Tribal Engagement: A Silver Bullet?

As we continue to debate what the "best" approach is for achieving victory in Afghanistan, I believe we have started on a major fallacy. This fallacy is the belief that ungoverned areas, mostly within failing or failed states, represent a grave threat to the security of the US. What I suggest is that we ask ourselves, what risks will the US assume by leaving Afghanistan in its current condition without any further US intervention. We can debate later on what other elements of DIME, other than the US military, the US can contribute in future blogs. But ultimately, whether its a tribal answer, a truly democratic central Afghan government, or a Taliban government, there will always be ungoverned areas within Afghanistan. What are the strategic risks, that an Afghanistan with ungoverned areas, pose to the US? I would argue very few if any. No foreseeable and credible conventional or unconventional threat can emerge from Afghanistan. The only foreseeable future of Afghanistan, in my opinion, is a moneypit type scenario. We can build ANA,ANP, tribal militias, concerned local nationals, you name it, but they all have a common denominator. All will have to be resourced, primarily monetarily, by the US in order to continue to exist. There is no long term economic apparatus being developed for Afghanistan that will be able to fund long term security forces. I'm as proud as any solider, and have 5 tours in Iraq. But looking from the outside, having never served in Afghanistan, I see a policy of "pride" keeping us in Afghanistan.

The views expressed above are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government.

Dirk Smith
MAJ,SF
Student: CGSC- Ft. Belvoir

Here is a link to Dan Green's article <i><a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/going-tribal-enlisting-afghani… Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes</a></i>.

Major Gant's approach is but one of many contemplated for the tribes of Afghanistan. Dan Green's article in Special Warfare Magazine titled "Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes" might provide a more sustainable and realistic approach to working with the tribes as a basis for slowly building the Afghan state in the countryside.

MAJ Springer:

What MAJ Gant is proposing has hands and feet in the history of SF operations dating back to VN where the SF led and advised CIDG program had approx. 50-60K CIDG fighters at any given time.

This did not include the Mobile Strike
Forces Command with another 3-5K which ran their own ops and were also QRF for the CIDG A Teams as well as QRF for big Army especially the 1st Cav.

He is leading the way back too being a true advisor and the associated risks of being in a small team in a hostile environment where your back is being covered by someone other than an American and sometimes wearing helmuts and body armor is totally optional.

I was on a A Team that took over 800 rounds a day from the NVA and never wore a helmut or armor-we never had any. I have as a SGT led a Cambodian CIDG BN against a full strength NVA Regt to distract them from a 1st Cav BN in War Zone C in order for them to escape a major ambush costing me over 100 KIA-I asked them as an advisor to attack and they did and why because I ate, slept, fought with them, drank with them at their celebrations, learnt their language and played with their children--but when I needed Cobras from "Gerry Owens" I got everything I ever needed.

MAJ Gant is in fact totally correct in his assessment of the tribes--trust your own instincts as I think you really do get it.

I would like to start with a disclaimer; I have not served in Afghanistan and only view it through the lens of 2 tours in Iraq and my thesis that studies the Anbar Awakening. The dynamic of Anbar are not the same as those in Afghanistan, but there are lessons to be learned from the Anbar Awakening that could be applied in Afghanistan.
The vast majority of insurgents in both countries are native to the areas they operate. Their issues are largely based on control and conditions at the local level. Each has an Islamist part (AQ, Taliban) that has united the two groups based on a common threat posed by the US and their respective governments. The two groups, home grown insurgents and Islamist, must be treated differently. The homegrown insurgents dissatisfied with their government or the US are reconcilable; however the Islamist are not. Winning is not about defeating the Islamist, but about winning the legitimacy and influence of the populations. Without access to the mobilizing structures of the population, the Islamist are isolated and can be subjected to legitimate discriminate targeting. To use Maos terms, dry up the sea the insurgents so freely swim in.
How do you separate the reconcilers from the irreconcilable? To start, never allow the actions of the counterinsurgent to unite the two groups. Understand what untied the two groups and where natural fault lines exist. In Iraq, AQI displaced the tribal sheikhs as the node of influence in their society and implemented their own control mechanisms over the tribes. As time passed the population grew tired of the Islamist ideology and increasing control over the daily aspects of their lives. The tribal sheikhs, seeing their control of the tribes being subverted approached the U.S. for assistance. The U.S. capitalized on the opportunity and began to re-empower the tribal leaders. Resources began to flow into to the tribes in a culturally consistent manner (though the sheikhs). This increased his Wasta within the tribe. To remain the belly button we were going to push, he had to operate in manner that was consistent with our goals and objectives. With the additional resources were also initiatives to provide the tribes with a security apparatus to counter AQI coercion (tribal based security forces). He now had the means and ways to counter the AQI influence. When given the choice of AQI or the tribal leaders, the people chose the tribal leaders. Over the course of several months an estimated 110,000 Sunni insurgents and sympathizers changed sides. What was left was a couple thousand Islamist without the human terrain needed to survive. The tribal security forces and US forces, armed with excellent sources of intelligence were able to quickly defeat (discriminately) the AQI elements.
That is an oversimplified account of the details and there were many other factors, but what is clear is (1) we made the tribes a stakeholder in the future of their areas and (2) it was done by empowering and enabling at the local level as opposed to trying to extend the reach of the central government.
Similar conditions exist in Afghanistan; the jirgas have been displaced as the traditional node of influence in their society by the radical mullahs. Empower the jirgas by channeling resources through them. Assist them in their security through community defense initiatives. Control the nodes of influence and you by extension control the population. Develop governance at the local level and intermediate levels to meet the central government. When given a viable option to the Taliban and the Islamist, the locals will follow the jirgas. What will be left are the irreconcilables that can be subjected to discriminate, legitimate targeting. Introduce the resources for solution that comes from the bottom up because that is where the insurgency is drawing its problem.

