A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq
SWJ Book Review by Lieutenant Colonel Adam Strickland
Download the full review: A Third COIN Course of Action
A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq by Mark Moyar, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2009, 368 pp., $30.
Years from now, local economists and civic leaders may well curse the name Dr. Mark Moyar for the irreparable harm he did to the local Washington, DC economy in 2009-2010, and blame him for creating the conditions necessary to finally inhibit the unfettered flow of government money to local defense corporations asserting special skills or knowledge applicable to counterinsurgency. Over the past decade, thousands of retired and former military professionals have created new-identities for themselves as counterinsurgency or counterterrorism experts around the Metro DC area regardless of their lack of experience, training, or education in those fields. This re-branding created financial and professional opportunities that were only possible due to the absence of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism knowledge within the Department of Defense and individual military branches in the period immediately before and after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; thus, we in the military have no one to blame but ourselves. Thankfully, after hundreds of books and thousands of articles produced by self-proclaimed counterinsurgency experts, that were truly more akin to travel monologues detailing individual lessons learned during extensive periods in-theater ranging from 10 days in Kabul or Baghdad to a 12 months combat deployment in which the author was fortunate if he ever left the immediate 5 miles around his Forward-Operating-Base, we finally have a book worthy of careful examination and an all-important second-read.
Download the full review: A Third COIN Course of Action
Lieutenant Colonel Adam Strickland is a Marine Infantry Officer with previous combat tours in Iraq. During his last tour, he engaged daily with former insurgents, members of the former regime, and civic leaders as part of Marine counterinsurgency efforts in Anbar Province, Iraq. He is a graduate of USMC Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting, and MIT's National Security Studies Seminar XXI Program. He is scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011 in support of continuing USMC counterinsurgency efforts.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Bill,
I submit that FID is the reality of the present... God forbid that our military would actually have to conduct COIN operations... This would imply that maybe one or two renegade special forces colonels like Jones and Maxwell left the reservation and are now hanging out up river with a bunch of native Robin Sage Gs who worship them for the irregular warfare demi-gods they are...This means that some poor conventional commander must execute some very unpopular populace resource control measures in North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland (maybe the Shenandoah Valley as well) as these irregular warriors unleash their Gs against the capital itself. The FBI and local authorities would be busy seeking to uncover and eliminate the auxiliary and underground network in support of demi-demons Jones and Maxwell's plan of action to topple the regime in power and to replace it with a paradise on earth... or something like that.
Our guys would be doing COIN and our allies helping us to eliminate these 2 bad men would be engaged in FID.
COL Gentile might actually be on to something if he really wants us to stop doing COIN i.e. social work with guns ... maybe we should focus our efforts on doing FID well instead.
:-)
v/r
MAC
Bill:
Whose reality man, the Coin experts? Come on, you dont understand what I have been arguing. I have always said that the American Army needs the capability to do Coin, stability operations, etc. And if the President says Army go do a humanitarian relief mission in Darfur then that is exactly what we must do. But it is also the function of an army, especially its senior generals, to develop strategy in cooperation with its civilian masters in order to accomplish policy objectives. Coin--aka population centric Coin or better known as Nation building--doesnt have to be our reality in Afghanistan. We have choices; and choice is the essence of strategy. Problem is that the senior American Army leaders have offered up a one way only operational approach in Afghanistan which is Coin to achieve the President's rather limited political objectives for the place.
So Bill you rightly conclude it is not about enemy centric Coin or pop centric Coin or whatever operational approach one chooses, it is about achieving the political ends given to us relative to our interests in the area. I agree fully. So if the President's political objectives are actually quite limited--that is to "disable" "disrupt" and "defeat" AQI in Afghanistan so that it cant use Af/Pak as a base to attack the US then riddle me this: Why does the US Army feel it needs to take a maximalist approach--aka Nation building--to achieve those limited aims?
gentile
After reading through all of the comments, I almost forgot what the original article was about. Will everyone forgive me is I bring us back to "leader-centric" COIN? Interesting idea, but it seems that the book and the article essentially are saying that it still could be either about population-centric or enemy-centric COIN, but good leaders are really important. Well, I didn't need the book or the article to tell me that.
Really, I have two problems with this. First, were talking about reforming our personnel system to get the best leaders selected to lead our COIN operations, but we cant agree on what definable attributes a good leader has or what he/she should do in order to be successful at COIN. Of everything Ive read, the best we seem to be able to come up with is akin to the Supreme Courts old definition of pornography... you know it when you see it.
The second problem I have (Col Gentile, I hope youre reading this) is that none of these three (leader-, population-, or enemy-centric) are actually STRATEGIES. Every insurgency is different and every insurgency has different strategic objectives. Since COIN, by definition, is simply everything that you do to counter an insurgency, then a COIN strategy would be a strategy to counter the strategy of the insurgency, right? Refer back to my comment that every insurgency is different. And no, Col Gentile, we cant just decide that were not going to do COIN anymore. COIN is the reality of the present and at least the near future, and what were still missing is the discussion on developing a strategy (military or national) for places in the world where insurgencies are underway--whether we caused them or whether they were underway when we got there. Its not simply about the population, the enemy, or the leaders. Its about what national ends we need to achieve in the given region and what ways and means we are willing/able to leverage to achieve those ends.
<b>Dayuhan:</b>
I don't. It was unlikely on several counts, it was not a threat in the issue of concern sense though it was one in the voiced or implied sense. Immaterial now. I mentioned the Euro to avoid mentioning several other Europe related aspects that were more germane.
A few of those things I suspect Baker had evidence of in his attache case when he made his very successful swing through Europe in December 2003... ;)
Col. Jones:
<i>True, but only because we were "unwilling" to go after the heart of the matter... We are yet to reach down and squeeze the political will to get at the heart of what threatens us. We have the skill in spades in our military though. But this is Insurgency, and that is far more a political problem than a military one. </i>
What insurgency are we talking about here? The insurgencies we created through our decision to occupy nations and establish governments? If not that, then what?
It seems to me that we ignored a problem for many years, and when that problem could no longer be avoided we overreacted. It may be true, as Ken says, that our decision to move on Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted our will to fight and our military strength, but I suspect that our (misguided, IMO) decision to occupy these nations and try to establish governments has highlighted our vulnerabilities even more effectively.
