that, no.
Steve Metz: A few years ago, James Fallows wrote an article in the Atlantic saying that we should declare victory in the war on terror and then proceed with doing things that such a declaration would give us the freedom to do. Is that the kind of thing you are talking about?
I'll try to be very clear on this whole war thing....
Our only focus right now should be capturing/killing UBL and Zawahari and dismantling AQ regardless of where they live. That's the military option. Period. Somehow, we lost sight of it. Instead, we've engaged in proxy wars in Iraq and A'stan.
I'd volunteer in an instant to target those that planned the attacks on 9/11. Somehow, we got distracted from this goal.
As far as A'stan goes, as long as we have nation-states, there will always be bottom-dwellers where the majority of the land is ungoverned, the people are uneducated, and the women are oppressed. If the majority wants to change, then I'm all for nation-building in the Greg Mortenson sense.
Outside of the strategic raid focus, our goals are blind to the realities of human nature and history.
v/r
Mike
I think Max's essay reflects exactly the type of misguided strategic thinking that I'm constantly railing about. Every great power in history except the United States has understood that some security threats require "victory" or "winning" while many, perhaps even most require management. For some reason we Americans can't get this through our head. Maybe it's because we see everything through sports analogies.
But so long as we are unable to distinguish threats which can and must be defeated from those which must be managed, we risk disaster. If we take that route I at least hope that the people pushing us in that direction will later stand up and take responsibility for it.
Morgan,
Good Post, and I like your two cents. With my tactical hat on, I'd agree with everything you said. If I was in charge of a company, battalion, or brigade command right now, I'd work doubly hard to beat out those Marines in Helmand Province. You can damn be sure I'd do it :).
Alas, I'm wearing my strategic hat. You state:
"I agree that the host-nation must ultimately be the ones executing security operations and safeguarding the populace. But in a country like A'stan, where such an organization is still being built, we, as the external actors, must take on that responsibility, quite possibly for years or decades, as we build their forces."
I question why.
You state,
"We lack patience and expect rapid progress in developing ANSF capabilities and forces. Not realistic in a place like Afghanistan. Our lack of patience is evident in our expectations of some of our advisor teams. We conduct a monthly capabilities assessment and expect noticable progress of a force made up of illiterates operating under austere, almost 18th Century-like conditions. Additionally, ANSF knows we're there for only a short time....they don't listen to us if they don't want to, further limiting their progress."
Concur. God bless our transition teams. I gave up a platoon for three months for their security, and I always offered them a break in my patrol base to regain their sanity.
You state,
"We cannot. We must BE THERE with them. If ANSF/ ANP presence is non-existent, then we must be prepared to execute ourselves. The local nationals want peace and security....if the host nation government cannot do it, we need to do it until they can. We must lead by example, even if it means staying there for quite a while."
Again, why?
Finally, you state,
"So, to your questions: What is the host nation doing....unscrewing themselves, I hope. But that's above my level."
Concur, but HOPE is not a method.
In many ways, we agree, but I'm just pessimistic on the final answer.
Finally, you assert,
"How much do we invest and to what cost.....depends on how much we value security in a former terrorist-supporting state that contributed the deaths of close to 3000 Americans. If staying there for decades and going on multiple deployments helps to keep us safe at home, it's worth it."
No and wrong. UBL and Zawahari planned those attacks. We should capture them and place them on trial for the world to see. They are in Pakistan. Nuff said.
v/r
Mike
Starting to believe that non-conventional, asymmetrical and coin war study is already being performed at the Center for Disease Control and within the drug studies up for approval by the FDA especially those for cancer treatments and immunity suppression. Without the hierarchy of state and the columns of the marching army, warfare is looking more like a reaction to transplants, or an invasion HIV and MRSA.
There is a building consensus of historical scholarship that views with extreme criticism the Nagl, Sorley, Krepinevich theses on the Vietnam War. It is there and easy to see in the works of Andrew Birtle, Dale Andrade, the Army Greenbook Series on Vietnam (Cosmas, Carland, MacGarrigle), John Shaw, and others. This recent essay that I mention by Kevin Boylan argues (based on primary sources) that the pacification effort by the 173rd Airborne Brigade called Operation Washington Greene didnt work for a number of different reasons. This essay challenges the Sorley et al thesis because he and others argue that Abrams came in, turned the American Army around immediately and on a dime, focused on pacification, and it was working until the American people lost the will to continue the war and pulled the rug out from the American Army under new and inspired Coin leadership.
David: It is not just one, lonely article by Carl Hack that is challenging the Malaya Coin paradigm but other arguments by historians like John Newsinger, Paul Dixon, and others. If nothing else, David, the stock histories of Malaya that conform to the Coin Paradigm are contested by new scholarship. Yet Boot's article treats the explanation for the turnaround in Malaya due to Templer and better hearts and minds (aka population centric coin) as a matter of fact. It is not, and the newer scholarship coming out just like that with Vietnam challenges these stock explanations. Other historians not necessarily about Malaya but with regard to other coin campaigns are arguing similar things. Have a look at Doug Porch's excellent book on the French in Morocco and see what his explanation is for the crushing of the rebellion there; it wasnt hearts and minds as some have tried to portray it.
