Officials: Belt-tightening Will Cut 1 Command - Anne Gearan, Associated Press. Officials briefed on the decision say Defense Secretary Robert Gates plans to eliminate a major military command in Norfolk, Va., and try to cut the Pentagon's use of outside contractors by 10 percent next year.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will conduct a press briefing at 2:30 p.m. EDT in the DoD Briefing Room, Pentagon 2E973.
Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama - "One of the wisest military analysts I know remarked, upon hearing the rumors, that JFCOM does three valuable things that either the joint staff or another command will now have to pick up: 1) Writing joint doctrine, 2) Monitoring force readiness and modernization across the services, and 3) Coordinating U.S. and NATO modernization efforts."
Update
Via the press briefing here's SECDEF Gates decisions:
1. Reduce the funding for support contractor personnel by 10 percent a year for the next three years.
2. Freeze number of Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agency and combatant command manpower positions at the fiscal 2010 levels for the next three years.
3. Freeze the number of senior Defense Department leaders at fiscal 2010 levels. Expect this effort to cut at least 50 general and flag officer positions and 150 senior civilian executive positions over the next two years.
4. Increase the use of common information technology functions within DoD.
5. Freeze overall number of required oversight reports, cut by a quarter the money allocated to these reports.
6. Eliminate boards and commissions no longer needed and cut overall funding by 25 percent for these boards and commissions.
7. Immediate 10 percent cut in funding for intelligence advisory and assistance contracts and a freeze in the number of senior executive service positions. Also moving to end needless duplication in the DoD intelligence community.
8. Eliminate the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Integration and the Joint Staff's section for command, control, communications, and computer systems.
9. Eliminate the Business Transformation Agency.
10. Eliminate U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Update # 2
Sec. Gates Announces Efficiencies Initiatives - DoD News Release. Today, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced a series of initiatives designed to reduce overhead, duplication, and excess in the Department of Defense, and, over time, instill a culture of savings and restraint in America's defense institutions. These initiatives represent the latest of the secretary's efforts to re-balance the priorities of the department and reform the way the Pentagon does business. As part of the fiscal 2010 budget, the department curtailed or cancelled nearly 20 troubled or excess programs - programs that if pursued to completion would have cost more than $300 billion. Additional program savings have been recommended in the defense budget request submitted this year.
Gates Announces Defense Cuts, Allocates Funds to Priority Needs - Al Pessin, Voice of America. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday announced the elimination of a major U.S. combat command and other steps designed to save money and protect his department's ability to defend the country during a time of economic constraints.
Obama Calls Gates Announcement 'Step Forward in Reform' - American Forces Press Service. President Barack Obama today called Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates' announcement concerning Pentagon efficiency initiatives "another step forward in the reform efforts he has undertaken to reduce excess overhead costs, cut waste, and reform the way the Pentagon does business." In a written statement, Obama added that the initiatives "will ensure that our nation is safer, stronger, and more fiscally responsible."
Mullen Issues Statement on Gates Initiatives - American Forces Press Service. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a statement today supporting initiatives announced by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates designed to make the Defense Department more efficient.
Joint Forces Command Responds to Gates Announcement - American Forces Press Service. We all will work to carry out the Secretary's decision to disestablish Joint Forces Command. There will be much hard work and analysis in the time ahead and we will do the best we can to provide solid data on which to base decisions.
Gates Strives to Change Pentagon's Culture - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service. The initiative to reduce Defense Department overhead and to eliminate duplicative capabilities is part of a larger thrust to change the culture of the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said here today.