I don't believe that our core conflict is with "insurgents". We're not fighting aggrieved populaces responding to our policies. On a local scale in Iraq and Afghanistan we're fighting groups who see the governments we established as weak and vulnerable and are striving to seize power themselves, for their own benefit. On a global scale we're fighting a relatively small but extremely committed group of extremists who are proactively pursuing their own political ambitions. They may try to cloak those ambitions with a charade of indignant reaction, just as we have occasionally cloaked our ambitions in a charade of self-defense or reaction to external forces... but in either direction these concoctions must be taken with many grains of salt. We may have to counter the perceptions created by our enemies charade, but it does us no good to convince ourselves that the charade is anything but what it is. Believing the other guy's propaganda is only slightly less dangerous than believing our own.
Ken:
Digression, re this...
<i>world oil supply was not disrupted and was enhanced and did not switch to the Euro for trade</i>
Don't believe the conspiracy theorists, a switch to the Euro for the oil trade was never an issue or a threat.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b><blockquote>"This was an enemey with a real military we knew how to beat, and it engergized the place."</blockquote>I have no doubt -- I can well recall how that place was reeling in 1989 with the 'loss' of a <b>defined</b> enemy and I watched it wallow around, totally lost and head in the sand for six years before I retired from my civilian job. It's still wallowing way too much...
However, as you know, Washington is not the US and the Pentagon is not the Army -- neither by a long shot...
The bottom line is that the Army exists to fight this nations opponents armed forces in land warfare. It can do that, excels at it in fact. For other types of enemies, different types of forces and efforts are required -- and are available in adequate numbers <i>if properly used.</i> You and I are probably in agreement on that...
Though we may differ slightly on how to get there. ;)<blockquote>"What message to you suppose going to Iraq, the one regional state LEAST associated with AQ, sent to those, largely allied states, where the members of AQ did hail from?? I can think of several, but few are positive."</blockquote>We can disagree. There are as you say several and few are positive -- but those that are positive in my view far outweigh the many negative aspects.
The big positive is that we can and will fight. That served to counteract the belief we, the US, had fostered since 1979, 1983 and 1993 -- generally throughout the 1979-2001 period -- by our actions that we would not fight. Yes, I'm aware of DS/DS but it was an aberration in almost all aspects and it was quite properly discounted by our current nominal opponents. A hundred casualties in a hundred hours is not a war. Sorry.
I realize that to many western post modernists, such apparent machismo is derisory and really should be avoided. However, many in the world do not share that view and one who is not prepared to defend ones self is looked upon as easy prey at worst and fair game at best. That may be regrettable. It IS reality and we in the west ignore that at certain risk.
The second big one is fact that the US alone is capable of moving a major force most anywhere in the world and sustaining it and is prepared to do that regardless of 'world opinion' or fear of the so-called Arab Street. Or the UN.
There were a number of other positives; world oil supply was not disrupted and was enhanced and did not switch to the Euro for trade, the futile Northern and Southern Watches were eliminated, we got out of Saudi Arabia (I know others wanted that but so did we and it is to our advantage. Think about it), French, German and Russian economic hegemony in the ME was removed. There's more...
Not least the reminder that the US is not quite as constrained or predictable as many thought and wish.
Ken,
Fair, my assessment is my own from where I was working at that time in the belly of the Pentagon, where I personally watched atmosphere change from ODAs being paraded around the building with tales of success in an AOR that the conventional force had not figured out how to even get to in significant numbers (no small feat, to be sure); and watching a Rumsfeld "snowflake" grow into an avalanche as the word "Iraq" was injected into building.
It was like someone pumped the place full of pure oxygen. This was an enemey with a real military we knew how to beat, and it engergized the place.
As to the message it sent the region (as all operations send messages, planned or otherwise): What message to you suppose going to Iraq, the one regional state LEAST associated with AQ, sent to those, largely allied states, where the members of AQ did hail from?? I can think of several, but few are positive.
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
While I agree with your last two paragraphs, the first one sort of exceeds the gray propaganda limit for the week. ;)
Speaking of red herrings, You've neatly skewed what little accuracy is there to make some really non germane points. The SOF guys were not getting all the press in Afghanistan in '02-03 -- and much of what they did get was not complimentary. At a minimum it seems SEALs and Chinooks don't mix well. There's also the concern expressed by some that diversion of SF to DA wasn't the best idea...
Of course, most of the press from the 'Stan early on for <u>all</u> parts of the Armed Forces unfortunately did not spread much good news. It's safe to say that after the very early SF and CIA success with major assists by the Air Force and NavAir, things sorta degraded a bit for Alcon...
You're correct in saying that Iraq had nothing to do with WMD but it had a great deal to do with the area -- not one country -- the 9/11 crew hailed from (as you know, in addition to Saudis, there were Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Lebanese, UAE and Yemeni citizens involved). It was a message to a <b><i>region</i></b>, not a nation and it had a great deal to do with and required considerable political will.
Unfortunately, the senior uniformed people from <b>all</b> major commands responsible for advising the rare politicians who possessed a bit of will seem to not have done a very good job...
Those facts should not be left out of your polemics. :D
D.
True, but only because we were "unwilling" to go after the heart of the matter. Instead we roughed up Afghanistan (no nukes, unlike equally culpable neighbor Pakistan), and then, after the SOF guys were getting all the press there, we went to the next best target that our conventional forces could actually get at, without also upsetting relations with the ally next door, where the 9/11 team actually hailed from. Saddam was doomed, and it had nothing to do with his connections to AQ (none) or whether or not he had WMD (everyone Dem and Rep suspected he did, but no one knew so far as I know. A red herring to help justify getting the Infantry, Armor and Artillery boys into the fight.
Again, political will and skill is the key to succesful COIN (or rather FID, as it is the assistance to the COIN of another).
,
We are yet to reach down and squeeze the political will to get at the heart of what threatens us. We have the skill in spades in our military though. But this is Insurgency, and that is far more a political problem than a military one. A civil emergency rather than war.
