War is dynamic, changing, and unpredictable. The ongoing war in Iraq is no different; it has seen a fundamental shift in how the Marine Corps fights as the doctrine of maneuver warfare and the decisive single battle concept have been supplanted by the steady state and continued operations that are counterinsurgency operations. Years of active combat in the hotly contested Al Anbar Province have been the driving force for change within the Marine Corps as al-Qaeda and others have sought to nullify American and the nascent Iraqi Government's influence in the area. Fortunately the studied development and application of counterinsurgency doctrine has resulted in a largely stable Iraq that is well on the road to self-governance. Unfortunately, it wasn't our idea.
The greatest single influence on our counterinsurgency doctrine isn't a Marine. He isn't even an American, or a colonel or a general or an admiral for that matter. He is an Australian lieutenant colonel who did the bulk of his influential work as a captain—work that has become the cornerstone of company-level counterinsurgent operations and has brought him to prominence as an advisor to the likes of GEN David Patraeus, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, and to the Department of Defense during the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. Not bad for a foreign field grade officer, but why are we, the most powerful Nation on the planet, importing talent to help solve our warfighting problems? Don't we have Marine officers capable of doing the same?
The answer, unfortunately, is that we do not. The Marine Corps has not invested in the education and development of its officer corps to produce such an officer and, as a result, stands ready to be marginalized within the Department of Defense as a result of this shortfall. Unconventional times and unconventional wars require unconventional thought, and the ability to think brilliantly and unconventionally is a product of education. The foreigner who so significantly impacted our counterinsurgency doctrine and the planners who developed the controversial, but ultimately successful, "surge" shared a common background—the commonality of a doctoral-level education. How, though, can the Marine Corps correct the deficiency? And who is this guy, anyway? ...
Much more at the Marine Corps Gazette.
Comments
Kilcullen might have a description for and how to handle this statement. Begs the question of who is really the insurgent?
Pakistan's ongoing support of the Afghan Taliban is anything but news to insurgents who have spoken to NEWSWEEK. Requesting anonymity for security reasons, many of them readily admit their utter dependence on the country's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) not only for sanctuary and safe passage but also, some say, for much of their financial support. The logistics officer, speaking at his mud-brick compound near the border, offers an unverifiable estimate that Pakistan provides roughly 80 percent of the insurgents' funding, based on his conversations with other senior Taliban. He says the insurgents could barely cover their expenses in Kandahar province alone if not for the ISI. Not that he views them as friends. "They feed us with one hand and arrest and kill us with the other," he says."
This has been a very interesting stream of posts, and I am going to chuck in my two bits as the author of the article.
My point is that there are undeniable and indisputable examples of the positive impact of higher education for military personnel, and that the Marine Corps has no program to systematically develop and educate Marines to that level. The other services do, as do our Joint, Allied, and Coalition partners. My thesis is that we should educate officers in order to utilize their talents while in uniform. It is not that we don't have brilliant Marines, but they are brilliant in their own right and through their own talents, bents, and ideals. A smart guy once told me that hope is not a method, and to hope, as an institution, that we will continue to be lucky that Marines like Mattis and Ellis show up when we need them is to cast our fate to chance. Wouldn't it be far sighted and beneficial to invest in our best and brightest in order to build a bench of such talent? I think it would.
At any rate, I have enjoyed the debate.
S/F,
LtCol Mike Grice, USMC
@Vito - plenty of guys are looking at the "next fight" as well, but cant talk about what the plans are. You'll just have to wait for it to come out on Wikileaks :(
I think it will come to a public discussion when things start to stabilize in Afghanistan and big budget cuts start to hit DOD. Unfortunatley this sort of warfare doesnt line up with congressional districts like major procurment programs do.
Just because a guy writes a couple books and gets a lot of appearances on TV, that doesn't mean he's smarter or more creative than anyone else. I think we're confusing notoriety with knowledge and skill.
Kilcullen is a smart guy. But I see no evidence that he is any smarter or offers up anything more insightful than hundreds, perhaps thousands, of military officers and NCOs who have chosen career paths that do not include the Charlie Rose show or panel discussions.
He has contributed to the debate and injected some ideas - some good, some bad - that have prompted people to think. Well done. Let's leave it at that.
SOF Intel: And Dr. Kilcullen would probably be the first to agree with you. I think the discussion here is getting beyond its original intent. The article asked where is the "USMC Kilcullen" and the context, I believe, was concerning those thinkers looking beyond the current fight, much like Kilcullen did before our institutions even recognized that we were facing an insurgency in Iraq, and elsewhere for that matter.
We have plenty of Kilcullens. However, they are too busy fighting the war to appear on TV or write books. Which is not to be taken as a criticism of Kilcullen. We have plenty of people who have more APPLIED knowledge of COIN than he does. Its one thing to come up with these theories, its another thing to go outside the wire and execute them.
We have no Kilcullens as we do not reward "free thinkers" especially in a COIN/UW environment.
To be a "free thinker" means to me someone who is willing to challenge the conventional with true actual "live environment" experiences coupled with a deep understanding of what composes "conflict ecosystems".
Most Army officers and alot of the military intelligence field just roll their eyes and then ignor the term "conflict ecosystem" instead of attempting to fully understand it and then implement it.
