Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force
A Holistic Perspective
by Colonel Cindy Jebb and Colonel Richard Lacquement
Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force
The purpose of this paper is to provide our observations and preliminary thoughts concerning the way ahead for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) based on our work as part of the Quick-Look Assessment team from 3-19 December 2009. We both had the pleasure to work closely with members of the command whose professionalism and enthusiasm were deeply inspiring. The command confronts great challenges as it pursues a mission vital to coalition success. We are qualified optimists about the potential success of the mission. The most important source of our optimism for eventual mission success comes from our observations of the tremendous talent and dedication of the individuals assigned to this command. We were also heartened by our interaction with individuals from other commands and with many impressive Afghan partners.
COL Jebb primarily worked with the Afghan National Army (ANA) Development office while COL Lacquement primarily worked with the CJ5. Both offices are comprised of selfless, dedicated, and smart professionals. Of particular note, COL Jebb had the terrific experience to interact with senior advisors to the Ministers/General Staff (COLs Mike Barbee, Jim Campbell, Fred Manzo, Tom Donovan, and Kevin Cotten, as well as the senior advisor for ANA development, COL David Henley); COL Lacquement benefitted immensely from the support and collaboration of many CJ5 officers, particularly, COL Don Bigger, COL E.G. Clayburn, LtCol Steve Tilbrook and LTC Norm Fuss and from JAG, COL Tom Umberg.
While here, we both sought to understand the needs of NTM-A/CSTC-A on behalf of our home institutions, the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army War College (USMA and USAWC), so that we can best match faculty skill sets, interest, and availability to provide future support if requested. At the very least, this experience will facilitate reach-back efforts for the future. We were able to learn a great deal due to the open command climate and everyone's generosity with his/her thoughts and time. Finally, we offer our sincere gratitude to LTG Caldwell, Dr. Kem, and CAPT Mark Hagerott for enabling this fascinating experience and to MAJ Jon Klug for coordinating the visit and support.
Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force
Colonel Cindy Jebb is a Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. Colonel Richard Lacquement is Director of the Military History and Strategy Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Legitimacy can not be bestowed upon a security force by a government widely perceived by its own populace as illigitimate itself.
Legitimacy in Afghanistan comes from the bottom up, not the top down.
For those who are truly interested in this topic, I suggest you study the KAU led by Matiullah Khan. This is an organization that makes those who love top-down, formal security structures very nervous; but this is also an organization that makes the Taliban very nervous. MK is growing his own legitimacy among the people of Uruzgan and Kandahar province, spreading across tribal boundaries. Does he profit from this? Certainly. Though the ANP commander in Uurzgan province certainly profits more, and is far less committed to the enduring security and justice for the people of this province. This is MK's home, these are his people, and I do not exaggerate when I assess that if we lost the KAU through our arrogance it would probably require at least two BCTs to replace what they currently provide in terms of security effect.
The west must overcome its fear of militia-like organizations, and stop trying so hard to mirror image what may work in one part of the world onto another. After all, the security threats that exist in Afghanistan have defeated or serverely frustrated the greatest western military powers of the modern age, correct? Why, in what analysis, would one assume that a mini-me version of the same type of security force would be more successful against that same threat?
Because it is local? No, because the ANA is not developed or employed locally. It is as foreign of a force when recruited and trained in the north and employed in the south as any Western military is.
The key is to develop the grass roots security as well as the centralized and to effectively connect the two into a cogent system of security. I would also recommend an approach to the military that looked a whole lot more like the US National Guard (recuited, trained, and employed locally, with an understanding up front that active service is just for the crisis), than the US Active Army. But then that would smack too closely to being a militia...
Afghanistan has never had a large standing army. They can't afford one.
During Soviet times they had a rag tag for of around 300K with the same problems of desertion, pumped up numbers to scam payroll and massive indolence.
The flaw in the current "strategy" is that Afghanistan can neither build or sustain a 400,000 man security force. It is academic COIN doctrine not reality that drives that number. Afghanistan has always had a small useless formal army supported by regional militias. Some good, some useless but aligned by pay packet.
Those same units also calve off when a new paymaster shows up. So we are just creating nicely defined groups of armed men who will flip allegiances the day after their pay doesn't show up.
Quality not quantity in a highly mobile force is the solution.
Perhaps I was reading into this article but I got the overall "sense" that the authors see time as the most important aspect of our efforts in A'stan. We need time to root out corruption within the Afghan government....and society. We need time to grow ANSF, especially the police and the judicial system. We don't have a lot of time to do all of this, especially with the timeframe given to us by the POTUS.
A couple of points stuck out for me:
"We only add that if in fact NTM-A/ CSTC-A is the main effort, then it is puzzling why resources have not been forthcoming, especially in the form of authorizations for personnel." No kidding. I was there in '08 and would like to go back as an advisor...but no. We were told at Funston and Phoenix that A'stan at that time was short over 2500 advisors, yet it was like pulling teeth to move to an advisor team in the east or south, where the shortages were the most critical, nor could we extend our stay despite the oft-noted shortages. I'm told the situation is a bit better now with 4/82 there as a BCT-A (working along side 48th BCT) but given the "mandate" to significantly increase ANSF in the next 12-18 months, certainly more advisors will be needed. So why is it so difficult to get back over there and why aren't more BCT-As being sent there? Perhaps that is about to change.....?
If we are truly interested in rapidly increasing ANSF and reducing the amount of time it will take to do so, more advisors are needed there.
Second area of note......the authors (like many) advocate patience, persistence, and tenacity since "change will not occur overnight". They also point out that "local issues need to be addressed locally". Both of these ideas complement each other as working at the local level (the ink-spot thing) will require that we be very patient....lots of local areas to cover. If that is the case, how can we continue to expect relatively rapid improvements in A'stan's government and security forces (12-18 months?) when many (the authors, current and former advisors, regional experts) are saying the opposite...that this will take a decade or more...? Will our focus remain the central government in Kabul in an effort to push a western-style "quick fix" or will we actually shift our focus to the local "governments" in the villages and districts?