<i>A nation typically sends it's military in to assist a foreign power with its insurgency problems when it is either unable or unwilling to address the political issues that lay at the root of the matter.
</i>
Typically, yes... but our current situations are atypical. We didn't send troops to assist a foreign power, we sent troops to remove two foreign governments. Our troops weren't sent to assist the successor governments, they were there before those governments existed.
Our intent in both Iraq and Afghanistan was not to bolster friendly governments threatened by insurgency. It was to protect governments we had created while they gained the capacity to govern.
I'm not at all convinced that the "insurgencies" in Iraq and Afghanistan are entirely driven by popular resistance to governments perceived as illegitimate. I think there are some other ingredients at work: groups who were thrown out of power with violence trying to seize power back through violence, groups who see power held by a weak and unstable government positioning themselves to seize power for their own purposes when the current government's foreign support erodes.
"Sunk Costs" is a false metric for a program that is determined to be futile.
That is like putting your kid's college savings on the table in Vegas to win back the sunk cost of your monthly paycheck.
Or continuing on with the F-35 program for billions of dollars over the next generation simply because we've lost so much to it already.
It's never too late to do the right thing, just sometimes it hurts more than others.
But it always hurts worse when someone makes you quit rather than wisely cutting your losses of your own accord. Vietnam hurt bad. Fighting harder or employing other COIN tactics, or putting different generals in charge wouldn't have avoided that hurt. THAT is the lesson of Vietnam. The war was lost with the decision to support an illegitimate regime at all costs in order to thwart a legitimate regime that had adopted an idological approach to governance that we were (at that time) opposed to.
There are those out there who are trying hard to make the fantasy of a grand Islamist Caliphate to be the grand boogeyman that the USSR was made out to be. We are wedded to a strategy of containment, and we need something to contain for it to work. The Chinese refuse to take that role, as do the Iranians, so we apply it to the Middle East in general. Pure lunacy driven by a threat centric intel community, senior leaders trapped in a Cold War mentality, and the fear mongering of the anti-Muslim crowd.
As is often the case, our fears are misplaced adn overblown, and we need to act smarter, not harder to resolve the things that challenge us. Far more success can be found in minor modifications of our own behavior, rather than in forcing major modifications in the behavior of others.
"The question that must be asked, is how much is one willing to invest for a temporary effect?"
Dr. Steve Metz is working on a rebuttal to what we currently call Strategy- Ways, Means, and Ends. He wants to address your question in terms of opportunity cost.
I concur. I just cautioned him to remember sunk cost.
A nation typically sends it's military in to assist a foreign power with its insurgency problems when it is either unable or unwilling to address the political issues that lay at the root of the matter.
The best the military can hope to achieve in such a situation is to merely assist in the suppression of the outwardly visible symptoms of the larger insurgency for some period of time.
Today, to engage in such a strategy has a new consequence that was not terribly significant in times past. Today that nationalist insurgent is harder to suppress in general due to his connection to like-minded and like-situated peers elsewhere; and also to sympathetic indinviduals and organizations globally. They also are much more able to deliver devastating raids against the external power that is supporting the government at home that they are rising up against.
The best generals for such COIN operations would be those who recognize and work within these parameters. The worse generals would be those who believe they can actually "defeat" such an insurgency. As often as not it is the government, and not the insurgent that should be adjusted. Going in with the mission to preserve the government in the face of such popular challenges with no corresponding authority to address the failures of government is a sucker's bet if one also believes they will achieve more than a temporary suppression of insurgent activity.
The question that must be asked, is how much is one willing to invest for a temporary effect? Particularly when that temporary effect now comes with a much higher risk of significant counter-attacks against the homeland than in eras past.
Slap: Doubtful. OK, just to let out a little hidden part of my recent past when the President spoke here at West Point last fall I got asked to go on the Charlie Rose show alongside David Brooks from the NY Times to do sort of a running and afterwards commentary on the President's speech. So I said to the producer who called me on the phone, "let me think about that for a second [no better yet nanosecond] NO!! I was tempted to say no in the way that one of my tank commanders when I was a tank company commander back in the day in Korea said to his gunner when he wanted to upload his 240B when the range crew was still down range, he said "not no but f..k NO! A little bit too too dangerous for me what with proper civil military relations and all.
Unless it would be something on history I am reluctant to go on these shows to talk about current ops, etc. I am happy to write an oped every now and then and mix it up on SWJ blog.
Publius: It has been a very good discussion for me too and has sharpened my thinking on these matters. The four sets of generals I am interested in are: Malaya--Briggs, Templer; Vietnam--Westmoreland, Abrams; Iraq--Casey, Petraeus; Afghanistan--McKiernan, McChrystal and beyond.
gian
That is wonderful news, Gian. No one deserves it more than you. I'm just happy to see you're not retiring; the Army needs all of the officers like you it can get. I just hope you'll be able to continue exerting influence by sharing your thoughts on the usual suspect blogs. It occurs to me that the blogs have assumed a great deal of importance in the eyes of many younger military personnel and your voice is needed.
Despite the fact that I am a poor pensioner and usually avoid book stores in favor of public libraries, I will purchase your book when it is published. Some day I'd like to get an autographed copy.
I'm with Ken White on the hall of fame generals he named. I'm too young to have known Harkins--a name I hadn't heard for years--but I recall an old master sergeant who'd been on his personal staff in the early days in Vietnam telling some interesting tales.
This has been a very interesting and informative discussion. I've appreciated the opportunity to participate. Nice job, everybody. Stop by and see us at milpub.blogspot anytime.
Ken: Thanks for your words of encouragement; they mean a lot to me. Also thanks for suggestions on how to focus the project, which I am still trying to get my hands around in terms of themes addressed. Choices will have to be made and some things left out. My hypothesis going into the project is that generally, across all four sets of generals there was more continuity than discontinuity between them. This I believe will be linked to a theory of sorts that generalship in counterinsurgency although important is not usually decisive. Of course eyes are rolling when I say something like that, and to be sure it runs directly against Mark's thesis in his new book. We shall see how it plays out from the research.