There is the underlying problem---an unwillingness to question and challegene---it is not in their DNA nor in the DNA of any US military organization--and I am afraid to say even not in SF currently.
Just three comments that shed some light on the conversation.
1. A former NTC Ops Group Cmdr now a BG use to issue via email to his Officers and Staff a required reading list in order that they stay current in the field of COIN and COIN tactics--those Officers that had served previously with him read the articles-but a majority of those that had not served with him rejected outright the suggestion that they do extra reading. This included a pass around of the latest insurgent TTP battle videos that a number of the Officers refused to look at as they deemed it "enemy propaganda". And it has not changed much with their mindsets since he left.
2. a large number of BCT Cmdrs while during their CTC rotations (from 2006 through 2009)as well as their Staff Officers relied totally on the concept of "been there done it" when it comes to COIN doctrine and could not if their lives depended on it quote anything verbatim fromthe FM.
3. the concept of a "free thinker or an unconventional thinker" in the current Army officer corp is one who is determined to "kill" his career as it definitely does not enhance his career---much like officers who chose to serve in SF during the 60s killed their careers.
Think about it!
The most interesting thing about the list of names posted that may be equivalent to Dr. Kilcullen is the fact that none of them are above the rank of Colonel. It seems that their "unconventional" ways of thinking may have kept them from obtaining the rank of General.
Our services have a way of marginalizing unconventional thought. I rememeber specifically the day that I was asked by my battalion commander whether I wanted to be a strategic planner or a battalion commander. I had placed emphasis on a desire to be a strategic planner since I believe commanders cannot win a war with a bad strategic plan. Then he asked me to answer the question again with the knowledge that he would only be able to rank one planner out of the entire staff above center of mass because "he had to give the commanders above center of mass." We had, until it became necessary, relegated the thinkers to the sidelines.
While an effects based organization may tend to promote the audacious commander who achieves tactical victory, this does not necessarily work well in a COIN environment. The company grade officer is the executor on the ground and this definitely means that our military education has to change. We can not expect that we will produce a large number of senior officer who attend SAW or get a doctorate. The OPTEMPO of today's operations obviously constrain us. We need talent on the battlefield.
I am finishing CGSC and the most striking thing I noticed in the military history courses is that we focus on the Western way of war. We are in an operational environment that will result in continual meeting between the east and the west, not all of which will be amicable.
I feel that it would be extremely beneficial to include at least one class on the Eastern way of war and one on the Islamic way of war. After all, these two populations account for over 40% of the world's population. We need to institutionalize the differences in mind sets of our potential enemies as soon as possible (preferably at the Company Grade level) to get our commanders at a point where they understand the differences in how the enemy think and can react accordingly at the tactical level.
It would also help if strategic thinkers were also promoted to the rank of General instead of relegated to staff jobs. Then perhaps, we wouldn't have talented officers like LTC(retired) John Nagl leaving the Army after realizing that his chances for promotion to General Officer were being marginalized for his unconventional thought. Just my own personal opinion, but that would send the message that thinking outside of the box can be rewarded.
Anon @ 2:44 wrote:
"many of those who had their education limited to military schools think doctrinally, and try to see view any problem they're dealing with from a doctrinal perspective."
"They have the answer (doctrine), now they have to make the problem correspond to the answer."
This statement may be worth investigating from a cause and effect perspective. It does not condemn what is taught in PME, it is saying that if you teach a specific subject, many of those taught will probably conform to what they have learned, or in this instance try and conform the problem to what they have been taught. It is I think at least part of what we sometimes refer to as a reflection of organizational culture.
Now, having said that, I'll also say that military PME is working hard to push the envelope on the "how" vs. "what" to think, but it still falls within the confines of limited PME windows where there is give an take between what the future says are requirements and what commanders in the field say they want in terms of staff officers and subordinate commanders. Don't forget that for the vast majority of officers the last formal PME school they will attend is ILE (or a service equivalent). There, in a relatively small space they must wedge in an ever growing list.
This is why I still say we must work backwards from the point of determining what it is we want leaders to do at each level and position, and then modify the educational path and the developmental assignments they are given to fit. It is a combination of the two I believe.
Along with the idea that a full spectrum force need not require every part of the force to be able to do everything within the spectrum at all times, maybe we do not need every leader to look the same in terms of development and education. While some may say we already have this with functional areas, I'm not sure that is what we need if we identify we want senior leadership - e.g. CSMs and GO level CDRs to be developed differently. While some may say there is too much risk involved since the only way to be a good CDR of a Division is to have been one at the BDE and BN level, I'd counter that there may be room for both.
If you trace the development and education for most of the leaders I've known, they hit the "right" jobs - they are primarily all ops and CMD jobs, perhaps with an aid job to a GO thrown in (which is not just a networking job, I believe its a hard one, and gives a leader insights into how senior commanders think and function). However, not all ops jobs are equal or offer the same developmental opportunities, even if they appear so on an ORB.
Which is better - a job as an S-3 for a BDE (which generally results from being the best BN 3 in the bunch), or a job as an advisor to a FSF BN or BDE? Which one best prepares the major for BN CMD? Which one best prepares him for BDE Command? The truth is I think they both have serious merit, and were I a BDE CDR or DIV CDR I would prefer to have some of each as BN CDRs to enhance the experience set in my BDE/DIV as I suspect my organization may be called on to do wide range of tasks to support different purposes. Having a variety of relative developmental experiences in my organization helps me cover gaps and limit surprise as long as I do not blind myself with professional cultural biases.
