Approaching Doctrinal Training the Army Way

14 September 2010
Stay put, it was all bunk...
Just as our training centers are revamping their training programs to deal with the threat of "hybrid war", H. Lucien Gauthier reports that "hybrid war" is, in fact, bunk.

This is something I realized after committing myself to a massive writing project on the topic, due out in December. Though, to its credit, the project sought to examine whether or not there was any substance to the belief in a new, "hybrid", form of war.

According to a recent study conducted by the Government Accountability Office:

- DOD has not officially defined "hybrid warfare" at this time and has no plans to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare.
- DOD officials from the majority of organizations we visited agreed that "hybrid warfare" encompasses all elements of warfare across the spectrum. Therefore, to define hybrid warfare risks omitting key and unforeseen elements.
- DOD officials use the term "hybrid" to describe the increasing complexity of conflict that will require a highly adaptable and resilient response from U.S. forces, and not to articulate a new form of warfare.
- The term "hybrid" and hybrid-related concepts appear in DOD overarching strategic planning documents (e.g., 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report); however,"hybrid warfare" has not been incorporated into DOD doctrine.

Ken:

A thorough study/after action of the 5/2SBCT currently in Afghanistan might be an example of what is being discussed here---there was a good artcle in Ink Spot concerning problems with 5/2 SBCT and that might have in fact contributed to the recent charges of the murdering of civilians in Afghanistan by 12 members of 5/2SBCT.

<b>Anonymous at 6:33 PM:</b>

I still think it's a symptom...

Bear with me a sec. I do not think an STX at a distant location is an effective use of time, people or money -- that's a home station thing. That said, I'm not a fan of lanes, either. As I said, our third error is inadequate individual training and education -- that leads to lanes and STX -- and our penchant for donating training only exacerbates that problem. Tank units don't do gunnery as well as they used to because the Master Gunner gets overused; you donate training to any unit by outsiders (like OCs and cadre at the CTCs) and I'll guarantee you'll see most unit NCOs standing around, arms folded on their chest and doing little. That's not a flaw in those NCOs, it is a completely normal human reaction to telling the NCO he doesn't know what he's doing. That may not be the intent but that's the message sent.

NCOs today do not train as well as they used to; that too is not a flaw in kids who are a whole lot brighter than in my day. It is a reflection of the fact they are not allowed to train by a system that shoves them aside all too often. That really does not bode well for the future.

Add that problem to my first cited. Those units do not have nine years of constant warfare. Each of them goes to every rotation, every deployment with a new set of Commanders -- and many new NCOs. Almost no one will be in the same job as on their last trip to Irwin or Bagram / KAF. So we have units which have been in existence for nine years but not many who've been through two years, much less nine, of warfare. So yes, you're right -- that is the core problem. Or my second flaw...

FWIW, I agree the CTCs are not worth the expense -- FT Irwin is as a place to train but not the CTC concept IMO. However, the real problems are that our personnel system and training processes are just wrong; the CTCs are simply the obvious and very expensive symptom.

As an aside, the staged equipment kits is also not a good idea. We've done that before. Problem is the unit training doesn't own it so they 're rough on it. That causes the owner, the CTC, to get really picky about turn in and thus a hated bureaucracy arises -- and the equipment still goes down hill at three times the speed of unit owned equipment.<blockquote>"In some aspects more homestation training would better serve the BCTs and save taxpayers a massive amount of money."</blockquote>Yes. Most aspects, I'd say...

Ken:

"Rather pointing out that your superficial assessment is attacking a symptom, not the problems."

The assessment is not a sympton it is in fact the actual problem---when a BCT has a CTC rotation usually the first week is a STX lane set of drill patterns, then followed by two weeks of FSO---do you agree that it is rather strange after what nine years of constant warfighting a BCT still needs STX lane drills?

Comes from the simple fact that with virtually no loiter time at homestation little to no homestation training was occurring and the CTC rotation was mainly the first time a BCT is able to to a complete top to bottom shake down with BNs and Companies working together for the first time and many of the officers are working together for the first time as well---that is the core problem.

And the idea of shipping complete BCT equipment trains across the country just to be able to exercise a complete BCT instead of staging the equipment in place has always been a major problem---if one digs deeper they could not pre station enough BCT equipment because each BCT more or less equips itself for whatever the mission set is and a CTC would have to have three or four different staging kits to cover the different configuations.

In some aspects more homestation training would better serve the BCTs and save taxpayers a massive amount of money.

Durn...

That 12:36 Anonymous is me.

<b>Anonymous at 11:09 AM:</b><blockquote>If scenario driven training is the answer one would think that after a total of say 3-4 CTC rotations and then followed by actual field deployments all BCTs would be able to do just about any COIN scenario thrown at them--literally blindfolded.</blockquote>Any one who would think that would in fact be rather ignorant. The major flaw is failure to consider that NO scenario can equip any unit for all eventualities. The second flaw is the failure to consider the turnover in units due to our flawed personnel policies. The third error is failure to realize that our inadequate individual training and education inhibits the flexibility required.

