The leaders of one of the largest Pashtun tribes in a Taliban stronghold said Wednesday that they had agreed to support the American-backed government, battle insurgents and burn down the home of any Afghan who harbored Taliban guerrillas. Elders from the Shinwari tribe, which represents about 400,000 people in eastern Afghanistan, also pledged to send at least one military-age male in each family to the Afghan Army or the police in the event of a Taliban attack.
In exchange for their support, American commanders agreed to channel $1 million in development projects directly to the tribal leaders and bypass the local Afghan government, which is widely seen as corrupt. "The Taliban have been trying to destroy our tribe, and they are taking money from us, and they are taking our sons to fight," said Malik Niaz, a Shinwari elder. "If they defy us now, we will defeat them." The pact appears to be the first in which an entire Pashtun tribe has declared war on Taliban insurgents...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
Okay, on further reflection, we need to do this type of stuff. I just hope, HOPE, that the money is getting funneled towards development more efficiently than through the government channels. AND that said money is actually creating more stability, rather than increasing the power and prestige of tribal leaders who may or may not have the best interests of his tribesmen in mind.
Having experience relegated to a small area of Afghanistan, I'm interested in the "caveats" of this tribal engagement.
These Pashtun who have committed to this plan are from Eastern Afghanistan (the "kh" Pashtun). This was also the area where Maj Gant drew his experience for his tribal engagement proposal. Is anyone aware on how the Pashtun to the south (the "sh" Pashtun) view these tribal engagements?
I ask because much of the "Taliban" we've come to know and love in Kandahar and Helmand are linked to various degrees with the Southern Pashtun. In my time in Afghanistan, I noticed a persistant bias that Northerners (including eastern Pashtun ANA and translators) have regarding the Southerners I've lived amongst.
I am a fan of small scale engagments at low levels, although not necessarily always on a tribal level. Is this something that can be repeated in the south? If so, in what sort of way?
Some good comments, I'd like to add a few points:
"Experts": We've been growing a lot of "experts" lately who expect every other free thinking person to kneel to the superiority of their "expertness." Does three tours in Iraq make one an expert on COIN? On Iraq? Does having lived in Afghanistan for 20 years make one an expert on governance? On COIN? I caution that most of the problem sets we currently face require a very broad base of knowledge and experience, and that "expertise" in any one area is quite likely to render opinions that are highly biased by that particular focus. Better are the voices from those with a broad but significant background of training, education and experience that are relevant to a particular problem. I grew up in Oregon and am an "expert" on the culture there, but that does not make me the guy you should listen to for a concept on addressing unemployment in that state. Similarly with many experts on Afghanistan who suggest that makes them the right answer for addressing insurgency there. These things are a complex mix of disciplines.
Linking "Legitimate" and "Official" governance. This is a large aspect of what Special Forces does day in and day out in Afghanistan. Not to build a tribal solution to governance, nor to force a centralized solution of governance; but rather to be the bridge that links the two together. Passing legitimacy up to GIROA from below; and Passing Officialness down to tribal and village governance from above. This is the real key to the future in my opinion. But then I'm no expert...
The importance of Legitimacy vice effectiveness: I think JT makes an excellent point. Most people are not insurgents. Most people just want to get on with their lives, particularly in a country like Afghanistan where most people have very little contact with either the government or government services. It just doesn't affect them that much. So, would most of the populace settle for an effective, but illegitimate government? Yes. But you would still have insurgency.
The fact is that only a small percentage of the populace needs to actively participate in an insurgency for you to have a major drama on your hands. And if that small percentage is also well funded by Poppy -drug funds, they can hire all of the seasonal fighter help they need to keep a country like Afghanistan in chaos.
Again, I am no expert, but I believe it is a very dangerous proposition indeed to marginalize for the sake of convenience or the sake of Western perspectives, the importance of enabling the establishment of a legitimate government. By removing this critical causal factor one sweeps the proverbial legs out from under the insurgency hardcore. They'll still have the funding to hire fighters, but their message will fall on deaf ears, giving growing effectiveness of governance a chance to develop.
Start with the strategic basics, and build on that strong foundation. Legitimacy is the cornerstone, and right now that stone is sadly missing.
But as I said, I'm no expert.