I don't think I would want all my folks to have advanced social science degrees - some I'd like to have a MMS - or to have spent their time in SAMS, or to have spent more time in other developmental assignments. Time is very much the limiting factor. As brilliant as Dave K is, he has devoted his time to focus on a specific thing I think and while he may be able to apply logic to a number of types of problems, that logic is probably at its best when applied to something he has spent time studying. Its worth considering that his impact has been felt in our discussions as an advisor to U.S. commanders and other US agencies (and I'm sure our MNPs as well), not as an organizational CDR. I'm not sure he (or anyone else) would enjoy the same level of influence while trying to run a command - that takes allot of time and effort in itself. GEN P (as the MNC-I CDR more so then as CENTCOM) may be an exception given the political exposure engendered by the heated debates in D.C. around 2006/2007 ref. OIF.
That said, I think we have many "undiscovered" or "unpublicized" Killcullens in their own right out there who are applying a logic refined over numerous operational deployments and hard study. For me the question is how do you recognize them, cultivate them them and institutionalize a process that sustains their development in times when we will not be at war? We not only need "Kilcullens" capable of thinking about COIN, we need them capable of thinking about every type of purpose to which the military could be employed to a political end. Until we define and accept what that range is, and then define what we want out of leaders at each level and by position I think the best we'll manage is talent identification by chance and circumstance.
Best, Rob
COL Celeste, I think you hit upon the greatest challenge and that is identifying an appropriate assignment where those who have been fortunate enough to pursue advanced degrees can serve in a meaningful manner. Not much use to the force in pursuing a doctorate in political anthropology if you're going to be assigned as a garrison commander. Unfortunately, at least in the Army we don't do a good job of training/educating an individual for their next assignment, after the junior ranks the education/training is largely focused on block checks for the next grade. CGSC for LTC, War College for COL, etc. Tough to avoid that in large organizations, but we should be able to create more opportunities for those who desire to pursue and then "apply" advanced education. The key is identifying what types of advanced education is worthwhile. I have seen many officers with graduate degrees in business management, which does little for the force, but it is one of the easier degrees to pursue due to wide availability.
I think we have to ask ourselves some tough questions about education, what do we hope to get from it? What value is it to the force? Why do we need it? What is the risk if we don't create these education tracks?
Personal opinion, what I have noticed about those who have advanced degrees in the sciences to include anthropology learn to think critically, and apply that type of thought process to military problems, and this is especially beneficial in complex small wars where identifying the true nature of the problem is essential to success. On the other hand, many of those who had their education limited to military schools think doctrinally, and try to see view any problem they're dealing with from a doctrinal perspective. They have the answer (doctrine), now they have to make the problem correspond to the answer.
Excessive focus on doctrine has prevented SF from evolving appropriately over the last two decades, and I'm sure it has done the same many other organizations. This is what we do, versus this is what we need to do.
I read the February article by LtCol Niel Schuehle on "Where is Our Kilcullen". I think that the issue of a doctoral program for the Corps is a very good one at this time. As you know, we have many education programs that have been highly successful. The Marine Corps supports, Marines going to undergraduate and post graduate schools now. This is done through a variety of programs such as the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program, the Funded Law School Program, Naval Post Graduate School, etc.
By accepting to attend one of these programs, the Marine incurs a payback period and in many cases has a utilization tour that allows the Marine Corps to take full advantage of the knowledge that the Marine gained while attending school.
While I was at the Marine Corps Office of Legislative Affairs, I personally managed the Marine Corps Congressional Fellowship Program. In this program a Marine, or civilian Marine works in a Congressional Members personal office or on a committee staff for one year. Upon the Marines return to the Corps they are fill an assignment that can make use of the skill set that they developed while serving on the Hill.
It was very challenging at times to find the right utilization assignment once their fellowship was over. But by working directly with the monitors, many times we were able to find a good fit. Before General Jones became Commandant the Marine Corps hardly used this program and now the Marine Corps leadership finds it to be invaluable.
I believe that a very well run doctorate program may prove just as valuable, if not more. After all, General David Petraeus earned MPA/PH.D degrees and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. And I believe that his doctorate was in Counter Insurgency. I am confident that his educational background molded him to into the Leader that he is today. And lets be frank, we as a Nation, dont have many General Petraeuess around. I think the Nation made a good investment in General H.R. McMaster as well, who write the modern day classic, "Dereliction of Duty". This book was written as a result of his doctorate thesis.
I am very much for another educational program that can help build not just competent regimental combat team commanders, but outstanding General officers, too. And potentially a Combatant Commander .
The challenge, in my view, is in managing the program and finding the appropriate follow on assignments (utilization tours). But the U. S. Army has done it well, so I think the Marine Corps has a good model to examine.
So to the Marine Corps Leadership, I ask: Why not? Our Corps has nothing to lose and our Nation has potentially lots to gain!
Laurinda, your comments reflect your personal snapshot in time and place. Not all have had the same experiences as you in regards to this issue. Many, with many years in this game and a broader and deeper perspective, would disagree very adamantly with your over-simplification and generalization of Army LTCs in particular and Marines in general. But that is the beauty of the Internet; everyone has a voice, even disgruntled and bitter SSGTs. You would have made a better case if your comment had a bit more substance and had been less caustic in nature. You might have a point, but that is now lost.
