... two other items serve as anecdotal illustrations of what I've previously flagged as another consequence of COIN-centric thinking, namely, the decline not so much of conventional warfare, as has often been posited, but of armor, in particular, as a central pillar of ground operations. According to Jean-Dominique Merchet, as part of a budget-induced reorganization of its armored regiments, the French army will be reducing some from four to three squadrons of AMX 10 RC light tanks. Meanwhile, Ajai Shukla reports that following successful tests against the Russian T-90, the Indian army will be increasing its orders of the indigenously produced Arjun main battle tank.
The contrast illustrates the kinds of environments in which tank commanders enjoy promising career perspectives. India and Pakistan seem like obvious bull markets, as does Russia. (Georgia, too, although the career perspective is somewhat mitigated by the less-promising outlook for life expectancy). But I'm not so sure the same holds for Western Europe or the U.S. Again, that's not to say that we no longer need to prepare for conventional war with a nation-state, but rather that even in the conventional wars we're most likely to fight, massive armored formations are unlikely to play a role...
More at World Politics Review.
Comments
Even if rumors of Armor's demise are, in Mark Twain's words, "greatly exaggerated," COL Gentile has contributed importantly to a debate that needs to occur. There is plenty to be concerned about regarding the future of Armor.
It is certainly true that there are issues in Armor and combined arms training. Many officers and some units have not experienced the kind of training for major combat operations that they need. But the Army leadership is well aware of the problem and are actively trying to remedy them - with mixed success to be sure.
The deeper problem, however, is one of strategic communications. Too many at the Pentagon and in the Army simply do not appreciate the need for Armor across the "full spectrum." HBCTs fit neatly into the "Fulda Gap" box, and COIN/Stability Ops are for IBCTs, or maybe SBCTs. As pressure to reduce defense spending grows in the next decade, as it surely will, Armor may be the bill payer.
And....it remains to be seen whether the MCoE, which might be dominated by a light infantry culture, will be an effective proponent for Armor.
DOD and the Army will need to be reminded about Armor's contribution to OIF (the Thunder Run, the 2008 fight in Sadr City, the fact that nearly all IBCTs received heavy unit attachments). We will need to talk about the Israeli experience in Lebanon and Gaza.
The Army should be embarrassed that the Marines first received the Assault Breaching Vehicle and are using if effectively in Afghanistanwhen the Army has been very slow to deploy any type of armor there (even the Canadians did).
Armor may not yet be dead...but the future is cloudy.
Matt T:
The Lyall/Wilson piece is spurious and uses flawed case studies to support itself. I have a pending response in a peer-reviewed journal with a co author that should be out this summer rebutting many of their claims.
BLUF, correlation without causation, dangerous conclusions, everything that is wrong with large-N studies in the security studies field.
For some discussions of the points see these threads in the council: (many pages but read it all, thesis is addressed very well)
The Lyall-Wilson piece is flawed because it assumes that armies that are built on combined arms competencies with at least a part of its balance being toward mechanized, armor forces makes such armies prone to fail in irregular warfare.
History does not support this, at all.
What is more worrisome is that this fetish with light infantry and the promise of it winning hearts and minds in the world's troubled spots has caused the American Army to feel guilty about firepower. Firepower nowadays in the American Army has become a dirty word. Moreover and as a result of this degradation of firepower has been the preposterous notion put forward by advocates of the "whole of government approach" that combined arms, mechanized warfare is simple and easy to do, you know, the "undergraduate level of war" quip.
It was not the machine and firepower that lost the war for the United States in Vietnam. It was lost because the United States failed at strategy and more importantly the other side--the enemy--wanted victory more. Too, it was not the machine that caused Iraq to turn out the way it did until rescued by the Surge, yet again a failure of strategy and policy.
So why all of this talk about "rage"?
If we are talking about "rage" I would rather listen to what Zack De la Rocha has to say about it.
gian
Okay, some facts
Bobby -- it's doggone clear their reasons for disembed are spurious. (Among other things.) So part is factual, and part is gut instinct. Paul -- had to kindly decline several offers from British lately. Very much like covering Brits but it's too expensive in time/resources/opportunity to continue to let US/UK slit embeds wide open. I wanted to go back to Mt. Everest this year (April best month for what I wanted to do) but stayed with troops instead. Then McChrystal's staff killed embed and lied that it's about overcrowding. Brits did something similar. Time to reduce any direct work with military. I'll cover the war because it's important to US/UK and I don't trust media/McChrystal/Washington/London. Grunts will tell you the truth.
Michael
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III did a study of insurgencies from 1800-2005 and find that modern "force structures" interfere with local intelligence gathering that is critical to successful COIN ops. In particular, they ascribe this to mechanization of forces and lessened dependence on the dismounted infantry soldier.
Their measure, however, isn't confined to armor/tanks. They take a broad brush look at ratio of troops to vehicles.
Not sure that I'm qualified to speak on this, other than pointing out the linkage between the armor discussions and the Lyall/Wilson piece (http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jml27/YaleWebsite/Research_files/Rage_Final.p…).
SWJED here. Big, your comment here is obviously deleted. It had absolutely nothing to do with the balance between irregular warfare and conventional operations or the future of our nations armor capabilities. Instead it was an ad hominem attack on General McChrystal via (and one of our SWJ contributing authors) Michael Yon. That is not acceptable here.