Well, lone voice but not alone. You hit directly on many of the problems with this tribal engagement proposal--it is not tied to a strategy, it is not a whole-of-government approach, there is no buy-in by either the central government nor the Coalition Partners, it directly counters the MoI's (endorsed by Karzai) ultimate view for an end state for non-military security forces in AFG, who do you pick to engage with, and what happens when there are Afghan-Afghan confrontations? In a different operating environment it might be the way to go. In this operating environment it may be modified (to gain unity of effort) and still be the way to go. but I am not sure doing something just to do something is an acceptable approach.
Bob,
You captured the Catch 22, the national government is not legitimate, so COIN efforts in an effort to legitimize them will likely fail. Pursuing Gant's tribal empowerment (hardly a strategy) is guarunteed to undermine the central government, thus the concern and push back from the State Department. We have to have only "one" strategic objective for a whole of government approach, now we DOD and State pursuing different objectives that appear to be odds with one another. I would offer that tribes are important, but that social system is hardly locked in stone, and those who are truly experts in the region (not just an OEF-A rotation or two) have noted the evolution of the tribal structure over the years. In an area we both worked in, it is noted that the old tribal/clan structure is being rejected by the younger generation who would rather have a nationalist government, because they believe that serves their interests better than pursuing the tribal/clan system. Using the tribal system to mobilize masses to go after AQ makes sense (a tactical victory, but with no strategic end), but since the presence of AQ in Afghanistan is limited, what is the strategic end state of working with the tribes? Wouldn't it be better to allow the Afghan people to throw the inefficient government out of power in Kabul and work with whoever wins? Don't forget insurgency is a form of democracy. Gant's approach would have been great in 2002/03, but it seems we're going backwards at this point. Let's say it works and they defeat the Taliban, which may very well happen, what's next? Tribal conflict throughout the region? Who do we side with? Who does Pakistan side with? etc..... I think this needs to be thought through in more detail. You have more troops coming, you'll be able to extend the power of the central gov (corrupt or not) over much of the key areas, the wild frontiers will remain wild for years (I suspect). The only way the Taliban will make a come back is if the government of Pakistan provides external support. If we sign a treaty with Afghanistan before we pull our conventional force structure out of Afghanistan, any external support provided to insurgents can be construed as an act of war and we take the appropriate actions against Pakistan. I know I'm dreaming, but I just don't see where this tribal engagement is going to take us at this point in the game. I seem to the lone voice of dissent so far. Bill
I think we need to see the 'inside baseball' on this before any substantive comment can be made (i.e. the number and level of jirgas held that preceeded this announcement). I agree Jim, $1.2m is a collective drop in the bucket. The thing is, $1.2m can't be spread throughout a tribe of 400,000 people. So I guess I am suspicious of an 'agreement' being made based on that figure (as well as the timing of the story).
Mr. Jones - There is the legal (aka official) gov't and then there is traditional (aka legitimate) gov't. Dr Tom Johnson and others have several good papers out on this issue. However, my sense from preparing to deploy and speaking with those who recently returned, is that this is over-analyzed a bit. Yes, the rural Afghans do not accept the gov't. But this is the case more because of incompetence and corruption than legitimacy. If GIRoA could deliver governance, the rural Afghans would support it.
This calls for a real bottom up approach vs business as usual. It seems like we are shifting gears for this but I am skeptical of any real effect that can be take hold with the uncertainty of the political timeline set. The Taliban acknowledges that the US owns the watches but effectively counters that they own the time.
Mr. Jones,
Excellant post. I side with you. We need to "connect the dots" here. We need to do it quickly, as time is not on our side.
When you combined the events of the Shinwari tribe (which borders the Mohmand tribal area where my ODA conducted tribal engagement) and the events in Pakistan's tribal area...see here:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100102/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan
Along with the recent "cables" made public about the reliability of the Afghan central government...what are we waiting for?
Tribal engagement on a large scale is one of the only viable options we have left.
"It is possible to visualize a series of self-governing tribal units covering the whole length of the border, each possessing a clearly defined constitution, federated possibly under a central tribal body and maintaining ordered relations with a central and provincial government."
That was written in 1944 in a UK government report. A good friend of mine just read "The Savage Wars" and sent it to me.
As I (and many others) have been saying a "loose confederation of tribes" under their own system of "centralization." What does the model look like? Who knows. It is not in the Government 101 book.
What are the other options? Is the end-state a civil war - no matter what we do? How long will the ANA be able to stand up on their own without US support? Why support and try and build a system that is not working? Let's give the tribes and their "already in place" and "centuries old system" a shot.
There are many more opportunities like these out there. We just need to find them and get after it. It won't be pretty. But what we have right now isn't very pretty either.