Steve: You are correct that Nixon was frustrated with many of his flag officers with regard to Vietnam. Still within the context of the better war thesis I believe it is important to bring out that Nixon along with being frustrated by many of his flags was at times especially frustrated with Abrams. In my original statement on this matter I used the word "toyed" intentionally to imply that although he mused over the possibility was probably never serious in carrying out the relief. Abrams is in fact portrayed as saint- like in the classic texts of the better war thesis. Shoot go back and read Sorley "A Better War" and in one of the first paragraphs in one of the first chapters he argues that things changed, significantly, within the hour of Abrams taking command. Anybody who has been involved operationally in an area security mission like population centric Counterinsurgency knows that armies simply dont turn on a dime in hours as if they were VII Corps pivoting around Mortain. Sorley also has his chapter 13 titled "Victory" in which he argues that the war in the South had been won. In line with his thesis, Abrams was the prime causative factor in bringing about that victory. If he is not a saint, then within the better war thesis he has certainly been painted as the savior of the American effort in Vietnam, only to have it lost by weak politicians and lack of American will.
With regard to Westmoreland I stand by my earlier statement that within failed US strategy and policy Westmorelands operational method of attrition made sense, and the derivative of attrition in terms of labels such as "the body count" also made sense. Of course American combat units were focused on body counts because that was what their operational mission was: kill the enemy in the hopes that enough would be destroyed to reach Westmoreland's hoped for "crossover point." Again, within the political constraints placed on Westmoreland this operational method made sense. The Krepinevich/Nagl notion that Westmoreland should have forgotten about the NVA and VC main force units and focused American combat power into dispersed small Cap-like units to win hearts and minds in the villages just doesnt make sense. They would have been chewed up and annihilated piece meal by the NVA and VC main force if they did.
And Steve, thanks for your words of encouragement too.
gian
<b>Gian:</b>
Great to hear on the permanent faculty and the sabbatical. I'm looking forward to the book -- though I offer my standard caution on the pitfalls of Malaya as exemplar for anything the US does as a third party and not the Government; a factor of which I know you are very aware...
I trust when you discuss the Generals and Viet Nam, you will accord Paul Harkins the respect due him for setting the tone dutifully followed by Westmoreland -- and treat the Weyand years with the care and respect they deserve...
For all those wars I hope you will address the strong role of the institutional cultures involved. That and the Staffs; maybe even particularly the Staffs. Their importance and effect is often overlooked. The MACV Staff had a pernicious influence.
With or without either of those things, I hope the sabbatical is productive and enjoyable for you and the family.
Gian,
If you read my comment about Nixon and Abrams I say
"Bringing up Nixon's thoughts about relieving Abrams is really sort of silly, because Nixon thought about relieving many generals during his involvement with Vietnam. If you doubt this, go review some of the scholarship about Linebacker and especially Linebacker II."
not
"not fair to say it was silly to mention that Nixon toyed with the relief of Abrams, historian Dale Andrade mentioned the same thing in his essay of a few years ago" (your words).
You have to look at it within the context of Nixon and how he did business. He was extremely frustrated with ALL of his senior military leaders at this time, and frankly I would have been surprised if he hadn't have mentioned relieving Abrams. I also never contended that Abrams was a savior of any sort (and frankly don't see why you keep trying to paint my comments in that vein)...but I do contend that he was more able to adapt to the situation he faced in Vietnam than was Westmoreland. And from my review of the sources (primary and secondary) I continue to agree with Ken that Westmoreland in particular (although Abrams did some of this as well) was still trying to fight a Central European-type battle in the jungle. Westmoreland's emphasis was on body count (although one could reasonably contend that the overall emphasis on quantifiable measures came from the SecDef), and the command climate he created and fostered within most of his staff placed emphasis on both force protection (where it was possible) and body count. If you want to discount this as myth, I'd suggest reviewing the operations of the First Infantry Division and the Ninth Infantry Division in particular.
Congrats on the move, BTW. Sounds like an interesting assignment.
Publius:
Thanks for clarifying some of my earlier points. I think you stated them correctly. It has been a busy week and I fear I may have made many of them in haste, lacking clarity.
I especially liked your third paragraph about the "can do" spirit in our Army which of course is essential at the tactical level of war but with regard to strategy, sometimes it is necessary to say in the modern context that "if you want us to do this it is going to take a very, very long time, and we really wont accomplish much, we will spend and waste lots of blood and treasure on what will end up being a fool's errand so the cost, at least from our military assessment, simply isnt worth it." One wishes Westmoreland had made such an assessment in 64; moreover with Westmoreland and here is where I think he fails is that deep down inside he had this assessment on his mind by early 67 or even late 66 but instead kept up the facade that the war could have been won.
I may be wrong about perceptions within the Army toward Abrams and Westmoreland and you may be right, although I do think that that assessment really comes to the fore after, AFTER, TET when the war in the minds of the US was clearly stalemated. It hardens into concrete after the fall of Saigon. This is a matter of interpretive disagreement between the two of us. Prior to Tet Westmoreland may not have been the charismatic leader that Abrams was, but he certainly was not a fool, was not a bumbling general just looking for Normandy beach in the central highlands (as Krepinevich and so many others portray him), and once one moves past the strategic and policy failures of the US going into the war, Westmorelands operational approach for the situation that confronted him in late 64 made perfect, logical sense. The idea that Westmoreland did not understand Counterinsurgency but only World War II style industrial war is simply not supported by the primary evidence as anyone who has gone through the documents knows.
Thanks for asking where I am off too. Well since I have been truly blessed with the good fortune of being a permanent military faculty member at West Point I am authorized a year-long sabbatical which I am taking this upcoming year. I have also been blessed with the opportunity to have a visiting fellowship at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City so the Army is moving my wife and I to Manhattan for a year (rough duty down there I know!). I hope to make significant headway on a book on four sets of generals in four wars: Malaya; Vietnam; Iraq; Afghanistan. You can probably imagine who the generals are and the themes and arguments I will attempt to make in it.
gian
Ken White said:
<em>It has been my observation as an Infantryman that Armor folks are generally more flexible than the rather hidebound infantry.</em>
Back in the day in the Orient, one of the most savvy old Asia hands we knew was an Armor Colonel with brass M26 Pershings of all shapes and sizes in his home office. Although a very kind-hearted individual, a number of the signed black and white photos on his wall addressed him affectionately as, "Killer". He had a son in the Infantry and an adopted Korean daughter who lived in the States. Might sound strange, but meeting her was like seeing someone from the future.
