by James R. Van de Velde
Download the Full Article: Bring It On Worked
Through accident or design, mostly through accident and blunt trauma, the war in Iraq was brutal, costly in lives and money, and heavy-handed, but dealt al-Qa'ida a severe blow -- hopefully a fatal one and even better, a self-inflicted blow. By creating such a rallying cry for the West's alleged 'war against Islam,' thousands of al-Qa'ida fighters were directed to Iraq where they trained and committed terrorist acts. These acts killed the perpetrators, of course, and killed thousands of innocent Muslims and many American, and Coalition soldiers and civilians. But the attacks revealed al-Qa'ida's brutish nature, its willingness to kill Muslims, and its goal of achieving chaos and totalitarian rule in pursuit of deposing 'apostate regimes' and restoring a new Caliphate (under al-Qa'ida rule, of course) -- all of which undermined its legitimacy.
Download the Full Article: Bring It On Worked
James R. Van de Velde, Ph.D., a former Lecturer of Political Science at Yale University and a former Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval Intelligence (Reserves), is a counter terrorism and WMD expert at the international consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton.
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Comments
One way to look at it is that al-Qaeda in Iraq helped to consolidate a lot of the actual and potential radicals who existed in 2003 - largely from outside Iraq - to rally them under one organization, to put them into contact with one another and, in doing so, to make it easier for us to target them.
Mr. Torch,
You make several legitimate arguments. Thanks for commenting!
Certainly Iraq undermined *our* credibility and narrative too (Abu Graib; inexcusable collateral damage; war atrocities; perceptions of occupation), but at least the US tries to take responsibility, adjusted its strategy by successfully devising the Anbar Awakening and is now leaving Iraq altogether. AQ still claims that Iraq is its 'central battlefield - meaning, presumably, that it will stay and continue its insane strategy of killing Iraqis indefinitely to liberate Iraqis.
If the counter insurgency goal is to defeat AQ by eliminating its recruitment, then I would still argue that Iraq hurt AQ more than it helped, given how it is impossible for AQ to claim that it is the vanguard of Muslims.
I dont think we know that there are more AQ franchises today than there were pre-2003. Many new AQ groups are Muslim groups that are so weakened that they joined AQ to gain some visibility. Anecdotal evidence suggests AQ is today stretched, thin, weakened, ideologically confused and tainted.
While its true that Zawahiri denounced Zarqawis brutishness, it was too little and too late and the damage to AQs brand was significant. Its really impossible to separate AQI from AQ, despite their internal squabbles. Its really a Western media fiction that they are separate entities. (Many AQ regional groups claim they are separate from AQ senior leadership, but they all share now AQs brand.)
The ISI kills Iraqis, but its not really a credible political challenge to the Iraqi regime. ISI is just a horrid murdering machine with zero chance of victory in Iraq. If it were smart, it would claim some sort of victory and leave. The fact that it continues in Iraq is not evidence of its success, but its stupidity.
The counter narratives you cite against America are the same ones AQ has used for years - they are lame, and work on the many Muslims who are poorly informed. Such manipulation would have continued with or without the US invasion of Iraq. And although AQ can attempt to cite these new US 'crimes in Iraqi, such arguments are overwhelmed by AQ hypocrisy, given the comparatively larger crimes AQ has committed in Iraq. In all conflict, both sides find examples to support their narrative.
There is no evidence that AQ recruiting has benefited from the increasing hostility toward Muslims. (What increasing hostility?)
US missteps in Iraq are insignificant when compared to the damage AQ has committed against its brand. It is not a governing alternative. If prospective recruits consider AQ counter to Islam, AQ will suffer. Luckily it has, and will continue to suffer from its experience in Iraq. Our objective now should be to push these counter narratives AQ has created for itself within the larger, disaffected (but not yet violent) Muslim community to stall any additional recruitment.
I'm going to disagree with Dr. Van de Velde: I think AQ's balance sheet from Iraq is a net positive, though perhaps a small one.
Prior to the US invasion, AQ had no meaningful presence in Iraq. Its message blaming America for the ills suffered by pious Muslims relied on drawing out linkages between the US and Israel, as well as those between the US and Arab regimes. Today, AQ has been able to leverage America's strategic errors (Abu Ghrayb especially) to increase its stable of "franchises" and flesh out the details of what it describes as an American war on Muslims.
Dr. Van de Velde makes a significant point regarding AQ's strategic blunder, but I think he mistakes the zeal of Abu Musab al Zarqawi for the AQ strategy. AMZ's propensity to attack both Shia Iraqis and Sunni tribal leaders was a mistake for two reasons: it upset the traditional leadership structure which AQ has insinuated itself in elsewhere, while unveiling AQ's eliminationist intentions toward Shia Muslims. In that light, AMZ's actions have set back the political appeal of the Islamic State of Iraq, but the ISI remains a major challenge for the Iraqi government.