Making Good on Pledge, Gates Outlines Military Cuts - Thom Shanker, New York Times
Gates: Pentagon to Cut Thousands of Jobs - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post
Gates' Budget Ax Swings at Pentagon Overhead, Joint Forces Command - Howard LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor
Gates Orders Cuts in Pentagon Bureaucracy - David S. Cloud, Los Angeles Times
Officials: Belt-Tightening Will Cut Major Command - Anne Flaherty and Anne Gearan, Associated Press
Defense Secretary Gates Targets Jobs - Tom Vanden Brook, USA Today
Gates Puts Meat on Bone of Department Efficiencies Initiative - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service
Gates Says Defense Bureaucracy Bloated, Declares Cuts in Contractor Jobs - Viola Gienger, Bloomberg
Gates Announces Major Personnel Cuts at Defense - Katherine McIntire Peters, Government Executive
U.S. Defence Secretary Gates Proposes Officer Corps Cuts - BBC News
Pentagon to Cut Contractor Budget 10 Percent a Year - Agence France-Presse
Webb Expresses Concern about Norfolk Command - Jeff E. Shapiro, Richmond Times-Dispatch
Virginia Stands to Feel the Most Pain from Defense Cuts - Rosalind S. Helderman, Washington Post
Gates will Eliminate Norfolk's Joint Forces Command - Kate Wiltrout, Virginia-Pilot
Bipartisan Group Blasts Defense Closure Plan - R.E. Spears III, Suffolk News-Herald
Va. Governor, U.S. Reps Condemn Pentagon's Cuts - Bob Lewis, Business Week
McDonnell Attacks Joint Forces Command Decision - David Macaulay, Newport News Daily Press
Gates to Shut Down Va. Command - Jen Dimascio, Politico
JFCOM to Be Shut Down? - Max Boot, Commentary
The Political Audacity of Bob Gates - Marc Ambinder, The Atlantic
Gates Launches Latest Battle Against waste... and Against Congress - Josh Rogan, Foreign Policy
Pentagon War on Waste: Winners and Losers - Sandra Erwin, Defense News Magazine
'Culture of Savings and Restraint' - Colin Clark, DoD Buzz
Odierno Yet Again Asked to Eliminate His Job - Craig Whitlock, Washington Post
Comments
Two quick things:
The term "contractor" has been used to describe a very broad swath of personnel support. The JFCOM situation has nothing to do with the need of support personnel in a combat zone.
With regard contract support to the "Corporate Army" - again, not the technical support folks but the folks who are denigrated as "double dippers": every one of those folks has to be vetted to be hired to do work based on background and experience. How many of our military masters assigned there can say they are the best fit for their job?
Here is an interesting comment that in fact shows us why we have spent billions in defense contracting costs which if the problem had been truly studied BEFORE making the decisions would have in fact saved DoD money---again although the solution was being driven by defense contracting companies not by well thought out DoD guidance.
This article is literally a read and weep moment and one must really ask ourselves with all the defense contracting and DoD billions are we really going backwards and why have we not seen or want to accept this "open source warfare" concept? Just maybe "open source warfare" is easy to understand and does not cost us billions to counter thus less money for the defense contracting firms who largely ignor it.
Monday, 09 August 2010
JOURNAL: Open Source Warfare and IED Design Innovation
Insurgencies that utilize open source warfare are almost always extremely innovative (see earlier posts on the topic). As a result, big conventional militaries find it very difficult to keep up even when they spend tens of billions and hire thousands of consultants (while, unfortunately, studiously avoiding a study of the method of warfare that creates this innovation gap). With this in mind, here's a new article in Wired magazine on the innovation rates seen in IEDs, and how these innovations are spreading globally as new groups adopt this form of warfare. Here are some choice quotes:
"I can take $600, go into a bazaar, and make a device," says one senior Jieddo officer. "And I can tie up $1.2 billion to $2 billion of US money by doing it."
This escalating arms race, pitting kitchen-table bombsmiths against US government technologists, began in the early months of the Iraqi insurgency. The first IEDs were often simple radio-controlled bombs, made from two or three 155-millimeter artillery shells set off by a signal from a cheap household gadget, like a key fob car alarm switch or a wireless doorbell buzzer. US troops, traveling in unarmored Humvees, were defenseless against them until each of the services hastily bought hundreds of radio-frequency jammers -- with codenames like Cottonwood, Ironwood, MICE, ICE, Warlock Red, Warlock Green, Jukebox, and Symphony -- capable of generating an invisible hemisphere of electromagnetic energy that could drown out those trigger signals. Eventually, Jieddo would oversee the deployment of more than 40,000 jammers in Iraq.
The bombers quickly learned how to circumvent the electronic countermeasures. They used handheld radio-frequency meters and bombs with dummy trial-and-error firing circuits to figure out what part of the spectrum the jammers blotted out and how big the jamming field was. Then they simply switched to new remote controls that used bandwidths beyond the jammers range. When US technicians introduced electronic countermeasures to jam low-power radio-control devices like garage door openers and car alarms, insurgents moved to high-power devices, including two-way radios and extended-range cordless phones. Then they moved on to mobile phones in every local cell network, from 1G to 3G. While this race had been run before, it had never taken place at such speed.
