Despite the lavish time and attention that the Obama administration devoted to reviewing its Afghanistan strategy, the result was more continuity than change. The administration adjusted U.S. troops levels and shifted some operational methods but accepted the most basic—and questionable—assumptions of the Bush strategy. Unfor-tunately, these do not hold up under close scrutiny. The new strategy, like the old one, totters on a dangerously flawed foundation.
Both the Bush and Obama strategies assume that al-Qaeda needs state support or sanctuary. That, after all, is the fundamental rationale for continued American involve-ment in Afghanistan. But throughout the "war on terror," no one has made a persuasive case that the September 11, 2001, attacks would not have happened had al-Qaeda not had bases in Afghanistan. While it may take meetings and phone calls to plot terrorism, these can be done from nearly anywhere. Al-Qaeda's Afghanistan sanctuary was a con-venience, not a necessity. Destroying the sanctuary has not stopped bin Laden and his henchmen from plotting new attacks.
Why, then, should the United States devote billions of dollars fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan if doing so has little effect on al-Qaeda's ability to launch terrorism? The answer says more about the way Americans think than it does about how terrorists operate. The United States has expended great effort to eradicate al-Qaeda's bases and training camps less because they were important than because we are effective at it. There is an old saying that, "when all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail." America has an amazing hammer—its military—which is very good at seizing and controlling territory. So, we reasoned, eradicating bases and training camps will cripple al-Qaeda. Yet there is no evidence to validate this idea...
More at the Strategic Studies Institute.
Comments
<b>Bill C.:</b><blockquote>"They are simply the way I read where both political parties ... and using as the basis for their strategy.
...
how our national leaders perceive of such things ... the need to "transform entire societies," and how they intend to shape and use military forces -- and other "instruments of national power" -- today and in the future."</blockquote>No question. You are I believe quite correct and I certainly agree that:<blockquote>"If these are seriously flawed ideas, then I believe that we should, as you do, "call" them on it before it is too late."</blockquote>Indeed.
My suspicion is that they will be called by a majority but not all the American public and that in the near term, this or a few subsequent administrations will be forced to scale back their desires.
How long that will last is problematic because the urge to meddle is almost overpoweringly strong in the political classes.
However, I do not believe we can sustain a process that really dates from the 19th century in today's world -- certainly not at today's prices...
Ken White:
Thanks for the critic and for the appropriate cautions and concerns re: this line of thinking.
I need to clarify, however, that these are not positions that I advocate, agree with or "wish for."
They are simply the way I read where both political parties -- and past and present presidential administrations -- seem to be heading, how they seem to be thinking and how they appear to be justifying their actions, formulating their policies and using as the basis for their strategy.
If these are seriously flawed ideas, then I believe that we should, as you do, "call" them on it before it is too late.
But for the present, this appears to be the way that they are heading, as virtually every speech (such as that given by Sec. Clinton referenced above -- and those given by Sec. Rice before) and action seems to acknowledge.
It is within the context of these ideas -- and in our recent actions -- that I believe we can better understand how our national leaders perceive of such things as COIN; AQ; rogue, weak, failing and failed states; the need to "transform entire societies," and how they intend to shape and use military forces -- and other "instruments of national power" -- today and in the future.
In my 12:32 PM comment above, Third paragraph, first line should read:
"That 'job finishing' seems to be essentially a camouflaged wish for <b>retention of our</b> departing great power status."
That status is slowly evaporating and it is unlikely to come back short of an existential war in the near term. Sorry for the inadvertent lack of clarity in the original.
<b>Bill C.:</b>
Fascinating views. Your sense of "mission" shared by too many put us where were today. How's that working out for us...<br>
That is a point where this:
<blockquote>"However, it seems unlikely that the United States, believing that (1) it has "bagged" the great powers/great societies mentioned above and (2) can only sustain these gains by also transforming "the rest of the world, will now abandon this new task; one which we might call "Finishing the Job."</blockquote>is sheer folly. While some may believe the US has "bagged" others, reality says otherwise -- and the all too pervasive attitude that we have so "bagged" others is rapidly insuring that many States have and will continue to do everything they can, both overtly and covertly, to impede us in pursuit of your stated goal of "finishing the job."
That job finishing seems to be essentially a camouflaged wish for departing great power status. The World has changed and we are resisting it but we must eventually accede. The Math is against us and the little guys are beginning to be. We should realize that and adapt. After all, we used to ride to work on Elephants and then when the parking lot attendants rebelled, we found a better way...
Your idea of "gains" and mine differ markedly. We have gained the enmity of many in the world and massive debt for only minimal recompense. That doesn't perturb me other than that means that others will do things great and small to trip us -- and sooner or later, we will be tripped if we continue on that path. That could possibly be avoided but often we aren't very alert...
In the interim, we are not going to be able to retain, service and sustain our recent great power and / or great society gains. We literally cannot afford the nominal gains of which you write. That will get worse before it gets better...
Your stated goal is beyond a chimera or a mirage, it's totally unlikely to be realized. Or even to contemplate. Such a course will not "finish the job" -- it would finish the US. Note I say 'would' and not 'will.' That's due to the fact that I believe about a third of Americans, including many in the current Administration and other policy wonks might like to do that. However, I strongly doubt the other two thirds of Americans are willing to support such action at great cost and for little gain. IOW, I doubt what you seem to wish for will occur. Thankfully...
Hopefully the next Administration will revisit the current policy as the ideas do not pass the cost - benefit test. If the next one does not, a later crew will be forced to do so -- we cannot even afford to do what we are now doing; to urge taking on more is really beyond folly.
It may be that America is too optimistic/not realistic about (1) the direction that it wants to go and (2) what it thinks that it can achieve today -- in Afghanistan -- and elsewhere in the less-integrated world.
But such confidence and optimism is somewhat understandable considering that the USofA, in the past century, believes that it has (along with its allies) successfully used its/their instruments of hard and soft power to "shape the world" and to "transform" such great powers/great societies those of Japan, Germany, Russia and China.
With these amazing tasks now considered to be somewhat in hand, the United States -- for its 21st Century mission -- has set its sights on similarly shaping, modernizing and transforming the "the rest of the world."
(This new task being considered essential to being able retain, service and sustain its recent great power/great society gains.)
As in the case of the 20th Century mission re: the great powers/great societies noted above -- likewise with this century's task of transforming "the rest of the world" -- it is acknowledged that this may (1) take substantial time, resources, commitment and (2) a degree of learning/adjustment/re-adjustment/innovation as to methods, tactics, etc.
However, it seems unlikely that the United States, believing that (1) it has "bagged" the great powers/great societies mentioned above and (2) can only sustain these gains by also transforming "the rest of the world, will now abandon this new task; one which we might call "Finishing the Job."
Respectfully, Bill M., I am not a pessimist -- really. I'm an incurable optimist but I have learned in a long life that the US of A does what's smart and necessary <i>only</i> when it really <u>has</u> to. The rest of the time, we're prone to goof off a lot...
Churchill was right; "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative." ;)
Thanks for the link.
Ken, as always your comments based off years of experience and reflection on those experiences are full of wisdom.
Bob Jones, while we may never agree on some points, I have always liked your counter UW concept in general terms (I suspect we'll view it differently, but that's O.K.).
I agree if we describe what AQ is doing as UW (not the new SOCOM definition, but the previous one), we would describe the threat much more accurately, and that would hopefully move us beyond the COIN discussion into a more holistic and ideally effective strategy.
Recommend you google an Israeli paper on the Dune Theory of Al Qaeda. I didn't agree with all of it, but it is an interesting view of AQ's strategy (what we would call UW, but they call it the Dune Theory). Anyway it provides some alternative view points that are thought provoking.
Somewhat bias since I was a victim of several IW working groups, I find the concept somewhat useful, but the development of the IW concept was overly constrained by guidance from higher. None the less it was a good first step even if it is anchored anchored to legacy doctrinal concepts to ensure we didn't threaten anyone's rice bowls. The definition was not open to discussion, and IW could only consisted of CT, FID, COIN, UW and stability operations. In short we started off with the problem narrowly defined and then were given a set of legacy doctrinal solutions/frameworks to work within, so ideas like counter UW didn't make it in any of the documents. It was either too rad, or it challenged someone's rice bowl.
