The discussion explores the Army's role in executing both combined arms maneuver to gain and retain the initiative during a conflict and wide area security which allows the Army to consolidate and capitalize on those gains. Defining ourselves against these two broad responsibilities helps break the paradigm of preparing either for Major Combat Operations (MCO) or Counterinsurgency (COIN). General Dempsey outlines the cascading effect this conceptual shift will have across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF).
In an effort to stimulate a dialogue about where our Army is headed while also educating the force on the emerging concepts that serve as a critical component of our conceptual foundation, we're posting GEN Dempsey's interview. GEN Dempsey believes this period of introspection about our profession is critically important and he welcomes your thoughts and ideas.
If we are to take the hard learned lessons of the past nine years and make our Army better and more capable, we must encourage an environment of transparency and insist on collaboration to allow us all to take ownership of this great Army. Therefore, we should always seek to discuss our profession openly and gain the perspectives of those inside AND outside our ranks. General Dempsey looks forward to a healthy dialogue on this critically important work that will guide our Army to confront the challenges of the 21st Century security environment. I invite you to view the video and provide your perspectives and insights. The videos are posted on YouTube (here and here) and embedded below.
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Horan
Chief, Commander's Planning Group
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Part 1 of 2: Gen. Dempsey Discusses a Framework for Army Adaptation. After approving the release of the Army Operating Concept 2016 - 2028, Gen. Dempsey sat down to discuss some of the critical elements outlined in the Concept while also describing how this document will serve to inform and drive institutional adaptation for our Army.
Part 2 of 2: Gen. Dempsey Discusses a Framework for Army Adaptation.
Comments
<b>Sean Gilfillan:</b>
Three quick answers...
1. It is impossible to predict what factors may be considered during the planning phases for Wide Area Security in the future. Thus there is no way to say whether we will plan to, be concerned with or be able to preempt any ability to begin an insurgency by ensuring we have adequate numbers needed to <u>assist the Host Nation in the conduct of <i>their</i> COIN effort</b></u> (see Afghanistan) or to occupy a formerly hostile nation (see Iraq) or one that was totally defeated in a major war (See Germany...). Many permutations are possible.
2. <i>If we wish</i>, the eventual existence of an insurgency might be an assumption that we will make in future planning. There is no necessity that we do so nor often is there any reason to enter a conflict where that becomes an issue. It CAN become a self-fulfilling prophecy if we aren't careful...
3. If there is a possibility that an adequate amounts of troops to conduct Wide Area Security in an occupation or FID role, then rather than a plan to quickly recruit or draft numbers to ensure a successful transition to Wide Area Security, we would be better advised to develop a Plan B and achieve our goals another way. In a democracy, recruiting is always a market proposition and a draft is time consuming -- <u>if</u> the public will accept it. Either way, the trainup and equipping time required makes such augmentation efforts inadvisable, so there will be no 'quickly.' We would likely replicate the first three years of Iraq and I hope we're not that dumb. It is generally considered unwise to assign roles and missions that forces cannot accomplish without augmentation unless that augmentation is readily available.
Not that the US is usually deterred by such considerations...
You later said:<blockquote>"My argument is based on the assumption that it takes 20 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents and this is using every single Active Duty or Reserve/Guard personnel or 1.1 million in the Army today.
x/1000 Ãâ” 20 = 1.1 million with x being the total population we could secure using a 1.1 million counterinsurgent force."</blockquote>Two problems with that. The most significant is that the 20 per 1,000 is (a) a very questionable figure perhaps wrongly included in FM 3-24, I wouldn't put too much stock in it. (b) Your 1.1M nominally available, given other Army missions and requirements, might yield a deployable or usable figure of more nearly 850K, if you hope for a two to one ratio on reset versus deployed, you can actually deploy around 300K. Length of the presumed mission dependent. Thus your formula, realistically applied means we could theoretically do 'Wide Area Security' or occupy a another nation with a population of around 15M.