But I disagree with Dr. Van de Velde's assertion that this has fundamentally damaged AQ's strategic position. It has made it difficult for AQ to portray itself as the protector of Muslims, certainly. But there is no credible moderate Muslim opposition to America's policies supporting Israel and the authoritarian Arab states, leaving AQ in sole possession of the resistance market. And in the meantime AQ has made important progress.
In contrast to 2003, AQ has a viable franchise in Iraq capable of challenging the elected government's security forces with a low-level bombing campaign. It has a robust strategic narrative linking American invasions to internationally-documented abuses of Muslim men. The AQ recruiting campaign has benefited from these abuses, and from the increasing hostility toward Muslims and Islam being voiced in American public discourse. The public image of the United States has been tarnished by its deliberate violation of international norms, first to invade Iraq, second in its handling of captured Iraqis and extremists of other nationalities. America has been forced to expend massive amounts of money, manpower, and time to establish and protect a government in Iraq. This expenditure of resources represents an opportunity cost, money not spent shoring up the weakened American economy. All of this roughly fits AQ's strategy of emulating the war of attrition waged by the Afghans against the Soviets in the 1980s, which to their mind weakened the Soviet Union and brought about its collapse. Whether or not that perception is accurate is another issue- it's a good story line that's easy to believe.
AQ has significant challenges, to be sure. The American drone campaign continues to degrade its stockpile of combat commanders. The barriers to executing complex attacks of the scope of 9/11 are significantly higher. The security apparatus of major Arab states has become increasingly capable of rooting out AQ's adherents, forcing them to remove to the geographic periphery (but cultural heartland) of Yemen. Iraq is ultimately only one theater among many, and it can still facilitate and coordinate activity in Afghanistan.
In balance, I think that while "Bring It On" forced AQ to make a single costly mistake, AQ is better off because America has made several.
In the spirit of constructive debate, I respectfully challenge those who have commented on this analysis.
First, the article argues that Iraq was a disaster for al-Qa`ida - something I absolutely believe. The article specifically does not address the shrewdness of the Iraq war overall. AQs experience in Iraq cost it money, thousands of jihadist lives, undermined its narrative, diverted attention, sucked operatives from around the world into Iraq but most importantly shattered any Muslim perception that al-Qa`ida was fighting for Muslim liberation. In Iraq, AQ killed Muslims by the thousands and Muslim support for AQ dropped to zero inside Iraq and was halved around the world. The analysis does not say the war was a 'good or 'bad thing - only what it cost AQ. The article specifically does not debate the Iraq war - only what it did for injuring AQ.
Of course other counter terrorism efforts hurt AQ too worldwide. But the article is about what has hurt AQ most worldwide. Its about how AQ picked a strategy ('kill Iraqis to win over Iraqis) that is impossible to succeed. In fact, the more it pursues its strategy, the less credibility and voice it enjoys worldwide. Imagine if AQ only attacked US forces inside Iraq - what a difference in credibility it might have made.
9/11 did not reveal AQs brutish nature to Muslims--it was the killing of 100,000 Iraqi Muslims that revealed AQs brutish nature to Muslims. Iraq revealed UBLs and AQs narrative to be a fraud. Only through such counter narratives can and will AQ die.
The article specifically acknowledges the effect the US invasion had in creating more recruits for AQ. But those who point this out have a hard time estimating whether the overall gain for AQ outweighed AQs loss in Iraq. I think it was a loss - and a big one.
James Van de Velde
I think Rex raises some legitimate and thoughtful reactions to this paper.
<blockquote><em>"... the war in Iraq also facilitated the spread of the AQ franchise to AQIM, AQAP, and al-Shabaab."</em></blockquote>
I am curious, though, if this is really a negative. There were already militants in those locales. Now they've taken up the AQ brand image. Does that make them significantly more effective? Or does it create an opportunity for us to exploit?
<blockquote><em>"If one talks to regional security officials in the ME they'll tell you, strenuously and in no uncertain terms, that US intervention in Iraq made their jihadist security challenges greater, not smaller."</em></blockquote>
I wonder if this is a horrible turn of events. Does this prompt those officials to take the security challenges more seriously? To see greater convergence of our interests with theirs in the battle against AQ and other terrorist organizations?
Basically what came to pass in Iraq is evidence of the nature of war's three forces acting on one another: unpredictable, irrational, and rational. US thought it could create a new democratic Iraq by ousting Saddam, using the license of GWOT. The chaos of occupation created a power vacumm that brought Muslim extremists into play for this political jump ball. They thought they could turn Iraq into a radical Islamic state at a strategically ideal location. Their methods brought about their unpredictable demise, namely the reaction of Iraqis to "throw the bums out". From our perspective this Iraqi response created a Al Qaeda Salt Lick that we and the Iraqis benefited from. Totally unpredictable.