In Afghanistan, "re-empowering the village councils of elders and restoring their community leadership is the only way to re-create the traditional check against the powerful political network of rural mullahs, who have been radicalized by the Taliban"

Tom Johnson

Anonymous- you're over thinking.... Sitting Bull lives in the valley, or lowlands. The highlanders live in the mountains.

Infanteer- there you go with the word "tribal." Some might say those small-scale systems in every village and district with its own little patchwork of local governance structures are indeed tribes...or at least mini-tribes. Or maybe it's like a neighborhood watch program working closely with the town police. Or maybe it's like the burrows in New York City. Each burrow contains a different ethnic group and they have a couple of cops that live there and keep the peace between folks from the other burrows. The police in the burrows, in turn, work closely with the NY City police. Voila!! Law and Order. Tomato, Toe-ma-toe.

Casey Yourk - I am fishing here: please explain to me who these "highlanders" are/were in a more anthropological and historical sense?

GBNT - "The primary, urgent struggle now is to understand the South Asian political market economy." We are a little late in the game wouldn't you say? I would further point-out the qualified civilian backfill doesn't seem to be forthcoming.

Make no mistake about it, I want us to be successful in Afganistan, but I am becoming rather guarded in my prognosis.

Thank you Gentlemen

First let me say that nothing unfortunate came out of MAJ Gant "picking sides." Sitting Bull and the highlanders made a truce without a single shot fired. There's always someone trying to over think his work, trying to make him out to be a rogue warrior. If you were in Afghanistan in the 2001-2004 time frame, think back to the number of troops on the ground, the number of HQs on the ground, the number of allied troops, the mission...it was a different place. All the ODAs had some degree of autonomy. What they did with that autonomy only they can say. But autonomy does not a rogue warrior make. The battlefield is an ever changing, fluid environment that requires constant maintenance and innovative solutions. The Tribal concept appears to upset some folks because it seems there are no longer any "tribes." Semantics my friends. You can call it anything you'd like; tribe, villager, qawn, conglomerate of Afghans, Pashtun peeps, whatever. MAJ Gant's TET proposal is the concept that solidarity and governance should start at the very bottom with the tribes. Without the support of the commons, the intermediate and national governments will not work. Let's not forget he specifically stated this could work in the Southern and Eastern Pashtun provinces. He acknowledges it wouldn't work everywhere. But let me remind you that MAJ Gant's paper is based on his personal experience with the Mohmand Tribe. He did it and he was extremely successful and he and his ODA left Sitting Bull and his tribe with a great impression of Americans. This was evidenced by the great relationship that CPT Harrison was able to establish with Sitting Bull in 2007 and continue again in 2009 (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/2010/01/gifts-of-honor-a-tale-of-two-c…). The Afghan campaign has many levels from strategic down to tactical. Each level must be worked simultaneously in order to have the desired effect; a legitimate national government with legitimate branches down to the "neighborhood" level, if you will. MAJ Gant is saying he's the guy to do it at the tactical level. The other programs currently under way are at the intermediate and national levels; AP3, CDI, LDI, all of which are very important pieces of this complex puzzle. Everyone from the President, to the Ambassador, to the Generals down to the foot soldier, from every allied nation on the ground, is doing the best that they can. The fact that MAJ Gants paper has had such a profound affect at the national and strategic levels only means that we're all looking for a way to leave Afghanistan in a place of peaceful and prosperous sovereignty.

I feel there is also some oversimplification here. A traditional tribe may in fact be broken down into competing factions due to old squabbles, unresolved legal claims, and just plain ordinary differing everyday concerns that ddiffer from eachother.
If not careful, we could find ourselves empowering one faction over another, though they all belong to the same "traditional" tribe.

In fact, if I'm not mistaken, Gant describes throwing-in with one bunch over another thereby picking sides - something I don't think is our place to do.