At the beginning of this year, US forces in Iraq reported a new version of the passive infrared trigger, nicknamed the Black Cat. It looked exactly like a regular passive infrared sensor, but the motion detector was altered to be triggered instead by radio frequencies. Shielded to prevent it from being set off by household radios and with reduced reception range, the new device is one of the most devious yet. Designed to detect the passing bubble of a coalition jamming systems powerful radio field, the Black Cat has brought Jieddo full circle: It is an IED that will detonate only when it detects an IED countermeasure.
Late one afternoon in April, Llamas shows me the latest device theyve been working on, just in from Afghanistan. A neatly made plywood box about 8 inches high and 5 inches square, it has a length of replica detonation cord emerging from the base. Llamas pulls the box open, revealing a layer of soft foam and a wooden plunger attached to the lid. When stepped on or driven over, he says, the foam is compressed and the tip of the plunger, which is saturated with a chemical, descends into a chamber at the bottom of the box. That chamber contains a second substance, and when the two chemicals mix, a pyrotechnic reaction ignites the end of the detonation cord, which leads to an explosive charge. The box is the logical conclusion of years of reverse evolution in insurgent weapons technology. Without a power source, a blasting cap, or a single piece of wire or metal contact, it has no electromagnetic or metallic signature. Linked to a charge mixed up from odorless homemade explosives, packed beneath a dirt road, it would be all but impossible to detect: a Flintstones land mine. "Its a block of wood, basically," Llamas says.
MAJ K:
Forgot to mention the tension between military members and contractors doing the same jobs--do not know how many times I have heard "man you get the high salaries" coming from an inexperienced young soldier/officer and constant other comments around the same topic and you the contractor have over 20 years of experience in just say one aspect of what the young soldier/officer is doing but you are ignored when you say something. And as soon as they can leave the military they dash to defense contractors looking for work.
How many military personnel can match the skill sets required of a SME grade 4 or 5 just to get into the recruiting interview? Yet lately the SMEs are taking major salary hits (in some cases there is now a 30% salary reduction in previous salary ranges-but you take the hit as you need the work) as the defense contractor is top filling their profit margins as work slows down---THERE is where the problem is!
So why not get into a true conversation of the inherent contracting issues and not an emotional argument---yes there is waste an abuse---but where is the triple A when it comes to contract audits?---why does it take DoD five years to get around to auditing a particular contract---why do contracts inherently now lean towards officers especially in the O4-O6 ranges, why are Flag Officers even allowed to join defense contracting companies at all-especially with their military benefit packages? How can a previous O6 jump straight to GG15 ranges, WHY is there an inherent GS discrimination against Veterans in the intelligence community DIA/CIA/FBI/DEA/DHS especially if one is over 40.
MAJ K the list could go on and on especially if we start the conversation on "pet projects" that have been started as there was not such training available anywhere in the military which focused in the needs of keeping soldiers alive and defense contractors were willing to provide it.
Umar-al-Mokhtar;
Well put my friend.
Overall defense contracting is really nothing more or less than the old style "Manpower" concept just on steroids.
While one might in fact be a contractor working for say L3, CACI, or LM you never really obtain the status of an actual headcount employee of the contracting company as you are "tied" to that contract not to the company---and MAJ K try to transfer to another city, position, or new contract without being asked. AND there is no protection for your employment if the contract is lost to another contractor of closed out such as JFCOM will be.
All the things that one can do as a military member.
In the ongoing witty repartee between Maj K and Anonymous a few revealing issues might be interjected.
While the good Maj certainly has valid points in his observations that the Contractor (big C for the company) gets paid obscene amounts for the contractor (little c for the person doing the work) one problem with that is in how the Government negotiates the contract vehicle and SOW with the Contractor. The government negotiators do not always get the best bang for the buck. And the contractor is rarely getting half of what the Government pays the Contractor for his or her service.
The advantage of the contractors over the Active Duty service members is contractors gets no extra tax free money for having dependents, must provide for their own housing without a tax free subsidy, for the most part must purchase food off the local economy without a tax free subsidy, and relies on the Contractor for medical, dental, and retirement benefits, provided by the Contractor for a fee.
