My visit to Kandahar is leg one of a two part trip that will also include RC (SW) and Helmand. The purpose of this southern swing is to see how civ-mil relations are up and down the chain of command... From Kabul/ISAF/IJC to the Regional Commands to the Task Forces to the PRTs and DSTs. Effective civ-mil coordination is a key part of the work we do and a critical tenant of COIN. As part of the civilian uplift, State and AID had now sought to parallel the military structure with civilian counterparts at the Regional Command, Task Force, and Battalion level. Was it working?
My going in position was that Regional Command (South) at Kandahar Air Field would likely be a model of success because of my familiarity with and respect for the Regional Platform leadership -- Senior Civilian Rep Henry Ensher, CoS Rob Tillery, and USAID Development Advisor Tom Baltazar. This is an all-star team of experienced Afghanistan and civil-miltary coordination talent. I expected the rest of RC (S) to be jumping on Oprah's couch proclaiming their love for their regional platform and the new alignment of civilian and military structures.
Alas, things are never quite so simple. Complication #1: RC (S) is a NATO HQ, not a US HQ. ISAF RC (S) Commander, MG Carter (a Brit) no doubt appreciates the US regional platform but that is not his chain of command. And his existing stability operations section has been working these issues since the infant days of the platform. Complication #2: the role of the regional platform as a regional coordinator of multiple provinces doesn't work because so much of the RC (S) focus is on Kandahar — the mandate of the PRT. This is bound to lead to some tugs between the platform and the PRT. And if that were not enough, Complication #3 is that the civilian staffs themselves are not really integrated. USAID and its implementing partners may listen to their State colleagues but they ultimately still have authority over their own programs.
Not that there are major issues here — by all accounts folks are working together in constructive and practical ways. But the staffs have clear differences and are not integrated. This is may improve when 10th Mountain gets settled in. The 10th Mountain CO MG Terry is fully switched on to importance of civ-mil integration. My suggestion to all involved is to integrate the platform and stability operations staffs into one relatively seamless unit and for 10th Mountain to fully embrace the SCR as the political and economic lead on the team.
The situation at RC (SW), in Helmand province is perhaps even more complex. Here again, the Regional Command had an overwhelming interest in just one province -- Helmand. The Helmand PRT, under British leadership, was well staffed and independent. Furthermore, under agreements made in Kabul, the Helmand PRT Team Leader is also the ISAF Senior Civilian Representative — bypasing the US chain of command. This has led to considerable tension between the US contingent at Camp Leatherneck and the heavily civilian British led PRT in Lashkar Gah. The good news is that the new leadership at both the Regional Platform and the PRT are working closely to improve relations and collaboration.
Leatherneck also had three different organizations competing for leadership of civil issues — the still forming Regional Platform, the RC (S)/I MEF C-9, and the 1st Marine Division CMO. The professionals in all these organizations are working hard to make this work but it is just that... Work. Plus there is a missed opportunity here to integrate and streamline these staffs under the SCR, reduce coordination friction, and push more CMO resources out into the field.
Closing point on the civ-mil issues. A common civ-mil refrain we have heard is the effective cooperation is "personality dependent." We heard this at every level of command, including in the assessment of how each DST was performing. Personalities that succeed tend to be those that think more about the team and less about turf, more about consensus and less about being right, more about demonstrating value to their counterpart rather than judging the value of their counterpart. However, I would argue that "personality dependent" is also a sign that there may be some room for organizational improvement.
If an organization has a clear mission, clear lanes and lines of authority, and most importantly the right standard operating procedures for decision-making and action, personality matters a lot less. A flight crew of a 747 can usually taxi, take off, fly, navigate, approach, land, and taxi from one crowded airspace to another without either crashing or having a fight among the crew. Success here is not usually personality dependent! Why is that? Neurosurgery is pretty complicated business involving a team of different specialists and nurses yet we don't think of success as personality dependent. The same is true for a ballet, or a battalion staff. Organizations with clear processes and procedures for decisions and action, and experience/training in exercising those decisions and actions, will function with much less dependence on personality. What this means is it is important for civilian and military leaders in Kabul and at the platforms to more carefully define lanes and procedures for joint planning and decision-making, and then to push those staff processes hard in the pre-deployment training. This will do more than simply preaching peace, love and understanding — though the right attitude certainly helps as well.
