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Bill,

I drew a very favorable impression of ADM Willard when working with him in his previous job; what I worry about is the box that is drawn for him in DC.

During QDR I was privy to briefs by our intel/strategy experts that draw that box, and I frankly felt they were out of touch with reality and trying too hard to make similar looking situations fit into the same neat box.

This is way bigger than just PACOM. Marshall warned against "Theateritis" and certainly our GCC construct contributes to theateritis. On that topic, this from a paper Dr. John Gaddis wrote on Grand Strategy:

"Some of you may remember how often General George C. Marshall, arguably the greatest of modern American grand strategists, complained about what he called "theateritis" - the tendency of military commanders to look only at the needs of their own theater of operation, and not at the requirements of fighting the war as a whole. The best illustration of this was a Herblock cartoon from the Korean War. It showed General Douglas MacArthur - often a cause of General Marshalls anxieties - planning military operations on a square globe, with only the Asian mainland visible at the top of it. A nervous Washington official is reminding him: "Weve been using more of a roundish one here lately, sir."

I think the "Washington officials" have found some of those old square globes....just make sure your PACOM brothers are breaking out the "roundish ones" from time to time...

Bob,

I agree that we need a holistic paradigm shift (not just China, but globally) that perhaps redefines our national interests, and our strategy for achieving those ends. I believe the current leadership in PACOM is trying to do that.

This link contains an article or blog post titled the "PACOM China Group", that does a fair job at describing that approach (you have to page down until you get to it):

http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring021110.html

ADM Willard formed strategic focus groups to help inform his decision making at the strategic level. You can google it, there are a few articles on his approach. An excerpt from the artile at the link is helpful in explaining:

"the groups are part of a coordinated interagency effort that will work with the Pentagon, State Department and other agencies. "The mission of each special focus group is to advance strategic understanding, informing development of strategic guidance from the commander," she said. "The goal is to inform Pacom's continued efforts to build a comprehensive understanding of the security environment, working with U.S. government agencies, allies, partners and other combatant commands," "

I think that one of DOD's roles as part of the whole of government is responsible for evaluating the potential military threat China poses and ensuring we're postured "appropriately" to deter or respond to it. The threat in 2010 is much different than the threat even 15 years ago, and unfortunately China is using its military power aggressively to exert control over large and strategic geographical areas as noted in the article that the SWJ editors posted. Economic competition is one thing, and China is very competitive economically in the Pacific region (and beyond), but using the lightly veiled threat of force to achieve their goals is exactly what PACOM should be postured to deter in my opinion. That isn't old school thinking, that is simply being pragmatic.

We are definitely overdue for a major overhaul of how the PACOM AOR fits into our overall strategy as a nation.

Prior to GWOT it was too rooted to Cold War notions and positions; and during GWOT we chased Islamist boogiemen in a manner that cost us influence at the same time that China was flexing its growing economic strength to expand its influence.

My eye-ball assessment of the PACOM AOR is that over the past 10 years there has been a significant net change of relative influence in the region between China and the US; and that US conventional capabilities are still overly obsessed over what the mission was in 1980 rather than what the mission should be for 2010 and forward.

Much of our future success as a nation balances on how we approach this region of the world, and the fact that China will be a part of that future is inescapable. Efforts to apply a containment strategy to China are IMO misguided and counterproductive. I suspect that China's internal issues will put a far more effective check on their rise than anything we could muster anyway. We should shift our focus to one of competition rather than containment.

How do we outcomptete China for influence with the people and governments of the region?

How do we work with the Chinese to ensure that major security issues do not grow to disrupt the economies of the region?

How do we promote and support the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination that are so vibrant within these (relatively) recently liberated nations from the yoke of Western colonialism?

We need to pause and think about this, as our old concerns are dated, and our current concerns are inflated. We need to create a fresh perspective and then craft the policies and capabilities that enable our pursuit of the same.

For Bill M - reference China its own version of irregular/unconventional warfare; they call it _Unrestricted Warfare_ and 2 PLA Colonels published it in 1999. It is available commercially and I think there are translations on the web as well. But I think it is a pretty good blueprint for a Chinese strategy.

SWJ Editors,

Thank you for posting this article, it serves as a reminder to those who have simply wished away the potential for a conflict between states, and constantly demand that we convert the military into what they call a COIN force. Larger threats to our national interests exist than pockets of instability as this article clearly pointed out.

I suspect that China will employ its own version of irregular / unconventional warfare to leverage more influence in the world in addition to developing their strategic weapons, increasing the size and capability of their Naval forces, while downsizing and professionalizing their ground forces.

As ADM Willard stated, the threats we faced in 1985 differ from those we are presented now in 2010. It is time to move beyond the narrow focus on COIN and develop the concepts of irregular warfare for the 21st century, while simultaneously still maintaining adequate general purpose forces to serve as a deterent to emerging powers who will push as far as they can with their military forces to obtain their objectives.

We're being tested now, and now is the time to send the right message about our national defense capabilities, and in my view it isn't surging more conventional forces into every country in the globe that is experiencing instability.

It is always interesting to read about senior level military individuals such as Admiral Willard and their views, who by the way is listed in the credits at the end of the movie "Top Gun."

Maybe SWJ will revisit the position of CINPAC in ten years, and perhaps Ill be around to read such, when we find though the PLAN may not be as large as our forces, they may possess a competitive edge in competitive technological capabilities, and modernization, thereby raising the ante to American actions in ways that could result in damage to American security/economic interests as well as decrease our ability to exercise international leadership.

Absent an appropriate level of American investment in its naval combat capabilities, and by the year 2020, the PLAN may be able to exercise increasing control over the Pacific.

If I am correct on my target date of 2020,it would be interesting to see if we still view our CINPAC as the most powerful military man in the world?