Anonymous is correct that many of the traditional services (mess duty, laundry, transportation, etc... ) that military members perform are now contracted out. This was a cost saving measure by DoD to downsize or eliminate the infrastructure, equipment, O&M, and personnel associated with these services. In part, services are contracted for because it was not politically feasible to place a large portion of service support capabilities completely within the Guard and Reserves, which would probably be the optimum solution (having all your cooks, bakers, MPs, truck drivers, fuel specialists, laundry operators, etc... in the Guard and Reserve would probably be much more cost effective as you could use them as you needed and always have a large trained pool of military personnel to do it).
Hanging over all of this discussion are the statutory requirements in Titles 5 and 10 and other areas of law that mandate personnel limits on the number of active duty, Guard, reserve, and civil servants. Post 9/11 and again post-OIF DoD efforts to fulfill personnel requirements to satisfy workload demands was through hiring more government employees but the components were then needing to supplement them with contractors due to the previously mentioned restrictions on personnel. Just as in business, if the workload increases then companies hire more people. The private sector rarely has to deal with personnel caps; the number of people employed and overhead spent is examined proportional to gross income. So with increasing requirements for personnel DoD just couldnt get the people. Exacerbating the issue is the fact that the DoD personnel system has been, and remains, not very well structured to deal with the immense amount of work added to the Department in the past decade and the often immediate and time sensitive personnel requirements of the components. This antiquated personnel system fails to adequately respond to the often mission critical needs of DoD components to support the warfighter. In the absence of an effective and rapid hiring system, the components naturally turned to the private sector with its much quicker turn rate in fulfilling those personnel requirements.
Another aspect of the current heavy reliance on contractors to perform service support functions was Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Contracting out the service support function made some fiscal sense when you expected wars to last less than a year. Unfortunately our new paradigm of becoming involved in regions with weak, failing, or failed states, countering insurgencies, and using the military as a nation building force has put the US in the position of deploying significant numbers of troops overseas for a significant amount of time. So the contractors are being employed longer.
As to Active Duty's truism that "wars aren't fought from 9 to 5," again thats an issue with how the contracts SOW is written and also the Contractor that wins the work and the contractor hired to perform it. I am a contractor; Im in at 0600 and typically work until 1715 to 1730, Monday through Friday. The math says thats about 11 hours per day thus 55 hours per week. I only get paid for 40 (full disclosure, Im salaried, AKA exempt, so I record 40 hours per week but in actuality am expected to do what it takes to perform the work), I am not a member of a union (we are in fact almost forbidden from unionizing), and I do not receive overtime of any sort (thats the "exempt" part). If I need to come in on weekends I will, and if I need to come in earlier than 06 or stay later than 1730 I will. Will I try to comp the time with time off? Yes, but it doesnt always work out that way.
MAJ K:
You have some inlightening comments concerning contractors.
Having assumed that you did at least one rotation to Iraq I am assuming that you took the time to out of you rather busy military operations day to do the following;
1. Wash your BDUs yourself instead of complaining that you could not get them back in 24 hrs from the civilian run wash/dry facility and they were folded if I recall---or you dropped them off at the LN and paid to have them washed---either way you did not wash them yourself
2. I guess you as well participated in the traditional military past time of KP and you did on occassions meal serving duties because there WHAT were no contractor cooks, servers, and dishwashers?
3. I guess as well that when your BCT deployed into and out of Iraq your Army transportation BN if you had one made the approx 1000 low boy vehicle convoys to Kuwait dodging the IEDs and occassional ambushes just to pickup and drop off the BCTs' vehicles for you to do your job
4. Let's see---if I remember correctly or not a majority of the fuel truck and food/water deliveries were being made by civilan contractor drivers---who by the way if wounded supplying you have now a major battle with DOL just to get healthcare covered for that injury when you turn to VA.
5. Let's see---did your BCT bring enough Combat Engineers and Construction Engineers to do the electrical, water purification, and HVAC work neceassary to house soldiers in hundreds of FOBs across iraq or Afghanistan?
LETS see---just how many BCTs deployed at full strength manning levels--most never made it over 60/70%?
Let's also see just how many UAV units had civilian SMEs or Federal Equipment Reps with them.