Rather than Bring It On, concentrating on Afghanistan and Pakistan would have made more sense. The 100,000 dead in Iraq cannot be good for us in the long run no matter how you try to assign the deaths.
I just dont think we are very good at this information war stuff, either with the Muslim world or our own people. Very few in the US know that that many have denounced AQ.
Steve
A agree with the above comments.
I thought we had done away with the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flypaper_theory_(strategy)">"Magnet Theory"</a> of counter-terrorism.
The conclusion is simply incorrect. If the premise of this paper were true, Bin Laden would be dead or captured, not a fugitive.
It is a mistake to use Al Qaida and their Iraq franchise interchangeably. Bin Laden's core group was never betrayed by the population nor did AQ overplay their hand in their treatment of the population.
The extreme differences in the leadership styles of Abu Musab al Zarqawi and Usama bin Laden are well documented but ignored in this paper. Furthermore, the fact that Iraqis spend over 35 years under a dictatorial and murderous regime yet Saddam is not even mentioned. Did he not leave an impression on Iraqis worthy of mentioning?
The rather fundamental problem with this piece is that it fails to recognize the extent intervention in Iraq created a "surge" in membership for al-Qa'ida and AQ wannabe groups. Certainly, AQ and AQI were badly hurt thereafter, but AQI--which didn't even exist prior to 2003--is infinitely larger and more deadly than it was before US intervention. AQ core has been weakened, but I would argue that this is largely a function of intervention in Afghanistan and related activities, and has little to do with events in Iraq. Indeed, the population of Afghanistan and much of the population of Pakistan pay little attention to AQI atrocities (in Iraq)--and any decline of AQ support there has far more to do with events closer to home. the war in Iraq also facilitated the spread of the AQ franchise to AQIM, AQAP, and al-Shabaab.
If one talks to regional security officials in the ME they'll tell you, strenuously and in no uncertain terms, that US intervention in Iraq made their jihadist security challenges greater, not smaller.
The argument presented, I think, is rather akin to setting a house on fire, saving half the furniture, and calling it a victory--except that in this case the victims were tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians.
The problem with thinking "Bring 'em on" (Bush's actual quote - "Bring It On" is a movie about cheerleaders) worked is that in 2003 Iraq had a powerful police apparatus that could deter AQ. Saddam no more wanted AQ in Iraq than we wanted AQ in the US. Unless you believe Bush and Cheney planned 9/11. But I digress.
Today, AQ can work in a much more permissive environment in Iraq than under Saddam's rule.
So, the net of the whole thing has us losing 4,500 KIA, and ten times that in WIA, we spent a trillion dollars or whatever and -- we weakened- Iraq's ability to fight AQ.
Good going George.
Had we just left them alone Saddam would probably be gone (he was born in 1937), and we'd have our people whole, and our money; we wouldn't have made a mockery of the UN Charter that WE WROTE, wouldn't have shown that the US Army is a lot more like the French army of 1940 that it was the US Army of 1945, and would not have made a mockery of everything the country stands for.
I call BS on the good PhD. He can't posibly believe what he wrote in this article.
Walt
I would have thought flying aircraft into the WTC and Pentagon would have sufficed to show the brutish nature of AQ.
The invasion of Iraq was a disaster for the US, and nothing else.
Here is the famous (but not famous enough) clip of Dick Cheney in 1994 predicting disaster if we invaded Iraq.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YENbElb5-xY&feature=player_embedded
Once it was shown it would make him personally very very wealthy, he apparently changed his mind.
Walt
I note Dr. Van de Velde falls into the possible trap with his statement in part, "the lack of sustained al-Qa'ida violence in the United States, Europe and in Asia suggest that, yes, it did hurt al-Qa'ida more than it helped."
Equally, the case can be made that since the attacks of 11 September 2001, international law enforcement and homeland security has tightened the security envelope restricting the space al-Qaeda now has to operate and may be a more important factor in limiting any further terrorist attacks in the West and in Asia than AQs defeat in Mesopotamia?
If Afghanistan was supposedly always the real war, and momentum, as well as international support was clearly on Americas side in those early days, wouldnt it have been equally as logical to have left AQ where they were and concentrate our efforts in one region?
Finally, I am simply not sure that "Bring it on" worked as Dr. Van de Velde states, due in part that though AQs action in Iraq did show the world its brutish side, unfortunately, the World concentrated more on our early actions (albeit, by the few) showing Americas dark side in the treatment of Muslims to that same Islamic world that has forever tainted America's reputation in their eyes.