In re: the idea and usefulness of "expertise" in planning and judgment (e.g. zenpundit, etc), I recommend Tetlock's "Expert Political Judgment" - excellent, long-term study of decision-making by "experts" and individuals with more general knowledge.
On Grice's article - yes, earning a PhD guarantee's nothing in performance enhancement. As a former grad program professor put it on the first day of class, "All my PhD in [subject X] means is that I know as much about this one little area of history than most other people; it doesn't mean I know more across the board than you do." Many, maybe even most, PhDs are simply narrow-minded within their field. Grice points to the need for nimble thinkers, and the McMaster's, Nagl's, Mansoors, are perhaps the exceptions whose thinking and speaking out of turn in an organizational sense were probably the exceptions to the general, big-organization resistance to all forms of rocking the boat. The Corps' Lessons Learned program is probably an area of weakness, a system that asks to be fed but which may or may not be a useful or much used resource but various professional and independent forums likely supplant the ineffectual LL program.
What Grice is really getting at is asking the Corps for some allowance for especially curious individuals to take a path already offered to the other services (I agree with the comments above - the opportunity shouldn't be limited to the Top Level School cohort, and it shouldn't be an officer-only program). The Marines may be somewhat more tolerant from time to time of seeming oddballs and individualists with different ideas but more could be done - 20 years ago when I first went in, Gen. Gray was re-intellectualizing the Corps, instilling a new emphasis on personal and PME. Might be time for a renewed emphasis on study to combat the growing buzzwordism in DoD.
OMG! Four years at CENTCOM fighting the facts of Islam and COIN up against the most bone-headed, insecure, careerist, jerks (generally Army LTCs were the worst)put me in a mentally psychotic state from which I will never recover. Watching boys die by the hundreds as those idiots strutted around obsessing over font size & color and never having read a book on either subject in their lives ... (Then)COL McMaster kept me from jumping. He treated me like an equal (I'm an E6)and had IDEAS and shoved them in people's faces whether they like it or not. I have to say that working w/the USMC was generally always a more positive experience than w/the Army but they still would rather do chin up than read a book ...
Couple points to throw into the discussion. First, this essay was from a Marine officer and directed at the Marine Corps - not DoD. The fact is that the Marine Corps does not offer nearly the same amount of education opportunities that the other services do. In fact, USMC promotion & command screen boards tend to not look favorably on school if it comes at the cost of oprational experience.
I am not worried that USMC officers are not on anyone's best-of lists. The last time I checked, the spiraling situation in Iraq was halted by the Marines in Anbar. The Marine Corps in general can train, lead, and EXECUTE COIN and does not seek to cannonize a couple officers that got it right.
Three points:
1) Billets - The names mentioned in previous posts (such as Mike O'Neill and Anonymous) are spot on, but are heavily if not all Army. All the services have some sort of civilian institution option available, but the Army is large enough that it can afford (and needs) more slots in these schools, and the other services usually only have openings in specific career paths (such as the Master's in Engineering Management for Navy Nukes); a degree in Anthropology would never get approved. The Army also pushes education at the O-3 level, while the other services push it as prep for O-5/O-6 command, leaving less time for PhDs. They don't want to take up an O-3's time with anything other than combat/tactical training/instructor duty.
2) The value of a PhD - A PhD is the ultimate form of specialized education, and the military doesn't specialize its senior officers (hence "General Officers").
2.a) The Navy for example, (despite owning the fantastic NPS) offers very little non-service schools to its Line Officers other than an Exec MBA, which is designed to provide advanced management skills that would be needed by a senior officer controlling large commands, budgets, and systems.
3) Execute or create policy? - Simply, combat experience and leadership billets are and always will be more valued than a tour as a student. This can be argued as an appropriate stance, since the military's job of is to execute policy, and PhDs can still be employed (directly or as advisers) by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is one of the key reasons why we have civilian control of our military.
The way ahead - The OSD should consider the strength of veterans with PhD and create formalized post-graduate and post-doctoral veteran billets in USD-P, USD-I and USD-AT&L.
Matt F, your suggestion to have officers take a tour in an NGO is a good one. I'd expand that to include NGO or State. The question is when. I'd recommend post-command (between year 8-12) b/c you simply need to spend the first 5-6 years learning your job for company command. The Army used to have a program (TWI) that sent post-command officers on internships with big business so it's definitely feasible. Another option is to apply for the Olmstead Scholarship and study abroad. A good friend of mine is studying in China now, and he spends his weekend traveling all over SE Asia. He's now fluent in Chinese and Russian, and he's an aviator. Go figure.
Mike
As an alternative to a formalized doctoral program, what about a PME path whereby company grade officers are afforded the opportunity to work with an organization such as teh Peace Corps, or some other NGO. A key point in the Kilcullen article is that his most valuable experience was gained and aimed at the company/sub-unit level where it can have some of the most tangible benefits.
It's one thing to learn formal anthropology, counter-insurgency theory, etc. in the classroom, but the ability to take a Western officer (i.e. American, British, Australian, Canadian, etc.) who's been raised in a fairy homogenous cultural environment and expose him to a new culture first and way of conducting business firsthand could prove to be invaluable when conducting COIN/Full Spectrum Operations around the world.