In the end Ken's pessimism is always right. I only get excited for a short period of time anymore before I come back down to planet earth.
<b>Old Blue:</b>
I realize you were writing to Bill M. but I 'd like to chime in on a couple of points you make.<blockquote>"Which is the same bullshit that got us here; funding proxies to fight our real enemies because we don't have the will to actually finish a job when we realize that it's a little bigger than we thought. We cannot take responsibility for the results of what we do, so to just come in, wreck something, and leave actually sounds like something we should do."</blockquote>That first point is arguable but I'll leave it for another time. However, on the will bit I'd like to posit a couple of thoughts for your consideration.
First, my experience has been that not we but rather our elected politicians do not have the will to attack potential problems until they become full blown disasters -- then they scream "Armed Forces go fix it." They do this for a variety of reasons, none good and they do it without knowledge of what those Forces can reliably do well. Forces can do anything, how well they do things varies from task to task and unit to unit. So the application of force needs some common sense applied. It has been my observation that a gaggle of politicians loses any of that the indivduals may have...
It's also been my observation that a lot of people in those forces do not really know what the capabilities are -- but that's another thread.
So I agree on the will, I disagree on when and where it is and should be applied.
My experience has also been that those same politicians, attuned to what they believe their constituents may want in an ideal world, forget that it is not an ideal world, that those constituents may want totally different things than the pol personally wants and that they would rather throw <u>our</u> money at things that might buy a few votes and get them reelected than at a minor war in a far off land. Particularly one started by another Party before most of the then current crowd was elected. So they squeeze the funding and abort the mission.
Thus I agree that we do not have the will to finish jobs (that's the Polity thing again, our election cycle messes up a lot of things -- but it is reality and it is not going away...), however, I strongly disagree that we have really chosen the jobs at all well. For example:<blockquote>"Question: After contributing to a vacuum in Afghanistan after the Soviets left and manipulating the outcome of the remaining regime by proxy (when the mujaheddin around Kandahar refused to rocket the city because their families were in it, we paid Gulbuddin to do it for us... just an example), how did that work out for us?</blockquote>Not at all well and there's enough blame for a bunch of people -- including some in high places today.
The issues are two. Should we have interfered in Afghanistan in the first place?. Should we have let that Soviet departure vacuum fester during the 90s? We could argue those for hours. Point is what happened has happened, we cannot change it.
I said above "I strongly disagree that we have really chosen the jobs at all well." We have not. all you'll ever get in <u>any</u> COIN or FID op is an acceptable outcome -- and 'acceptable' gets defined down as time passes. I've been in six countries playing the game, one worked out, four were messy draws and the biggest was a total loss for us. We cannot change any of that.
What we can change is future action...
You also said:<blockquote>"No, we cannot "fix" the world; but we don't have to be manipulative jackholes, either. Call that idealistic if you will, but returning to our old behaviors that didn't serve us well and helped create this environment just doesn't sit well with me, and that's what I'm hearing being advocated... </blockquote>In order; I agree, I agree, I agree -- and I am NOT advocating such a return nor do I think Bill M. or Robert C. Jones are. Those behaviors on our part were flawed -- stupid even and in no way should we return to that.
Nor should we continue to do almost the same thing and hope for a different result. IMO, a strategic raid is a whole different thing than a CT strike; the intent is not to take out a few people, it should be to remove an entire operation with widespread simultaneous strikes, possibly in multiple nations without the consent of some which might entail airlanding as much as a Brigade to do the job and will probably entail heavy casualties and a few PWs and loss of a bunch of equipment. No need to worry about that in the near term; the political will to do it does not exist.
Today. Sooner or later, it will have to -- because what you're doing doesn't work either. Not because you aren't doing good work but because you'll leave, the next guy may be a schlunk and sooner or later we'll leave because we cannot correct 3,500 years of history in a generation, much less ten to twenty years and we can no longer afford the costs in all respects. The world has changed and we have tried to not change with it. We'd better start...
There is a lot of goodness in what Blue, Ken and Bill (to name but three) are posting. Most of the friction is on the edges, and not the core, of their arguments. This is why I am an advocate for "counter UW" against AQ rather than narrow, tactical CT; or broader, but not wholly appropriate COIN.
The recognition that AQ is conducting UW and then developing a comprehensive program of CT, COIN, Policy, Development, Capacity building, etc) under that umbrella provides a focus and flexibility that is sorely lacking under approaches to date.
Concepts like "SFA" and "IW" don't help me much, and I see them as buckets to dump problems in, that don't really help much to solve the problem. Counter UW goes straight to creating an understanding of the nature of the problem that facilitates solving it. To me that is helpful.
<b>Bill C.:</b>
This from the Clinton speech:<blockquote>"That should go without saying, but it needs to be not only repeated, but perhaps emblazoned as a set of principles that are guiding us. Democracy, human rights and development are mutually enforcing and they are deeply connected to our national security."</blockquote>That myth -- and it is a myth -- has been a guiding factor in US Foreign Policy for a good many years. It is used because it is able to be sold both US domestically politically and internationally as a benign intent. Actually, it is a very aggressive and malign goal.
It's also stupid but that's another thread...
That leads to your question:<blockquote>"Thus, should not AQ, COIN, our actions in Afghanistan, our view of problematic states and societies and the use of Special and other military forces throughout the world, etc., be viewed within the context of this, the actual (rather than the wished for) foundations of America's current (and recent) national security strategies?"</blockquote>Leaving aside AQ and Afghanistan as we are currently committed and must see them through in pretty much the mode we've started, the broader question of "COIN" in general and the use of military forces in our nominal current strategy can be addressed. I think first that it is not a strategy, it is merely a policy. Policies are produced by politicians who have many different goals but focus on the one important to them -- getting reelected or taking care of their friends and party. They bear considerable watching and merit virtually no trust...
The stated policy is deeply flawed as we have no inherent right to dictate to others what their form of governance and more importantly, are not capable of enforcing our will on other than a few nations -- thus we merely look like big hypocrites with such pronouncements and such a 'policy.'
That doesn't even address the issue of who determines what constitutes a failed or failing state...
Secondly you say "the actual (rather than the wished for)" foundations of our current security strategy. That is correct. Whether it should be correct and whether the US is best served by that flawed premise is another question. I believe history in the period of "Manifest Destiny" starting in the late 19th century and continued through Woodrow Wilson and up to the present day show that we have expended massive quantities of money and wounded generations of our young men and women in those backwaters Old Blue cites for little net gain.
We do not have the fiscal or practical capability to correct the attributes of every other nation to the extent some seem to envision. I would expect our national leaders to know better. Sadly, I think they do -- they also know how to sell snake oil and that's what has been and is being done. There are many far better ways to provide for US security than by dumb foreign adventures. I've been on those in a total of six nations and only one -- it a small one -- has had a lasting and beneficial impact. One was a great, glaring loss and not beneficial to us in any way. The rest were not a total waste but all would fail any reasonable cost benefit analysis. We're <i>supposed</i> to be smarter than that...
So yes, there is an <i>actual</i> policy. That actual policy certainly has not worked too well, history over the last 64 years tells us that. The policy is a relic of another era, it is dangerously deficient in many aspects and it needs to go. It needs to be rethought and replaced -- and any one of a number of <i>wished for policies</i> would be an improvement.
As you also point out, in the 19th Century:<blockquote>"...the lessened threat of great power war caused the great and rising powers to focus their attention, energies and resources on rapidly expanding their influence, values, culture and way-of-life outward into the nether regions of the world?"</blockquote>
You can consider them a justification if you wish, your prerogative -- but I suggest it was a self serving ploy then and it remains one today. It also did not really work then and it does not today. It's a deeply flawed policy and it should be retired as the relic it is.
Funny I don't recall us conducting effective Special Operations strikes agains AQ prior to 9/11, so I'm not sure how we were doing the same as we ever have. As a matter of fact I'm not convinced we're conducting effective SOF strikes against AQ now, so neither one of us can acccurately guage their effect.
