You are probably already familiar with the Wikileaks-edited video released April 5 of the 2007 airstrike in which a number of people were killed, including armed and unarmed men as well as two employees of the news agency Reuters. As of this writing, the initial instance of the edited version of the video titled "Collateral Murder" on YouTube is over 5 million views, not including reposts of the video by others using different YouTube accounts, and, according to The New York Times, "hundreds of times in television news reports." An unedited and not subtitled version upload by Wikileaks to YouTube, in contrast, has less 630,000, reflecting the lack of promotion of this version.
This video represents the advantages and disadvantages of social media in that highly influential content is easily propagated for global consumption. The persistency provided by the Internet means it will always be available and easily repurposed. Further, this situation highlights the ability to suppress unwanted information, both by the propagandist (omission of information) and by the supporter (removing an adversarial perspective). Lastly, the official response to this video shows the Defense Department still has a long way to go in understanding and operating in this new global information environment.
This video is, on its face and in depth, inflammatory and goes well beyond investigative journalism and creating transparency. It has launched debates about the legality of the attacks and questions of whether war crimes were committed. The video, as edited, titled, and subtitled is disturbing. It will continue to get substantial use in debates over Iraq, the US military, and US foreign policy in general...
Much more at MountainRunner.
Comments
Ken, I disagree. This is a combat action and therefore falls under the reponsibility of the Combat Commander. Passing this back to the services usually results in a PR nightmare...eg Haditha. The Combat Commanders need to justify these incidents with the Rules of War...passing it back to the Services creates the preception that these incidents should be look at using the Rules of Law.
Good and accurate article by Matt for which he deserves the thanks of many.
Just as old lessons learned about how to fight the wars like Afghanistan and Iraq were deliberately buried by some in DoD, it appears the senior leadership there has also forgotten that failure to respond to a 'minor' PR problem <i>always</i> creates a public affairs disaster...
Actually, this one isn't DoD's unless they got stupid and deterred or delayed the Army from responding -- it's the Army's to answer.
What I am struggling with is that when these incidents happen (and we know they are going to happen), we seem to throw gas on the fire. I think the US military are the best in to world at preventing civilians deaths but we do not fight the information or PR battle well, in fact, we seem to walk into these things like a blind man walking into a L-shaped ambush. Sec Gates just came out this weekend with a comment on the incident saying it was OK. TooLate! Damage done, the preception is we have a free murder zone in Iraq. The Combat Commander is closest to these incidents, he has the "military necessity" authority, but dispite the brusing they continue to keep their heads in the sand.
<b>PolarBear1605:</b>
No problem, we can disagree. Based on history and performance, I personally wouldn't trust CentCom to get much of anything right. Add to that I'm genetically opposed to DoD's approach to Public affairs.
My point is that regardless of the chain of command, the Army is the owner of the element involved and it is the Army, not DoD, much less CentCom, that will be 'responsible' in the eyes of the public and the relatively ignorant media.
A secondary point I made was that the overweening bureaucracy of all the above has caused excessive delay in responding due to I suspect arcane argument about <i>how or whether</i> to respond...
I'm still struggling to think this through in its broader context. The fact is, the "gotcha" mentality is the dominating chracteristic of our time. Whether the pervasiveness of trash talking in sports or the dominance of attack ads in political campaigns, it is everywhere. This is simply one more manifestation of it.
Seems to me there are two possible implications. We all know the best outcome would be for leadership to prevent things like this video or Abu Gharib. But that ain't gonna happen. So we can either simply address abuses when they come up and solider on without allowing the "gotcha" to paralyze us, or we can adjust our strategy to minimize "gotachas." Which means little or no involvement in complex counterinsurgencies which, by definition, are rife with actions that can be translated into "gotchas."
<b>Steve Metz:</b>
You hit two of my pet rocks:
We train better than we ever have -- we are still far from "good enough."
Complex or even simple counterinsurgencies can and should be avoided as the costs rarely if ever justify the 'benefits.'
The electoral cycle, governmental structure and the politics of this nation are inimical to such operations which invariably are costly, lengthy and problematic. Add to that American public acceptance of military operations that are obviously speedy and successful and our Forces penchant for offensive action. There are a host of reasons we should not be playing to the strengths of our opponents -- which is exactly what is entailed in getting involved with an insurgency...
Better intelligence and effective 'global scouting,' along with stronger, better funded and more forthright diplomacy with less DoD involvement, enhanced and effective US Aid and information operations plus the ability to conduct strategic raids with ground forces can and will easily preclude most if not all such engagements.
Steve Metz:
You make the statement "We all know the best outcome would be for leadership to prevent things like this video or Abu Gharib. But that ain't gonna happen." Two points. First, in Abu Gharib there was a response including an investigation and the semblance of action being taken to punish the responsible parties including leadership. That does not seem to have happened here. While those actions may have prolonged the agony (as opposed to the 'lets ignore it and it will go away philosophy" it provided the impression that the DoD would take responsibility for its actual or perceived mistakes. Second. I do not believe that this incident was inevitably "gonna happen". I normally dont like to second guess guys on the ground, but I have to agree with Ken White that this would have been better handled with ground pounders. The guys in the air had contact and there was no immediate threat. I see this as more of a command emphasis on aggressive action and instant solutions. Relatively speaking this incident happened a long time ago in a different era of the war.
At Last!
http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=58731
Gates expressed frustration that investigations that get the full story of what happened can take weeks or months, while the damage that results from these incidents is immediate.
"But lets also face the reality," the secretary said. "We are in a war. And our adversaries, the Taliban, mingle with civilians, they use civilians, they purposely put civilians in Afghanistan in harms way. And I think we had better not forget that reality as well."