He and his wife really looked out for us in the early Seventies. Still not sure why, I guess they were just good people.
It's my sense that Colonel Gentile is advancing the idea that Westmoreland and Abrams were equally capable as a means of buttressing his main argument that, absent a coherent and realistic national strategy, the field commander actually doesn't matter all that much. I agree with this; I also agree that the viability of a COIN approach in far off, troubled lands has been oversold to policy makers who are always searching for a quick and dirty solution to the problems that have landed on the NCA's desk. We see this in all matters politic and we should not be surprised to see it when military action is contemplated.
So Gian is right in his primary argument. He understands that the American polity just won't accept the costs inherent in a major COIN effort, a factor that ensures a disgruntled public, a enormously weakened military, a half-assed job and even a failed presidency. The principal problem we have as a nation is that these unfortunate COIN-type concepts continue to be oversold to the folks who actually make the decisions.
And who oversells them? Well, we know the answer to that, don't we? It's the military. Instead of using all of that wisdom and good judgment developed over the years, military leaders tend to say, "Can do, sir," when they should instead be saying, "You want us to do what?" It should be clear to all of us by now that political leaders can be grievously flawed. They may be trying to divert attention from domestic issues, they may be trying to deflect opposition party criticism. Whatever. The unfortunate fact is that those who will be charged with executing the policy must speak up when they see flaws in the great man's plans. They don't.
Getting back to Abrams and Westmoreland. I accept Gian Gentile's thesis that neither made a difference in the outcome in Vietnam. Just as I accept that McKiernan was trashed wrongly and that neither McChrystal nor Petraeus is or will be the savior. Further, despite their numerous shortcomings, Rodriguez and Casey won't matter when the Iraqi story is finally written. These guys don't get my opprobrium. In our current era, the guys who do are named Franks, Myers, Pace and the rest of the JCS. In the Vietnam days, they were named Wheeler and Johnson, plus the rest of the JCS. Curtis LeMay wanted to bomb the North Vietnamese "back to the Stone Age." This is the quality of military advice that our all too often flawed political leaders get.
But Colonel Gentile is still wrong when he equates Abrams and Westmoreland. He's right in calling me out on the hyperbolic "troops loved Abrams," but the reality is Abrams was greatly respected within Army circles where Westmoreland was, shall we say, not viewed in the same light. Westmoreland was flash; Abrams was a rubber-meets-the-road guy.
And now my final question. Where are you off to, Colonel Gentile? A lot of us don't want to lose touch with you or lose the benefit of your insight.
Abrams did have influence over the battle field during the Easter Offensive in the application of firepower. He also used his influence as the senior American commander with subordinates like John Paul Vann and others to try to coax, cajole, and persuade senior SVN military leaders to do certain things, and not others. Bunker also did his best to influence Thieu.
Read Jim Willbanks's excellent book "Abandoning Vietnam" to see the importance that American firepower played in staving off the NVA offensive.
The dispute between Abrams and Nixon had to do with Nixon wanting to use the bulk of the B52 delivered firepower to attack targets in and around Hanoi that might have direct political influence in the ongoing negotiations to end the war. Abrams, on the other hand, wanted the bulk of the B52s to be applied toward attacking the NVA in South Vietnam and along its supply chaing through Laos and into North Vietnam. Abrams was fighting a conventional war of maneuver, his political masters were trying to end the war through negotiations through superior American firepower. See Jefrey Kimball's book in this regard.
I wish I had more time to respond to Steve (not fair to say it was silly to mention that Nixon toyed with the relief of Abrams, historian Dale Andrade mentioned the same thing in his essay of a few years ago). It is an important point because if you read any text of the better war thesis one comes away with the idea that Abrams was the visionary able to rescue the failed war in Vietnam. If that was true, then why did not Nixon and Kissinger then see him in that light?
I am in the middle of a PCS move and will try to get back to this thread soon.
gian
Gian P. Gentile:
Thank you for responding to my post and providing the information I was fishing for. What I am trying to square is that information with this quote:
"Kissinger himself characterized Abrams's generalship as simply average especially after his performance during the Easter Offensive where both Nixon and Kissinger became deeply frustrated with Abrams for not using his air delivered firepower in the way that the President wanted."
coupled with your thesis in this thread: that Westmoreland and Abrams were equals as generals in Vietnam which (apparently) supports your overarcing agenda of disproving as a viable theory "poplulation centric COIN" (whatever that means). Please correct me if I have misinterpreted your motivations for posting.
Your problem here is that you have run over your own tail: you are critisizing Abrams for his generalship under a far different set of circumstances than existed for Westmoreland or even earlier in Abrams' own tour as MACV. Further, Abrams had little to no influence over the battlefield during the Easter Offensive, as support for this point I refer you to Turley's first hand account. As to your suggestion about the tremendous amount of firepower available to Abrams during the Easter Offensive and how it apparently wasn't used correctly, two points:
1. The majority of american airpower used during the linebacker campaigns did not arrive in theater until after the easter offensive, and
2. The American firepower that did exist in the region during April, 1972 did in fact play a major role in stopping the NVA. Are you saying that if the availabe firepower had been used differently the NVA could have been stopped sooner? Or perhaps you are suggesting that the ARVN stood toe to toe with the NVA and stopped them while american firepower twidled their thumbs? The fact is that NVA tanks did not roll into downtown Saigon until well after said American Firepower departed the region. I am amused by your adoption of a standard by which our measuring stick of a general's perfomance is Mr. Nixon or Mr. Kissinger's opinion of them.
Finally back to my orignial point, using Abram's performance (or lack thereof) during and after April 1972 as a comparison to Westmoreland isn't that helpful when you can make direct comparisons with similar data: compare 1969-1971 with 1965-1968. I make no representation about what such a comparison would yield. Many others have written on that topic.
<b>Patrick R. Jennings:</b><blockquote>"What I should have said is that Abrams' image, as reflected by the feeling of failure in VN, needed to be rehabilitated."</blockquote>That's not how I recall the period but my recollection is so-called middle America, not academic...