Ignoring Afghanistan after the Soviets left was a bad decision and recognized as such by those in the know, but don't confuse providing post war economic and military assistance with conducting major military activities in their country. Those can be two separate events. Don't forget that when the Soviets pulled out they left a communist government in place, and we were still in the Cold War era then, so providing assistance to a Soviet installed government wouldn't have been a popular decision.
It is a fair assessment to say I'm advising doing CT strikes before they strike us. I also advocate providing economic assistance and providing support to help them develop their security forces, among other relatively low visibility activities that keep the host nation, while keeping us in the background as much as possible. I have been an advocate of this for my 30 plus years of service. Most Special Forces Soldiers are based on their unique location. Again that doesn't always equate to deploying a large military force.
Of course AQ has an imagine problem (they always have), they're nothing more than a much of murderers, yet they provide a means for certain segments of Muslim population to lash out. Where we disagree (I think) is what would have been the best course of action (in reality we'll never know). I believe if we did a punative raid in Afghanistan to kill AQ (and pursue them globally as necessary we would have seriously degraded them, since the entire world with the exception of a few crazies hated them after 9/11. With our current approach we have changed the image of the fight, it now looks like we're the ones responsible for all the innocent people suffering.
You're not going to take away AQ's rallying cry by occupying Afghanistan. Non Muslim forces occupying Muslim lands (quite different than helping with a small presence) provide a rallying cry in itself; you won't take way their arguments about Israel by building schools in Afghanistan; nor will you address the West's presence and support of a government in Saudi that they don't like by stabilizing Afghanistan. They have several rallying cries that have nothing to do with Afghanistan. Whether we win or lose in Afghanistan AQ will continue to exist. At best we'll defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Bill M: Just be direct about who the "some" people are who are idealistic flag-wrappers. Bear in mind that one man's experience does not detract from your own. What another individual has seen takes nothing from what you have seen. Take from his vision what you will, or get insulted by it and take nothing. Your choice. Each of our experiences put our ideas in context. You know the context of my experience.
I challenge your assertion that AQ is more popular now than it was in 2001. As a matter of fact, there are indicators that AQ has image problems. A lot of people have come under a lot of scrutiny because of their maneuver, and they are not happy about it. All available evidence indicates that your assertion that AQ popularity is high is a falsehood. If you have data to support their popularity, would love to see it.
No, I do not agree that we were sucked into any trap, and do I think that neither Afghanistan nor Iraq serve either their best interests or their preferences. Iraq resulted in AQ having to admit defeat and redirect their resources to Afghanistan, which showed a marked increase in certain operations when they did. They would prefer to be able to plot offensive activities in the west instead of having to defend their own backyards.
Insurgents are not insurgents because they want to be insurgents. They are insurgents because they do not have the strength to fight toe-to-toe. We have demonstrated a weakness against asymmetric threats. That is our failure, not their preference. Just because we are ill-prepared to fight in this end of the spectrum, don't think that it's a cake-walk for our enemies. This is not fun for them, because while we are not engaged in an existential struggle, they are. They never expected us to invade anybody. Perhaps a cruise missile strike, but to invade? Nah.
Plus, we didn't stay to do COIN/Stability Operations. We had no idea <i>what</i> we were doing. The COIN manual wasn't even published until December of '06, after we had been in Afghanistan for <i>five years</i>. The Stability Operations manual wasn't published until 2008. This has been a learning process, and most officers still haven't been learning because they haven't read those books or any other on the subject. The State Department only recently showed up in force, and the same goes for USAID. No, we didn't stay to do COIN and Stability. We only recently figured out that we needed to. We assumed, in both countries, that by removing the malignant regime, good governance and rule of law would sprout like flowers in the desert after a rain. Wow, what a disappointment that was.
Had we showed up in Iraq with those missions in mind and the training and manpower to do it, thousands of lives may have been saved. We simply didn't know what we were doing and many Army officers still try to approach it with a maneuver mindset. COIN is not a failure because it's flawed doctrine. It's a failure because so few actually bother to know how to do it. It's a testament to our professional officer corps that 15 of a hundred field grade officers who arrive in the country have read the manual. Over 90% of those who didn't will still see LTC at a minimum. Many of them already are LTC's.
I also disagree that radicals magically appear out of the dust. There are social factors that create conditions favorable to pushing people towards radicalism. Perceived injustices, for instance. Religious fanaticism, sure... but even that is usually based on some other factors that cause people to grasp at ideological straws, providing motivation to kill. But as I understand it, trying to assist in alleviating those factors that drive people to become amenable to becoming, say, a suicide bomber would be abhorrent as foreign policy.
As far as proving that removing the impetus to radicalism will decrease radicalism, you are asking me to prove a negative. But if our civil rights movement had not resulted in legislative and executive actions, what would the result have been? Can we look back and see the emergence of radical groups which began to attract adherents and which advocated violence? What happened to those groups when changes were made? Did the violence escalate, or did the groups fade until the last adherents were basically viewed as criminals for their violent tendencies and not activists or revolutionaries?
Understand that full-blown stability operations are an emergency procedure, the most extreme of which is counterinsurgency. So a stability-based foreign policy is not dependent on stability operations. In fact, a coherent policy would most likely help to avoid both insurgencies and possibly the need to conduct stability operations as major projects. Also bear in mind that stability and capacity do not equal American-style anything. If they want to be a monarchy (or whatever), so be it. It's not a force thing; it's an approach. Right now we toss the equivalent of 2LT's all over the world to do feel-good projects and call it the Peace Corps. But there is no linkage between digging a well in Rwanda and building their capacity to govern and develop, which could actually contribute to peace.
Well, you're in luck. John Brennan, Pres. Obama's CT advisor, wants to use proxies to fight against AQ and others. Combined with scalpel-like DA strikes, of course. So, you're winning the argument as far as the advisor to the current administration... and probably the next. Which is the same bullshit that got us here; funding proxies to fight our real enemies because we don't have the will to actually finish a job when we realize that it's a little bigger than we thought. We cannot take responsibility for the results of what we do, so to just come in, wreck something, and leave actually sounds like something we should do.
Because it has always worked before. Lets do more of that and see which one of our dogs bites us next.
Question: After being faced with two radicalized and ideologically-charged nation-state enemies in WWII, how did we de-radicalize them to the point that we cannot get them to swat a fly now? How did that work out? Contrast this with the Treaty of Versailles. Did it have the same effect? Was it in any way similar to the Marshall Plan? How did that work out?
Question: After contributing to a vacuum in Afghanistan after the Soviets left and manipulating the outcome of the remaining regime by proxy (when the mujaheddin around Kandahar refused to rocket the city because their families were in it, we paid Gulbuddin to do it for us... just an example), how did that work out for us?
Seemed cheaper at the time. Now, two buildings and 8,000 lives later, how does it look?
No, we cannot "fix" the world; but we don't have to be manipulative jackholes, either. Call that idealistic if you will, but returning to our old behaviors that didn't serve us well and helped create this environment just doesn't sit well with me, and that's what I'm hearing being advocated. All you're advising is that we do the CT strikes earlier in the lifecycle and hope that will have a different result.
Now, I have to go wrap myself in the flag and go to bed. It's late over here.
More from Sec. Clinton's national security strategy speech of May 5th (link at my 30 Aug, 8:26 PM comment above):
"We are in a race between the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration."
"Because universal values lie at the core of who we are, so they must lie at the core of what we do. We seek to solve problems because we are committed to global progress that promotes dignity and opportunity for everyone to live up to their God-given potentials. Values matter to our national security. That should go without saying, but it needs to be not only repeated, but perhaps emblazoned as a set of principles that are guiding us. Democracy, human rights and development are mutually enforcing and they are deeply connected to our national security."
Thus, should not AQ, COIN, our actions in Afghanistan, our view of problematic states and societies and the use of Special and other military forces throughout the world, etc., be viewed within the context of this, the actual (rather than the wished for) foundations of America's current (and recent) national security strategies?
