Our initial meetings feature a variety of senior civilian and military officials representing State, USAID, ISAF, RC-South, and Task Force Raider. Our discussions go quickly to the issues at hand: are we winning? If so, why? How is the civ-mil collaboration working?
The general consensus from those on the ground is that we are making progress in security and the population is responding, especially in the south. The story here sounds pretty close to the COIN manual. The extra forces and more dismounted approach are improving the security environment in the areas that used to be dangerous. Areas in Helmand and Kandahar that used to be Taliban strongholds have been cleared or will be, and the rapid follow up efforts show results with the population. Additional staff and resources are generating a lot more activity in the political and economic areas. These approaches are particularly effective in areas where the civ-mil team is closely integrated and strikes the right balance between stabilization, reconstruction, and development (not all do). There is measurable progress in capacity building in some areas.
Several US officials dismissed US and western media reporting on the war, noting that the media reports on violence and controversy rather than understanding operational effects. The US offensive is fueling more violence in the short term as the Taliban resist the clear operations with both fighting and information operations. Public access and activity is seen as an indicator of diminished Taliban intimidation (one officer noted "you see more kits flying in Kandahar city every day") and therefore political progress (a leading indicator). Reduction in violence will tend to be a trailing indicator. This matches the Iraq surge effects many of them saw firsthand in the 2007-2008 time frame.
That said, not all is well, particularly at the national and provincial political levels. There is broad skepticism about the Afghanistan government in both its capacity and integrity. Key power brokers and government figures like the Karzai brothers and Gul Aga Sherzai (and many others) are masters at manipulation for political and personal gain, at the expense of political progress. They cultivate and reward allies, vacuum up US reconstruction dollars through affiliated companies, look the other way at shake downs and intimidation, and profit off other licit and elicit activities. Rarely are they —to expend political capital for long term progress or to do the right thing. Governing capacity and legitimacy remains poor, particularly in the provinces and municipalities, and the central government control hinders efforts by ineffectively controlling them and blocking progress.
What is most clearly lacking is the same thing I saw in 2009 on my last visit: leverage with national and provincial officials over key issues such as corruption and management. How can we get these guys to clean up?
Next stop: Kandahar and Helmand to see how civil-military integration is working at the regional platforms, Task Forces, PRTs and DSTs.
SWJ Editors' Note: Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and "soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Comments
Hannah --
Good to hear from you! I actually find two types of common opinions on the ground. The first is "Standard VIP Power Point Briefing on Why We are Winning" and the second is "Let me bitch and moan about how we have no strategy and are getting conned by the Afghans." I think you learn to spot those pretty fast, try to get a read on your briefer, and ask questions. You also rely on relationships with enough of a track record to inspire some candor.
And the larger point is true: what we have is thousands of people each with a slightly different perspective on a complex system. Nobody can tell you for sure what is really going on. So you gather different perspectives and put them in context based on your own experience and schema, try not to be too prejudicial, and make a judgment. Anyone who thinks it is more scientific than that is fooling themselves.
Nick
Hi Nick,
I appreciate your effort to maintain balance in this general assessment.
As I see it, a key barrier in this effort is the fact that many, if not most, of the people on the ground have a stake in identifying progress.
As we all know, and as your piece suggests but doesn't quite say outright, reports of progress typically cite superficial indicators without addressing more fundamental structural and political problems.
So, that leaves you and other analysts in a bind, which will not be undone, no matter how many posts you visit in Afghanistan.
Joshua --
Stay tuned -- this was an overview and typical of the broad assessments you tend to get in Kabul. More specifics will come from our meetings in RC-S and RC-SW.
Also, I think you took too positive a spin on the report. There are major concerns about whether this strategy will work (leaving aside whether it is even the right strategy). The two biggest in my view are the relatively passive approach we are taking toward the big corrupt power brokers like Sherzai and AWK who have so much power and influence.
The other question is that more troops does equal more security but government and legitimacy remains negligible in much of the country. Without capacity and legitimacy, any security will remain dependent on a US military presence.
And the media doesn't suck, they are partners in our democracy. Their objective is to report accurately on an interesting story. And they do it well. The point I was making about violence being a trailing indicator and political progress as a leading indicator is one that isn't always obvious in media reports.
I hate to do my eyore thing here, but I'm scratching my head trying to find something concrete and not buzzword-y in this. We're achieving progress, generating effects, and we're particularly effective at it? Oh yeah and the media sucks?
I dunno. Nick, can you be more specific about how we know these things are happening and what measures we use to justify saying they are?