NOW turn to the US--at the CTCs just how many positions are being filled by contractors just under the Warfighter contracts---NOW where is the soldier headcount that can be diverted from their active duty unit to do range work, truck deliveries to the field, cook the meals, repair the field vehicles?
So one can rant all day about defense contractors but until the Army for example expands by another 5-7 Divisions in order to get the necessary manpower just to deploy say to Afghanistan the necessary manpower to replace civilian support contractors I am afraid you are stuck with them.
So yes you can do without them---the question is are you personally ready to step up and do the extra work that is required to replace them without complaining that you have to work now some weekends and are working longer hours when you are not deployed?
ALSO if you pay attention to the contractor job descriptions a rather large number of them suggest to me that they are looking for former military trained personnel with clearances so are you suggesting that employment options for former military personnel be cut, because a lot of former military are in fact contractors?
Anonymous at 1055,
You said:
<i>"1. if they all disappear just how rotations to Iraq or Afghanistan do you think you will be then doing"</i>
A lot better actually. The money and time suck that would be erased if 80-90% of the contracts disappeared tomorrow would be a windfall to actually getting something done over here. Contractors doing the lion's share of advising, mentoring, and training? While making 6 figures? For only 8 hrs a day and 2 wknd days? That's BS. I can think of only a scarce few other reasons why this war has lasted 9 yrs.
<i>"...or for that matter how many times will you be transferred to a new posting-once every year due to the shortage of then military personnel to do the defense contracting positions and once every other year for Iraq or Afghanistan---not so conducive for a family life."</i>
Again, less contractors in critical billets = more productivity when those roles are filled by uniforms who want to get the job done, win the war, and go home....not ensure the contract stays open and profitable year after year after year. Plus, if there was a "shortage" of military personnel to do the "defense contracting positions" (I've never heard of a function being labeled as a <i>defense contractor position</i>, but I have heard of positions as being inherently military), it might force Congress to prioritize and only use the DoD for missions worthy of blood and treasure.
<i>"2. currently the DoD study puts the average per year cost of a military person at 94K per year up from 64K five years ago---so do not think for a moment you are any "cheaper" plus you come with a potential pension and healthcare benefits which is now amounting to over 30% of the entire DoD budget."</i>
So short-term savings by using contractors (which I still don't think holds true) makes more sense? It only makes more sense to the companies who make themselves inseparable from the mission. Like a tick. I don't care what a contract company pays the dude in the sports coat, but I'm damn sure pissed off as a taxpayer that the DoD is paying the company literally obscene amounts of money per yr for that sports coat.
Whatever I've said above, I don't blame the guy in the suit for getting while the getting's good. If I were in a similar position, I'd probably <b>take advantage of the system</b> too. But the DoD has got to get its head of of it's arse and quit thinking that contractors are cheaper...in the short-term OR the long-term....than actually putting thought to a strategy and a manpower and training structure that would allow the military to do the military's job.
I get back to my position, no matter how unpopular it is in today's corporate military world, that if this was a vital national interest requiring our presence, we wouldn't have to pay extra and outsource the very jobs deemed so critical. Why bother then to have a military? To protect the contractors downrange?
I am discouraged with the kill all contractors and let God sort them out mentality. A contractor is not a contractor is not a contractor and just because one may not have contract IT help before 0600 does not mean that a contractor who is a subject matter expert in an area important to the DOD should be lumped in here. Ive seen my fair share of active duty and GS who should not be let anywhere near the position they hold and (especially with the GS) you are stuck with them. With a contractor you can have them out the door the next day if so desired.
A simple answer to many in the military that think the defense contracting positions should disappear.
1. if they all disappear just how rotations to Iraq or Afghanistan do you think you will be then doing---or for that matter how many times will you be transferred to a new posting-once every year due to the shortage of then military personnel to do the defense contracting positions and once every other year for Iraq or Afghanistan---not so conducive for a family life
2. currently the DoD study puts the average per year cost of a military person at 94K per year up from 64K five years ago---so do not think for a moment you are any "cheaper" plus you come with a potential pension and healthcare benefits which is now amounting to over 30% of the entire DoD budget---no such pension/healthcare requirments for a contractor-actually defense contracting companies are driving their overall salaries lower recently in order to maintain if not increase their internal profit margins in the coming lean years
3. you have a long term employment position---contracts come and go as does employment opportunities
I work here at USJFCOM. In the Navy. I, for one, am happy to see that the military is taking these contracting jobs out. For too long, I've been trying to get military training to operate and maintain my systems, just to get slapped with a "No" while someone spends more money to hire a contractor to do two or three times what they could have taught me and had such services at their beck & call. If something breaks, whey the hell should I have to wait until 6am for a contractor to come fix it because he's got some stupid union rules? Wars aren't faught from 9 to 5.
