Strategic Communication &
Influence Operations
Do We Really Get 'It'?
by Dr Lee Rowland & Cdr
Steve Tatham RN
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The last 2-3 years have seen an explosion in interest in the application of influence
as a tool for achieving military objectives. This is not new, the military
have always sought to exert influence -- albeit at times unwittingly. However,
two significant events have brought the issue to further prominence - the publication
of JDP3-40 and the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmand Province in 2007/8.
This article does not intend to debate either in any detail -- a quick search of
inter and intra nets will provide plenty of information for the curious
reader -- but there are two issues worthy of slightly more discussion.
The first concerns 52 Brigade's deployment. When Brigadier Andrew Mackay
led 52 Brigade to Helmand Province he did so having examined previous kinetic based
deployments and concluded that these, for various reasons, had not achieved the
effects that he envisaged for his mission. For him the consent of the population
was utterly key and would not, nor could it, be achieved by hard power alone or
even with hard power primacy; as he developed his operational design he felt frustrated
that existing doctrine did not adequately prepare him to operate within the influence
arena. The second is that Andrew Mackay subsequently became one of the driving
forces behind JDP3-40 and in particular the forceful articulation of the 'centrality'
of influence. However, the 'how to do it' guidance still lags behind the emphasis
on and enthusiasm for, its use.....
This paper seeks to provide greater clarity in two key areas -- Target
Audience Analysis (TAA) and Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE).
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Lee Rowland is a former Royal Marines Commando. He holds a Ph.D. in Experimental
Psychology and was co-director for the M.SC. in Psychological Research in the Department
of Experimental Psychology at Oxford University. He now directs the Behavioural
Dynamics Institute.
Cdr Steve Tatham is completing a PhD in Strategic Communication and was formerly
Director of Advanced Communication Research at the Defence Academy.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Thanks for these insightful and fair comments.
It is not forcefully stated in the article, but my opinion is that Influence is less about messages and more about behaviour. It is a widely held assumption that we need to get our messages to fit with an audience so that they maximally resonate and bring about the desired effect, but there are several things wrong with this. Most prominently, it is a grave mistake and an egregious assumption to decide in advance what message we wish the audience to hear - no amount of fit will get the job done if the message is wrong from the start. How do you know if the message is the right message? Well, first and foremost, TAA must seek to determine the message that the audience are best disposed to hear. This obviously creates a paradox, but can be resolved if we focus our attention not on transmitting messages, but on creating favourable behavioural circumstances, i.e. those that foster an environment that is conducive to the overall behavioural objectives. (And there are always behavioural objectives - what else is communication, power, Influence - whatever - for?)
Effective messaging is tricky, but we should be looking beyond messages at the whole communications environment, which includes behaviours/actions, and working closely with audiences (or, better termed: groups of people) to understand how information of all kinds can best be used to bring about a stable environment.
This requires a shift in thinking, a paradigm shift in the way we use science in influence (focussed on the behaviour of groups and social forces, not on foisting messages on groups according to their cultural characteristics), and a much greater partnership between military practitioners of Influence and scientific specialists. It will not be easy, as influence is very difficult, but it will be worth it if we are successful.
Over the last few years, US military leaders (and likely the British) have increasingly recognized the need to match/reinforce actions with words and visa versa. While the article doesnt explicitly acknowledge this, it is implied. For instance, the example of ANA Soldiers earning a dowry after a period of good behavior is an action. Effective messaging on the action could make or break success.
That's the key point the authors are trying to make - effective messaging is critical...but tricky.
They also get to the root of what it takes to get it right: targeted expertise and effort.
But does the US military/NATO have the resources to do that? Are there enough smart people available for the task? If so, are they affordable in the quantities required?
I cant speak for our NATO partners but the USs deployment structure does not foster the requisite cultural expertise within our forces. DOD and DOS personnel rarely return to a locale often enough to develop a genuine understanding of a specific area - creating a perpetual advantage for adversaries. It's a problem being discussed at higher levels, but one not easily resolved.
Also, as the article points out, the "how" part of influence in SC ops (apparently in Britains as well as the USs) is strangely sidelined in favor of process. Maybe that's because process is predictable (thus safe) and the "how-to-influence" is terribly complex, dynamic, controversial and not-universally-agreed-upon.
SC is not not an option for current operations. As social beings, communicating is a primary activity for humans. (Think of the tens of millions of people who have cell phones but not running water.) So we might as well devote ourselves to being very good at it. The article, IMHO, provides good fuel for pressing ahead.
Dayuhan: Good catch, add the word "willingly" to the end of my comment.
You are right. The US loves NATO, even though it costs us an arm and a leg (borrowed from China) because it gives us leverage over our Euro allies. They tolerate being "leveraged" as it saves them bank for their own defense, and besides, it is in their interest to maintain a good relation with the US even if what we leverage them to do is outside their interests.
This wears thin over time though. Influence takes away that wearing friction.
<i>Influence is what motivates allies to support ones actions</i>
Do allies support our actions (when they do) because of our influence, or because they believe that it is in their interest to do so? I would suspect the latter, and I suspect that alliances based on common interest will be generally more durable and effective than those based on influence.
Bob:
As usual, pithy comments. And to sum up, "actions speak louder than words.". Did I just think of that??? :-)
But you are exactly right. We think Strategic Communications is the answer to everything and if we can sell ice to an Eskimo we should certainly be able to "market" the American brand. If we can just get the message right and out faster than the enemy then we will be successful seems to be our focus instead of understanding that if we get the policy and strategy right the message will be much easier to craft and get disseminated. I do not know what it is going to take for us to learn this lesson bit as long as we focus on Stratgeic Communications an trying to manage the news cycle an get our message out before the enemy's we will never get to work on why is most important and critical and that is of course policy and strategy.
So long as we continue to see "Strategic Communication" as words and messages we will never really "get it." What is the number one Strategic Communication to the world that the US has right now? Our operations in Afghanistan. It is not what we SAY about our operations, that is merely ancillary to the actual message. It is the whole package, but primarily it is what we do, and how we do it. Words lie, but actions are a window into the soul.
So, for me, the first step to effective Strategic Communications is recognizing that every strategic action carries with it a strategic message, and to design those actions to carry the message one intends. Planned or not, they will carry a message. The US lost a tremendous amount of influence during the first few years in Iraq due to the strategic message our actions carried. We said one thing in our written and spoken strategic messages, but those words were completely incongruent with what the world saw and perceived on the ground. That very incongruence magnified the amount of influence we lost in those dark days.
Influence. This is really another word for "Power." A nation cannot effectively "influence" the verb unless they possess "Influence" the noun. Influence is what motivates allies to support ones actions, and deters threats from challenging the same. Coupled with the loss of Influence in Iraq was the doubling down loss of Influence with the following financial crisis. The effect of the deficit spending from our Influence account over the past 8 years has made the US a less powerful nation today than it was then.
This is curable, but it requires a keen eye to true strategic communications, and designing operations and engagement so as to contribute to our national Influence account more than they draw it down whenever possible. There will always be those "rainy days" when we will need to draw on that account. Lets get our Strategic Communications right, so that there will be sufficient Influence there when we need it.