I'm unsure that anyone is trying to create a 'better war' narrative about Viet Nam -- though that is a myth beloved of the nominal intelligentsia in the US. I'm certainly not. It was a stupid war, totally unnecessary and was a waste. Further, neither Commander but the US Army as a bureaucracy totally failed the Soldiers and the Nation in that war.
Quite simply, the US Army tried to fight a land war in NW Europe while in the paddies of SE Asia. The surprising thing is that they had earlier tried that in the rice paddies of Korea. Slow learners...
The Commanders were incidental
You are correct that Abrams was a tanker -- he also disliked airborne troops and had a particular dislike of SOF -- but he wasn't stupid or a consumnate politician. It has been my observation as an Infantryman that Armor folks are generally more flexible than the rather hidebound infantry.
Westmoreland was a late arriving Parachutist (he was never really a paratrooper at heart), a choice made on political grounds, and while he commanded a Regiment in 82d, he also commanded the separate 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (poorly), the 101st Airborne Division when it was on jump status (so-so job) and XVIII Airborne Corps (again poorly). The 82d was not "his beloved."<blockquote>"What I love best about this is that Westmoreland (the "light" guy) is cast in the role of the hidebound traditionalist against Abrams (the "tanker") who is now the flexible, open minded COIN guy. What fun."</blockquote>Actually, Westmoreland was not a light guy by inclination; he was, like Abrams, a product of WW II in NW Europe and he was a converterd (later conversion) Field Artilleryman and he acted accordingly and very predicatably. Unlike Abrams, he was rather inflexible and much concerned with his image.
While my long time airborne service in two divisions, an ARCT and SF should lead me to be a Westmoreland fan and an airborne disliking Abrams detractor, having served on multiple occasions under both and having talked to both a few times the reverse is true. Very much so.
Neither was COIN centric, both did what the system pointed them to at the time. Abrams was the more open minded of the two, no question. Their post Viet Nam history proves that in spades.
There was nothing fun about it.
<b>Gian:</b>
Actually, this sub topic is germane to the thread. In essence, Moyar's book appears to be about opinions and choices. You say:<blockquote>"I have come across many others in various roles who would argue the opposite or at least support the point that I am making."</blockquote>I'm sure you have -- and I ask how many of those were there during the command of both Abrams and Westmoreland and how many were on the MACV or Field Force staffs.
Never mind, that's a rhetorical question...
You use the word Saint frequently -- to my knowledge, no one is contending that either was that or that you have said Westmoreland was one. What you did say was "...Actually they do, Westmoreland was just as capable as Abrams." That specific statement was the one to which Publius and I took exception. While as I said, you're certainly entitled to that opinion, you are in my first hand experience compared to your scholarly continuity based opinion just plain incorrect. ;)
Further, to this interested observer you are making an attack for what seems to be no reason other than to be different. It seems to be one that does not advance your cause and serves little purpose other than to draw possible distractors ...<blockquote>" But this war of Vietnam was not that kind of war and could not be rescued by better generals, whoever it might have been." ... "So too with Afghanistan today."</blockquote>Agreed.
That is a substantive issue and not a personality or historical opinion question.<blockquote>I know I am beating against the shield of a powerful myth that protects the scars and memory of an earlier war. But I believe my historical interpretation--again supported by primary and secondary sources--to be an angle at the truth..."</blockquote>I acknowledge that is your historical interpretation, I'm sure you do see it as an angle at the 'truth' (placed in quotes only to highlight that all history is an effort to do that -- and as a reminder that opinions enter that truth and do indeed provoke perceptions of angle...). However, I suggest that this particular angle is skewed in relation to the gun-target line. Your issue is strategy and operational capability and performance. So is Moyar's book. Introducing personalities implies that, in the case of Viet Nam, Westmoreland or Abrams set the operational methodology. They did not. The system and institution that is the US Army did that, impinged upon by other elements of the US Government. Both those ComUSMACVs had minor impacts on that bureaucratic process -- indeed, arguably, the MACV Staff, larger than the combined staffs of Eisenhower and MacArthur at the end of WW II, had greater impact than either Commander.
The attributes of either Commander are not the issue. The strategy of the US Government -- or lack of it -- in Viet Nam is the issue that can be related to current operations. The techniques of so called COIN theory are assailable on many counts.
As the personalities and command presence of Westmoreland and Abrams varied, so too will those of future Commanders vary -- those variations may have minor impacts but the strategic precepts and the operational techniques and the doctrine will determine future success or failure to a far greater extent than will the command presence of whoever's in charge.<blockquote>"...I see the two as being tightly coupled and in need of separate and discrete analysis so that the one can be accurately understood in relation to the other."</blockquote>Perhaps -- only perhaps -- true for a dedicated Historian. Almost certainly decidedly untrue for the large majority of policy makers.
What audience are you seeking to convert?
Gian,
I think that, with respect, you're starting to over-dramatize your position. That takes away from the value of your observations, IMO.
I also think that the attempts to paint either general as hero or villain really misses the point: the Army as a whole had significant issues in Vietnam and carried those with them for many years afterward. Abrams, for all his "dark side" (and Westmoreland had one as well...as do all generals and leaders), seemed to adjust to the changing situation better than Westmoreland did.
Bringing up Nixon's thoughts about relieving Abrams is really sort of silly, because Nixon thought about relieving many generals during his involvement with Vietnam. If you doubt this, go review some of the scholarship about Linebacker and especially Linebacker II. Nixon routinely expressed his frustration with what he considered his military leaders' reluctance to use the weapons at their disposal.
I consider Abrams to have been more able to adapt to the changing situation in Vietnam than Westmoreland, but that doesn't mean that he was the second coming of anything. Neither man was especially ideal for that situation, but Abrams seemed to handle it better. But both men still advanced and retained subordinates who obviously didn't have a grasp of the situation. And neither man made a concentrated effort to preserve the lessons of Vietnam (although in Abrams' case it's impossible to say what he would have done had he lived). So in that instance, I would have to say that they both failed.
Ken White made a great observation about my earlier comment:
"I'm really at a loss to understand why Abrams might have needed rehabilitating..."