Then again, if you're doing FID, 'helping' the host nation and they have, say 300K troops and police, then you've doubled your Counterinsurgent strength to 600K and might be able to handle a nation of 30M...
Since the Allies operated in south Viet Nam with well over 1.5M combat troops (plus Police, net force of about 2M) in a nation of only a bit more than that 15M and were only marginally successful, I'm not sure one can safely or should use that rule of thumb...
Every war is different. Trying to template them invites dangerous errors.
Definitely like the concept of a big hammer (combined arms maneuver) followed by a stability force (Wide Area Security) that focuses on security and building governance capacity. Sounds like they pulled a few concepts from Thomas P.M. Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map".
However, I am always curious how we decide what size force to use during Wide Area Security Operations. Obviously this was a huge issue in both OIF and OEF. Planners did an excellent job in planning for the Combined Ops pieces, but didn't plan well for Wide Area Security. Paul Bremer disbanding the Iraqi Army and the US not securing the borders in Afghanistan will go down in history as two monumental mistakes in both war plans that, had they been accounted for, would have certainly helped in preempting both insurgencies.
That said, the COIN Manual dictates that most density recommendations fall within a range of 20-25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents.
Three Quick Questions based on all of the above:
1. During the planning phases for Wide Area Security in the future, will we preempt any ability to begin an insurgency by ensuring we have adequate numbers needed to conduct COIN?
2. Is the eventual existence of an insurgency an assumption that we will make in future planning?
3. If there is the need to conduct immediate Combined Arms Maneuver, but not adequate amounts of troops to conduct Wide Area Security, is there a plan to quickly recruit or draft numbers to ensure a successful transition to Wide Area Security?
I see this as a huge politcal problem, but want to ensure any administration/congress sending the Army to war understands that we must be prepared to conduct Wide Area Security in the immediate aftermath of Combined Arms Maneuver. This has been traditionally called "Nation Building" and we've not had adequate resources to do either in Iraq or Afghanistan.
This begs the additional question, that even though we write this is our Operating Concept, can the Army, as it is currently resourced, truly conduct Wide Area Security? I would argue that unless there is an indigenous security force that we can supplement, the Army does not have the numbers to conduct Wide Area Security on any population over 55 million at the absolute most.
My argument is based on the assumption that it takes 20 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents and this is using every single Active Duty or Reserve/Guard personnel or 1.1 million in the Army today.
x/1000 x 20 = 1.1 million with x being the total population we could secure using a 1.1 million counterinsurgent force.
Thoughts everyone?
Just two coments regarding GEN Dempsey's interview on the Army's Capstone Concept and Operational Concept:
First, I totally agree that combined arms manuever in the 21st century cannot be military centric. Our Army must take into account USG interagency, as well as, foreign interagency players as multipliers in today's operating environment. However, history continues to show us that our interagency partners are not up to the task. Clearly, this has to do with resourcing, but that excuse is becoming increasingly hollow if we do not also challenge organizational cultures. I am not suggesting that there does not exist individuals in our interagency who have the same energetic perspective as the military when dealing with today's operating environment. What I am suggesting is that our interagency institutions need to go through the same conceptual process that we in the Army are doing. Our government demands this intellectual debate of our military. It must demand the same of our interagency.
Second, like GEN Dempsey, I am extremely proud to wear the Army uniform. It represents the resilience that our institution has shown in the past 10 years of war. No time in history has our military been asked to shoulder this level of sacrifice and still meet reenlistment goals regardless of the demands. The US military has earned the right to be proud of our accomplishments as an all-volunteer force of professionals in arms. My concern is that the the profession of arms is becoming increasingly alienated from society. This isn't an Army problem nor is it for DOD to solve. However, it is a national problem. We need to understand what these second and third order effects are on our society. In my mind, yellow ribbons on the back of cars aren't good enough when one considers the level of sacrifice a young soldier's family must endure each time their loved one deploys into harms way.