Hi Anon,
You wrote ( and I agree):
<b>"I read an interesting article where they refered to this hypothesis as "skilled incompetence". The so called experts aren't stupid, far from it, but they're very much trapped in a narrow paradigm of their own making, and won't let reality get in the way of their ideas and processes."</b>
Yep. Now when/if these experts learn to think beyond/across their domain and mash-up their rich store of data with another field(s) or in an experimental/emprical fashion *then* a powerful dynamic might begin to take shape, if the expert is a key figure in an organization (like Kilcullen). That's what we need to replicate more - and not just in the military, but in most large institutional orgs.
There are a couple of issues:
A) It is interesting that many of the hit lists (or at least some) contain numerous people who possess doctorates:
Petraeus
Mansoor
McMaster
Marks
Nagl
B) Also, two to thee years to obtain the doctorate? I'm not sure that's adequate to complete coursework and comprehensive exams, let alone complete a dissertation. Additional time would be required to work on the dissertation - perhaps time spent teaching at one of the academies?
C) The ultimate question is whether a doctorate improves one's warfighting abilities, or perhaps more precisely, the ability to shape an institution's doctrine on how to fight a war. It is certainly not necessary to possess a doctorate to do so. But does possessing one - through whatever means - make one more likely and able to accomplish such a feat, in whatever way, shape or form?
zenpundit, I read an interesting article where they refered to this hypothesis as "skilled incompetence". The so called experts aren't stupid, far from it, but they're very much trapped in a narrow paradigm of their own making, and won't let reality get in the way of their ideas and processes.
For one I'm a fan of David Kilkullen, and not because he has a Phd in political anthropology, but because he (as Zen pointed out) is "uniquely" capable of independent thought that supports the generation of relevant strategy and tactics. I'm not convinced he significantly shaped the development of our COIN doctrine, but rather he significantly assisted in helping us translate it into action.
As for our Kilcullens, I would offer LTC Lansdale who an American advisor to the Philippine goverment during the Huk Rebellion.
I know we have numerous individuals who are knowledgeable on counterinsurgency, but few were positioned effectively to influence the fight. Sometimes, during moments of frustration, I wonder why we strive so hard to build irregular warfare expertise in officers and NCOs, when in all likelyhood they won't have a voice at the table?
A brief follow up, on the difference between divergent thinking and expertise:
http://eideneurolearningblog.blogspot.com/2006/08/dark-side-of-expertis…
<b>"This is the "dark side" of organizational expertise - a larger fund of knowledge and organizational template for decisions - may handicap you from accurately seeing information that's right in front of you...or more simply, the more you know, the more you may see only what you expect to see."</b>
By nature, humans are lazy. Attention and observation require more effort than does simple recall. Without conscious concentration, we all tend to shift to "automatic pilot" and experts, being experts, navigate very skillfully in that mode.
We (USMC) have Kilcullen-like minds. Frank Hoffman comes to mind here. The sad fact is that we do not treat them that well in terms of paying them what they are worth and seeing to it that they are in a position of longevity. The Marines need a clone of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute with full power to be the Corps' devil advocate. CETO (Center of Emerging Threats and Opportunities) is not cutting the mustard in this respect as it reports to a three-star flag who - and rightfully so - has agendas. We need free thinkers who are not constrained by party line. It isnt that we dont have Kilcullens, we just have a tendency to bury them to a point where they move on to someone else who appreciates their talent.
Dave Kilcullen was never saying anything different from other people's perceptions on COIN. His view addressed COIN fundamentals and is a view shared by professional Western armies across the world. COIN has never been rocket science but must always be played carefully within the political dimension prevailing at home. Dave's greatest asset was able to play within that without upsetting US political perceptions. The OZ accent and personality helped sell that line.
While I don't have names of USMC officers that would be instantly recognisable to people on this blog site I encountered in my time at the COIN CFE and in the field during 2007/2008 many who were excellent COIN thinkers and practioners. You have have to be careful not confuse media profile with acumen (that is not to say that folk who have a 'profile', like David Kilcullen, do not have the goods). As an Australian who has been quietly engaged in research about this subject matter for some years I can identify a host of many Americans who are obviously 'world class' COIN thinkers or actors. More on that list in a minute.
I think that the people who have already posted about David Kilcullen being an 'outsider' have part of the answer. The novelty helps, an outsider can say things and get and audience where a'local' will not. (And , of course, it helps if, as in Kilcullen's case, what you are saying is largely sound).
People might think it funny, but it is my contention that Australia does not have a 'David Kilcullen'. David Kicullen the COIN expert is an American phenomenon. While his achievements are noted in the press here from time to time and people interested in COIN and small wars are keen to hear what he says when he is 'back home', it is difficult to identify from the public record where a single thing he has written or said since he left the ADF has had any impact on our Army or its operations. This is perhaps less a reflection on David as it is upon our approach to COIN issues...