Should we consider this approach/these justifications to be similar to those seen in earlier times (for example, in the 19th Century) wherein, like today, the lessened threat of great power war caused the great and rising powers to focus their attention, energies and resources on rapidly expanding their influence, values, culture and way-of-life outward into the nether regions of the world?
In simple terms one can view evaluate the strategy on costs versus benefits and don't forget effectiveness. Don't confuse "idalism" with a strategy. I can see some folks on this forum like to wrap themselves in the flag, but they shouldn't forget that the vast majority of folks that participate have made the same sacrifices and then some. When conducting our missions, we have "all" seen progress with the individuals and units we work with, but over time you realize that in itself doesn't equate success (it is simply dust in the wind without a winning strategy).
AQ as a mass movement: AQ had a following prior to 9/11, but they didn't become a true mass movement until we occupied their lands and gave their propaganda some real meat. That was the rallying cry for the global Muslim community, so I agree strongly with Jones that our approach was predictable and "exactly" what AQ leadership wanted. To clarify they were shocked by our initial operation that lost steam too quickly, but when they realized we were staying and going to do COIN/stability operations the opportunity was clear from their view. They had a great opportunity to wage the war of the flea and mobilize those Muslims so inclined to reject foreigners from Muslim lands. We changed the scope of the conflict from CT against AQ to something else entirely based on some flimsy idealistic views.
I agree with you 100% that our current direct action operational strategy is deeply flawed, and that our focus on targeting the leaders rarely works once the group has transitioned from a terrorist group to an insurgency (in some cases it will). It may be too late to rely on direct action, but I "believe" it would have worked if we did more of it shortly after 9/11 when we had the political will (well almost) and more support from the global community. The initial surge with CIA and SOF rocked AQ back on its heels, and if we continued the pursuit into Pakistan and terminated UBL and then LEFT we wouldn't have the problems we have today. Would another group emerge? Looking at it historically it is almost guarunteed. Will stability operations prevent it, almost guarunteed it will not. Cost versus benefits and don't forget effectiveness. I think you're arguing that if there is stability, then the ideals that emerge that drive folks to employ terrorism as a tactic will cease to emerge. Where has that ever happened? I have a son to, and I don't want to see our national wealth wasted on ill conceived strategy. None of what I'm saying is a reflection on what the men and women on point are doing at the tactical level, but rather a call for a coherent strategy to make those contributions more valuable.
<b>Old Blue:</b><blockquote>"The concept is not to fix the world."</blockquote>That's good because we cannot afford to do that, we are not capable of doing it and our attempts over the past 64 years have resulted in far more and more costly failures than successes...<blockquote>" The concept is that instability, in a globalized world, is an incubator for such extranational actors."</blockquote>I totally understand the concept and have participated in our chosen design for solving that little problem -- to little avail. The problem I'm highlighting is that is that our solution doesn't work that well and we need to revisit the design.<blockquote>"Go ahead and whack AQ. As long as the conditions exist, a new hydra will emerge. One approach is the Intel/SOF DA approach. I've seen how well that works here. If it were all that effective, there would not be a single group with a viable leader."</blockquote>In reverse order, the concept isn't that effective at the level at which it is being pursued.
I cannot comment on whether it works there or not though indications lead me to believe it works about as well as it did in Viet Nam. There it did a little good, very little, and some harm, not too much. On balance it was hardly worth the effort -- because it was under resourced (those pesky politicians again...) and was begun way too late in the effort that was the Southeast Asia War Games.
The Intel/SOF DA approach is a poor design -- to work, the intel has to be good and the target set has to be selected for quality, not quantity (which seems to be the current process; not likely to work all that well). Our Intel is not as good as it could or should be due to political tinkering and forced emasculation at the national level -- and that is the better intel of which I wrote, national level.
Using SF and the overdeveloped CIFs for the job is a poor plan; the SF guys should be doing the village living and training thing though it's really too late for that -- they should have been training the Afghans 20 years ago...
That they were not was due to the failure of that Polity bit I mentioned...
In any event, SF should be doing SF stuff, a separate and slightly larger than now crowd should be the DA specialists -- the GPF is also capable of doing such missions and should be more used (if we can stop the turf battles...). Regardless, AQ is but one entity, there are others that are arguably more dangerous out there. Regarding AQ, though, the option to decapitate them occurred several times in the 90s and the Politicians were too weak kneed to launch even though various folks were in a position to do so on a few occasions. The opportunity to modify history was presented and ignored.
The politicians at fault include those residing in the five sided funny farm who have over many years deliberately not fostered and developed a robust strategic raid capability in fear it might actually be used.
You are of course correct that if we do a poor job of removing threats, they'll just morph and re-arise. The solution is to do a better job of early aggressive and thorough decapitation and we are capable of doing that. We are unwilling to do it but we could -- and IMO, we should. We will have to do that eventually, might as well get good at it before we launch one that doesn't work well and brings on efforts to shut down the capability...
Because regardless of the desirability of righting the wrongs in the ungoverned, poorly governed or overly tolerant spaces and states, we cannot do that for the world IF we wait until the fire is out of control before sending in the intervention element.<blockquote>"I have seen this with my own eyes and cannot be talked out of knowing it. "</blockquote>Me too. Knowing it is why I say the approach is flawed. We wait until too late to do things, we use the wrong tools for the jobs and then we under resource them. I saw that -- and I'm sure you're seeing it today. It's the American way -- and it's dumb. We're capable of doing better and we owe it to the nation to try.<blockquote>" I have chosen a different path, and I believe that we can have a positive impact on our own national security over the long term by making smarter choices in the future.
This problem will not go away of its own accord, and we cannot kill our way out of it. "</blockquote>Again thank you for what you're doing. I totally agree with your belief and emphasize the need -- not desirability, need -- to make smarter future choices. That's my sole point in this thread. We are where we are in Afghanistan and we must do what we're doing. That you're a part of that is a plus. My concern and my comments, however, are for the future.
Also agree that the current problem and those yet to be will not go away of their own accord and that we cannot kill our way out of them. That applies everywhere and not just today. What we can do is pay attention, transcend US domestic Politics to be a bit more proactive (I hate that word...) in the world, fix the national intelligence apparatus, empower State, get the CoComs out of the foreign policy business, let SF do it's job and avoid diverting those trainers and combat leaders into Shooters, put them to work early in the process and better train our GPF for a role that we work hard to keep them from entering.
We can and should develop a strategic raid capability also employing the GPF for some missions because an adequately sized SOF force is not possible short of an existential war. That Raid capability, rapidly, aggressively and properly employed can establish a pattern that others, including non-state actors, will not wish to attract. IOW, lets use a really good fire extinguisher instead of throwing buckets of water and calling in the Fire Department a little too late.
That will be affordable and it'll keep a lot of people honest. More importantly, it'll allow failing states to fix themselves -- which they in any event ultimately have to do...
My sarcasm before was not intended to be mean-spirited, and I hope that all could see the humor intended in it as well as the points made, some admittedly barbed, a few of which have been discussed since.
Bill C.'s comment about AQ is good. AQ itself is a symptom and not the disease. Juxtapose this against McVeigh, who had no mass base. If McVeigh had a mass base, he would have been a symptom of a larger problem. AQ has a mass base, an avid audience that provides moral support, a recruiting base and financial support to continue operations. Without that mass base, bin Laden and his cronies are just crazy old men hanging out in a cave in Waziristan.
That is what they must be reduced to. They will have their Chauvins, but Chauvin was just that; the original Chauvinist. He had zero long-term impact on the world.
The concept is not to fix the world. The concept is that instability, in a globalized world, is an incubator for such extranational actors. Go ahead and whack AQ. As long as the conditions exist, a new hydra will emerge. One approach is the Intel/SOF DA approach. I've seen how well that works here. If it were all that effective, there would not be a single group with a viable leader. One of the three prerequisites for insurgency would be missing in each of Afghanistan's 364 districts. That is not the case. This is only one country. Expecting them to do it worldwide is not supported by their current results. They have their jobs, but they do not constitute a strategy. They do not solve this problem of the mass base of support, from whence fighters, funds and weapons come. Even here we have realized that a DA strike that removes a leader only creates a temporary vacuum and, lacking follow-on effects, will only result in a lull.