Well, he is right. As a soldier Abrams record stands alone - he was a great old-school fighter, the kind of rough-and-ready GI we only see in cartoons today.
What I should have said is that Abrams' image, as reflected by the feeling of failure in VN, needed to be rehabilitated. The effort appears to have started with Sorley's work and has gained steam since.
It strikes me that in order to create a "better war" narrative about VN you need both a hero and a villan thus you have Abrams (good) vs. Westmoreland (bad). As for the Army it couldn't get more delicious. Before COIN killed any discussion of doctrine other than COIN this used to be an Army of combat cliques and our two leaders certainly came from different cliques. Abrams was a tanker - one would imagine he was a bold arrow sweeping across a large scale tactical map kind of guy. Westmoreland was a paratrooper and had a lifelong love affair with his beloved 82nd Airborne.
What I love best about this is that Westmoreland (the "light" guy) is cast in the role of the hidebound traditionalist against Abrams (the "tanker") who is now the flexible, open minded COIN guy. What fun.
In the end, however, I am compelled to agree with Gian. There is little difference between the two and had Abrams gone first he most likely would have tried the application of firepower method well before the so-called enlightened methods of COIN.
Ken: Not to beat this horse too much to the detriment of the main issue in this thread, but I have to say that I think you are the one who is wrong about Westmoreland and Abrams. While I respect your opinion greatly, your view on the ground albeit important is just one, I have come across many others in various roles who would argue the opposite or at least support the point that I am making.
I have never said that Westmoreland was a saint, or the Patton of Vietnam fighting the lost cause. No, only that these wild comparisons between Abrams and Westmoreland that paints Westmoreland as the single point of failure for America's loss and Abrams on the other hand as the oracle, and shining point of the single chance for an American victory are wildly off the mark. Instead the story of these two generals is much more mixed. To be sure one can find plenty of fault with Westmoreland, but so too can one find plenty of fault with Abrams.
Not to throw out the "scholarship" card again but for whatever it is worth the majority of scholarly historians see more continuity than discontinuity between Westmoreland and Abrams. Within that reasonable framework one could reasonably argue that in all things considered Abrams was the better general. But again, not by much.
To Publius's point again I would say the same thing I just said to Ken, I have talked to many officers, some relatively senior at the time, who paint a much more favorable portrait of Westmoreland and a much less saint-like portrait of Abrams. Again the issue here is not that one was the next Patton and the other was the next Fredendall, but instead more continuity than discontinuity between the two and their commands. And Publius, come on my respected friend, any officer who has spent time with the troops knows that troops dont "love" generals (you should read combat veteran Karl Marlantes's new novel on Vietnam "Matterhorn" in this regard). To say that the troops loved Abrams and then imply that they hated Westy is naive. But what has happened in thinking about these two generals as I said in an earlier post is about the American Army after Vietnam and trying to get over the trauma of its first loss. Even when the war was still going on and after Tet the better war thesis, constructed by Abrams himself in his weekly meetings, started to be built, and it was in that context that perhaps officers like yourself saw in Abrams the possibility of a better war. This mentality became more pronounced after Abrams's untimely death in 74 but especially so after the fall of Saigon.
As I said in my previous post, dont take my word for it, read all 900 or so pages of Sorley's transcriptions of Abrams's weekly meetings with his commanders and staff, word for word, page for page, meeting for meeting. What comes out of these documents is a picture of Abrams being a charismatic and competent general, but not a saint, and not the single source of possible success in Vietnam. He also comes across as a very much old-school general who was most comfortable when using firepower to attack NVA supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh trail. There is also a darker side to the man that comes out in these documents: a general who held in contempt most of the American political class and the American media as well. Some of his discussions with his staff and commanders about certain politicians and most of the American media resemble the recent discussion reported in the Rolling Stone article on General McChrystal and his folks. Other primary sources support this overall re-interpretation of Abrams. Did you know that Nixon actually toyed with the idea of relieving Abrams after Lam Son 719 because of the disastrous performance of the RVNAF and because Abrams led Nixon to believe that it would be a successful operation? Kissinger himself characterized Abrams's generalship as simply average especially after his performance during the Easter Offensive where both Nixon and Kissinger became deeply frustrated with Abrams for not using his air delivered firepower in the way that the President wanted.
One more time, what I am trying to do is level the playing field so to speak between these two generals and also to remove the seductive notion that a war like Vietnam in all of its complexity could have been rescued by one good general that saved the mighty 101 a generation earlier. But this war of Vietnam was not that kind of war and could not be rescued by better generals, whoever it might have been.
So too with Afghanistan today.
I know I am beating against the shield of a powerful myth that protects the scars and memory of an earlier war. But I believe my historical interpretation--again supported by primary and secondary sources--to be an angle at the truth. And even though Ken and Publius think that in so doing I degrade other arguments that I make about current events I see the two as being tightly coupled and in need of separate and discrete analysis so that the one can be accurately understood in relation to the other.
gian
As one who respects Gian Gentile enormously, I'm reluctant to go against him in his analyses of military history. However, Col Gentile wasn't there. Like Ken White, I was there and that's something that's important to me. I served under Westmoreland and Abrams in war and in peace. I even met both of them. IMO, there was more substance to Abrams than there was to Westmoreland. Again, IMO, and without getting into some of Westmoreland's decisions, Abrams was simply the better officer.
Col Gentile may be correct in surmising that Abrams would have attacked the problem in 1964 the same way Westmoreland did. After all, they were contemporaries, although I'd point out that Westmoreland was FA and Abrams was AR. But, although I don't think he would have, we'll never know. I'd like to think that maybe someone like Abrams--instead of Westmoreland--might have made a difference in the early years, but reality compels me to admit that it probably wouldn't have. Due to the political issues in our government and the issues with our "allies," it's clear in retrospect that ours may have always been a doomed venture. Also, in fairness to Westmoreland, he commanded MACV when there were still hopes of "winning." By the time Abrams got there, we knew it was a lost cause.
