Update:
Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24 - Colonel Gian P. Gentile
The principles of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) have become transcendent in the U.S. Army and other parts of the greater Defense Establishment. Concepts such as population security, nationbuilding, and living among the people to win their hearts and minds were first injected into the Army with the publication of the vaunted Field Manual (FM) 3--24, Counterinsurgency, in December 2006. Unfortunately, the Army was so busy fighting two wars that the new doctrine was written and implemented and came to dominate how the Army thinks about war without a serious professional and public debate over its efficacy, practicality, and utility...
Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24 - Dr. John A. Nagl
In late 2005, then--Lieutenant General David Petraeus was appointed to lead the Army's Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After two high-profile tours in Iraq, the posting to Fort Leavenworth was no one's idea of a promotion; the dominant local industry is prisons. But to his credit, General Petraeus recognized that this supposedly backwater assignment presented an opportunity to help revamp the Army's vision of and approach to the wars that it was struggling with in Iraq and Afghanistan. He called on his old West Point classmate, Dr. Conrad Crane, to take charge of a writing team that within just over a year produced Field Manual (FM) 3--24, Counterinsurgency, in conjunction with a U.S. Marine Corps team under the direction of Lieutenant General James Mattis...
Freeing the Army from the Counterinsurgency Straightjacket - Colonel Gian P. Gentile
In October 2006, while in command of a cavalry squadron in northwest Baghdad, I received an email with an attached document from my division commander, then--Major General James D. Thurman. General Thurman sent the email to all of the division's brigade and battalion commanders asking for input on the important document attached, which was a draft of Field Manual (FM) 3--24, Counterinsurgency. Over the next couple of weeks, I tried to read the draft manual closely and provide comments to the commanding general. Alas, though, like probably most of the other commanders, I was so busy carrying out a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign on the ground in west Baghdad that I never found time to get to it. While anecdotal, my experience suggests a microcosm of the U.S. Army. The Army has been so busy since FM 3--24 came out 4 years ago that it has been unable to have a Service-wide dialogue on the manual...
Learning and Adapting to Win - Dr. John A. Nagl
Admiral Mullen highlights Clausewitz's dictum that war is not essentially "about death and destruction" but is fundamentally an instrument of policy designed to achieve political aims. It is this understanding of war that must drive how military strategy and doctrine are developed, and the metric against which they must be judged. The counterinsurgency field manual must therefore be evaluated against its record in assisting in the accomplishment of national objectives...
H/T to redactor, Robert Jordan Prescott and Dave Maxwell.
Comments
Military and civilian operatives in Afghanistan are tasked with implementing counterinsurgency activities by a stop-watch. The politicians and commentators expect a people who have been bludgeoned to the bottom of Maslow's hierachy of needs triangle to turn their country around in a short space of time.
Winning over populations take a very long time - even in Western societies. The World is Flat according to Thomas Friedman, but not that flat in Afghanistan.
NATO government's never unequivocally state what the key measurements are for transition and have been poor at conveying how long this will take.
I would stress the need to change one of the overriding factors that permeates throughout the military and aid organisations; that is an obsession with imposing Western values on development. The analogy is this: whenever we contemplate life on another planet we think it should resemble humans. Too often aid agencies make Western based judgements about what is good for Afghans and impose processes and systems that are not recognised the local tribal way of doing things.
These two points alone undermine what is a very obvious doctrine.
The Frontier analogy is bad for a number of reasons, not the least of which is its suggestion that the frontier was somehow "pacified" by the symbolic 1869 golden stake show. Also, it ignores the fact that the native cultures had been modified beyond recovery by the arrival of the Spanish about 300 years before (the Plains Indians modified their lifestyle to accommodate the horse), and in doing so really created the seeds of their own defeat. It also ignores the combination of ignorance, paternalism, and vested interests on both sides that influenced policy decisions.
Cole said: "... few would argue that the continent would have been better off (if the American Western frontier had been) left undeveloped."
(Items in parenthesis -- used for clarification -- are mine.)
