by Dr. Matthew B. Arnold and Dr. Anthony Vinci
Download the full article: The Need for Local, People-Centric Information Does Not End in Afghanistan
Appreciating local contexts and applying that understanding strategically is something Americans are accustomed to doing in the domestic forum. Presidential campaigns, for instance, regularly collect information about the local level, down to individual small towns in rural America or urban neighborhoods, and use this knowledge to design national campaigns. Yet, when we look at the rest of the world we have tended to discount the local perspective and instead focus on the national level.
Our latest generation of counterinsurgency experts, like generations before it, has had to relearn the lessons of local-level understanding in order to compete with insurgents. People-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) appears to have been one part of an effective strategy in Iraq and now the US' strategy in Afghanistan is predicated on its acceptance. The people-centric approach to COIN demands appreciating the local realities amongst which insurgents and counterinsurgents must fight, viz. understanding life at the village and neighborhood level. This means talking to local people, from farmers and truck drivers to village elders and merchants. It also involves asking the right questions about local dynamics, such as who provides social services, what the crop of choice to grow is, or how tribes interact with one another. This approach allows counter-insurgents to protect the local populace, assuring provision of basic social services, and to work with and through local leadership to ensure that actions taken are mutually beneficial to local communities and hence widely accepted.
But, the need for local, people-centric information does not end in Afghanistan. In an era defined by weak states with limited governance and the 'localization' dynamics that often make communities look inward for problem solving, adequately understanding foreign countries requires a more consistent emphasis on local socio-political dynamics. The counter-insurgency demands of Iraq and now Afghanistan provoked the initial development of an interest in localized, people-centric information. In the future, there is a need more broadly for such a localized approach to be consistently applied within the US government's presence abroad.
Download the full article: The Need for Local, People-Centric Information Does Not End in Afghanistan
Dr. Matthew B. Arnold served in Afghanistan in 2009-10 as a socio-political advisor for the US Department of Defense and was seconded to French forces in Kapisa Province. Prior to that he worked as an aid worker for the United Nations in assorted countries in Africa and Asia. He has a PhD from the London School of Economics and is currently a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand.
Dr. Anthony Vinci received his PhD in International Relations from The London School of Economics. Dr. Vinci is the author of 'Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents' as well as articles in journals including Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Journal of Strategic Studies. He has studied emerging threats and US responses to those threats on the ground throughout Africa and the Middle East. Currently Dr. Vinci consults on national security issues.
The views expressed are the authors' personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the Human Terrain System, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command or the US Department of Defense.
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Comments
Great article. I think they're spot on. No one doubts our intelligence community's SIGINT/COMINT (and all the other non-HUMINT INTs)abilities. However, that same community's corporate culture, based on my experience, militates against long term HUMINT investment in any space, much less Aghanistan/Iraq. Until we develop a systematic and sustained green layered information collection capacity we will always be behind the eight ball. Furthermore, developing that capacity requires a long termed commitment to presence in space, which we seemingly still lack. I liken it to our CA approach wherein we claim to be about "building relationships" but we rotate out after nine months. Does anyone honestly believe that an Afghan, having seen 13 iterations of CA personnel, who's dependent upon true long term relationships for survival, to risk their lives in support of a COIN effort where we lack sustained presence and focused unity of effort. Afterall, what campaign plan are we now on?
Understand that be sustained presence I don't necessarily mean military presence either. There are, afterall, many ways to skin a cat.
Hopefully, some will take Arnold and Vinci's advice in order to enable us to get ahead of the curve rather than staying behind.
Hello!
A very interesting article together with the
"Improving the Coalitions Understanding of
'The People in Afghanistan:
Human Terrain Mapping in Kapisa Province".
I am myself a GIS person working in ESRI environment with military decision support systems as well as IS regarding natural environments as well as social factors like demography and crime prevention and emergency management. It would be very interesting to get some more detailed examples of the analyses made for teaching purpose on the officers programs in Sweden so is it possible to forward this message to the author I would appreciate that very much!
Best regards
Associate Professor Ãâ¦ke Sivertun
Swedish National Defence College
Stockholm
[email protected]