I have seen this with my own eyes and cannot be talked out of knowing it.
Post-WWII foreign policy involved a focus on anti-Communism, containment and meddling in the internal affairs of others in order to further those goals. Does anyone have a reasonable doubt that we are at least in part responsible for today's relations with Iran? We meddled in their internal politics and then sheltered the very target of their ire when they overthrew the leader we were instrumental in installing. We helped create al Qaeda through our support of anyone who opposed the Soviets in Afghanistan. It is time to learn from our mistakes and understand that the ability to provide effective governance and economic development eventually brings its own societal changes, which don't require engineering, that are generally positive. They decrease the ability of groups like AQ to attract a mass base.
What would have happened had we not funded the mujaheddin in the '80's? Would the Soviet Union still exist? Or were they doomed to fail under the weight of an unsupportable economic system? Have we in the US not been affected negatively by their collapse (Russian mafia, etc., who suddenly had freedom of movement)? Even in this case, local instability had a negative effect globally.
We, and the world, will always have our Timothy McVeighs. However, they are a criminal problem and not a national defense issue. We thought that the budding jihadists of the 70's and 80's were fringe groups with no mass base, and this saw the birth of Delta to stomp out grass fires like hostage-taking and hijackings. We supported some of these jihadists who were convenient allies at the time, not realizing that we were assisting the development of our own future enemies.
Our immediate objectives achieved, we abandoned Afghanistan to its own fate, secure in the knowledge that it was clean on the other side of the planet. What was the threat to us? The fact that it was then used as the incubator for the plots that brought us violent strikes on the scale of Pearl Harbor is ironic indeed. The grass fires are now raging forest fires that have the ability to affect large numbers of our own civilians on our own soil. This is not trivial, and while not existential it does fall into the realm of national security. Is the loss of a few thousand acceptable if the larger whole does not fall? What of the societal changes this causes at home?
We have spent billions, perhaps trillions, on international aid over the years. Largely on projects that were humanitarian in nature but have not brought any significant security benefits nor even necessarily goodwill. This is parallel to the lesson we have learned here in Afghanistan and discussed on another thread, where provision of social services and projects do not necessarily bring a positive effect for the counterinsurgent. We are currently dealing with the second and third-order effects of our previous foreign policy. Going forward, we need to look at the potential second and third-order effects of our foreign policy and our international assistance as an instrument thereof. The alternative is more activity such as the one in which I am currently involved.
Ken, I reached retirement age within a year after 9/11. I have volunteered for both of my tours and have been asked on a third by a brigade commander due to my experience specifically with COIN. I will probably go and do that, too, though I am tired and the marathon of this tour has gone into its 29th mile already. I have never turned down a call and in the absence I made the call. A big reason for that is that I have sons, too. One is a scant two and a half years from the age where he will make his choice after being raised by a father who believes in the Constitution, national service and the values of the Armed Forces. I've got lots of skin in this game. My personal blood and treasure. I could easily have sat it out, and have watched as others have made that choice and justified it. But I have chosen a different path, and I believe that we can have a positive impact on our own national security over the long term by making smarter choices in the future.
This problem will not go away of its own accord, and we cannot kill our way out of it.
I think we all need to sit back and exhale slowly. Then with a clear mind and put AQ into a more logical context. While it is a threat to the safety of our citizens, they are far from an existential threat to our nation. All the political crap during the election reminds me of another era, where every politician must exaggerate the threat to remain viable politically. Of course in the meantime we ignore much greater threats to our national interest, and are expending vital resources to chase a few freaking fleas with Bdes instead of small special operations teams.
What is the logic of deploying Bde after Bde to occupy countries that have ungoverned spaces (that is pretty large ink blot on the globe, and if this is really our strategy it can't stop at Afghanitan), or spend billions of our tax dollars in a doomed effort to develop all the undeveloped nations in the world, or attempt to re-educate the global masses to reject ideologies and militant methods we don't find gentlemenly or otherwise acceptable.
We're bleeding out resources in pursuit of what again? In the meantime we're undermining our national security by focusing on the flea and ignoring the real tigers in the world.
Some questions worth pondering: what would the world would like now if we didn't occupy Afghanistan or invade and occupy Iraq? What will Afghanistan and Iraq will look like 10 years from now? What are the greatest threats to our national interest? Are we really on the right path? Where will this path take us to if we're effective?
Terrorism has been with us from the beginning of history and will be with us until the end of history. We can kill them when we know they exist, but we're not to eliminate terrorism as a tactic. We'll even continue to have our own home grown terrorist groups and crazy individuals like Timmy McVeigh; that is the way of the world. Deploying our general purpose forces to swat at fleas won't change that.
<i>States and societies which are not organized, configured and/or grounded in certain of our ideals, principles and values; THIS being thought to be the primary obsticle to our achieving a just, sustainable, secure and prosperous international order -- and, thus, a safe and vibrant America.</i>
Why should such states be necessarily an obstacle to anything?
Look at North Korea, perhaps the ultimate example of a state that is "not organized, configured and/or grounded in certain of our ideals, principles and values". The presence of North Korea has not obstructed the emergence of the surrounding states, not has it had a significant negative impact on the US.
Of course such states can become a problem, if they attack other states, if they shelter non-state actors who attack other states, or if internal violence spills over to other areas. Those cases can be dealt with as seems fit, on a case to case basis. The mere existence of such states, though, is not a threat or obstacle to anyone but their own unfortunate inhabitants, and does not need to be seen as what it isn't.
With this understanding, AQ is conceived to be but a symptom of the overall problem.
The true problem being thought of as:
States and societies which are not organized, configured and/or grounded in certain of our ideals, principles and values; THIS being thought to be the primary obsticle to our achieving a just, sustainable, secure and prosperous international order -- and, thus, a safe and vibrant America.
<b>Old Blue:</b><blockquote>"Wow. You guys have made me realize that I've been wasting my time over here."</blockquote>I'm not sure anyone said that. I know I did not. My comment was not addressed at where we are, we're there and not being involved I can't really comment on that. My son who's there for his third trip can but I can't...<blockquote>"I now realize that everything I've done for a total of 26 months in this country has been a monumental waste of time and effort. When I think of how I've fooled myself, and how I've worked with others to see "progress" in little backwater places that don't really mean a thing to our national security... never did and never will... well, it shames me."</blockquote>No need to be shamed, even sarcastically. A lot of folks have been there or other places and done that or similar things -- but then you know that. Having done the backwater thing, I felt the same way at the time. No regrets, do it all again in a heartbeat. However, that does not mean all those things were wise or even really needed to be done no matter how important they seemed at the time...
Even when I could remember all the words to 'Old Blue' I saw flaws in using conventional forces in a FID effort. Not their bag and though they will give it their best shot, they'll never be good at it. Better plan is better intel, better 'diplomacy,' SF commitment early on and do our best to preclude the need for deploying the GPF.
I said above: <i>"Trying the COIN foolishness on any number of States is a softer easier road than a raid that hits the source of the problem, not the host -- and all the more or less innocents that will be inadvertently involved."</i> By that I meant easier on the politicians who will deploy people and resources without a qualm or a question, no matter how inappropriate the mission, rather than display the strength of character to order a strategic raid by DA forces -- or that same GPF -- taking the potential casualties, PWs and equipment losses to decapitate those non-state actors who will, in fact, just move to another location. Else you and I wouldn't have been in those fun backwaters...
The Politicians will take the easy on them, short term gain approach every time. National interest becomes secondary. It is easier for them to deploy massive force inappropriately and expensively than it is to prepare the right force and take rapid, decisive action that might be politically embarrassing or antagonize their base.
Anyway, I can't comment on Afghanistan and am not. I can discuss other wars in earlier times and I can extrapolate what I learned in a few and apply it to what I read and am told about the current ones -- from the Phillipines through Africa and Iraq to the 'Stan -- but if you take a look at my comment above, I'm not talking about Afghanistan -- Afghanistan is virtually on autopilot -- I'm talking about the future.