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Cole, I would say, makes both an important and a correct observation re: this American "Wild West" analogy offered by Mr. Ghani and Mr. Ignatius.
I would argue, however, that an equally important and correct observation -- re: this analogy -- is that the indigenous populations of these regions (the American Indians) did not benefit from this development process but, instead, were decimated by it.
Accordingly, I would suggest that, in contemplating the "if" and "how" of transforming "outdated, "aberant," "troublesome" or simply "different" societies, those doing the deciding should consider BOTH of the important outcomes re: the "taming" of the American "Wild West," to wit:
a. The "foreigners" did very well indeed, however,
b. The indigenous populations (being unable and/or unwilling to adapt) did not.
Bill C said: "What goes unsaid, of course, is that with the coming of the transcontinental railroad also came the decimation of the indigenous populations and the destruction of their way of life. The "foreigners" profited from their railroad. The indigenous people did not."
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Near as I can tell, in the 1980s only the Soviets were decimating indigenous populations...not USAID in the 1960s...not ISAF in the new millenium.
"Destruction of their way of life" appears tied to youthful "foreigners" from Pakistan madrassas demanding adherence to shariah law, often in conflict with Pashtunwali and the beliefs of Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks willing to practice a more tolerant form of Islam.
Because the government owns the land and would be paid billions for its mineral exploitation, it's unconvincing that solely foreigners would profit...especially since indigenous Afghans would also gain jobs from that mining and construction of associated road, rail, and electrical infrastructure.
Bill C continued: " b. As Mr. Ghani and Mr. Ignatius inadvertently illustrate, that "Western"-based modernization and development initiatives can have horrible and devastatingly adverse effects on indigenous populations."
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It was horrible that innocuous "Little America" "modernization and development initiatives" were misused to grow poppies, thus addicting many in the nation, and more in Russia and Europe...and that poppy profits fund the Taliban, and breed corruption.
While the U.S. past has tragic episodes, few would argue that the continent would have been better off left undeveloped. Similar arguments apply in Afghanistan where religious beliefs of some and lack of beliefs (graft, murder) in others leaves a nation with undereducated and persecuted women, murdered or extorted citizens seeking to grow, and unexploited or corrupted industry and growth.
When I visit my family in Silicon Valley, I see plenty of Indian, Pakistani, and Iranian families that somehow practice Islam and assimilate with western culture and ideas. The two are not mutually exclusive.
In the Cole-provided WAPO article of today by David Ignatius, Ashraf Ghani (a state-building professional) -- commenting on the "Modern Silk Road" paper by SAIS (linked in the Ignatius piece) -- made this analogy:
"What secured our (the United States') lawless Wild West frontier was the transcontinental railroad in 1869. With trade and economic growth came stability."
What goes unsaid, of course, is that with the coming of the transcontinental railroad also came the decimation of the indigenous populations and the destruction of their way of life. The "foreigners" profited from their railroad. The indigenous people did not.
Given:
a. As Cole suggests above, that the 1973 coup re: Afghanistan and the 1979 revolt re: Iran came from attempts made to try to transform these societies along "Western" lines and that
b. As Mr. Ghani and Mr. Ignatius inadvertently illustrate, that "Western"-based modernization and development initiatives can have horrible and devastatingly adverse effects on indigenous populations.
Given these risks, should this give us some pause as to if and how we should proceed?
Schmed:
No worries, as I was re-reading my post I noticed a typo in my transcribing of the quote. In the first line, "and" should read "an."
What has always amazed me about notions of societal change and "re-wiring" through better social science at the barrel of a gun is how a-historical these conceptions are. I mean do we really think we can "change" Afghan society for the better in a mere 18 months, or even 10 years? It took the United States almost 100 years to fix its major societal and political problems (Civil War to end slavery). The idea that the American military super charged by the "whole of government" approach can do it in foreign lands with military power in five years or a decade is fanciful thinking to say the least.
gian
In fairness to Dr Nagl, who may have exaggerated our near term ability to change entire societies...isn't that exactly what Islamic fundamentalism has done over the past 40 years?