And beside, 6,300 jobs to be cut? Well, not mine, the Navy will just relocate me to a new command.
I think SECDEF Gates is right on the money. Coming from an Army perspective, I've seen my share of malingering leaders and civilians leeching onto this last decade of, for lack of a better word, unlimited spending. They are literally a drag on performance across the military, and his approach could certainly help keep pensions as they are.
We should go back to the post-Desert Storm plan of, "trimming that fat", across the DOD. The budget cuts will happen regardless. Better to make the forces as effective and agile while we can, while we can still afford to retain their knowledge and experience.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
KC;
Just as side comment---there is nothing in the enlistment contracts that one signs with the military that clearly states in the contract "you will be receiving X amount of money over X amount of time in exchange for 20 years".
It has been the assumption that in exchange for your service you will get a pension---but based on the recent DoD study DoD cannot continue to have the pensions grow at the percentage of DoD budget as they have in the last ten years.
Not many fully understand that healthcare for both the soldier and his family and his pension are directly paid out of the exisiting yearly DoD budget so now you have the choice continue to fund those costs vs getting more equipment, vehicles, or ammunition---how would you do it---easy have the soldier pickup a portion of his healthcare and delay the start of the military pension to match the start time of a SS pension---also easy to sell to the politicans.
KC:
1. the mission of JIEDDO was to field new CIED equipment/vehicles to the field which has been completed and fielded----just what else are they to do---if I remember they have been averaging a yearly budget of 4-6B per FY----if anyone wants to save JFCOM then reduce JIEDDO by an equal amount as a starting suggestion---secondly even with the vast FY budget IED deaths and injuries still are not going down especially in Afghanistan---after having how many years of CIED experience from Iraq one would think JIEDDO has it down to a tee in Afghanistan.
2. you really do need to revisit the retiree pension discussions from the 92-94 period--it is the exact argument being made again in this DoD Study---an believe me DoD was ready to make the move in 93---the vet organizations just argued louder and the politicans caved---this time I really do think it will stick.
3. you argue that delaying the pension is not delivering on the promise---yes it is--- it is just starting it latter---DoD can in fact change the pension system without having to ask Congress---it will argue that DoD cannot be out in left field when the rest of the country is suffering and everywhere there are large cuts coming in all areas of the society
"There is a long list of organizatinons that have sprung up as BCT enablers that can be eliminated as well---JIEDDO. . ."
Errr. . .
Ask some of the folks who've been saved by IED defeat devices if this is a frivolous, non-productive organization that should be eliminated. .. .
and enough with the "double dipper" nonsense. Employment (enlistment) agreement says "do this work for this many years and receive this in return." Next employment agreement says "do this other work for this many years and receive this in return". Person satisfies the requirements of each, person is due what was agreed to up front. What part of that is hard to understand?
I think Robert H makes a good point - what is it that JFCOM was supposed to do, and does it still need to be done. If so who has the capabilities and capacities to do it? What are the consequences for not doing them?
While JFCOM may have had a surplus of contractors, its worth asking the question why? I think at some level this could indicate a lack of soldiers and civilians in the generating force to develop and sustain the capabilities the operating force says it requires.
This is the problem with mission creep and organizations that are built in ad hock fashion without enough analysis to align form to function. Without doing the hard work of determining what really needs to be done it is difficult to separate essential from non-essential. When it does not perform as desired we keep adding to it. When it does perform as desired we add additional tasks to it. We place leaders in command of these organizations that while often incredible bright and successful developed their intuition in the operating force - on the user end. This is good and bad - good because it brings an OF perspective to the organization at the top, bad because they apply their intuition on how much they need in a generating force organization based on knowledge and experience developed in a different set of conditions. Combine these two and you may find out you dismantled some capability that you need now or may need in the immediate future - and it may be a capability that cannot be built in a crisis.