Westmoreland was a cipher, a non entity as Army Chief of Staff. A failed field commander bumped upstairs to CofS. Just like George Casey. One wonders why we do these things. But, then most chiefs of staff are. I agree with Ken White about this, and about Shy Meyer, a old friend, whose son I served with. Having been around maybe 20 chiefs of staff in the time I've been around the Army, I'd say most were unfortunately small timers and political hacks. The story is that Harold Johnson, CofS when I went to Vietnam for the first time, said when he was dying that he wished he'd told the truth about Vietnam, the truth being that it was unwinnable.
Abrams, OTOH, was a significant CofS. He was the architect of today's Army organization, with the reserves and National Guard playing significant roles. It was done specifically so presidents couldn't have private wars, so that the populace would have to buy in to military expeditions. We all loved the idea, but none of us figured that the nation wouldn't care. We lost, Abe lost, and the country lost. And now we have COIN, the bizarre concept that the U.S. Army can somehow lead that horse to water and make him drink.
Gian Gentile is a fine officer and a terrific historian. But, IMO, he's missing the story when he's discussing Westmoreland and Abrams. Gian needs to know why it is that the troops back in the day despised "Westy" and loved "Abe." I'd suggest that instead of reading dusty histories, if he really wants to get to the truth of the U.S. Army in the 60s and 70s, Gian needs to actually talk to the troops. Slam dunk with us--many of whom went on to serve full careers in the military--as to the differences between the generals of our day. And it's a funny thing about that. Leadership does make a difference.
<b>Matt:</b>
Excellent question. Whether the services have the ability and will to change fair to mediocre mobilization but absolutely atrocious professional force personnel policies is indeed the big question for the 21st Century...
Let us pray... :\
<b>Gian:</b>
As they say, you are entitled to your opinion. Even if you are wrong.
As one who served under both Westemoreland and Abrams outside Viet Nam, in Viet Nam and when each was Chief of Staff of the Army, there is no comparison of the two other than the fact that both made it to their respective positions and they were about the same height.
In all those positions, Abrams was quite far the more capable of the two.<blockquote>"The turning of Abrams into a visionary General is more about the American Army after Vietnam than it is about General Abrams during the war."</blockquote>That's partly true but not in the way you meant it. As CofSA, Westmoreland did nothing (just as he did as a do-nothing Regimental, Division and Corps Commander...). When Abrams got the job he reorganized the Army and had he not died, his efforts and that reorganization would have continued. Unfortunately, he did die early while still serving in office and Fred Weyand took over. Except for Shy Meyer, it's been mostly downhill from there...
You have a good point with which I very much agree. I cannot understand why you continue to dissipate your message by attacking -- generally wrongly -- those who have little to do with your point. It can, I fear, diminish your effectiveness.
<b>Patrick R. Jennings:</b><blockquote>"Abrams' rehabilitation was more the result of an Army looking for its soul than his particular ability in the closing years of VN."</blockquote>Interesting comment though I'm really at a loss to understand why Abrams might have needed rehabilitating...
If the Army was looking for it's soul, all I can say is it's a damn shame the bureaucracy did not have one to find.
Gian often makes the point -- and I very much agree with him -- that the Army learned a lot of the wrong messages from Viet Nam. Of course, we do not agree totally on what those messages happen to be. ;)
Like Patrick I found a lot to like in Mark's book. I especially liked his chapters on Vietnam and Iraq for the refreshingly fair treatment that he gave toward Westmoreland and Casey. I thought some of his points in the chapter on Reconstruction with regard to white supremacist leadership in the south after the war were a bit farfetched, but all in all it is an important book that needs to be read, just as his previous work does on Vietnam.
gian
With reference to LtCol Strickland's review I am compelled to agree with COL Gentile in that Abrams' rehabilitation was more the result of an Army looking for its soul than his particular ability in the closing years of VN.
For the most part I enjoyed Dr. Moyar's book but was a bit disturbed that he made such a dramatic leap from the American Civil War to the Philippine Insurrection carving out an almost 50 year piece of American counterinsurgency experience - one that is possibly our best research laboratory for the historical study of small wars especially as it concerns a leader-centric approach. But, LtCol Strickland covers that.
Taken as a whole the book is quite interesting but I am also compelled to ask the same question as Matt above - does our military have the flexibility to change long accepted practices in selecting and promoting leaders? I for one highly doubt it unless we plan on forming yet another armed service designed just for COIN.
Actually Mark has one of the most sympathetic treatments yet that I have read not only of General Casey but also of Westmoreland.
The review states this:
"If you desire to criticize his conclusion that counterinsurgency requires a specialized skill set and aptitude not shared by all military leaders then please understand that you are in fact arguing that General Westmoreland was just as capable and effective as General Abrams...The facts don't support this conclusion."
Actually they do, Westmoreland was just as capable as Abrams. The war had changed greatly when Abrams had taken over which allowed him to put greater emphasis on pacification. However, he was very much like Westmoreland in that he was an old-school, conventionally minded General who was more comfortable using firepower to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail than he was discussing and really understand what was happening on the ground in the countryside. But dont take my word for it, read page for page Sorleys "Vietnam Chronicles" which are transcriptions of Abramss weekly meetings with his staff and commanders.
If Abrams had gotten the call to command in 64 instead of Westmoreland he would have done the same thing as the latter. Too, if Westmoreland would have stayed on after Tet he would have done the same thing that Abrams did in shifting the focus toward pacification.
This Abrams hagiography is not warranted, nor is it supported by the historical record. The turning of Abrams into a visionary General is more about the American Army after Vietnam than it is about General Abrams during the war.
gian
Sir,
I am a recent graduate of EWS and the OIC of a Police Mentor Team. While at EWS I wrote my contemporary issues paper on the idea of leader-centric COIN strategy and, not surprisingly, referenced Dr. Moyar's work heavily. I'm currently attending training at the Advisory Training Group and, again no surprise, the curriculum teaches a population centric approach. My team is comprised of Marines from within the Battalion and they are certainly good Marines but I don't think their screening had much to do with whether they possessed the traits Moyar identifies as necessary among successful COIN leaders. From my perspective and experience I think Dr. Moyar is correct. However, my concern is that the course of action he proposes represents such a significant departure from established Marine Corps organizational practices that it won't even be taken seriously much less implemented in our institution. Do you think we have the institutional flexibility to change such firmly established practices?