Near as I can tell, not being a historian, Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir Shah allowed modernization and more western contacts during his reign from 1933-1973. That included a period during the 1960's when USAID transformed Helmand River valley into what was called "Little America."
What appears to have transformed the entire Afghan society was the coup in 1973 by a relative who thought contact with westerners had gone too far. The same sort of transformation occurred in Iran with the overthrow of the Shah.
So to some degree, Islam must heal/transform itself through processes like the Saudi Fatwa condemning violence and a Green Revolution in Iran. The transformation of entire societies toward Islamic fundamentalism would only be aided by killing more Muslims.
The U.S. can help Afghanistan by facilitating the sort of secured construction that will allow Afghans to transform themselves. We can point to history and show how we transformed "Little America" in the 1960s and helped Afghans overthrow a truly anti-Islamic communist rule in the 1980s.
We can point out that with only 11% of land being suitable for growing crops and an expanding population, there are limits to how many families can make a living from agriculture. Even greater animal husbandry would be preferable because it would require less land.
But with untapped mineral wealth spread throughout the country, opportunities exist to provide jobs that do not involve fighting over limited land and water to grow poppies or other crops.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR20100…
For those desiring a strategy, the above article outlines one. More aggressive action in Afghanistan is not a winning strategy. We cannot bail now until the ANA and ANP are adequately trained. And if we don't want to be paying $10 billion annually to finance the ANSF for the foreseeable future, it would help to help Afghanistan gain some homegrown billions in revenue, not involving poppies. As John Nagl said:
"Unfortunately, the debate over FM 3-24 has largely consisted of critics without an alternative course of action of their own complaining that no alternatives to population-centric counterinsurgency were considered."
Since I have often used this statement by John Nagl which he made in a recent review of Dr Brian Linn's superb "Echo of Battle," here is what Dr. Nagl actually said about changing societies:
"The soldiers who will win these wars require and ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies--and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms or work for the Department of the Army."
I suggest to those interested to read the entire review and then decide what he really means. It is available on the SWJ Documents page at:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/naglunprepared.pdf.
gian
<em>"If he truly believes we can transform an entire society THAT DOESN'T WANT TO BE TRANSFORMED, he's mental enough..."</em>
I'm not aware of him arguing that we can transform an entire society. Perhaps one might argue that he has argued something equivalent, but I doubt he would agree. I think his argument like that is done to exaggerate the weakness of his claims rather than to accurately describe them. If he is wrong then his argument shouldn't need to be re-characterized.
Using Nagl's argument, could we say that COL Gentile's position is still the best?
If we agree, as Nagl points out, that:
a. "War is but an extension of policy and beholden to it" and that
b. US foreign policy today is focused on "transforming entire societies"
Then why, in such circumstances as these, when war is required to tranform entire socieites, would we want to limit ourselves to the method of COIN generally or population-centric COIN specifically?
Would policy makers and military commanders not want to have available a broad spectrum of capabilities and methods to achieve their purposes?
What if the enemy were to "adapt" re: our telegraphed approach. Would this not leave us (1) unnecessarily vulnerable and (2) SOL -- because we had limited ourselves to achieving our objective via only one very narrow and specific method and approach?
Likewise, and along these same lines (limiting oneself re: ideas and methods) should one question Admiral Mullen's statement that "... when they believe that they are safer with Afghan and Coalition troops in their midst and local governance in their service, they will resist the intimidation of the Taliban and refuse to permit their land from ever becoming a haven for terror."
Is it possible that populations, if they believe that local government forces, local governance and "Coalition troops" will be used to "transform their societies," that these populations will forgo "safety" and choose, instead, to fight -- so as to attempt to preserve their way of life?
In such realistic circumstances such as these; wherein, the enemy adapts to our narrow and telegraphed population-centric COIN methods and the population rejects safety and transformational governance in favor of their current way-of-life, in such realistic instances, does not COL Gentile's arguments re: having available a very broad spectrum of war-fighting capabilites and methods find favor?