As to the Americans who I mentioned earlier? They may not give as good a quote or powerpoint presnetation as David (few people do, although on or two on this list do), nor is their public profile as high (some would be embarassed or annoyed to be named), yet I would contend they are at least equal in COIN thinking. In alphabetical order, and with apologies to those I may have inadvertently forgotten:
Bruce Hoffman
LTC (ret) Jan Horvath
COL Fred Krawchuk
Carter Malkasian (worked a lot with USMC)
COL (ret) Pete Mansoor
Tom Marks
Daniel Marston
LTC (ret) J.J McCuen
BG H.R McMaster
Steve Metz
LTC (ret) John Nagl
LTC (ret) Doug Ollivant
COL William Rapp
Ok, not a lot of USMC personnel there, I think that may reflect both my exposure and the culture of the Corps.
Regards,
Mark
A couple of points...
First up, it is sometimes a lot easier for an outsider to say things that might not be palatable and/or follow the party line; similarly, it is often easier to listen to an outsider than one of our own.
Next, as has been pointed out above, a doctoral level qualification is no guarantee of performance. If anything sets David Kilcullen apart, it is the individual, not the qualification.
I'm not sure which Marine Corps that author has been dealing with but my (limited) experience with Marines since 2003 is that they very much DO have thinkers of the same calibre as David Kilcullen and I would dare to suggest that at least some of them are at the COIN Center in Ft Leavenworth. The broader problem may be that in such large organisations as the land forces of the USA and USMC, it is not so much a problem of not enough voices but too many - who do you pick put from all the background noise. David Kilcullen, certainly when he first came to the US, 'spoke funny' and was easy to pick out...
By
Colonel Andy OMeara (US Army, Ret)
LTG Thomas McInerney (US Air Force, Ret)
MG Paul Vallely (US Army, Ret)
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Men have fought wars throughout the annals of history. Americans have known wars since the birth of the nation with aspirations that set our people apart from all others. These lofty aspirations have tested our people in wars to preserve our freedom with decades of domestic strife to make good our claims to the cause of human freedom. Within the brief span of two centuries, Americans have fought wars to fulfill a destiny defined by our Founding Fathers. Each conflict has tested our courage while shaping our identity which stands apart from the Western Civilization that is our heritage. The struggle to endure and preserve our ideals - the love of freedom and the dedication to self-government - has made us unique and has made America an example that inspires mankind.
Today, we find ourselves in a difficult and new kind of war. It is a war that we did not start nor can we end without destroying those who have declared war upon us. Unique to our experience, we find ourselves attacked by assailants who wear no uniform and claim allegiance to no sovereign state and follow a barbaric ideology that takes no prisoners. Our assailants aspire to world domination and wage war to destroy the very aspirations of freedom and democracy. The terrorists conceal themselves within civil populations that provide human shields to these radical zealots that follow a barbaric ideology that takes no prisoners. Their mode of conflict strikes at the values we hold sacred, while they use our aspirations and self-restraint to conceal and protect their assassins. It is a war that tests our men and women in combat more severely than any conflict we have waged before. We have attempted to keep the faith and honor our traditions as well as our noble culture of freedom. In this time of bitter war, the Armed Forces impose strict rules of engagement upon our soldiers as they confront the barbarism of the radical Islamists who exercise absolutely no restraint. No crime is too heinous and no act of treachery too despicable to deter their quest of victory and ultimately world conquest.
In former times, our soldiers have fought on even terms against foes who in many ways shared our commitment to international law and the Geneva Conventions. Such conflict recognized basic human rights and sought to punish those who violated the "Law of Land Warfare". Such conflicts saw humane treatment of prisoners as the rule and atrocities were the exception. Yet in the bitterest struggles of World War II, the "greatest generation" resorted to retaliation for unprovoked air attacks upon British civilians that resulted in massive bombing attacks of civilian targets in the Third Reich.
Were we to use such tactics today to obliterate the sanctuaries of the enemies, as we did in World War II, the cry of the international media and the United Nations would be filled with outrage at the American combatants? And the United Nations, which we formed at the end of World War II to preserve peace, would side with our enemies openly declaring the American combatants as war criminals. It is fair to say that we live with double standards today that are ignored by the international media and nation-states that support international terrorism. Americans are trained and expected to conduct themselves with the utmost restraint complying with the most humane rules of engagement, standards of conduct that are simply ignored by our enemies. We are asking a lot of our people. They must fight the enemy with great restraint and even the appearances of transgression of the rules of engagement by Americans are punished most severely by our own military courts.
A recent case of apparent transgression of the rules of engagement occurred in Afghanistan that has resulted in the courts martial of one of our finest young warriors who discovered that their Afghan comrades were enemy agents providing valuable intelligence to the enemy. The results of the enemy agents sequestered in the base of an American company resulted in a series of ambushes that killed and wounded numerous soldiers of the 101st Air Assault Division. The Company Commander, Captain Roger Hill, detained the suspected agents and requested they be evacuated by his higher headquarters which request was denied. Given the limited time detainees are allowed to be held without charges and the lack of support from his superiors, Captain Hill and his subordinates interrogated the detainees. While no detainee was physically injured during the interrogations, Captain Hill was charged with violation of the rules of engagement for making verbal threats during his interrogations. He was called before the equivalent of a grand jury and criminal charges were pressed against him, which could have resulted in the loss of his commission, a dishonorable discharge and a prison sentence. His defense attorney was advised that if he pleaded guilty to the charges that no courts martial would be conducted and Captain Hill agreed to accept the plea bargain. He was fined by his commander and ordered to be "discharged" from the Army under other than honorable conditions - a harsh sentence for a fine professional officer operating under duress in a harsh environment the enemy had successfully infiltrated. Our hope is that the Secretary of the Army will authorize an honorable discharge for Captain Roger Hill or keep his career in tack as a professional Army Officer. This is not too much to ask since they decided to downgrade everything to an Article 15 and allowed him to resign his commission (a way to subtly oust him from the Army). He deserves all Veteran benefits after 4 years at West Point and nine years of honorable service, including two wars. His highest personal decoration is the Bronze Star.
