Comments
Speaking of training
<blockquote>A rapid increase in the size of Afghan forces has already been broached with Afghan defense officials, according to U.S. military officials, and a new three-star general -- Lt. Gen. William Caldwell -- was recently nominated to oversee the project at the request of Gen. McChrystal.</blockquote>Same <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125632862358004497.html">WSJ article</a> mentioned above.
"If we think the insurgency is directed against the US then the insurgents must consider the US an occupying power..."
I think that's exactly what happened in Nuristan, and would happen throughout Afghanistan were we to attempt to stay without performing some sort of counterinsurgency designed to prevent the sort of ultimate counterinsurgency (shooting back at insurgents shooting at us) the soldiers in Wanat and at Keating were eventually conducting by enemy choice.
"I think it might be useful to think of our operations as Stability Operations conducted in order to buy time in order for the Afghan security forces to develop..."
Concur, and I believe that umbrella covers COIN, FID, and a number of other efforts. I'd add that stabilizing is necessary if we're going to remain in Afghanistan conducting counterterror ops.
If we stay: I imagine a move towards much closer working relationship between foreign and Afghan forces in the near-term, with all actions (kinetic and otherwise) having a training and operational component - OJT in the worst possible conditions. Along with ongoing CT this will be described as a "compromise" - or "hybrid strategy" - between the "Biden plan" an "the McChrystal plan". (Per <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125632862358004497.html"this WSJ piece</a> today.)
On the topic of semantics, I can't think of any word strong enough to describe the difficulty involved.
That is certainly troubling if the leaders thought the platoon was "doing COIN." COIN is something that you do at the operational level. Platoons execute tactical tasks. "Conduct COIN" is not a tactical task any more than "conduct CT" or "conduct HIC" is.
When one hears that the Soldiers at Wanat "thought they were doing counterinsurgency" in the context of OEF (not widely regarded as a COIN op), a common perception formed will be that the platoon essentially did not know what it was doing - that it had a "COIN mission" but lacked the training to do it properly. It reinforces a popular sentiment that our military "doesn't get COIN" and therefore needs to retrain its Soldiers on some nebulous, separate set of "COIN skills" rather than training them to conduct war across the spectrum.
To answer the question about why they thought they were doing COIN: It has been many months since I went through all the documents, but as I recall, senior commanders said so in the statements they gave to investigators. The Cubbison report goes into some detail on this, I believe.
You can read my series on this at:
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/28/inside_an_afghan_battle…
Best,
Tom
GreyHawk: Why is it that WE have to conduct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan? Why don't we support the Afghan government conducting counterinsurgency since the insurgency is against the Afghan government and its people? If we think the insurgency is directed against the US then the insurgents must consider the US an occupying power and if we conduct counterinsurgency then we could be perpetuating the myth that we are an occupying power. Seems like splitting hairs I know but I think the distinction is important not only on a psychological and political level but also in terms of tactical employment of forces (Afghans with US in support). I fully understand that the Afghan security forces are not yet ready to assume the lead role and that the argument is made that we have to "fill the gap" and conduct COIN until they are ready. I think it might be useful to think of our operations as Stability Operations conducted in order to buy time in order for the Afghan security forces to develop so that they can then conduct a counterinsurgency campaign to defend their country against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency (with our advice and assistance)
Schmedlap,
"Counterinsurgency" vice "population-centric counterinsurgency", perhaps?
Outside of doctrine here: if there were insurgents in the area and they exchanged fire they were conducting counterinsurgency. In that regards if we stay in Afghanistan and an insurgency continues there we'll be conducting counterinsurgency - the only question being to what degree IAW FM 3-24.
The enemy gets a vote.
I'm still really curious about Ricks's statement about the platoon at Wanat that <em>"They thought they were doing counterinsurgency."</em> That sounds odd. It appears that a small force was establishing a position in a dangerous locale with little more utility than shooting at stuff and conducting surveillance over a valley.
Seaworthy:
You state:<blockquote>"Your opinion of not having an ability to call for timely fire support by operating a static position beyond artillery range mystifies me?"</blockquote>Not what I said and I agree that a static position should be within the fan generally -- with some exceptions where air and /or adequate mortars are available; METT-TC and all that.
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My statement was that I hoped there was no <u>requirement</u> to stay under an Artillery fan in Afghanistan. That is an unduly restrictive, risk averse rule which did little good and some harm in Viet Nam in that it gave people an excuse not to patrol outside the fan; as I said "That was one of the more ridiculous, stultifying and inane requirements developed..." there.
That was predicated on your initial statement:<blockquote>"Incidentally, would anyone knowlegeable care to enlighten me if having infantry operate beyond the artillery fan in Afghanistan is SOP?"</blockquote>Infantry operating and infantry occupying a static position are different things...
As Schmedlap says, in this case it was academic and I suspect in most cases, Artillery coverage is a fact -- I believe that does not need to be the case and that factors of METT should be applied. Risk aversion has become an American fetish and we all suffer because of that -- and not just in fighting wars...
The deployment of U.S. soldiers and Marines to Afghanistan continues a lack of understanding in our abilty to prosecute this war. For insight into this flaw, see: http://www.thebutter-cutter.com/Protecting_Afghans.php
Ken White - I hope you're correct that abandoning this COP, under these circumstances won't be a propaganda bonanza. Though I'm not sure I'd use the language "strongly" doubt.
Your opinion of not having an ability to call for timely fire support by operating a static position beyond artillery range mystifies me?
Perhaps you'll elaborate Ken. I'm sure I'm missing something and am always willing to take a lesson (or give one). :)
Seaworthy:
I certainly hope there is no requirement to stay under an Artillery fan in Afghanistan. That was one of the more ridiculous, stultifying and inane requirements developed in Viet Nam. Didn't do as much damage as H&I Fires but it came close.<blockquote>"...this must be a major propaganda coup for our enemy?>"</blockquote>I strongly doubt that it will be seen as that.
One of the major television networks aired anecdotal interviews with Soldiers earlier last month from COP Keating, prior to the recent battle and its abandonment.
When asked why they were there - most Soldiers rolled their eyes and stated because they were told to be there. One stated, talking too much might get him trouble. (not unusal, but telling never the less to someone like myself).
If those manning this COP were told they were involved in counter-insurgency, they plainly didn't remember, or forgot to mention it; to put it tactfully.
I won't belabor with personal comments on the layout of these two outposts in relation to the terrain - the foolishness for that speaks for itself.
In addition to the sad loss of life and stolen gear, this must be a major propaganda coup for our enemy?
Incidentally, would anyone knowlegeable care to enlighten me if having infantry operate beyond the artillery fan in Afghanistan is SOP? Is there an over dependence on air as the major supporting arm?
I am trying to get a bead on if commanders have had to swallow a bitter pill and put units in untenable positions or if there are some questions of good tactical judgment.
If I sound a might curt, forgive me.