The right four or five men could fly into that area and if it were the right guys, with the right passion and drive, who were willing to be with this tribe for the next three to five years...we would immediately gain "influence without authority" over 400,000 tribesman in a strategically important border region...all with very little manpower and resources. I read they got one million dollars. One million dollars? A drop in the bucket for their support. Now we should send men in who can train and fight, who want to be there, who believe in the mission and who can build long-lasting meaningful relationships that matter. The strategic objective in Afghanistan will only be met with tactical level relationship building.
Once again, Mr. Jones, great post. You have my vote.
STRENGTH AND HONOR
Jim Gant
To both GBNT and to BG I would offer one summary word of advice: "Caution"
All is not as it appears; be it from the perspective of sitting around a Shura room with a tribal leader; or sitting around the Cabinet table with the President. Where one sits does indeed shape where one stands.
Consider a couple of points that I think are critical when assessing such a concept as the one proposed above:
First: The difference between "Official" and "Legitimate" governance. Official governance is that recognized by law; but legitimacy of governance comes from the populace being governed. This can either be directly or more indirectly, so long as it is a source of legitimacy that the populace recognizes and endorses.
Second: The people of Afghanistan have spent the past 30-odd years under "Official" governments that lacked "Legitimacy." Under the Soviet era they had an official government that drew its legitimacy from Moscow. Under the Taliban era they had an official government that drew its legitimacy from Islamabad; under the U.S./NATO era they have an official government that draws its legitimacy from Washington.
Third: In Afghanistan Legitimacy comes from the bottom up. It comes up through three channels: Tribal; Village; and Religious. Any governance that does not draw its legitimacy from the bottom up through those three sources is not going to be a "Legitimate" government of Afghanistan. The process used to develop and elevate this legitimacy from the people up to the top is not through elections, but through a time-honored process of Shuras and Jirgas; culminating with the "Loya Jirga" that settles such national level issues and combines finally that which is "Legitimate" with that which is "Official."
Now, one can debate the relative merits and intentions of those various sources of external legitimacy over the past 30 years: Soviet, Pakistani, and American; but to the people of Afghanistan that is largely a moot point. All were "Official"; none were "Legitimate."
To pursue grassroots initiatives, tied to local legitimacy is a good idea. BUT, and this is a big but: No COIN effort in support of an illegitimate government is likely to prevail.
Until the senior leadership develops the understanding of this type of conflict; combined with the moral courage to act on that which is likely to actually work (which by its very definition will produce result that those same external senior leaders cannot and must not seek to control) one is really doomed to chasing one's tail in a long, drawn-out insurgency campaign.
It is critical in our pursuit to win the war on terror and the conflict in Afghanistan to minimize the risk of diluting our moral authority, internationally, as we prosecute our mission. History has shown(South Vietnam/Iran in the 50's), that nations who at times provide "incentives" to those questionable factions which support it during conflicts can and have become something which represents the complete opposite of the morals and dignity upon which this country was founded. Essentially we turn a blind eye to 'some' atrocities of our 'incentive driven ally' in order to gain the 'ends' we want to achieve overall.
We need to be careful and mindful of types of funding and assistance which goes to support entities who openly threaten its own citizen brothers, i.e. burning down Afghan homes that harbor Taliban guerrillas. Is this the kind of legacy we want to create within Afghanistan--protection of one faction over another? Identifying those homes sympathetic to the Taliban and finding the root cause of that support would be the start--not alienating some of the population while protecting the other.
I would argue this approach might find ourselves back in the country years from now trying to reconstruct relationships.
We (US military in AFG) need to jump on this and get US AID to come along. This tribe needs to be made a positive example, once an decent investigation is made of the background of reasons why they would do this. Once the other tribes see how advantaged they are, others will follow. However, the tribe cannot and should not be directly advantaged by the US, or percevied to be that way. The markets with which they interface must tip their way, the infrastructure contracts must slowly increase, their direct access to other markets and power centers must emerge. A school or two must pop up, with others in the works. And their leaders and relationships must be protected. That is a great mission for a constabulary force, advised by Americans. A great task org would be an SF ODB (3x SFODAs (depending upon terrain/time-distance and social segments within the tribe, a 1-2 light infantry companies with trucks, a CAT-B with 3x -As, an HTT and 5x conventional CI/HUMINT teams. Oh, and 5x Contracting Officers and CO Representatives. This is the jump-start to the Gant Concept.