Given the uneven playing field upon which our combatants are waging war and the barbaric attacks our soldiers are subjected to, it is time for a public debate regarding the double standards that bind our hands in battle, but impose absolutely no restraint upon the enemy.
The bottom line is we must support our valiant American fighting men and women. They are fighting under the most difficult conditions and they are being second guessed by military lawyers (JAGs) and bureaucrats holding down desk jobs secure in the rear areas. Our generation will never succeed in protecting our sacred freedoms unless we are prepared to back our men and women on the battlefield. Stand behind our men in battle or kiss our democracy and freedoms goodbye. We must do all we can as to restore the honorable status of Captain Hill and others like him. Our Armed Forces deserve better.
The following is posted over at the Marine Corps Gazette Forum, December issue. Both a Counterpoint and a Letter to the Editor will be run shortly, but for now here are a couple of primer's in response to the article:
Kudos to LtCol Grice for an engaging article. I have already discussed with the author personally many aspects of his thought-provoking paper, and find that I have a different take on many of the statements he has offered. I ask the forum writ large for their thoughts on this matter as well.
The specific points he makes that I would challenge are that:
~ Dr. Kilcullen is the greatest single influence on our counterinsurgency doctrine.
~ The Marine Corps lacks Dr. Kilcullen's equivalent.
~ In failing to produce an officer the equivalent of Dr. Kilcullen the Marine Corps "stands ready to be marginalized within the Department of Defense as a result."
~ The Marine Corps [in the future] will not be allowed a seat at the planning table for want of "doctorate and the credibility that it provides."
~ The ability to think brilliantly and unconventionally is a product of education.
~ The Marine Corps must remedy its lack of a doctoral program.
~ The Marine Corps "collective intellectual relevance is in peril."
I appreciate that he has offered a topic worthy of debate, and hope to see other members join in. I have submitted my formal responses to the Gazette to be published as a "Counterpoint" but have no idea if or when they might consider doing so.
Semper Fidelis, Schuehle
<b>"Unconventional times and unconventional wars require unconventional thought, and the ability to think brilliantly and unconventionally is a product of education"</b>
Or, perhaps, in spite of it.
Don't get me wrong - I'm a deep believer in the possibilities of education but I need to echo and expand what Dr. Tyrell said upthread.
Like the military, American public and higher education tend to impart conformity of thought along with expertise as a function of being inculcated in the fundamental assumptions of a discipline. Innovation and creativity requires either challenging the assumptions of one's field or applying them outside their traditional context.
Freud getting a PhD in his time was not sufficient to become Sigmund Freud of psychoanalysis fame - he'd have just been a guy concerned with neurological responses. Einstein what have been a Newtonian physicist with a doctorate and no more. They had to additionally break with orthodoxy which requires some cognitive and tempermental characteristics that are not explicitly part of formal education.
What education does is allow the innovative thinker to have a large enough cognitive map of acquired knowledge and thinking skills to develop and apply new insights. Generating insights is a different mental task from from simply becoming educated. Conventional thinkers who get PhD's tend to become experts who think conventionally.
I'm going to build off Schmedlap's comment. I hope to do so a bit less harshly than he did.
Who is successful?
This answer transcends just the conventional military force. Schmedlap brought up some good regular army examples. I'll provide others.
Unconventional Warfare- 10th group in OIF One. Combined force in OEF One.
Small Wars. SF in Phillipines and Colombia. ISOF BCT and Hillah Swat in Iraq.
Military Advisors. Still looking for a good example of this from regular Army Transition Teams.
Political Advisors. Ryan Crocker hands down.
NGO's. Greg Mortenson and Mohommad Yunnis.
I'd suggest that we continue to debate who is doing well not who is thinking well about untested theorems.
Mike
It is not that the US military does not have its own Kilcullens, they are no doubt out there, but it is the "zero defect" mentality and a "don't rock the boat" culture that keeps the military a very conservative institution. Certainly there is a theoretical call for innovative thinking (witness the Marine Corps Gazette, JFQ, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and others) but in reality those who do "think out of the box" are often ignored, marginalized, or even humored. This attitude does not particularly encourage others to also do so, typically being a hard charger gets you promoted, but one who keeps within the general doctrinal flow. The services are, for the most part, run by general officers who usually made it to the top by being conservative in their approach, and as Grice points out the leading COIN guru is neither "a colonel or a general or an admiral." There's probably a reason for that.
Kilcullen's rise to prominence in 2005 is as much due to the US military's lack of anyone with current experience in COIN, as it is to Kilcullen's own COIN experience coupled with a degree in anthropology (how many US officers can make that claim). It also helps that he happened to to be in the right place at the right time knowing the right people (this is not intended to be pejorative, in life sometimes opportunities are as much due to who you know as they are due to what you know).