Three ancillary concerns of lesser impact are the rather foolish rotation of units between theaters and to different areas within those two theaters; and that the scenarios used may be flawed in that, in a doomed effort to provide objectivity (plus hit time constraints or 'milestones'and end with a 'result...'), they inculcate a mindset rather than breeding flexibility. Possibly more important is the societally induced (and promotion and selection system reinforced) preference for risk averse decisions that deters delegation of authority...

I'm not a CTC fan, thus I'm not defending them. Rather pointing out that your superficial assessment is attacking a symptom, not the problems.

If scenario driven training is the answer one would think that after a total of say 3-4 CTC rotations and then followed by actual field deployments all BCTs would be able to do just about any COIN scenario thrown at them--literally blindfolded.

I am here to say ---sorry that seems to not be occurring as the resident institutional knowledge both at the soldier and Staff levels seems to get "lost" before each CTC rotation and deployment---how many times has a OC at the CTC had to say "well there is another way" and then pulls out his stack of CTAs to explain what went wrong?

With every new CTC rotation and field deployment a BCT has typically new SGTs and new Officers in new positions not previoulsy held during a rotation or deployment so it is "start all over again mode"---we should be much further along for the annual CTC budget of the what 380M plus per year? The CTC ROI is killing both the Army and the taxpayer as the training budget for the CTCs has got to be well over 1.6B in total.

Ken White: Splash, over.

<b>Morgan Sheeran:</b>

Interesting you mention Scenario based training. That was how the Army trained prior to the adoption of the industrial training model, designed to train assembly line workers to do just a few specific mind numbing task repetitively, of Task, Condition and Standards in the old BTMS and continued in SATS. The idea was and is terribly flawed for the reasons I stated above -- task integration is lacking. Additionally, while SATS acknowledges that 'Conditions' can vary widely. 'Clear a room' parameter, equipment and requirements differ from rural Viet Nam to New York to Baghdad to Shkin. Tasks learned on mild June days are difficult to apply in the dead of Afghan Winter nights at high altitudes...

Scenario based training worked.

It was virtually eliminated (though it crept back in -- it had to...) to cope with the training shortfalls that were introduced by the accession of sub-standard persons in Robert S. McNamara's "Project 100,000." That program infused the Army with unprepared recruits in the early 1970s and the Army foolishly adapted to them instead of forcing them to adapt to the Army. We essentially dumbed down the system.

Concomitant with that, also as social engineering, a combination of DOPMA and other personnel policies 'encouraged' the Army to emphasize fairness and objectivity in promotion and selections -- so the stage was set to force mediocrity on the entire Army. A minor adaptation along those lines was the elimination of the Army Training Program (ATP); a series of scenario and sequential event oriented training efforts on the theory that the ATP created peaks and valleys due to its sequential nature. That little slight of hand elided the fact that dues to our personnel rotation policies, such peaks and valleys became constant. The effort did raise the valleys -- it also cut off the peaks...

At the culmination of the ATP for a given echelon, there was an Army Training Test (ATT) wherein units were tested against scenarios to written standards -- plural and broad based -- and failures could often result in relief for cause. While it made sense that a unit be tested and its Commander prove he and tha unit could cope with combat prior to deployment, the Personnel community hated that. It created turbulence (work for them). So the ATP and ATT were eliminated in favor of the ARTEP. Reliefs for failure in training were almost eliminated. That effectively dumbed down Unit training to a level where the dumbed down individual training products could cope.

Fortunately, a lot of dedicated people transcended the poor system, ignored as much as they could, taught and did more than they were required to do and the Army coped.

A somewhat allied problem also intruded. Risk aversion. A lot of LTCs in Viet Nam discovered they had few senior NCOs and CPTS but a lot of new LTs and SGTs. They were great kids, would do anything you asked of them -- but they didn't know much. So those LTCs discovered they had to micro manage and do a lot more themselves to decrease the potential for combat errors. When they became General Officers, they continued to micro manage and continued to do too much themselves even in peacetime. They did not trust their subordinates because they <i>knew</i> they were under trained. They became risk averse and taught those subordinates to be risk averse. Add all those factors and you produce an Army that can do the rote things on which it 'trained' very well but which is inflexible and unable to cope well with unexpected situations.

That the Army has done as well as it has. given those handicaps, is a tribute to a number of people in the Army who get past all those problems. The fact that they are self inflicted problems makes the performance of the great and good even more laudable.

A professional force is saddled with a training process that is good for a mobilizing Army in event of a major war and resumption of a Draft. It should not have to constrain itself to an inadequate system.