It is curious to me why Counterinsurgency experts and analysts have such a hard time excepting that these challenges are there and they are real and are being made by reputable scholars.
Your book, as important and well written as it is, falls squarely on these stock explanation for Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq which can be summarized as this: big bad and ignorant Conventionally minded armies cant do coin and always fumble when confronts by it, but then a cluster of enlightened young Turks figure out how to do it, get a couple of general officers on board, and they then lead the process of learning and adapting to better population centric coin that changes the army and allows it to win at whatever coin campaign it is conducting. The closing argument in your book is a warning that although this process of learning and adapting toward better pop centric coin that has taken place in the US Army it is still in danger because the bogeyman lurks just waiting for the opportunity to put in the request sheet for more M1 tanks taking us back to the pre enlightened days of the fulda gap.
First to Schmedlap....though it has been over a year since I was Kabul, I don't think Kabul needs such a surge. The place isn't as dangerous compared to other parts of the country and there are plenty of ANSF there. They got it.
To MikeF......I agree that the host-nation must ultimately be the ones executing security operations and safeguarding the populace. But in a country like A'stan, where such an organization is still being built, we, as the external actors, must take on that responsibility, quite possibly for years or decades, as we build their forces.
We lack patience and expect rapid progress in developing ANSF capabilities and forces. Not realistic in a place like Afghanistan.
Our lack of patience is evident in our expectations of some of our advisor teams. We conduct a monthly capabilities assessment and expect noticable progress of a force made up of illiterates operating under austere, almost 18th Century-like conditions. Additionally, ANSF knows we're there for only a short time....they don't listen to us if they don't want to, further limiting their progress.
Our police teams are there for approximately a year, live on a FOB (some on tiny FOBs next to the ANP station), have responsibility for a few district stations and their checkpoints, execute "commuter "COIN" ops, and go back to the FOB. We seem to feel that by simply driving by, checking up every few days on the status of the ANP and giving them HESCOs and barrier materials, we can get a decent assessment of their capabilities and then leave it up to them.
We cannot. We must BE THERE with them. If ANSF/ ANP presence is non-existent, then we must be prepared to execute ourselves. The local nationals want peace and security....if the host nation government cannot do it, we need to do it until they can. We must lead by example, even if it means staying there for quite a while. The locals will support us if we protect them.
So, to your questions: What is the host nation doing....unscrewing themselves, I hope. But that's above my level
How much do we invest and to what cost.....depends on how much we value security in a former terrorist-supporting state that contributed the deaths of close to 3000 Americans. If staying there for decades and going on multiple deployments helps to keep us safe at home, it's worth it.
There's my two cents.
According to the Kagans' briefing, Nawa District has an estimated population of 117,000. I would guess that at least 90% is clustered in the Helmand River valley, thus making the protected population around 100,000.
Nawa is important for its location, being the Helmand River valley link between provincial capital Lashkar Gah to the north and Garmsir District to the south. It is also one of the pilot districts in the District Delivery Working Group, a U.S. Embassy interagency initiative to partner with Afghan officials in order to bring Afghan government resources to bear at the district level by facilitating interaction between various levels of the Afghan government. Afghan government officials from Kabul were taken on a visit to Nawa a couple of weeks ago to develop an understanding of local governance concerns.
Another new development is the ongoing deployment of civilian officials to Helmand Province at the district level, not just the provincial (PRT) level. In fact, there is a SWJ Council member who is deployed to southern Helmand as a USAID officer. (If anyone wants to know more about his identity they can send me a PM.) The civilian presence, along with the significant Civil Affairs complement in the 2d MEB, means that the Marines in Helmand can bring more resources and expertise to the development and governance lines of operation than has been the case in the past.
Gian,
We've had this conversation about Malaya before, about the 'new scholarship' that is apparently blowing the 'COIN matrix' reading of that campaign into smithereens.
Could you please let me know what 'new scholarship' you are referring to? Will you quote Karl Hack again? His is a good article, but it does nothing to disprove that population-centered COIN worked quite well, really, in Malaya, whether it was under Briggs or Templer...
Is there some other recent scholarship on Malaya that I have missed? I am genuinely curious.
First, Bravo to the Marines in Helmand Province. There should be no doubt in our military's ability to succesfully conduct such missions, but what is the mission they are doing?
LTC McCollugh states, "I HOPE people who say this war is unwinnable see stories like this. This is what winning in a counterinsurgency looks like."
I would say he is incorrect. His Marines have occupied, and they have become the de-facto governing force. The occupation is further highlighted here:
"The Marines are spending much of their time not in firefights but in clearing canals and building bridges and schools."
The Marines are doing great work, but to what end? In the end, small wars comes down to the host nation and govenance. If the Karzai gov't cannot get it's act together, then the good deeds of the Marines will be for naught.
Measuring effectiveness in a small war based on the work of the external actors is a slippery slope. Right now, his Marines are acting almost unilaterally so if they leave, then it falls apart. In other words, we're doing it for them. That's not good.