I'm curious to read what the other, more experienced SWJ posters add to this. Perhaps I'm way off on my thoughts....probably so.
A dear family friend recently died in Afghanistan. She was married to a South African in the security industry there. A brilliant woman, she was former mayor of a city in California's Silicon Valley, but after a trip to Afghanistan, she had come to love the place and found her husband there. Between her charitable women's activities, and her husband's profession (not a mercenary!) they had a very clear idea what is going on there.
She would often return to Silicon Valley and make local presentations to raise money for her charities. She said the problems of Afghanistan were four fold. Ranging from the least to the greatest they are
(4) there is a full-scale war going on in the eastern half of the country,
(3) the principal source of money in the country is drugs,
(2) the regional war lords are back. You can't travel anywhere without dealing with them.
(1) everything is corrupt, totally corrupt, from the president's brother to the cop on the corner.
I recorded one of her Afghanistan promotional speeches. Listen to it here
http://sep.stanford.edu/sep/jon/family/jos/memories/rosemary.html
"The west must overcome its fear of militia-like organizations, and stop trying so hard to mirror image what may work in one part of the world onto another. After all, the security threats that exist in Afghanistan have defeated or serverely frustrated the greatest western military powers of the modern age, correct?"
Sir,
If this is the case, and I believe it so, why are we there? Honestly, it seems like a case of wiping sh&t off of one leg and on to the other as my grandfather used to say. Are we to assume that these new militia leaders are less militant, more female empowerment friendly, and just all around better guys than the Taliban? It seems to me that we will just have a 90s redux, albeit with much better armed warlords. Not trying to sound snarky here, just genuinely curious. I know this forum is more for tactics than over strategy, but once again, what is the goal?
I agree with the above comments:
- need more advisers, and
- bottom-up is the way you have to do things
Unfortunately, I was disappointed in the seeming contradictions in this review. On the one hand it acknowledges at many points that everything is local and a centralized government is problematic. But it mainly recommends top-down solutions- with most of them being U.S.-centric and based on assumptions that could be alien to Afghanistan.
One thing I agreed with was when it mentioned that training must be linked to how the ANSF will be employed (i.e.- COIN). A sub-point to this is that they have to be prepped to operate at the level of support they are realistically going to get post 2011 and beyond. Bottom line, though, is that they must be set up to fight COIN vice "full-spectrum" or MCO. This may, however, not jive with the Afghan perception of their main threat. What to do then?
My main objections:
- IO is noted as a significant aspect of efforts instead of mainly an effect of our efforts.
- U.S.-centric language and concerns: "elites trumping national interests" (if we find a solution to that we need to export it to all other countries in the world!), eradicating "corruption", ethics training to judges, proper salary levels, good and honest leadership, rule of law, transparency- all of these ideas seem to assume that top-down efforts can solve these problems as opposed to bottom-up success LEADING to them developing (cart before the horse?).
Most of these ideas are very hard to make happen in a society that is unstable and heterogeneous without any kind of agreed-upon social contract that requires a uniform code of behavior.
- I am amazed that a military that is perceived as being mainly politically conservative continually advocates centralized-run economies as a key to success. This might be a result of a lack of economic knowledge among our officer corps- but it is curious nonetheless.
I would recommend simply concentrating on facilitating local infrastructure, small businesses, and growing cooperatives and local solutions and stop talking about economic development support and creating jobs, etc.
- Comments on corruption always puzzle me. What looks legal to some countries looks corrupt to others. In addition- do we have an assumption that we can stamp out corruption before the Afghans have a viable economic, judicial, and security system- or do those things have to grow together (corruption lessens as others become stronger- not from anti-corruption efforts in and of themselves)?
- And lastly- I view bureaucracies as systems that facilitate corruption in countries that have no social contract binding them to some sort of acceptable behavior. We are building a bureaucratic security and government apparatus thinking it will follow some form of alien rule of law and not do what bureaucracies normally do: provide certainty (read: create obstacles to change).
I'm amused that we take for granted it took hundreds of years and different traditions to arrive at where the U.S. is now- and that the same isn't required in other areas.
In conclusion- I think many of these ideas run counter to the systemic processes that have been in use in Afghanistan for ages. I'm not saying they aren't changeable- but I'm not so sure they will be changeable in the foreseeable future, result from the U.S. or others trying to get Afghans to change, or result from top-down efforts.
I left CSTC-A (working under a Polish BG in International Security Cooperation) in July 09 and was struck by how few names I recognized of the long list of interviewees. The US routinely bewails the short tenure of our NATO allies, but it is only the pot speaking to the slightly darker kettle; we lose our unity of effort because the team roster is always in flux. Another sad fact is that the development of the ANSF is hostage to the US budget cycle. We all understand the impetus to execute budget within our force; add to that the sums involved are eye-popping to the Afghans and everyone is incentivized to drive for short-term results in ways that would make a banker blush. I would like to (but can't) say the Afghans are party because they want their country to garner as much as possible before the US loses its attention again; I really believe that it is because they know that it is in the flow that opportunities arise to skim a share.
Lastly, I would opine that it was not just a lack of resources, but a lack of imagination that put us in this bind. We could have observed that there was no "industrial base" to train security forces in the Dari and Pashtun languages on a large scale; we could have worked with the contracted companies to build their capabilities (relationships like we have with high-tech weapons manufacturers) to work through a broad and long term training program. Rather we treated these trainers like a commodity readily available on the market and see no end to the inefficieny coming from cultural and language differences.