The Pentagon is revamping the way it deploys troops to Afghanistan, putting in place a new system that will return units to the same parts of the country so they can develop better regional expertise and closer relationships with local Afghan power brokers.Senior military officials say the "Campaign Continuity" initiative will determine the specific provinces and regions where many of the 30,000 soldiers and Marines who are being sent to Afghanistan as part of the Obama administration's retooled war strategy will end up serving.
The plan represents a significant change for the military, which has long rotated its combat forces through both Afghanistan and Iraq...
More at The Wall Street Journal.
Comments
Jackalope,
Thanks for the input and situational awareness.
I'm a 123 DLAB guy (from 1997.....score may be lower these days....damn light beer), have already served as a ETT in A'stan, and am willing to serve there as an advisor again, extended deployment if necessary.
Not sure how the slotting things works. I just thought it would be fairly easy to go where the war is happenning, especially given my background. Apparently not.
Morgan
There's a number of things that might prevent you from getting on one; some branches just don't have the "slots" for what you want. Demand is obviously with the Afghan ones right now too. There was also a second order effect created when the powers that be asked how many folks have deployed, creating the necessity for low density fa's and such to start jamming their guys in. That's a whole nuther discussion.
As for afpak hands, you nailed the issue as I see it. I'm not sure why they didn't juice the pot with places like Tampa or Miami. No one is going to want to volunteer if they lay Bragg and Drum out there on the table.
And Mike's right, we have been jamming good folks for a while. And yes, I do believe that a four month head start in an immersive educational environment beats tromping around villages. Unless you are a 145 dlab guy, you need the time. This based on my experience watching folks move through the language courses at Bragg. That being said, another four months of TDY ends up making life just that much harder.
I've tried to look at these solutions objectively. In one sense, eight plus years into this war, we're finally making positive steps of reform on both the intelligence, operational, and rotation cycle level. We're starting to define the problem set which is a good thing. On the other hand, as other commentators here have stated, "good idea, bad execution."
So what will make good execution, another 8 years of war? When do we as an institution (military) quit giving excuses on why we can't change? I don't know the answer, and I'm increasingly leary to consider if it's worth my time to ask or write about it.
To dovetail Morgan who is similarly like-minded, what is the bureacracy's answer to "the right guys" that volunteer? Do they really need to attend a short school in Monterey or DC to get to a 1/1 language proficiency or can that be obtained in country through the immersion of day-to-day life on the village level? What about their families? Keep in mind, the right guy, at this point in time, has sacrificed a good portion of the last decade in service to the nation.
Just some things to consider.
v/r
Mike
Jackalope,
Question.....why is it so difficult to volunteer for advisor duty (AAB) in Afghanistan? I've been screaming to go back there as an advisor but I get sent to a AAB getting ready to head to Iraq. At least I'm deploying as an advisor, not a staff guy.
One more.....regarding AfPak hands......sounds like a great program but the choices of CONUS assignments doesn't sound too appealing. Are there any other CONUS locations one can remain at while participating in the program?
As a member of the much loved HRC team in VA, I've been able to see the +/- up close and personal.
The long and the short of it is really, good concept and bad execution for a variety of different reasons. The Army hasn't decided on "hubs" yet which has made recruiting a nightmare.
"Yes, I would like to volunteer and BTW, where does my family move when I get back?"
"Uh, yeah, we're not sure"
So we got that going for us.
The second issue is just simply being tapped out. The schlitz has run out really so getting the "right" guy is where we start but where we finish is "whoever we can get".
The idea though I believe is sound; 42 months in the program, language training and a centralized hub where you work on the same region when you are back conus.
This is something my peers and I have been discussing for a few years now. I firmly believe that this is a step in the right direction, but I'm not sure if adopting the Regimental system would necessarily be the right answer. Yes, we definitely need an answer to ARFORGEN nightmare that the most of us are dealing with, ensuring real continuity at the Soldier level. As for the Regimental suggestion, we're just too big to adopt a system like that. It make some sense for the current COIN-centric fight, but once we enter the next realm on conflict, it's value would taper off.
My hat is off to those who made the decision to have units return to the same operating environment. Sounds a bit AFPAK-Handsesque!
realizing its only a drop in the vast bucket of soldiers, but, as the article references, the Afghan Hand Program is supposed to provide the core of this continuity; the right people at the right place with the language skills to provide the personnel continuity outside of unit rotation. For better or worse, its been referred to as the 'East India Company' model by more than a few people higher up the chain. People in the program fill a specific position that they rotate in/out of over the length of time that they're in the program. With a port/starboard of 2 to 3 people per in-theater billet, there will be a continuous face to the Afghan partners. It seems a modification of the Afghan Hand model is being adopted by standard units as well. To me it makes perfect sense.
Well that certainly briefs well, but unless we adopt a regimental system similar to the Brits, the personnel turnover within the units will negate any positive impact on the situation in Afghanistan. Just because the unit goes back to the same area, does not mean the same Soldiers, especially not leaders who have an even greater turnover rate, are returning to that area.