One of the questions that really needs a good answer is how big does our generator need to be? Currently the various GF organizations have been the bill payer and the area to accept risk in - kind of like tapping into your savings or line of credit. While we may have to do this, we should at least have an answer about what the cost is.
While Ken points out that we won wars without these organizations and the capabilities they bring, I'm hesitant to infer that we are better off without them as a result. I think the wars we won have more to do with having a workable ends/ways/means strategy and an objective that inspired enough political and national will to see the job through.
Reference long term personnel costs - you may not always get what you paid for when you get it home, but you won't get it off the shelf unless you can meet the price of the market. 20 years is a long time. Military service I think offers kind of a paradox in that while serving the fitness, nutrition and health care combined with that 20-50 years of age may mark you comparatively very healthy to non-military types (especially by comparison these days), however, I also believe it exposes a person to levels of physical, emotional and mental stress and toxic environments in combat and training that once a person is past that 20 or 30 year mark may accelerate the effects of age. I bring this up given the idea that the USG will not honor its commitment to those who spent their youth and prime adult years serving for 20+ years. If that deal is altered then you get what you are willing to pay for. If the USG is willing to live with that then it should go in eyes wide open.
Given that the eligible population who can even meet basic service requirements continues to shrink and that the product our public education system seems to be incongruent with analysis of what kind of people we need to meet our policy objectives then it should assess that as strategic risk.
The first question is not what can we afford, but what do we require? Work backwards from there, but if we don't start there it will probably cost more when we can least afford it. Never underestimate a policys ability to bring us up short when it matters most.
So who gets the JFCOMs functions (or anyone elses for that matter) that need to be sustained? SOCOM? Joint Staff? OSD? They all have room on their plate right?
Best Rob
Let's be honest about other organizations that have ramped up to give GS positions to double dippers ie former retired SF types ie AWG which can easily be replaced by SOCOM which is where a large number of the AWG retirees came from.
There is a long list of organizatinons that have sprung up as BCT enablers that can be eliminated as well---JIEDDO, JIEDDO/COIC, LEP program, HTS program, CECX, WTI, and the list goes on.
Let's see if the other parts of the DoD Study will be implemented once defense contractors are cut ie soldiers paying for their healthcare and the costs for their family healthcare plans which if one is a "civilian" starting in 2014 healthcare benefits are taxable income---AND the really BIG study comment---DoD/government cannot continue to pay retiree benefits.
This is something that was deeply discussed as an option during the '93 RIF after Desert Storm under the rubric "peace dividend". It was sidetracked because of the "volunteer" army argument but now that the defense budget is open in all areas it will be difficult for Gates to ignor as it is clearly mentioned in the Studyas a serious problem ---BET this one will be reinstated---the 20 year retiree benefit will continue to exist but only paid when one draws a SS benefit and then calculated against what one will get in SS benefits---anyone willing to place money that this idea will not go forward? Will also bet that current retiree benefits which cannot be cut will definitely be calculated against SS retirement payments thus lowering the SS payments by the amount of the Army retirement payment.
In the beginning, there was no JifCom...
Not really all that long ago, there wasn't a Department of Defense. There was a War Department and a Navy Department. We won every war we were in...
Then DoD was created -- we haven't won a war since.
A degree of 'Jointness' is necessary. It is also a great way to keep all the commissioned ducks in line -- however, really, its worth is significantly overrated...
There's nothing JFCom does that can't be done elsewhere. Same thing can be said of US Army FORSCOM. Those things exist, mostly, to provide justification for staffs 'properly vetted and allocated IAW the Staffing Guides and a Manpower Survey (another thing that could profitably disappear...).' Said Staffs exist almost as much to justify their Commanders Flags as for anything else. Gates proposes cutting perhaps 50 FlagO spaces. 50% would be a better idea. :)
What will be the cost of shutting down JFCOM?
The answer is to wonder what will happen to experimentation and the services' efforts to increase their ability to rapidly adapt to unforeseen battlefield circumstances.
If the services and the Joint Staff are able to carry on in other ways with experimentation and adaptation training, then JFCOM may not be missed.
But after JFCOM will there be a top-level advocate for experimentation and adaptation training, who ensures that the services carry on with these activities? And that service-level training and doctrine will synchronize on a future joint battlefield?