Comments
Generally speaking, Mcpherson is correct in his analysis. However, this article is the equivalent to producing a Cliff's note version to the material that is taught at HBS (where the author is enrolled) and expecting the subjects to be adequately addressed. The complexities and inequities surrounding promotion/selection boards merits a thesis not the cursory analysis given in the article.
However, the question that one should ask themselves after reading this article is:
Why is there not one mention of the Foreign Area Officer program?
My initial guess would be that because this article was written by a Marine and since the Marine Corps has a dual-track FAO program, many of his points remain valid. However, I fault his 'research' because his article isn't addressing only the Marine Corps career advancement problems, he aspires to address DOD-wide issues. And in this aspect he fails.
A robust DOD-wide FAO program answers the call for visionary, well-rounded leaders. But it isn't mentioned even once. Now this is not to say that the FAO program in the Navy (or the other branches) is "there" yet, but it is going in the right direction. It is taking proven, superior-performing warfare-qualified officers who have done tours in the fleet and combat and given them the educational and non-traditional exposure for which the author cries. And as a stand-alone community in the Navy, it is giving them the opportunity for promotion (again, let me emphasize this system isn't anywhere near perfect).
So many ways to go on this one.
First, I am a mid-grade Army officer. I've received good evaluations, promotions, and opportunities, so I hope no one will see the following as sour grapes. That said...
- The Army's evaluation system is broke badly. To become a general you must first get promoted, then get selected for the right job. You accomplish this by getting a "top block" (superior evaluation) in a "KD" (key developmental) position. The rest of the evaluations in your file may hurt you, but they certainly cannot make you.
Ultimately, your promotion rests on these one or two evaluations. If you are a "mini-me" version of your senior rater, you will get a good eval. If not, too bad. Oh, by the way, better hope your rater and senior rater are good writers. Your promotion depends as much on their writing skills as anything else.
This is not the best way to choose who gets promoted. Nor is it the best way to select for strategic leadership potential.
Sure, this system produced GEN Petraeus. It also produced a long line of generals who really screwed the pooch in Iraq before Petraeus put together a coherent strategy.
- The Army runs on timelines. All "broadening" assignments are subject to time availability based on (as near as I can figure) arbitrary officer development timelines contained in dated regulations.
- There is an anti-intellectual mafia in the Army composed of officers who fancy themselves "simple muddy boots" commanders, who don't like "smart guys", and who believe that the ultimate test of leadership is how fast one can run 2 miles on a physical training test.
This is why (as the author noted) Geren brought Petraeus back to sit on the promotion board - to stop the mafia from selecting more mini-mes.
- Bottom line, is that you must jump through the right hoops to get promoted. As a result, the Army is awesome at producing world-class hoop jumpers, which explains a lot...
I agree with all of the commenters above. They all make very insightful points.
Here is my two cents:
Why are potentially great soliders (not just officers) getting out of the military? The Army is a numbers game. We need to retain 100 soldiers in order to sustain our size? Ok make sure we get soldiers. I have seen officers with literally next to nothing on their OERs get promoted to CPT (O-3) after three years of service because they meet the time in service requirement. The same principal can be applied to the promotion between CPT and MAJ. The military does not reward achievement nearly as much as time in service. One of the biggest reasons urging me towards leaving the service was the aforementioned promotion policy. I got promoted to the same rank at the same time with people who were doing half the workload and possessed half my mental capacity. Why would any young bright minded American value or feel loyalty to a system that does not value or show loyalty to them?
The author has a valid point, many general officers succeed despite the system. It would be interesting to run something long term like Moskos was doing to track mid-grade career track to generals and see how/why they made it. The Army likes to promote those like themselves, not those with off the beaten path assignments. A lot of commanders won't sign off on special jobs, or actively campaign against them. As long as command at all levels is required as the key to moving up, expect the majority to be from that track. Either with a Godfather watching them, or friends, or sometimes just hard work and being in the right line at the right time. I like the article, but there is much more to be investigated, as the Army has done in fits and starts for the last 30-40 years.
As long as you have posts at Fort Bliss, Fort Polk, or Twentynine Palms, and the ability for Soldiers to leave the military and go to Harvard Business School, you are going to have people leave the military.
You add in two wars, significant number of deployments, and the ability to cash in your experience in the civilian world, and you are going to find a lot of people unwilling to stick around. The author of the op-ed addresses it briefly, but it's a tad disingenuous to act all, why aren't we having more visionary commanders?!, when he left the military after one tour. That doesn't make him bad, but sauce for the goose, buddy.
The military will always have to cope with this, and sweeten the pot of those who stick around. God love 'em.
Davidbfpo is of course correct, it is not a new problem. Nor is there any probable solution. For that matter, I'm not at all sure it is a 'problem.'
Mr. MacPherson indicates they interviewed a number of senior Officers, at least one of whom was surprised that he had survived the selection processes to attain the rank he held. I've known several who said as much. Essentially, the system works and, aside from the sheer size of the population with which it must deal, it has really only three minor flaws.
- It is forced, by law and Congressional pressure to be 'objective' and 'fair.' Aside from the obvious comment that anything involving humans must have some subjectivity applied and war is not fair it is rather silly to be over insistent on those parameters. They are desirable criteria and really fail only in the application of excessive zeal. That excess in effect means our efforts to be 'fair' in officer and command selection force an unintended degree of unfairness on the Nation and on other members of the Armed Forces.
- It is designed by, operated by and deals with people who reflect the society from which they come. If that society is risk averse, if it is essentially conventional and tends to discourage mavericks, then our selection system will adopt -- has adopted -- those traits...
- The system, as is true in other aspects, is designed more for ease of administration, conformance with law and ability to provide clarity to Political oversight than it is to produce the best, most intuitive Commanders.
The Article posits advanced education and interesting assignments as necessary or at least highly desirable for those destined for high command. I'm unsure that is correct. I am sure that it is not possible, the sheer size of the force; the availability of such assignments, minor wars and deployments as well as individual proclivities will intrude as they always have.
As David noted, most British General Officers in WW II tended to "disappear" to be replaced by a rising crew of combat performers and the tendency of good senior commanders to relieve marginally competent Officers and NonCommissioned Officers. The same can be said of the US Army in that war. The trend since then has been to discourage reliefs or failure to select due to marginal competence due to the two factors cited above. DOPMA was as much a product of the Personnel community attempting to forestall another slew of reliefs of Commanders as practiced by GEN William E. DePuy and a few others in Viet Nam as it was of Congressional pressures...
Given our democratric society and civilian political control, those constraints will disappear only when we <i>really</i> need them to do so; mere desirability is not enough. In the interim, a few will succeed in spite of the systemic flaws. Most selected will be adequate or better if not inspiring and the mix of subordinates will allow adequate if not stellar performance for most units most of the time.
Nice, short article and I am sure this is not a new problem. How external actors respond is critical, like the cited example of the Secretary for the Army and not the internal response.
I know there are two authors who have written on the British Imperial Army in WW2, along similar lines; one refers to only seven generals surviving the entire war period, all the others disappearing, sorry retiring or into remote posts.