SWJ Editors' Note: Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and "soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Comments
Mr. Jones:
Damn, I'm definitely going to have to fire my fact checker/proof reader (that would be me). Yes KAF is south of Kandahar City, not north. Thanks for fixing that. As for it not being in a desert, my defense is that it LOOKS like a desert -- a expansive brown sandy wasteland that is a dead ringer for the National Training Center (smack in the Mojave desert). But I will defer to the soil and climate experts on what is and is not a desert, irrigation or not.
Regarding MG Carter, I specifically say he DOES appreciate civilians and that his stability operations unit has been working these issues hard. Not sure where you got any implication otherwise. The point here is you have pretty good personalities and it still isn't integrated due to the different C2 chains and the evolution of the regional platform. Similarly, I came away awed by the work MG Mills and his team are doing in Helmand. More on that in an upcoming post. And I agree with most of the last paragraph. More on that as well.
As for the slight on being a VIP looking through a windshield, you are correct that nobody should be taking up time of staffs doing tourism in Afghanistan. There should be a clear need, you should rely on what the professionals in the field tell you, and you should bring those lessons back to your part of the fight. That is exactly why we were there. I would note that our visit was not mandated by Washington, both RC (S) and RC (SW) invited us because they recognize the importance of our work. And we are deeply appreciative of their taking valuable time to talk with us.
For Georgetown student:
I see the following specific changes:
1) more civilians across the board. In Spring 2009, there were just very few civilians in the field
2) the regional platforms and DSTs are the two new structures and they make sense in principle -- aligning civilian commands at each echelon.
3) in practice, the RPs may have added some short term friction as the Division staffs and RPs both vie for control and relevance. It is essential that gets worked out and we don't have dueling power point staffs. The DSTs seem to be jumping in the fray nicely and often partnering well with CA teams and BNS.
4) with regard to SOPs/staff processes, I'd point to a few examples: the Iraq model of a Joint Common Plan, integrated working groups chaired by civilians, co-location of staffs and offices, and a clear process for collective approval of project spending. An integrated team that has access to all the tools in the tool kit is preferred to each group spending "their" money on "their" priorities. I hear your point about fluidity but I think a good staff process will help, not hurt in those cases.
Wow. These drive-by VIP visits are probably as dangerous in windshield,snapshot perspectives that the visitors take away as they are burdensome in the weight of 3-5 of these a day being dumped on the RC Commander and staff to have to entertain.
(Yes, small point up front about Tim Hortons being Canadian lifeblood, rather than British - they still prefer a good brew of tea; and that KAF is SOUTH of Kandahar City, and this is hardly desert, but some of the most fertile ground outside the San Joaquin valley when similarly irregated...)
I know most of leaders whose names are dropped here. To imply that General Nick is not focused on civ-mil integration is borderline slanderous. I worked with him closely for 5 months, and am a fan. I also got to spend some time with MG Mills during his site survey and was very favorably impressed with him as well. He will probably find, as MG Carter has, that getting things accomplished in this crazy mix of ISAF C2 structures in support of an illegitimate GIORA and their hand-picked and equally illegitimate Provincial and District Governors is a challenge. And that is before the Taliban even punch in for work.
There is much hope being dumped on development to somehow resolve this insurgency; and its one with little basis in historical fact or sound theory. This is a two tier insurgency, the lower tier that RC S and RC SW hammer away at daily is a Resistance movement, that fights because we are there more than any other reason. We cannot "defeat" the insurgency by attacking the bottom, be it with development, security or governance. So please, carry this message back from your trip as well. Success will come when we shift our focus to addressing the issues driving the top tier of this insurgency, the Revolutionary movement. This is driven by the illegitimacy of the Karzai regime, and enabled by an abortion of a constitution, and protected by ISAF.
<b>Nick Dowling:</b>
The arrogance comment was based not on your post but the generic US arrogance in the treatment of Canada, indeed most other nations. We're all sometimes guilty of that, even innocent moi...<blockquote>"I'm asking why these complex team oriented tasks are not usually considered personality dependent. And Ken correctly answers the question: they are process oriented. That's exactly my point. Clearer civ-mil staff process will reduce the personality dependency."</blockquote>You elide two specific points and two implied points in my post above. One specific; "<i>small, specially selected and generally well trained and highly motivated teams who are obliged to cooperate on intense, focused operational endeavors only for relatively short periods of time.</i>" Military teams do not universally possess any of those traits; large amorphous, marginally trained and of varying motivation and a long, long slog is the norm. Quite a difference.