Thanks for what you're doing. Don't know about you but I'd really rather my kid didn't have to do what I did. He does and he likes it, so I guess it's okay in that sense. However, there really are better ways...
Thus, within the context I have outlined above, AQ does not seem to be either (1) the target or (2) the bullseye -- but only a small portion thereof.
Rather, "a world transformed" (to our liking) would seem to better explain our objective today.
And, within this context (the mission: "a world transformed"), rogue, weak, failing and failed states -- and different/problematic societies -- would seem to a better fit for the role of target/bullseye re: our recent, and our current, national security strategies.
COIN, as presently conceived, seems to lie within the context of a national security strategy discussed by Sec. Clinton on 5 May at the Brookings Institute
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0527_national_security.aspx
"In a nutshell, this strategy is about strengthening and applying American leadership to advance our national interests and to solve shared problems ... Our approach is to ... shape the global system so that it is more conducive to meeting our overridding objectives: security, prosperity, the explanation and spread of our values and a just and sustainable international order."
This, and national security strategies of recent administrations, seem to have a distinctive "offensive" (rather "defensive") tone.
Thus, COIN does not seem to be so much about AQ today as it does about "changing the world" (advancing our national interests, solving shared problems, shaping the global system, spreading our values, achieving a just and sustainable international order, etc.).
This seems to find the US military being used in unique and novel ways -- as part of the new "smart power approach -- which is wielded via "development," "diplomacy" and "defense."
Is this the real "kool aid" (objective: to "change the world"), of which COIN is but an (important) idea/method/part?
Wow. You guys have made me realize that I've been wasting my time over here. I've not only been drinking the KoolAid, but I've been pouring glasses of it for fourteen months and encouraging others to drink it. I can only thank God that most of the field grade officers I have ever met never read the book on it or tried to practice it beyond spending CERP for a bullet point on their OER. Imagine the time spent in pretending to train COIN in between simulated protests outside of simulated FOBs and kinetic events on every single training mission. All of that time could have been spent doing something realistic and relevant, like practicing battalion assaults in preparation for the inevitable Chinese onslaught across the Fulda Gap.
I even encouraged Afghans to believe in their own country. Boy, the joke is on them. I actually thought I had met scores of them who were smart, dedicated and patriotic. What a fool I've been. I now realize that none of these people are worth the effort because they are all corrupt, dirty misogynistic little peasants who are unsalvageable and bugger each other every Thursday, even if I never actually saw that. If they were worth a crap, they'd have found their way to America or stashed a bunch of money in Dubai. I now realize that everything I've done for a total of 26 months in this country has been a monumental waste of time and effort. When I think of how I've fooled myself, and how I've worked with others to see "progress" in little backwater places that don't really mean a thing to our national security... never did and never will... well, it shames me.
All of this time, I thought I was "learning" about how to do COIN right on the ground. I thought I had learned what "right" looked like. I thought it was all for own national security, that this place was important. Now, I find out that I don't even know what a "COIN Tactical Matrix" is and that it doesn't matter because it's all a failed expedition with no purpose. It's just like Vietnam, except for part about being bordered by other countries who are beset by their own ideological insurgencies and an openly hostile nation with a large military supported by two industrial powers on one side... which are really just trivial differences. Other than that it's the same, but it took me all this time to understand it.
Now I have learned that al Qaeda is conducting some kind of feint in Afghanistan, that it doesn't really need or care about this or any other failing or failed state. I've realized that their propensity to flock to failing states with significant Islamic populations is just confusing periodic migratory patterns with something that means anything. Now I realize that any little cell in any western country can wreak devastation without any external support, funding or expertise. Even if they got it, it could come from another little cell in another western country who secured it from no one in particular. I realize that safe havens are a complete fallacy. The threat could be, and is, everywhere. This is just a diversion to suck our resources overseas while the real enemy lies within our own borders, laughing at me and spending my own money to plot the deaths of my children.
Now, I realize that our strained but all-knowing and ingeniously disconnected intelligence apparatus combined with a small but impossibly effective Special Operations community is all that is really needed to deal with non-state violent actors. Because Superman really does exist, and he works with Batman. I've just been in their way this entire time, preventing them from achieving their purpose, sucking up their oxygen and eating all their rations.
As of tomorrow I am going to advocate the immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan of all forces so that the Afghans can sort themselves out in the absence of any external influence save Pakistan, which is how I now realize it should rightfully be. It's really all Afghanistan has ever needed. That, and to not appear to be between Russia and a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean.
I shall then spend my remaining two months in Afghanistan debunking GEN Petraeus' failed strategy. The power of the stateside wisdom in regards to the failure of this campaign... recognizing its failure even as my eyes were fooling themselves into believing I saw pockets of progress over the course of the past six months... well, all I can say is thank you. The thousands of miles of distance add a clarity that one cannot reach at this level.
And, finally, I am swearing off KoolAid. Except for the Raspberry kind, which mixes pretty well with that shitty iced tea from the DFAC.
I strongly disagree with Old Blue, but understand his reasoning. As Anon said it it the Kool Aid that the majority are drinking. Ken hit the nail on the head, we're pounding away shooting at the target frame, while the target is pretty darned safe. What Old Blue sees as an investment in security, I see as a bleed out of national resources to no end, and agree with Mr. Jones that we're actually getting played by AQ. Our involvement in quagmires is strategic success for them. Sending an elite strike force to kill the bastards would more effectively neutralized them than this global COIN effort. Ways and Means don't equate to the desired Ends except for AQ.
What Ken said. And to be clear, IMO we are being played equally hard by both AQ who is conducting UW to incite, support, and synergize these nationalist movements; and by the state governments who are largely waging very heavy handed CT efforts with our support to suppress the same to stay in power without having to evolve.
<b>Old Blue:</b><blockquote>"Non-state actors hiding in supposedly sovereign but unstable countries have achieved such things without offering the large target that nation-states offer..."</blockquote>Totally true, therefor why direct attention at the State, failing or otherwise? That's the wrong target and the one the bad guys want us to go for...<blockquote>"...Remember; we once lobbed 63 cruise missiles at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to little effect other than to give al Qaeda a concept and impetus to develop the largest and yet cheapest cruise missiles in the world...</blockquote>True, really, really dumb effort on our part. If we had instead launched the same number of well trained people to do the decapitation...
We have the capability to do that and could enhance the capability we now have. All that's lacking is the political will (that applies to within and without DoD...)<blockquote>"We cannot provide ourselves security cheaply and easily. Those who seek a softer, easier road inevitably fail at nearly anything they seek to do."</blockquote>Couldn't agree more. Attempts to correct "failed/failing states" or "supposedly sovereign but unstable countries" are addressing the symptoms, not the problem. Don't shoot at the target frame, the Bullseye isn't there...
Trying the COIN foolishness on any number of States is a softer easier road than a raid that hits the source of the problem, not the host -- and all the more or less innocents that will be inadvertently involved.
Such efforts also play to the strengths of those non-State actors who will just move elsewhere.
We're being played -- and we're falling for it.
Old Blue,
I used to drink the same Kool Aid you're drinking and have been involved in the fight for several years, and I know longer buy these arguments of denying safe haven by establishing stable governments. First off we can't afford to do it around the globe. Second, even in the unlikely event we establish a stable government (they still won't be able to control their entire country) in Afghanistan, that won't stop AQ. Again terrorists throughout history have formed operational cells in the West (stable governments), so while they may not have big camps with monkey bars they'll still be able to operate.
Not all of us that are opposed to our strategy are recommending a softer approach, we're recommending a more aggressive approach to find and kill the terrorists, and let the State Department, USAID and a small JUSMAG work the very slow process of building stability in the nation. Our Army is expending a lot of resources and getting very little in return.
So in response to your views, many of us no longer agree with them. Who knows we may both be right or wrong in the end, but for one I'm tired of expending excessive resources for little in return.
Dr. Metz attacks the concept that al Qaeda needs sanctuary, but this is belied by al Qaeda's actions. In fact, their main effort has consistently been <i>our</i> main effort. In fact, it is readily observable the increase in violence in Afghanistan following al Qaeda in Iraq's collapse. While Dr. Metz's argument <i>sounds</i> reasonable, why do the actions of al Qaeda seem to refute it?
