Unconventional Advisory Forces in Counterinsurgency
by Patrick James Christian
Download the Full Article: Rebuilding The Force
The United States Military strategy is in the midst of the largest disarray since the ending of the cold war with global communism in the early 1990s. US Ground forces are now split between two competing and divergent missions: Counterinsurgency Warfare and the projection of High Intensity Combat (HIC) capabilities to its potential adversaries. Even as Army and Marine brigade commanders prepare for their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, they try to retain one set of HIC skills while learning an entirely new skill-set necessary for the unconventional nature of countering insurgent warfare. Most senior conventional brigade commanders do not believe that they can do both successfully, and their use in one (COIN), renders them less than capable in the other (HIC). Finally, the sheer financial costs of breaking and rebuilding conventional force units for their (mis)use in COIN advisory missions will certainly result in decreased COIN mission performance as well as decreased levels of deterrence of the remaining political states hostile to US interests and objectives. Given the reality that our military and diplomatic forces will be tasked with operating in both the unconventional and conventional theaters of conflict for decades to come, a rebalancing of forces against these mission sets is now a stark requirement that we must accomplish sooner rather than later.
Download the Full Article: Rebuilding The Force
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick James Christian is an active duty Army Special Forces Officer who most recently deployed as a Military Transition Team (MiTT) Chief in Iraq, where he now serves as the senior advisor to the Iraqi Counterinsurgency School based in Taji. He has deployed for numerous missions in support of the global war on terror, including service in Darfur Sudan, Ethiopia, and Colombia. Additionally, LTC Christian authored a number of professional authors and co-authored Winning Damaged Hearts & Minds, with General (Retired) David Grange and Scott Swanson.
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An excellent piece by LTC Christian. I am struck by the quality we're seeing in so many of the junior and field grade officers who are being so ill-served by their leadership. This is really good news, with the bad news of course being, "What do we do about the leadership?" Ken White provides his usual outstanding input; it will take something truly remarkable to beat: "It certainly can seem "revolutionary" and is confounding to a nation and to military forces that have become egocentric, complacent in their awesome power, bureaucratic, overly centralized and hidebound," for quote of the week.
We Americans traditionally like to think of ourselves as the new kids on the block, the vibrant nation that runs rings around those old, tired Euro guys. In truth, as I look around at our dysfunctional political and military systems, the stifling bureaucracies, crappy transit systems, decaying infrastructure, etc., I see that, despite our self-image, we've become just as old and stale as those Euros we love to disparage.
Our rapid decline into old age manifests itself in our military, particularly the Army. Is there any longer a doubt that for years now, our Army has settled into a comfortable pattern that emphasizes preparing for the conflicts it WANTS to face rather than those it might HAVE TO face? In this, I'm mindful of just how hard it was for the Army to change when it was confronted with the challenge of irregular warfare, e.g., the time it took to prod the acquisition system into doing something about soldier protection, the resistance to changing tactics, etc.
Now it seems the Army has embraced COIN and the overall concept of combating irregular warfare to the point that it's decided as an institution that these are the conflicts it WANTS to face. Armor? FA? Nah, don't need them any more. Small wars is what our Army is now all about. It doesn't seems to occur to Army leadership that a reading of the political landscape and the economic crisis the nation faces virtually dictate that once we get beyond the astounding blunders we call Iraq and Afghanistan, Army maneuver elements are going to find themselves staying at home. The question then will be if the Army leadership is able to rebuild the force to the point where it will be able to credibly defend the nation in a real war, especially in an austere funding environment.
We've got a broken military system, characterized principally by generals and admirals jockeying for money and power. And it will not be fixed by an equally broken political system that emphasizes the same things. How long can the politicians and the generals/admirals continue playing the game? How much more of this can the nation afford? With a straight face, the CJCS says we should just give the military some arbitrary percentage of GDP and be done with it. Threats, world situation? That's so yesterday. This admiral has come out of the closet. "Just give us the money," he says. "We know what to do with it. Trust us. And trust us with your youth."
Will anybody pay attention to LTC Christian? Some smart people are suggesting it's time to think about halving the size of the regular army, with heavy forces moving into the reserve and NG. The once unthinkable becomes thinkable.
The probability is that our political, electoral and budgeting processes added to our unwritten 'doctrine' of building / retaining 'mobilization capability,' our current training regimen and -- in particular -- our politically driven personnel policies will impede achievement of the goals of this excellent article.
Much to agree with, this in particular:<blockquote>"We can no longer continue the negotiation of internal societal legitimacy with forces designed for protection of external legitimacy of political states. In short, where the human terrain dominates, then warrior-diplomats with complex skill sets must be allowed to work in low signature settings to help the host nation negotiate its own internal legitimacy."</blockquote>Totally correct. That requires better national level intelligence, stronger, more robustly funded diplomatic efforts with less DoD involvement as well as adequately structured and <u>properly employed</u> Special Forces units.
Not required -- initially and ideally -- are direct action SOF element and the GPF. If either of those is employed then things can be expected to go downhill rapidly. They have their uses and as Christian illustrates, they should be used properly. Both types of units do not do well in the FID or COIN assistance roles. Never have and that is unlikely to change -- nor should it.
He further states:<blockquote>"A body politic without ownership of its sovereignty will never feel the responsibility for securing it. This is also why Sovereignty can never be given to a people; they must fight for it, and more importantly, they must sacrifice for it. It is in the nature of this sacrificing that people find and accept the sovereignty of their social order and the legitimacy it contains."</blockquote>While I certainly agree, he does not address what should be done should such willingness not be shown by potential candidates for our assistance. My solution would be, in most cases, to not get involved as the potential for an acceptable outcome -- no one really 'wins' in such encounters -- is minimal. Other methods should be employed.
As an aside, I think he romanticizes the constitution, role and contribution of the Jedburgh teams. ;)
That said, LTC Christan is correct in his suggestions, however, one premise is quite suspect:<blockquote>"The development and employment of specialized teams of political proto-fighters (such as Al Qaeda¸s jihadist cells) dedicated to the conduct of challenging a state's internal organization as a military strategy does not merely constitute a revolution in military affairs, but suggests an entirely new approach to viewing human conflict and state legitimacy."</blockquote>It's not new, nor is it revolutionary -- indeed, most revolutions were fomented by such teams of political proto-fighters, including our own. It certainly can seem "revolutionary" and <u>is</u> confounding to a nation and to military forces that have become egocentric, complacent in their awesome power, bureaucratic, overly centralized and hidebound. As was also true in 1776...
Have to break that logjam and attitude to implement his ideas.