The implied factors were, first, that the current warfighting environment has a number of other players, allied nations, host nation government and population and various opposition groups which all impact on the operational effort. The sheer number of those have massive impacts not present in any of your other examples -- or most fields of endeavor. IOW, it's a people, not a process thing.
Secondly, the "<i>live together without undue friction</i>" and "<i>boring at times</i>" aspects call for leadership -- not a requirement in your corollaries. That leadership is imperative in cutting through excessively process oriented bureaucracies to achieve goals over a long period of time. That is particularly true in a combat environment where your opponent can rain all over your processes...
Fortunately, 747 crews, surgical teams and Corps de Ballet not only do not have a massive, stultifying bureaucracy to transcend, they rarely have opponents. Those two factors make a monumental difference.
The second specific and the most important was this: "<i>Personality matters. <b>So, even more, do competence and continuity. The US approach insures the latter two aspects are quite significantly diluted</b>...</i>" (emphasis added /kw) Thus your comment:<blockquote>"Finally, my intent was not to dismiss the role of personality. I note quite clearly that adaptive team oriented attitudes are essential. But the adoption of effective civ-mil staff processes have consistently proven to be effective in improving coordination."</blockquote> is both facile and correct -- but in the lack of good or better competence and some continuity, personality becomes more important than it should in making any processes work effectively. I suspect if you check, in those instances where that effective coordination occurred, there were personalities involved.
Mr. Dowling,
Based on your experience so far during this trip and your last trip to Afghanistan, what has been the good and bad moves towards civ-mil coordination? Additionally what points would you advise on establishing a framework based less on personality and more on actual SOPs when the situation can be so fluid and thus make SOPs almost obstructive to adapting to the actual situation on the ground?
Correction: Tim Horton's and Canadians. Aren't you all part of the Commonwealth? :) Not sure how stupidity equals arrogance but my apologies to my Canadian friends.
As for Ken's comments disputing the merit of adopting processes to civil-military coordination, I think he actually underscores my point in his argument. I'm not saying piloting, surgery, ballet, and battalion staff work are all the same types of activities; I'm asking why these complex team oriented tasks are not usually considered personality dependent. And Ken correctly answers the question: they are process oriented. That's exactly my point. Clearer civ-mil staff process will reduce the personality dependency.
Finally, my intent was not to dismiss the role of personality. I note quite clearly that adaptive team oriented attitudes are essential. But the adoption of effective civ-mil staff processes have consistently proven to be effective in improving coordination.
That's correct, <b>Jon</b> and my apologies to the Canadians for another example of US arrogance and ignorance. That error, however is fairly minor and it's only one of his erroneous statements.
Here's one that, though not exactly erroneous, displays a lack of knowledge or thought:<blockquote>"A flight crew of a 747 can usually taxi, take off, fly, navigate, approach, land, and taxi from one crowded airspace to another without either crashing or having a fight among the crew. Success here is not usually personality dependent! Why is that? Neurosurgery is pretty complicated business involving a team of different specialists and nurses yet we dont think of success as personality dependent. The same is true for a ballet, or a battalion staff. Organizations with clear processes and procedures for decisions and action, and experience/training in exercising those decisions and actions, will function with much less dependence on personality."</blockquote>"That" is because the 747 is a mechanical object and much of what it does is automated relying upon processes. Even Neurosurgery is process oriented. Both those things involve essentially adapting processes to if not benign then generally not hostile environments to achieve rather focused results. Both also are operative with small, specially selected and generally well trained and highly motivated teams who are obliged to cooperate on intense, focused operational endeavors only for relatively short periods of time.
Warfare, OTOH, involves convincing a number of tenditious humans of varying capabilities, attitudes and levels of training to operate and live together without undue friction in a quite hostile and volatile yet tediously boring at times and far from mechanically or process oriented environment over an extended period while unfriendly people are constantly engaged in trying to kill you.
Personality matters. So, even more, do competence and continuity. The US approach insures the latter two aspects are quite significantly diluted. That makes the former even more important...