Dr. Metz completely ignores the concept that in a globalized world, instability and failed/failing states are a security risk for all. A failure to at least consider this aspect leaves a gaping hole in his discussion, for if it is not addressed, then his conclusion appears to be only partially considered.
Dr. Metz also appears to fail to consider the second and third order effects of ceding Afghanistan. A perceived "loss" in Afghanistan would embolden al Qaeda and provide both legitimacy and momentum to a movement that has largely lost both in the intervening years.
Finally, but related to the point about instability; it provides birthing grounds and fuel for non-state actors who are now capable of exporting violence on a formerly nation-state level. How would Germany have loved to topple two of the largest building in New York City, or the Soviets have loved to punch a hole in the Pentagon? They were never able to achieve this, in part because they were rather large targets themselves and would suffer retribution. Non-state actors hiding in supposedly sovereign but unstable countries have achieved such things without offering the large target that nation-states offer. Remember; we once lobbed 63 cruise missiles at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to little effect other than to give al Qaeda a concept and impetus to develop the largest and yet cheapest cruise missiles in the world. We cannot provide ourselves security cheaply and easily. Those who seek a softer, easier road inevitably fail at nearly anything they seek to do.
Finally, what of the pronouncement of the President in the 2002 State of the Union Address that state sponsors of terrorism were subject to forcible regime change? Did the President of the United States not state policy at that point? Has this policy ever been refuted or retracted?
A question: Does anyone know what a COIN Tactical Matrix is? It does not exist in doctrine and a quick search of the internet brings up only one mention of it anywhere; in this thread. The closest thing that I can think of to it is the Tactical Stability Matrix, which is not COIN but from FM 3-07, Stability Operations. COIN is a subset of Stability Operations as far as the Army and Marines are concerned, but the Joint world does not view it this way. Someone help me out, because I've never heard of it before.
With such a "friend" as Karzai (firing his anti-corruption AG and wanting all PSD companies out of Afghanistan) WHY do we even need a strategy when Karzai is driving the strategy---or did I miss something--or maybe he knows something the entire IC does not know?
Hamid Karzai has ordered the disbanding of military contractors in Afghanistan. I had written and asked Tim Lynch for his reaction, and he gives it to us here.
As the fighting season continues the good guys are losing more land and population to the various insurgent groups operating in the country. Teams of doctors are being murdered in the remote provinces, attacks are launch inside the ANP "Ring of Steel" anytime the Taliban feels like it, and so where is the focus of the Afghan government? On private security companies of course... yes why not? Now is exactly the right time to make all PSCs illegal and let the ANP and ministry of the interior (MOI) provide security to convoys military bases, and all the mobile security for internationals working in the reconstruction sector. Ignoring that there are not enough Afghan security forces to go around as it is and also that their proficiency in preforming these tasks is suspect (to put it politely) what about the money? We already pay for the ANP and ANA - if they are going to provide mobile and static security then I guess the millions of dollars being paid to private companies will no longer be needed right? Right. The problem is one can predict with 100% certainty what will happen if President Karzai goes through with this crazy scheme. The logistics pipeline will start to rapidly dry up , internationals will be unable to move without their (mandated by contract) expat security teams and their projects will ground to a halt. Military operations will have to be suspended because there will not be enough Afghan Security Forces to both fight and provide theater wide static and mobile security support. And of course there are yet more millions of dollars to add another chapter in the long saga of wasted OPM (other peoples money) by our respective governments.
I cannot for the life of me imagine how this law is going to work out. There are (in my opinion) more international PSD teams then needed - why do EuPol police officers need PSD teams to drive them around Kabul? They have guns and armored vehicles already and should be capable of taking care of themselves. Why do the contract police trainers needs a whole section of dedicated PSD specialists? It is a crazy waste of money to have armed international PSD teams guarding armed ISAF personnel but it is also currently a contractual requirement. For companies working outside the wire in the reconstruction sector the absence of international PSD teams will also have a huge impact on the ability to get insurance for their internationals at reasonable rates. At exactly the time that internationals operating outside the wire need to be armed the laws are changing to make it illegal for internationals who are not ISAF military members to be armed. How are we supposed to operate now?
Tim is accurate and smart in his assessment as always, but he is just being nice to Karzai. Hamid Karzai is a stooge, and there is no possible way that this will work. Logistics and force protection will break down. We dont have enough troops as it is, and that goes for contractors too. Standing down even a portion of either category will spell death to the campaign. In fact, there are approximately as many contractors as there are troops in Afghanistan, doing everything from intelligence to cooking, from force protection to FOB construction, from fire fighting to translation. Whether KBR, Xe, Triple Canopy, Dyncorp, or smaller companies like Free Range International, contractors are needed, and needed badly. Karzais plan will be stopped before being implemented.
Carl said:
"The very small part of our economy devoted to the Afghanistan effort will not make or break us. If it got to that point we would have already collapsed. Entitlements are what threatens us economically, not a Marine battalion in Helmand."
The fact is that debt is a threat to national security, and the costs of war in Iraq and Afghanistan are a significant contributer to that debt. The defense budget is the single largest discretionary expense in the federal budget.
The great powers of Europe were the superpowers of their day until WWI financially ruined them - victors and vanquished alike. We'd be wise to learn the lessons of history.
Carl:
That is so so true. It is baffling. Maybe Im too naive but I simply do not understand why the US, UK and other allies as well as multilateral institutions dont confront the Pak Army/ISI/Taliban issue once and for all.
Its like the worst kept secret. We tip-toe around this issue. Nothing is resolved, abuse continues and our troops are being indirectly killed by this evil alliance. Pakistan is doing what Australians call "taking-the-piss" out of us.
A multifaceted strategy needs to be debated by world leaders and implemented by responsible member states of the international community.
We have tried to re-stablise failed or failing states through military intervention. Perhaps we need to abandon the usual shuttle diplomacy for a new formula of re-stablisation for a nation on the cusp.
Madhu:
Perhaps you asking THE question. Why do we keep doing this? Everybody knows what is going on, even the Taliban commiserate with us when it comes to dealing with the Pakistani Army/ISI. They have to deal with those guys, they are the only game in town for them. Why we do it? Count me among the totally confused.
The only thing I can figure that makes any sense is what you suggested, the human frailty of the inside the beltway ruling class. I am more cynical that you though. I think for them to acknowledge the perfidy of the Pak Army/ISI and act upon it would be to also acknowledge that they have been made fools of for years and years. That, they won't do. I can't see somebody like Adm. Mullen, after all the news stories about how he is Kayani's buddy and how important that is; I can't see him conceding that he had been a mark for a proficient con man.
At the group blog ChicagoBoyz there is a discussion going on about the topic "Afghanistan 2050".
Dr. Metz has also guest posted there as part of the discussion (I post at CB too, and it is a bit rude to self-promote, I know, but the other day I lost my temper at Abu Muqawama and "sock-puppeted" myself so I seem to be in the mood to behave badly online lately. Throwing the "trons" around is not good for some of us apparently. At any rate, here is a link to one contribution:)
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/14849.html/comment-page-1#comment-337527
I will ask the same question here that I asked in the comments over there. I think it is relevant to the question at hand:
"I am going to ask an impolitic question: do you think that the nature of the Beltway establishment makes it more likely that things remain static? We have a generation of inside the Beltway decision makers within the State department, the Pentagon etc. that have grown up working within and with certain strategic partners. Perhaps - and I dont mean this negatively, we are human and emotional creatures - this makes it more difficult to think creatively?"
I hope the above isn't rude or conspiratorial, but it seems as if the world is changing in ways that make our standard institutional players and policy-makers uncomfortable and perhaps it is easiest to go back to what you know: strategic partnerships that have worked in the past whether it be NATO or Pakistan or whatever. (Perhaps the only real contribution I can make to such an educated discussion is to let some of <strong>you</strong> know how confused some of <strong>us</strong> <em>are</em> out here. This will probably get me laughed at but I am glad Gen. Petraeus is going to do a little more public speaking about the war.)
