Abstract:
The Taliban have managed to expand their political and military influence every year for the last five years, and if this trend is not stopped and ultimately reversed, the government of Afghanistan will likely collapse. While there is not one solution for victory in Afghanistan, some counterinsurgency precepts are more critical than others. This thesis examines and explains why legitimate police are vital to defeating the Taliban insurgency. Additionally, this thesis identifies and seeks to validate two key recommendations for improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan National Police. First, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) need to make the Afghan National Police their number one priority for resources and manpower. Second, the Afghan National Police must be fundamentally restructured in accordance with traditional and cultural precepts to meet the needs of rural Afghan communities. Tailoring police reform to meet the needs of rural Afghans can reverse the Taliban's influence and legitimacy in Afghanistan's critical periphery.
The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution
Comments
Bellow are some perspectives to the thesis. They come from a Pakistani Infantry officer who is a graduate of NPS and currently working as an instructor in Pakistan's Staff College.
"It is an excellent thesis; and despite my ability, so typical of all instructors here at Staff College, i could rarely find many disconnects. I guess this is because of your know-how about Afghanistan and its people - 4 deployment trips (if i am not wrong) is considerable time.
Once you wrote down this thesis there wasn't much in air about reconciliation. Now the things have changed a bit. Previously, the US was apprehensive about Talibans, they being pushtun. You have rightly written that majority of Afghans have not forgotten Taliban oppression but you forgot that majority of Talibans have not forgotten Northern Alliance. The central government in Afghanistan is suppose to have majority of pushtuns, but, it has others. Till the time the central government regains the rt proportion, it is very difficult that agencies like police working under them will ever improve.
Your suggestion of having a bottom-up police organization is good and gives a different prespective on the subject. The question is - will it be possible? You yourself have highlighted problems in this regard. Police, since long in Afghanistan, has never been looked at an agency working or serving the people, it serves the warlords. Besides, in most of the cases police itself is not safe and secure.
30 years of war is a long time. Afghanistan now has a younger generation, which has seen civil war. You will seldom find an educated Afghan. They prefer to term themselves jihadis, because that's what they can do the best. The society the US is trying to build has no room for such people, so they are oppose to it. No matter what the US may say, they find no future in peace. So does that mean Afghanistan is a lost case? No.
You, in your thesis, have drawn an excellent analogy of present day Afghanistan with the "Wild West". Communities need to select and sanction police. I believe, as you have written, that the US Sheriff model can work in Afghanistan. The only problem is, the US wants a strong central government in Afghanistan, which is tangent to your police reform setup.
Lastly, a word about corruption. I could not find satisfying answer to this problem in your thesis. Collective accountability will only work when the top is corruption free.
I enjoyed reading your work. Why don't you condense its text and write some article on the subject?"
He has some interesting insights.
Respectfully,
David H
A well researched primer on police in AFG. And the distinction between the influence of the community (as opposed to the "tribe") is important.
And if the 30+K villages all existed in bubble universes it might work. Unfortunately, very few of them do--although some in the East might qualify.
Some problems I see with this proposal:
-- What happens when there is a dispute between villages? Do the police keep the peace and risk "ostracization" or do they fight for "their' community?
-- If the community accepts an honor killing or rape as justified, do the police as well, or do they risk "ostracization"?
-- There is no role for the governors, yet the more you disempower the central government, the more important and influential they can be.
-- "Many will argue that if local communities select their own police, the police will be more loyal to the community than to the entral government. This is a valid argument,but even in the U.S. a local sheriff adheres to federal laws, yet is loyal to the community he or she serves". And this applies to a country as different from the US as AFG exactly how?
-- "However, police who are educated and well versed in Islam can thwart the Taliban and actually bring the people closer to the government." Given the figures cited concerning the education and literacy level of the members of the ANP, exactly how could this be achieved?
-- In such a decentralized system, who determines promotions, training opportunities, equipment assignment priorities, and all the other things the MOI does, if it has no control over the personnel?
And the list can go on.
Regards to all.
Mint Condition LT,
In response to your point of what is their incentive, I would say their incentive should be to protect their homeland, not pay. Therefore I am not a strong believer in such a formal local ANP officer, but simply arming the locals so that they can protect themselves. How the locals decide to handle security would be up to them. Their relationships with neighbouring tribes and Kabul/Afghan government would be up to them.
A great idea but very difficult to implement. It all comes down to the incentives for being a loyal and professional ANP officer. What's in it for them? Have to look at it from a young Afghan male's point of view. When you're not getting paid regularly but are getting attacked all the time, it's hard to justify working like that from any point of view.
The US has done a bottom-up sort COIN response that focused on local security, most recently in Vietnam. US Army Special Forces involved itself with the Montagnards and other minorities beginning in 1961 (and SF veterans have even assisted the relocation to North Carolina of Montagnard survivors of Vietnamese assimilation/cultural genocide). What became the Civilian Irregular Defense Program (CIDG) lasted throughout almost the entire period of US involvement. Everything from fortified camps on the RVN's borders to hamlet defense and area development centers and even including battalion-sized reaction forces grew out of the SF-Montagnard partnerships.
The USMC used volunteer squads of marines to train local forces at the hamlet- and village- level in what became the Combined Action Program (CAP). The marine presence at this level enabled some pacification success in I Corps beginning in late 1965 and lasting until 1970 that otherwise might not have been possible.
Bottom-up COIN has been a strategic rarity, though, despite it being a historical continuity (Indian Scouts, Philippine Scouts, the Haitian Constabulary, etc). Rarely has success at these tactical and operational echelons become part of larger strategy.
It takes "special" folks to spend such intimate and sustained time among the indigenous populations, to say nothing of the language and other cultural challenges. There have been numerous institutional barriers to selecting or allowing volunteering of the best or most curious even for advisory duty. Little of the tacit knowledge of such advisors and leaders has become explicit in either the army or the marines.
The failure is not merely a military one, though, since the pacification plug in is almost exclusively the responsibility of the Department of State. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) came as big a surprise to the DOS as they did to the military. Once again manning and training, such as it was, was catch as catch can.
I like this strategy, or any that are based on enabling local groups of people to handle their own security. Are we afraid of doing this?
I see a lot of potential upsides to this strategy.
The players in this conflict would change. The conflict would change from being the Taliban fighting the US/NATO/Afghan government, to Taliban fighting the Afghan people.
We can send much of our military home, since we will no longer be doing security.
Our military presence will be much smaller and less visible. This will give less incentive for Afghans to join fight against us.
We will be supporting locals more, and less Afghan central government, and so we are not creating something that Afghans will be resistant to.
Our military is much less of a target.
We will save lives, health, time, and morale of our soldiers.
We will have less opportunity to accidentally kill Afghans.
There will be less pressure on finishing the conflict in a given time frame.
Arming local populations can be done quickly once they are identified.
Unlike the ANA or ANP, local populations do not require payment or upkeep for their services.
The US military can stop swating flies, and spend more time and effort on the bigger threats.
If the Taliban ever get to be a big enough threat, or even some of the people we arm turn on us, we can always destroy them quickly with air power. Remember how quickly the Taliban were decimated when they were fighting a conventional war against a US backed Northern Alliance.
Also, I would like the US military to go back to fighting where we do not give the enemy much of a chance to touch us. We use our air power, superior intelligence, and quick powerful strike capability. I think a military that focuses on these aspects rather than policing ultimately is one that is best to defend our nation.
So why don't we do this kind of strategy? Does it not fit with our end goal? Is it fear of arming people that could someday turn on us? Is it fear of giving up control of shaping Afghanistan's future?