By evoking Earl "Pete" Ellis, LtCol Grice invokes probably one of the most brilliant and foresighted Marine Corps officer in modern history. Ellis' "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" was virtually the playbook for the Marine Corps' island-hopping Central Pacific camapign. Ironically Ellis was not encumbered with a doctorate (nor a graduate degree), he had been commissioned from the ranks without the benefit of college. Unfortunately he died nearly 20 years prior to his plan being put into effect.
I do not believe Grice's supposition that "the Marine Corps has not invested in the education and development of its officer corps to produce such an officer..." In my experience with officers from the other services many state that the Marines they have encountered in Joint schools are some of the most educated officers they have known. While it is certainly in the Marine Corps' best interest to set conditions which encourage and allow Marines (both officer and enlisted) to seek their doctorate, what the Marine Corps, and the other Services, need is to better foster more "free" thinking officers who are allowed to test their theories without having to worry that failure will mean an end to their career. Combined with education that should ensure the Marine Corps a place at the table.
My experience has closely resembled Old Blue and Schmedlap's -- key individuals may understand counterinsurgency concepts (perhaps even intuitively, without having read the big FMs, Galula, or Nagl). As a force, however, I see the term "COIN" being thrown around by people who clearly don't understand it. Then there are those who look at me like I'm speaking Klingon when I talk about FM 3-24 or ink spots.
Let me second Schmedlap's comment about doctoral level education. Put simply, it doesn't guarantee anything. At its best, it gives a student three things: time to think, patterns to think with, and data to think about. Education <i>qua</i> education is an opportunity to acquire these three things, but it certainly does not guarantee them.
Let me make a couple of other notes on the argument in the article. Notice how those who would pursue a Ph.D. will be
<blockquote>Additionally, the opportunity for some select Command and Staff College graduates to attend SAW sets the precedent for a program that would select qualified and competitive students to pursue a doctorate-level education, with the pool of applicants being taken from the TLS pool.</blockquote>
Hmmmm. Please note that the competition to enter the proposed program requires very specific credentials which are based on an intra-Corps selection process rather than an academic one. This may make organizational sense, but does it allow for brilliant, innovative thinkers to pursue doctoral studies?
I would argue that it does <em>not</em> - it allows people who are organizationally success (and hopefully brilliant) to attend. So, what about someone who is so "out of the box" that they don't get the organizational requirements to attend but whose attendance would enhance both themselves and the Corps?
<blockquote><em>"The greatest single influence on our counterinsurgency doctrine... his influential work as a captain--work that has become the cornerstone of company-level counterinsurgent operations..."</em></blockquote>
The greatest single influence on our COIN doctrine? Let's assert, for the sake of argument, that is true. So what? Our COIN doctrine has not been the greatest influence on our COIN operations. The single greatest influences were the units that demonstrated how to do it - the most notable examples in <a href=http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/10/060410fa_fact2>Tal 'Afar</a> and <a href=http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-colonel_n.htm…; being before the doctrine was fully promulgated. What does this suggest about the problem that the author asserts - about us failing to develop the right types of leaders/thinkers? Why are we <a href=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/the_coindinistas>more impressed with Kilcullen</a> than with <a href=http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/11/the-coindinistas/#comment-5752…, McMaster, or Patriquin</a>?
<p>I'm always perplexed when I see this assumption trotted out that the military has embraced COIN doctrine in our training, education, and operations, as opposed to embracing it as a neat idea that we like to talk about and mimicking specific practices that other units have had success with. Is the assumption really accurate? From what I observed, there are few leaders who get it - largely because most of them haven't spent much time trying. My observation (now a bit dated, being over a year since ETS) was that most believed that they were supposed to get it, so they would talk about it a lot. And many leaders seemed to assume that if it was being talked about, then it had been embraced and was being implemented.</p>
Writing a doctrinal publication does not magically impart the knowledge contained within it to the force. Individuals need to read it, understand it, practice it - preferably with guided instruction - in order to fully grasp it and be able to implement it. I don't think most have gotten past step one of reading it. See <a href=http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/07/wanat-unasked-questions.h… Blue's comment</a> for someone with more recent and more relevant insight into how much attention junior leaders give to this doctrine...
<blockquote><em>"None will have received any formal training in the doctrine, most will never have cracked FM 3-24, and 95% will be unable to spell Galula 3 of 5 tries if spotted three letters. I am absolutely stunned at the vast number of people who have never cracked the book."</blockquote></em>
The question isn't where are our Kilcullens (the Marine Corps has many outstanding and forward-thinking Field Grade Officers), but why hasn't our Senior Leadership recognized and implemented creative and innovative ideas?
The Hunter-Warrior experiments in the mid-90s, had the concept been implemented, would have put the Marine Corps in the lead of distributed operations...now 12 years later, we're just starting to try catch up to Special Operations Forces in mobility, lethality and operational agility.
The culture of experimentation and boldness lauded by FIRST TO FIGHT and embraced by Generals Gray and Krulak seem to be anomaly. Our senior leadership is, by and large, very conservative and set on the WWII model as our way of doing business.
god bless the marines. the ones i worked with in al anbar did a great job at COIN.. unlike my unit.. where an Army O6 showed up in theater without any training and having not read the first book on Arab/Iraqi culture. within a week he was telling me "we are going to force the Iraqis to accept our plan". If the marines think they are struggling with education.. they need to see how bad the Army is struggling.