I do not think Dr. Metz's op-ed is very good.
He argues that the 9-11 attack could have been planned and plotted anywhere. In support of that argument he states "no one has made a persuasive case that the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks would not have happened had al-Qaeda not had bases in Afghanistan." Therefore who rules in Afghanistan is of small import. He is asking that foreign policy be predicated on proving a negative. That is not a practicable thing. It is asking that we not do something about a place whence death came because how do we know it wouldn't come from somewhere else? That line of reasoning appears to be a recipe for erudite paralysis. No one can ever know that but you had better do something about the place you know about or you are likely to get hit again.
It is fashionable to talk of computers allowing terrorists to function anywhere but that always neglects the fact that they have to live and be somewhere. They can plot and throw trons around from any place but eventually they actually have to do something, buy things, train, put things together etc, and they have to do that somewhere. If that somewhere has an even marginally proficient police force they are likely to come to somebody's attention and get picked up. They hang around the places they hang around because there are no police forces that can or will do anything to them. They are not there because it is convenient, but because it is vital.
Dr. Metz states simply funding anti-Taliban forces will prevent an outright Pakistani Army/ISI/Taliban victory. That may or may not be true (ask the South Vietnamese about the constancy of American support after we pull out) but even if it is it sets the Afghans up for conflict without end. We would be asking them to keep on dying without assuring them we will back them to win. That is cynical.
He argues that even if the Pak Army/ISI/Taliban prevailed in Afghanistan, they wouldn't provide sanctuary for AQ because they would be scared of what us Americans would do. Why on earth would they be afraid of us? They would have just booted us out of the country. They would have beaten us, and they would have done it with AQ's help and without ever having renounced their support of AQ. The Pak Army/ISI/Taliban's understanding of American history is as good as the next guys and they know that once we bug out, we won't be back.
His final point is that if the whole thing went to hell it would not make any difference because "There is no reason to believe that if al-Queda somehow recreated its pre-September 11 Afghanistan sanctuary that the United States would not quickly destroy it." How exactly would we go about doing that? The last time we had to invade the place. How would we know where anybody or anything was to destroy? How could we apply sufficient destructive force? Why would they be impressed by anything short of another invasion which won't happen.
Finally, an op-ed on this subject without one word about the Pakistani Army/ISI just isn't serious.
T.J.L.
The very small part of our economy devoted to the Afghanistan effort will not make or break us. If it got to that point we would have already collapsed. Entitlements are what threatens us economically, not a Marine battalion in Helmand.
I suspect that we may be dealing more with flawed policy than with flawed strategy in Afghanistan. Strategy is the means by which policy goals are pursued, and I don't see how it's possible to develop a focused, coherent, practical strategy to advance a nebulous, hesitant, and unrealistic policy. Our policy in Afghanistan, to the extent that it is discernable at all, does seem to fit that description.
RE: Dave Maxwell
Your point is well taken. Perhaps geography is too broad a term. I refer specifically to the physical terrain, i.e. that terrain-focused operations are less important in today's security environment.
As you point out, knowing the cultural "landscape" has never been more important. The point being that our stated purpose of "denying safe haven" to terrorists and our associated strategy of controlling physical locations on the face of the planet are less important in a battle of ideas.
I do not make the case that terrain-focused operations are without merit, however, I would say that their relative importance has diminished.
With all due respect to T.J.L and Starbuck; I do not think geography, and in particular military geography, is less important in a globalized world. We had long forgotten the defintion of and need for understanding military geography prior to 9-11 and OEF and OIF. Had we been educating our force about military geography as part of our professional military education we might not have had to come up with human terrain teams. I offer a definition for consideration:
"Military Geography is the study of the linkages between humans and the natural and cultural landscape insofar as it pertains to the employment of military force."
--Peltier and Pearcy, 1966
We should be studying this as part of education as matter of routine vice exception (or worse having to contract out for this expertise)
Starbuck makes a great point. One of the features of warfare in a globalized, connected world is the geography and terrain become less important. Of course, it is hard to formulate a strategy for, much less sell the American people on a war in the cognitive domain. I doubt many Americans even know what the term cognitive means.
There are many reasons cognitive war looks scary, not the least of which is that it is abscract concept. By nature, we long for the concrete. We have even decided that people are like terrain, hence "Human Terrain Teams", all in a effort to bring the abstract closer to a world that is concrete and quantifiable.
A strategy to deny "safe haven" for terrorists is questionable at best. Safe haven could be the the office of the jihadi down the street from you who uses the internet to access jihadist sites.
I disagree with the Obama Administration's assertation that al-Qaeda would be able to operate with impunity if they were allowed back into Afghanistan. They can already operate with near-impunity in Pakistan, due to its nuclear arsenal. The US wouldn't dare unleash a large-scale assault on Pakistan as it did Afghanistan.
I nominate T.J.L.'s wise words for the quote of the week:
"This seems to indicate the very real possibility that even a successful counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan may ultimately result in strategic defeat if it creates deficits so great that the economic viability of the United States is permanently damaged."
As always, Dr. Metz makes a great point.
Many times I notice that the two sides of the COIN debate seem to be talking past each other. Advocates argue that COIN can win in Afghanistan, just as we (presumably) did in Iraq (a verdict on which the jury is still out).
Meanwhile, opponents argue the point that even if COIN can prevail in Afghanistan, is it worth the effort?
As Dr. Metz points out, it is important to determine if the expected benefits of a strategy are worth the costs. We can look at this from many points of view. Take, for example, the economic costs.
Consider the following:
1. According to FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, "1-134. Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures
of time and resources."
2. CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen recently stated "Our national debt is our biggest national security threat."
This seems to indicate the very real possibility that even a successful counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan may ultimately result in strategic defeat if it creates deficits so great that the economic viability of the United States is permanently damaged.
Dr Metz raises an excellent broad point and one that the Obama Administration should articulate.
If I can make a couple of further points:
1) It is also true that the geographical terrain is not as important as how actions are perceived by groups or populations via communications. That is, the communication of al-Qaeda's act is more important than the act itself. Sure al-Qaeda may move from one failed host state to the next, whether it be Afghanistan, Yemen or Somalia. Further, our own mainstream media organisations fall for this every time and treat their radical rants and reports of international force atrocities as statements of fact.
2) it is an indictment on the rest of NATO that the individual European leaders do not make a direct and coordinated, multilateral effort on Pakistan. From an Australian perspective once again its being left to the allies of the 'New World'.
For all the EU's emphasis on human rights and democracy, with a $35b annual aid budget, they do very little in Pakistan, particularly over the last 10 - 15 years. Surely a stable Pakistan is also in the interests of EU security? Much of the al-Qaeda network has weaved its way through European nations and has launched attacks or attempted to launch attacks on European soil.
While Dr Metz's article is focused on US security strategy vis-a-vis Afghanistan/Pakistan, it is important that the EU is held accountable for their failure to share the load.
Dr Metz speaks truth to the power of the Coin Tactical Matrix; hopefully strategists and not Coin tacticians are listening. Pay attention especially to Steve's last paragraph where he says this:
"But in strategy, balance is the key--the expected security benefits of any action must justify the costs and risks. Today, America's Afghanistan strategy, with its flawed assumptions, is badly out of balance."
And it is in strategy that the US is failing in Afghanistan (just like it did in Vietnam). Current talk by senior Army officers and Generals of trying to extend the President's 18 month deadline in Afghanistan to allow their Coin theory to work reminds one of Sun Tzu's prescient warning that "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
gian
Forgive me, perhaps I am on the wrong track, but isnt this really about Pakistan at this time line? A nuclear country that views certain Afghan Taliban groups it supports as strategic to nuclear Indias influence in Afghanistan?
So do we need the large U.S. footprint in S.E. Asia? Sure, but not to neutralize al-Qaeda, only to keep Pakistan happy, but under the pretext that we are there to prevent the Taliban from re-assuming control and inviting al-Qaeda back.
If I am correct, President Obama and his national security team understand this and don't have a flawed strategy at all. It is the only strategy they know they can sell to the American public.