The real questions must be:
What is the host nation doing?
How much do we invest and to what cost?
v/r
Mike
What a happy, uplifting story this is by Max Boot, quite typical of the genre to be sure. The Coin Cavalry comes in to save the day, and they do because they are armed with a few more troops, led by inspired new leadership, and wield the light sabers of FM 3-24. So be it, it is the matrix and it has become so powerful that probably writers like Max Boot even believe in it.
Boot did however say this, which I have to point out is just wrong. But of course the truth is never a key pillar of the Coin Matrix. Here is what Boot said in the piece:
"The chronic troop shortfall made it impossible to carry out the kind of population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that has paid off in countries from Malaya to Iraq."
Nope, sorry Max, flawed history it is you are using my friend. In fact what is striking about Coin writers and experts like Boot is how unfamiliar they are with the most recent scholarship that has come out over the past 5-10 years that fundamentally exposes the flaw of the Coin historical trope: Population Centric Coin worked in Malaya once Templer took over, then it worked in Vietnam once Abe took over, it worked in Iraq once Petraeus took over, and now it is working in Astan (as Boot's article argues) now that McChrystal has taken over. But again current research with regard to Malaya and Vietnam show that this just isnt true.
In fact a very new scholarly essay in the recent issue of the Journal of Military History by historian Kevin Boylan shows that pacification by a US Brigade in Binh Dinh Province in 1969 didnt work which strikes a dagger into the heart of the Krepinevich/Sorley/Nagl thesis.
So if Max Boot wants to continue to proffer Matrix articles on Iraq and Astan so be it; but good gravy at least he might try to get his history right on previous attempts at nation building aka population centric coin.
May I remind to everyone that people like MSF have been working in Afghanistan since the 80th. It is all about personalities and contacts with the populations.
But Carl point is good: it took ages for MSF to build trust with the mudjahidin first then during the Taleb. But it took 5 minutes and 9 volunters assassinated to get MSF out of the country. MSF was not the target. The target was government. A small police chief was affraid to be quick out as security was fine so he killed 9 humanitarian workers from one of the most prestigious organisation which supported the afghan people for years. And had the respect of the people!
The bottom line is and will always be security distribution by the state. No matter how the humanitarian people get security (you can gain many things with an hospital or agricultural program, trust me), the fact that local government is not capable to handle minimum security is and will always be the problem. I lost too many employes and friends because of that.
You guys seem to know each other so I'll introduce myself by saying I've done a tour in Afgh as well (Kandahar - I'm a Canuk).
I'm with Mike on the "why are we there question" though.
Love the Afghans and agree that patient, skillfull COIN can work locally, but really... If we let the Taliban take over tomorrow would the West's strategic picture change in any significant way? AQ and company don't need much more haven than a village here and there. They will always be able to manage that, so I don't believe that the current campaign, even if successful, would provide more than minimal strategic benefits.
It does cost plenty in blood, treasure and national will. There is an opportunity cost to all the domestic political capital our nations are spending on this war. And it destablizes Pak, a country which really does matter.
Finally, you can make a good case that simply by being at war in a Muslim country we are strengthening the real enemies. It doesn't matter how decent and even succesful our guys on the ground are - Their ops are fuel for islamist propaganda. We are losing hearts and minds around the world, turning folks against us from Karachi and Cairo to Toronto and Detroit.
I do buy Carl's point about standing by promises made. I really do. But its not reason enough to harm our own strategic interests. Staying in a losing game because you can't afford to lose is the gambler's fallacy.
Ray:
i don't think the game is a losing one. it is a hard one to win, but winnable. it will require us though, as a nation, to actually start trying, just a little bit, in order to win. if you look at the size and potential of our nation and the size of the effort in Afghan, we haven't been trying at all. it bothers me a little that because real effort is required now, we are becoming reluctant. (i stress strongly the Americans as a people haven't really been trying; not that guys like Mike and all the service members and Canadians like you haven't been making herculean efforts.)
being at war in a Muslim country will tick off those who are already inclined to be mad at the west. many of the other Muslims know, i think, that this isn't the plucky Afghans against the bestial superpower as it was 20 years ago however the talibs portray their efforts.
AQ doesn't need more than a village or two to survive, but to prosper to the point where they pose a real threat, i think they need a country. when they had one to work they were very troublesome. (maybe they partially have one now anyway. the ISI has had 8 years to track UBL, Z and MO. perhaps...)
i take the opposite view with regards to Pakistan. one of the problems there as i understand it, is the struggle between civil institutions and the military for primacy. if the taliban were to re-take Afghanistan, the military will be strengthened. they will have pulled off the same game they played in the 80s with the added benefit of having had us partially subsidize our defeat. the army will have achieved its "strategic depth" thing and perhaps any inclination to really come to terms with India would be quashed. Pakistan is the key country but the key institution in Pakistan is the army. Anything that increases the power of the Pak army vs. the civil establishment may not be to our benefit.
the point has been stated better by others, but if successful, our efforts in Afghan may not mean all that much, but if we are defeated, the consequences will be grave. the fillip it would give to the takfiris the world over would be spectacular and actions would follow.