You said:<blockquote>"Education is certainly a part of that, but effective training develops education into practiced, skillful application of concepts and methodologies resulting in actions that are responsive to various problem sets on the ground; achieving the outcomes that are required in the real world.

So, what if the tasks were based on the outcomes of utilizing methodologies to analyze and develop effective courses of action based on various problem sets on the ground, including how to recognize your particular problem sets? What would your reaction to such tasks be?"</blockquote>Great assessment and fair question. I'd say "Thank the Gods, they woke up..."

Ken White: Great point. If I get your drift, then if tasks and conditions were based on outcomes, say, like "Understand the Operational Environment," or "Conduct Decentralized Operations," that would be a significant change? What if the tasks required the application of concepts rather than, say, "insert tab 'A' into slot 'B'" type training? You could still apply a set of standards to whether or not a unit had achieved the intent of the requirement. Currently, there are few tools for a commander to use to prepare his unit. None are standardized and some are actually damaging. There are no definitions that allow a young NCO to select high-payoff training to prepare his squad for COIN operations, other than standard Soldier tasks that they will then attempt to apply in an area that requires these skills plus others that are scarcely outlined.

Scenario-based training, with the integration of previous learning into what is required to be "successful" in evaluations, was what prepared the Army to conduct the impressive operations of Desert Storm, for instance. This was not necessarily set-piece in practice, even against the vaunted OPFOR of NTC. It required reactions to unanticipated moves by the "enemy." It required skillful application of combat resources. It was based on "outcomes." It just wasn't called "Outcome-based Training."

Some call FM 3-24 "prescriptive." It is not. It describes methodologies which, when applied, lead to a decision-making process. If one applies such methodologies for, say, understanding an operational area which has very different weights on certain factors, but has no practice in doing so, one tends to struggle. We have seen this many times in Afghanistan. When the population is not merely a consideration, as in AirLand, where it may as well be an obstacle to be managed humanely and kept out of the way, then how does one first gain knowledge of it and then affect it? What happens when the center of gravity is not, for instance, the enemy's logistics, but the ability to prevent a difficult-to-detect enemy from coercing(as an example)the population at night? What happens when friendly operations include non-military actors whom you don't control but must synchronize with? What happens when you need Captains who can make decisions on the ground, but you've trained them to only go where you tell them and do what you tell them to do?

Decision-making processes can be practiced and evaluated. If they are not, and the first real practice is on the ground, you will have widespread failure and a long learning curve. Such have often been our results in Afghanistan. You will always have variations in skills applying concepts in pursuit of a desired goal or outcome. Education is certainly a part of that, but effective training develops education into practiced, skillful application of concepts and methodologies resulting in actions that are responsive to various problem sets on the ground; achieving the outcomes that are required in the real world.

So, what if the tasks were based on the outcomes of utilizing methodologies to analyze and develop effective courses of action based on various problem sets on the ground, including how to recognize your particular problem sets? What would your reaction to such tasks be?

Well stated and I agree with his broad premise; the Army does need to <u>understand</u> what Counterinsurgency is -- and how best to employ the techniques. The Doctrine does need to be refined, understood and assimilated. People and units must be better trained and able to function in the environment.

However, I do have three comments that I believe policy makers and doctrine writers should consider...

- Emphasis on consideration of all the factors of METT-TC in training and operations should be increased.

- The excessive emphasis on discrete 'Tasks' can blind one to the <u>integration</u> of those tasks in mission accomplishment.

- More importantly, Sheeran states:<blockquote>"Standardized tasks drive standardized performance. METL-driven, ARTEP-type training, with certain tasks being non-negotiable, as in AirLand, is where this begins."</blockquote>That attitude, that approach is partly responsible for our current training shortfalls and the conditions and outcomes that he ably illustrates in the article.

That has been the Army approach to training for 30 years and it is incredibly shortsighted. That approach means that if an important task is left out, not trained, the individuals and units will not be able to effectively accomplish that job. On the other hand, if too much extraneous material is included, their focus may be wrongly oriented. Further, concentration on task specificity can lead to inadequate ability to properly integrate tasks.

As we all know, people will do what they are trained to do. If they are trained to look at discrete tasks, they will do that. Contrarily, if they are trained to look at desired outcomes, they will seek to achieve those.

In warfare, few tasks are standardized. That process quoted above worked in civilian industry, from whom the method was adopted. It is poorly suited for military forces, particularly for a force that is presumed to be 'professional.'

The method produces marginal capability IF the person or unit must do something for which it may not be fully trained. It is not possible to select and adequately train people for all eventualities; rather entrants must be thoroughly trained to accomplish basic processes and procedures and as they mature, they must add the ability to train and to synchronize those basic processes for missions.

It is, I believe, imperative that we do not follow that specific advice but rather focus on outcome based training and education.